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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Today, information technology (IT) permeates organizations: it supports key business proc-
esses and even forms part of many organizations’ products. Without IT, many companies 
would not exist. Accounting for expenses of up to 10% of revenues, IT is a significant cost 
factor, too. However, beyond its criticality in operational processes and representing a cost 
burden, also IT’s strategic role is recognized among companies according to numerous press 
reports. For example, even after the dot-com bubble burst, companies like Wal-Mart, Metro, 
and Procter & Gamble invest huge amounts of money to explore the impact of Radio-
Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, with the intention of fundamentally changing the 
integration of supply-chains as well as the whole shopping process (Birchall 2007; Blau 
2006). In the so-called Web 2.0 era, we find companies like Toyota and Adidas experimenting 
with Second-Life, the Internet-based virtual community platform, scrutinizing it as a potential 
new distribution channel (Harkin 2006). At the same time, HMV, the book and music retailer, 
is feeling the competitive pressure of online rivals who are selling music through digital chan-
nels (Braithwaite 2007). In addition, IT vendors do not cease to sell new concepts such as 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) as the “new silver bullet” for increasing business flexi-
bility while reducing IT complexity (Cane 2007). The list of recent news items on potentially 
strategic impacts of information technology could be extended much further. Management 
consulting companies, including such firms as McKinsey & Company, The Boston Consult-
ing Group or A.T. Kearney, react to these strategic IT challenges by founding or strengthen-
ing practices dedicated to giving advice on strategic IT planning (Prehl 2005). This ‘renais-
sance’ is documented in recent publications on strategic IT planning by consultants (Buchta et 
al. 2004; Craig and Tinaikar 2006). 
In fact, – and despite assertions that “IT doesn’t matter [strategically]” (Carr 2003) – the stra-
tegic planning of IT is what it has been for many years: a top concern to managers. It has sus-
tained its position beyond any technological hype so far. In brief, strategic IT planning (SIP) 
remains a “key issue” in practice. 
Academics have researched strategic IT planning for more than 20 years now and continue to 
do so. Their efforts have dwelled on the strategic IT planning process (how to conduct strate-
gic IT planning?) as well as on selected strategic impacts of IT, especially competitive advan-
tage (how can IT contribute to these impacts?). They have dedicated much less energy to in-
formation strategy itself. Information strategy is the output of the strategic IT planning proc-
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ess; its implementation is intended to create strategic impacts. Hence, it links the process and 
the impacts. 
There is surprisingly little consensus on what information strategy is and what its constituting 
elements are (its content). In other words, we have limited insights on information strategy. A 
plethora of related terms is used and the information strategy construct is found in central 
frameworks such as the “Strategic Alignment Model” (Henderson and Venkatraman 1993). 
However, the diverse extant proposals for the content elements of information strategy – stra-
tegic IT decisions – often lack grounding in practice. In addition, although they might be in-
tuitively appealing, they fall short of convincing reasoning. What is needed is a proposal for 
information strategy that is both reasoned and practically relevant. 
A number of challenges arise from this deficit. First, the lack of clarity regarding the informa-
tion strategy concept and content casts doubt on research results on the process; at least it 
hampers further research in this field. Second, missing out on an overall understanding of the 
concept hampers the development of theories that make use of information strategy. Research 
works on SIP today are difficult to compare and readers of these works have to reconstruct the 
meaning laboriously. Third, with a view towards the prominence of information strategy in 
practice, the current state of research is likely to hamper the transition of findings into prac-
tice. The result is an increased gap between research and practice. In order to avoid or counter 
such a gap, a better understanding of the information strategy seems warranted. 
This thesis addresses the deficit by making a practically relevant and theoretically reasoned 
proposal for information strategy content. It does so by reconstructing the content of informa-
tion strategy from literature and by eliciting information strategy content from practice. The 
results from literature are filtered according to their relevance in practice and the results from 
practice are filtered according to theoretical backing. On this basis, the thesis proposes rea-
soned content elements of information strategy (strategic IT decisions). The result of the the-
sis may be used by further research e.g. when operationalizing an information strategy con-
struct in terms of a measurement instrument so that it can be used in theories on information 
strategy. Practitioners may find the result helpful for cautiously using it as checklist for build-
ing new or examining existing information strategies. 
1.1 STRATEGY AND INFORMATION STRATEGY 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is certainly helpful to clarify what is meant by “strategy”. To 
this end, we briefly refer to the nature of strategy in management studies, which serves as a 
basis for our understanding of information strategy.  
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1.1.1 Strategy in management studies 
Questions such as ‘What is strategy?’ (e.g. Mintzberg 1987; Porter 1996; Whittington 2000) 
or ‘What constitutes a strategy?’ (e.g. Fahey and Christensen 1986; Hambrick and 
Fredrickson 2001) are actively discussed in strategic management literature. Researchers still 
criticize the lack of clarity surrounding the strategy concept and its content in this field of 
research. For example, Hambrick and Fredrickson (2001) bemoan that “We now have five-
forces analysis, core competencies, hypercompetition, the resource-based view of the firm, 
value chains, and a host of other […] analysis tools. Missing, however, has been any guidance 
as to what the product of these tools should be – or what actually constitutes a strategy.” 
Markides (1999, p. 6) also cites the dilemma that “despite the obvious importance of strategy 
and despite decades of academic research on the subject, there is surprisingly little agreement 
on what a strategy really is […].” 
However, there are active discussions on these fundamental issues. Attempts to find answers 
to the questions “What differentiates strategic decisions from non-strategic ones?”1 or “What 
are the characteristics of strategic decisions?” have been made since the advent of the strategy 
concept (e.g. Ansoff 1965) and are ongoing (Grant 2005). In the same vein, Hickson et al. 
(1990, pp. 27) pose the question “What makes strategic decisions strategic?” They answer it 
by stating that “a strategic decision is one in which those who are involved believe will play a 
bigger rather than a smaller part in shaping what happens for a long while afterwards” (em-
phasis added). Other authors have proposed additional characteristics of strategic decisions, 
including their expected impact on long-term firm performance, their irreversibility, their di-
rectional nature, which provides guidance vis-à-vis lesser decisions as well as their corporate-
wide impact (Ackoff 1970, pp. 5; Ansoff 1965, pp.3, pp.9; Grant 2005, pp.14; Hickson et al. 
1990, pp.27; Johnson et al. 2005, pp.6; Wheelen and Hunger 2006, p.20). 
Other works relate strategy directly to organizational hierarchy. They give a number of exam-
ples for strategic decisions at the corporate, business unit, and functional levels. For example, 
on the corporate level, finding an answer to the question “What businesses should the corpo-
ration be in?” (Porter 1987, p.43) as well as determining the level of synergies between these 
businesses are seen as major concerns (Bowman and Helfat 2001, p. 1; Collis and Montgom-
ery 1999, p. 1; Grant 2005, pp. 22; Hofer and Schendel 1978; Vancil and Lorange 1975). The 
central strategic decision on the business unit level is how to succeed in product-market seg-
                                                 
1
 Different authors assign different names to non-strategic decisions. Johnson et al. (2005) distinguish between 
strategic and operational decisions, Ackoff (1970) between strategic and tactical decisions, and Ansoff (1965) 
between strategic, administrative, and operational decisions. 
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ments – especially by gaining a competitive advantage there (Bowman and Helfat 2001, p. 1; 
Grant 2005, pp. 22; Hofer and Schendel 1978, p. 28). Hence, it is also referred to as competi-
tive strategy (Porter 1987, p. 43). Finally, functional strategy is said to be primarily concerned 
with the allocation of resources in order to achieve the “maximization of resource productiv-
ity” (Hofer and Schendel 1978, p.29; cf. also Wheelen and Hunger 1986). 
A major debate has centered on whether such a strategy is construed ex-ante (i.e. through 
planning) or ex-post (i.e. in an emergent way). In this thesis, we assume the perspective of a 
deliberate strategy. We acknowledge that certain decisions might not be planned and still have 
a substantial impact on firm performance. But it does not follow from this that making deci-
sions deliberately is not valuable. On the contrary, total adherence to the emergent view of 
strategy ultimately leads to an abdication of top management’s role and puts the fate of the 
company into the hands of serendipity and geniuses. As long as we are in short supply of gen-
iuses, we should try to concentrate on what can be influenced deliberately. 
1.1.2 Information strategy  
Explicit discussions similar to those outlined above for business strategy are rarely found for 
information strategy. As a result, the information strategy concept is still characterized by a 
huge degree of obscurity. In the existing proposals, we often find implicit and differing views 
of information strategy. Hayward (1987, p. 100) noted this early on by stating that “Almost all 
publications dealing with information systems assume some form of [information] strategy 
yet rarely is this strategy […] explicitly stated” (Hayward 1987, p. 100). This scenario has not 
changed significantly since then. The plethora and use of various terms is one indication for 
this: “The problem of terminology is one of the fundamental issues facing those wishing to 
develop an information strategy. […] there is a proliferation of terminology and a great deal 
of ambiguity surrounding its use” (Allen and Wilson 1996, p. 240). Commonly found terms 
include “strategic information plan” (Lederer and Salmela 1996), “IT strategy” (Gottschalk 
1999a), “IS strategy” (Galliers 1991), “IS/IT strategy” (Chan et al. 1998), and “information 
strategy” (Smits et al. 1997).  
We opt for the latter term because the other terms imply a too narrow meaning: information 
technology encompasses all kinds of devices and equipment that can be used for handling 
information. This includes hardware (such as computers or printers) and basic software (such 
as operating systems or database management systems) as well as communication equipment 
(network cabling, routers, etc.). IT is independent from solving a specific business problem; 
rather it can be used to solve a range of business problems (Teubner 2003). IT has to be ap-
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plied (in the form of an application) to solve a specific business problem or support the user in 
a specific task. The application together with the users of the application (the human factor) 
form a socio-technical system, the so called information system (IS) (Teubner 2003). In order 
to avoid using the acronyms IS/IT, we introduce the term information processing (IP)2. Be-
sides IS and IT, the IP concept also includes the activities needed to provide IS and IT within 
a company (e.g. developing the application system or maintaining hardware components). 
Together with the people carrying out these activities, they are referred to as the information 
function (IF) (Teubner 2003). Wherever we use the acronym “IP”, we could as well write 
IS/IT/IF. Hence, neither the term IT strategy, nor IS strategy adequately captures the whole 
picture. This led us to use the term information strategy as a short form of information proc-
essing (IP) strategy. We consider this in-line with the uses of ‘information’ in terms such as 
“information management” (Teubner 2003). Hence, the term information strategy is meant to 
encompass IS and IT strategy rather than to demarcate itself from them.  
Based on the understanding of strategy outlined above, we view information strategy as a 
deliberate expression of intentions articulated through an integrated set of directional, difficult 
to reverse IP decisions that are expected to yield an impact on an organization’s long-term 
performance, i.e. its overall success or failure. The constituent elements of an information 
strategy – in other words the content of information strategy – are strategic IP decisions. 
The content describes what kinds of decisions should be made as part of an information strat-
egy: “The content describes the subject areas or ‘issues’ for which the strategy is meant to 
provide solutions and directions” (Smits et al. 1997, p. 136). Hereby, we adopt the view of 
other researchers in the business strategy realm who view strategy to consist of intentional 
decisions or “choices”: “Strategy […] is about intentional, informed, and integrated choices” 
(Hambrick and Fredrickson 2001, p. 58; emphasis added), a set of “strategic choices […that] 
have critical influence on the success or failure of the enterprise” (Rumelt et al. 1994, p. 9; 
emphasis added) and that “strategy is not a random collection of […] building blocks but a 
carefully constructed system” of decisions (Collis and Montgomery 1999, p. 3; emphasis 
added). Rather than following the narrow and formal definition used in decision science, i.e. 
the selection among a given set of alternatives (e.g. Gäfgen 1974), we broadly refer to a deci-
sion as the formation of intentions for future action. 
                                                 
2
 The term ‘information processing’ should be understood similarly to the German notion of “Informationsverar-
beitung” 
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Our view of information strategy excludes the notion of information strategy as an ex-post-
only “pattern in the stream of decisions […] concerned with IT” (cf. e.g. the concept of 'real-
ized IT strategy' found in Chan et al. 1997a; Chan et al. 1997b; Holland and Lockett 1992). 
Such a pattern is not necessarily intentional. Of course, organizations without an (intentional) 
information strategy also use IT and hence make decisions regarding IP. However, following 
our understanding, we cannot infer an information strategy from the mere existence of IP 
within a company. In addition, simply looking for a pattern in a set of past decisions makes 
information strategy an arbitrary concept. Furthermore, realized strategies might differ from 
intentional strategies for pragmatic reasons. (certain intended decisions might not get imple-
mented). As we are interested in those decisions that are intended to influence action, looking 
at actually performed action alone would not be sufficient.  
Strategic information 
planning process Information strategy
Strategic
impact
Outcome
Implemen-
tation
 
Figure 1: Information strategy put in context 
To put information strategy into context, we distinguish it from the process of developing an 
information strategy as well as from the strategic impacts expected to arise from its imple-
mentation. While information strategy and information strategy content describe the “what”, 
the information strategy planning process describes “how such decisions [the content] are 
reached in an organizational setting” (Fahey and Christensen 1986, p. 168). Following our 
definition, these decisions are ultimately intended to impact long-term firm performance. 
Figure 1 depicts the relations between these three distinct concepts. 
The remainder of this chapter argues why research related to information strategy content is 
important (Section 1.2). It also outlines the challenge addressed in the thesis (its objective) 
and the thesis’ contribution to addressing the challenge (Section 1.2.3). The structure of the 
rest of the document is derived from the approach taken to address the challenge. Both are 
presented in Section 1.3. 
1.2 THE NEED FOR RESEARCH ON INFORMATION STRATEGY  
On the first page, we illustrated the relevance of research on information strategy by provid-
ing recent real-world examples of companies using IT with a strategic intent and making a 
number of claims about the state of research on information strategy. The following argu-
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ments substantiate these introductory statements and build a basis for formulating the research 
objectives underlying the research. 
1.2.1 Relevance of information strategy in practice 
Strategic IP decisions are important issues in practice; in fact, they have been among the top-
ranked concerns of managers for many years now (e.g. Luftman 2005; Luftman et al. 2006; 
McGee et al. 2005; Watson et al. 1997). Looking at the surveys conducted regularly among IT 
executives since the early 1980s, we see that SIP has always been among the top issues (see 
Figure 2; based on (Ball and Harris 1982; Brancheau et al. 1996; Brancheau and Wetherbe 
1987; Dickson et al. 1984; Hartog and Herbert 1986; Luftman 2005; Luftman et al. 2006; 
Luftman and McLean 2003; Niederman et al. 1991)).  
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discrete points in time
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Figure 2: Rank of SIP among key issues of IT executives by year 
Even in the one instance where SIP had dropped to the tenth most important issue, the authors 
of the study state that “interviews suggest that its drop in rank may be due more to the current 
focus on implementation and execution rather than to having ‘solved’ the problems relating to 
this issue [SIP]” (Brancheau et al. 1996, p. 233) 
Another indication of the importance of SIP is the existence of columns in practitioner maga-
zines as well as of practitioner conferences dedicated to SIP (e.g. the column “IT Strategien” 
in Computerwoche, a weekly German computer magazine, or “Strategisches IT-
Management”, an annual conference hosted by Handelsblatt, a German daily business news-
paper). Finally, it is not unusual to find position titles such as “Head of IT Strategy” in prac-
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tice (e.g. Heinz Kreuzer, Head of IT strategy/CIO of Preussag AG (TUI-website 2001), Jeff 
Temple-Heald, Divisional Director IT Strategy of United Insurance Brokers Ltd (UIB-website 
2005), Mike Hampson, Global Head of IT Strategy, Projects and Development at ABN Amro 
(Edginton 2001, p. 4), Thomas Becker, “Leiter IT Strategie” of German broadcasting com-
pany ZDF (ZDF-website 2005), Bob Fuller, former Director of IT Strategy at Dresdner 
Kleinwort (Equiduct-website 2007)). 
There are also good reasons for practitioners’ interest in SIP, especially in information strat-
egy and its content. Several authors3 argue that it is critical to have an understanding of which 
decisions are strategic and hence should be included in a strategy. For example, (Cash Jr et al. 
1992, p. 626) emphasize the difference in the “amount of senior management thinking to be 
devoted” to strategic issues vs. to non-strategic issues. They claim that strategic issues require 
more attention than non-strategic issues. In addition, Ansoff (1965, pp. 9) argues that strategic 
decisions are “not self regenerative.” This means that they do not automatically occur on the 
management’s agenda: “Unless actively pursued, they may remain hidden behind operations 
problems.” From this, Ansoff concludes that “Since strategic problems are harder to pinpoint, 
they require special attention.” One argument supporting this is given by Angell (1990, p. 
171). He states that strategic decisions have an “influence that has a lasting effect on the dis-
position of a system.” Accordingly, the failure to recognize a strategic decision may result in 
locking the “business system” into long-lasting if not irreversible problems. Consequently, 
managers might want to think more carefully about – i.e. pay more attention to – strategic 
issues. Hambrick and Fredrickson (2001, p. 49) and similarly Kay (1998) note that “Strategy 
has become a catchall term used to mean whatever one wants it to mean.” However, “When 
executives call everything strategy [...] they create confusion and undermine their own credi-
bility.”  
The question for information strategy then is: what are these strategic IP decisions, i.e. what is 
the content of information strategy? The next section looks at the state of answers to this 
question proposed by research to date. 
1.2.2 State of information strategy research 
Perhaps due to the importance of SIP in practice, several research efforts have been devoted 
to its study. However, compared to business strategy discussions outlined in section  1.1.1, 
there is almost no academic investigation of information strategy itself, especially not on its 
                                                 
3
 We partially rely on general strategy discussions here.  
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content. Alluding to the concepts introduced in Figure 1, most articles focus on the process of 
developing an information strategy or the strategic IP impact. In a study of 137 research arti-
cles published between 1991 and 2004, Brown (2004) found that only 26% of the articles con-
cerned the content. In contrast, 84% of the articles addressed the process of formation and 
48% concerned the impact4 (see Figure 3). For example, three recent MIS Quarterly review 
articles (which are meant to conduct comprehensive reviews of extant literature) looked at the 
relationship between IT and competitive advantage as only one instance of strategic impact 
(Melville et al. 2004; Piccoli and Ives 2005; Wade and Hulland 2004). Teo and Ang (2000) 
confirm that “most research seems to focus on the IS planning process itself […] rather than 
on the output […]”, i.e. the “strategic plan.” 
Information strategy 
contents (WHAT)
Strategic IT planning 
process (HOW) 84%
48%
26%
Strategic impact 
(WHY)
(100% = 137 articles, an article can cover multiple categories)
 
Figure 3: Topics of SIP articles published between 1991-2004 in academic journals 
As a result, there are few proposals on what an information strategy should contain. The exist-
ing ones are characterized by a lack of consensus on basic terminology and concepts (see Sec-
tion  1.1.2). Besides providing diffuse views on information strategy, the existing proposals 
are rarely based on sound reasoning. Furthermore, few of them are based on empirical find-
ings but rather on the authors’ own understanding. This might explain why practitioners seem 
to be dealing with different strategic IP decisions as part of their information strategies than 
researchers. Practitioners responsible for developing an information strategy – one of the re-
sponsibilities of CIOs according to (Stephens et al. 1992) – must find it very difficult to obtain 
guidance from research in this respect. In fact, an analysis of the topics discussed under the 
label of information strategy (the term “IT strategy” seems to be more common in practice) at 
practitioner conferences and in magazines reveals a gulf between research and practice. The 
most frequent “IT strategy” topics in Computerwoche in 2005 included technology standards 
(37 articles), IT cost reduction (16 articles), IT security issues (9 articles), and IT provider 
management (11 articles). None of those topics has regularly been ascribed as having strategic 
                                                 
4
 Several articles were classified as covering process, content and impact at the same time; hence, the percent-
ages add up to more than 100%. 
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relevance so far in research (cf. Doherty and Fulford 2006 on the neglect of strategic security 
issues in research). This fact is confirmed by earlier research reporting “differences within 
and between organizations, but particularly in comparison to the academic literature” with 
regard to “strategic IT issues” (Brady et al. 1992, p. 183).  
1.2.3 Research desiderata and objective of the thesis 
When we combine the messages from the previous sections, we see a discrepancy between the 
level of understanding of information strategy in research and its relevance in practice. Im-
proving this state of research is desirable for both research and practice. 
For research, the lack of clarity on the information strategy compromises the research on the 
process and the strategic IP impact: as long as there is no proper reflection on information 
strategy and its content, the discussion on the process and the impact necessarily remains 
vague. In support of this, Maritan and Schendel pose the question in the domain of business 
strategy “How can we really understand the process of making strategic decisions without 
explicitly considering the strategy content of the decisions and how it links to outcome?” 
(Maritan and Schendel 1997, p. 262). Hambrick and Fredrickson (2001) allude to the danger 
of “narrow, piecemeal conceptions of strategy” inherent in the approach of simply following a 
certain process without understanding the strategy content itself. Thus, an analysis of the 
process should be preceded by a substantiation of the (expected) output, i.e. the content. In 
addition, the content of information strategy (i.e. strategic IP decisions) may drive the re-
search agenda similarly to the research agenda on business strategy: the assumption that deci-
sions on business scope have a strategic impact has fueled research on diversification and 
industry attractiveness. The assumption that differentiation from competitors within an indus-
try is strategically beneficial drove the development of theories of competitive advantage 
(Bourgeois 1980). 
As long as we do not have a clearer understanding of the information strategy itself, building 
theories using information strategy (whether they have information strategy as a dependent or 
independent variable) will necessarily remain few and vague. This shortcoming is analogous 
to earlier state of business strategy research that have argued that the lack of “uniform treat-
ment of the concept [of strategy …] has hindered theoretical and empirical development of 
the concept” (Bourgeois 1980, p. 27) 
And unless this information strategy understanding in research is practically relevant, there 
will be little advancement of the practice of SIP through research. In conclusion: working on 
information strategy and its content is key to advance the understanding in one of the prime 
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areas of concern for practitioners. Thus, practitioners would benefit from a better understand-
ing of information strategy, too. A better understanding of information strategy will hopefully 
lead to more and more relevant theories on information strategy. Understanding and applying 
these theories would help practitioners to eventually develop more appropriate information 
strategies. 
Consequently, the thesis’ objective is to improve the understanding of information strategy 
with a special focus on its content (what are the strategic IP decisions). As outlined above, 
this should contribute to research as well as to practice. The contribution will take the form of 
reasoned and practically relevant proposals for strategic IP decisions, i.e. for the information 
strategy content. Practitioners might use the proposal as a tool for examining their information 
strategy agendas. Managers responsible for information strategy can use this work to ask 
themselves whether they have good reasons to not include the proposed elements of informa-
tion strategy within their own strategy or why they potentially pay attention to others not in-
cluded in the proposal. These objectives conform to those of Information Systems research as 
expressed by the “Wissenschaftliche Kommission Wirtschaftsinformatik”, namely to add to 
the understanding of research as well as to provide support to the practitioner (König 1994).  
The objective of this research is to make a reasoned and relevant proposal for the content of 
information strategy. This proposal shall be based on current academic discussion, but shall 
also be practically relevant. Hence, we want the proposal to be theoretically reasoned but also 
practically relevant. We have defined the content elements of information strategy as strategic 
IP decisions. Hence, the thesis answers the questions “which IP decisions can be argued to 
form the content of information strategy?” This involves to identify the IP decisions as well as 
to give reasons for why they form part of information strategy. These reasons should not only 
be theoretically backed, but also practically relevant.  
1.3 CONDUCT OF RESEARCH AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The principal approach to achieve the research objective involves four steps (see Figure 4): in 
a first step (Chapter 2), we take the academic perspective; we seek to identify the content 
elements of information strategy from the academic literature on information strategy. This 
entails reviewing the literature for proposals of information strategy content and ascertaining 
the reasoning behind the proposals. As stated above, we cannot expect academic literature to 
be fully satisfactory in this respect. Furthermore, also with a view towards the aforementioned 
disconnect between research and practice, we argued for grounding our proposal in practice, 
as well. Consequently, the study is not based solely on research literature but also entails a 
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practitioner perspective5: in a second step (Chapter 3), we conduct a practical empirical inves-
tigation. Here, we look at the content and reasoning of information strategy in practice. Look-
ing at information strategy content from this angle should help us to come to a more practi-
cally valid proposal for information strategy content. Both steps provide independent sets of 
content elements for information strategy. In a third step (Chapter 4), we analyze the two sets: 
for academic proposals, we have to check their practical relevance; for content argued to be 
part of information strategy in practice, we have to check their theoretical backing. Finally, 
we integrate the practically relevant proposals for the content of information strategy from 
research with the theoretically reasoned proposals from practice (Chapter 5).  
Which contents 
and reasoning 
found in research 
are practically 
relevant?
How can the  
content and  
reasoning from 
research and 
practice be 
integrated?
Research perspective 
on information strategy
Practice’s perspective 
on information strategy
What is the content and 
reasoning of information 
strategy in research?
What is the content and 
reasoning of information 
strategy in practice?
Which contents 
and reasoning 
found in practice 
are theoretically 
backed?
Reasoned and 
practically 
relevant 
proposal for 
the content of 
information 
strategy
Step 1 / Chapter 2
Step 2 / Chapter 3
Step 3 / Chapter 4 Step 4 / Chapter 5 Objective of thesis
 
Figure 4: Research approach and structure of the thesis 
                                                 
5
 The fact that the need for strategic thinking in the field of business was first articulated by top executives (i.e. 
practitioners) such as Alfred Sloan of GM, Chester Barnard of AT&T or Peter Drucker of GM (cf. Ghemawat 
1997, p. 2), might serve as another argument for looking into practice to obtain insights into information strat-
egy. 
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2 RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE ON INFORMATION STRAT-
EGY 
The aim of the first step of the study is to identify the elements of the content of information 
strategy from the academic research literature on information strategy. Synthesizing the cur-
rent state is important for two reasons: first, the deficits in the existing literature are a major 
impetus for this work. The claims made in the previous chapter regarding the lack of clarity 
on information strategy require substantiation. Second, prior works on information strategy 
might contain some valid proposals and should therefore not be disregarded out of hand. 
Answering the question “What is the content of information strategy proposed in research” 
entails a search for proposals as to which IP-related decisions ought to be included in an in-
formation strategy and why.  
The basis for finding answers to these questions in the research literature is a comprehensive 
literature review. The methodology of this review is presented in the next section, followed by 
the findings. 
2.1 METHOD 
The literature review follows the general guidelines for conducting comprehensive literature 
reviews (Webster and Watson 2002): in summary, we started with a literature database search, 
but also went through the titles and abstracts of leading relevant IS and business journals 
manually. We filtered the resulting articles according to their relevance for the research objec-
tive. In addition, we “went backward” by looking up the references from selected articles. We 
also went “forward” by identifying works that referenced the identified articles. In this way, 
we found 52 articles covering information strategy content. The following paragraphs explain 
how we arrived at this number in more detail (cf. also Figure 5).  
 22 
52
358
401
419
9
Total 
covering inf. 
strategy 
content
1,235
Added by 
’going 
backward’
and 
’forward’** 
Not covering 
inf. strategy 
content
Articles 
related to IT 
and strategy
Not related 
to IT and/or 
strategy*
Added 
through 
manual 
search of 
top journals
1,253
Database 
search 
result
* Includes 984 from the database search result
** In total, 26 articles were identified by ‘going backward’ and ‘going forward’, but only 9 were really related to inf. 
strategy content (of the 26, 3 were not related to IT and/or strategy at all)
 
Figure 5: Number of articles identified in literature review 
We began building our literature base by conducting a keyword search in several literature 
databases, which provided access to a broad spectrum of international IS and business jour-
nals6 (the leading journals covered are listed according to their ISWorld ranking (AIS 2007) 
in Table 1. A full list of journals covered in the databases can be found on the corresponding 
database websites (Ebsco-title-list 2007; Proquest-title-list 2007)). We searched EB-
SCO/Business Source Complete, Proquest/ABI Inform, and Science Direct for the string 
“(Info* OR IT OR IS) AND strateg*” in title, abstract, and keywords. This search resulted in 
1235 articles.  
                                                 
6
 Since our focus is on the academic discussion, we excluded practitioner magazines, trade journals, etc. from 
our review. For the most part, we also excluded non-scholarly contributions, such as editorials or book reviews; 
these were only included if referenced by any of the articles included in the review. 
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Number Journal Name Starting 
year 
Starting 
volume 
Starting 
issue 
Source used 
1 MIS Quarterly 1977 1 1 EBSCO 
2 Information Systems Research 1990 1 1 EBSCO 
3 Communications of the ACM 1965 87 1 EBSCO 
4 Management Science 1954 1 1 EBSCO 
5 Journal of MIS 1984 1 1 EBSCO 
6 Decision Sciences 1970 1 1 EBSCO 
7 Harvard Business Review 1922 1 1 EBSCO 
8 European Journal of Information 
Systems 
1993 2 1 Proquest 
9 Decision Support Systems 1997 19 1 EBSCO 
10 Information & Management 1977 1 1 Science Direct 
Table 1: International top journals covered by database search (selection) 
However, a simple keyword search is a rather imprecise method of scanning the content of 
documents for relevant contributions. Some relevant articles necessarily slip through the 
meshes of such a search, while a large number of irrelevant articles surface. In order to ad-
dress the first shortcoming to some extent, we manually scanned the titles and abstracts of all 
the volumes (starting in 1970; information strategy has not been discussed earlier) and issues 
of leading relevant IS and business journals listed in the ISWorld ranking (AIS 2007). Rele-
vant for our purposes are high-ranking journals that specifically address strategic topics (e.g. 
publications with “strategy” or “strategic [management]” in their titles, or whose mission 
statements explicitly cite the subject as a core topic). Table 2 lists the IS and business journals 
selected for our manual scan, with the corresponding starting year, volume, and issue number 
as well as the primary field (IS or business). The manual scan added 419 more articles to our 
literature base, bringing the total to 1654 when added to the 1235 articles from the database 
search.  
                                                 
7
 We considered starting with volume 8 of this publication appropriate given the fact that this volume is from 
1965. We expect hardly any information strategy-related publications prior to 1970. 
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Journal name Starting 
year 
Starting 
volume 
Starting 
issue 
Primary 
field 
MIS Quarterly 1977 1 1 IS 
Information Systems Research 1990 1 1 IS 
Journal of MIS 1984 1 1 IS 
Information & Management 1977 1 1 IS 
European Journal of Information Systems 1992 1 1 IS 
Journal of the Association of Information Systems (AIS) 2000 1 1 IS 
Communications of the AIS 1999 1 1 IS 
Journal of Strategic Information Systems 1991/92 1 1 IS 
Management Science 1970 16 5 Business 
Harvard Business Review 1970 48 1 Business 
Academy of Management Journal 1970 13 1 Business 
Academy of Management Review 1976 1 1 Business 
Strategic Management Journal 1980 1 1 Business 
Table 2: Journals included in manual search 
To counteract the second shortcoming of the database search, the profusion of irrelevant arti-
cles, we screened the abstracts of all the articles in our literature base for relevance. This led 
us to exclude 1253 articles (984 from the database and 269 from the manual search8) from the 
relevant literature base. The excluded articles were either not related to strategy as defined in 
the working definition (e.g. articles using “strategy” to denote a clever way of doing some-
thing (as in pricing strategy, search strategy). or not addressing IP in any way9 (as e.g. in 
(Southall et al. 2005)). 
Hence, the screening process left us with 401 articles that were somehow related to IP and 
strategy. As stated in Chapter 1, the focus of the thesis is on information strategy and its con-
tent, which is distinct from its development process and impact. Assigning the 401 articles to 
these categories left us with 43 articles devoted to the content of information strategy10 (i.e. 
358 articles addressed only the process or the impact11). 
                                                 
8
 We used a very broad filter in the manual search; we deliberately adopted a policy of including all articles that 
might somehow be related to IT and strategy in order to avoid the exclusion of any potentially relevant works. 
As scanning hundreds of articles can become a tedious job, no classification had been done at this point. This 
explains why in the later screening step, a large number of articles that were previously added through the man-
ual search had to be removed from the literature base again. 
9
 A large number of the irrelevant articles can be attributed to the lack of a case-sensitive search function on the 
EBSCO database. Because “IS” and “IT” were necessarily part of our search string, many articles containing the 
verb “is” or the word “it” (but irrelevant to our topic) were returned by the search. 
10
 An article can cover multiple categories. 
11
 In fact, the categories were derived bottom-up (i.e. by multiple rounds of grouping articles with similar re-
search questions/topics) rather than top-down. in addition to the three categories of process, impact, and content, 
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Upon reading these 43 articles in depth, we discovered nine other works cited in these articles 
covering the content of information strategy12, resulting in a total of 52 articles relevant for 
this study. 
2.2 FINDINGS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW: TERMINOLOGY 
Looking at the relevant articles, we find that the concept of information strategy is quite 
commonly used in research. As stated in the first chapter, a number of different terms are used 
to refer to similar constructs (Table 3). Upon closer inspection of the terms and their defini-
tions, we observe a lack of clarity with respect to how these constructs differ or relate to each 
other. We agree with other researchers that the multitude of ambiguous terms must be highly 
confusing to anyone attempting to interpret the research articles: “The problem of terminol-
ogy is one of the fundamental issues facing those wishing to develop an information strategy. 
[…] there is a proliferation of terminology and a great deal of ambiguity surrounding its use” 
(Allen and Wilson 1996, p. 240). 
Term used Definition provided Source 
I/T strategy  
 
None provided (Henderson and Venkatraman 
1999) 
A long-term precept for directing, implementing 
and supervising information management (In-
formation management left undefined) 
(Reponen 1994) 
 
Information manage-
ment strategy 
 
Deals with management of the entire informa-
tion systems function 
Referring to (Earl 1989): “the management 
framework which guides how the organization 
should run IS/IT activities” 
(Ragu-Nathan et al. 2001) 
Information plan Tangible outputs of the SISP process, namely a 
portfolio of computer-based applications that 
will assist an organization in executing its busi-
ness plans and realizing its business goals 
(Brown 2004; Lederer and Sal-
mela 1996) 
Information strategy A complex of implicit or explicit visions, goals, 
guidelines and plans with respect to the supply 
and the demand of formal information in an 
organization, sanctioned by management, in-
tended to support the objectives of the organiza-
tion in the long run, while being able to adjust to 
the environment 
(Smits et al. 1997; Smits and van 
der Poel 1996) 
                                                                                                                                                        
the categories implementation and alignment were derived, as well. However, the articles in these categories did 
not cover the content of information strategy.  
12
 Overall, we followed 26 potentially relevant references from the 43 information strategy content-related arti-
cles. However, after reviewing these articles, we found that three were not related to information strategy at all 
and that 14 were related to categories (e.g. process or impact) other than information strategy content. 
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A comprehensive plan that includes the follow-
ing components: IS mission statement, IS objec-
tives, linkage of the IS objectives to organiza-
tional goals, IS action plan for achieving IS 
objectives, assignment of tasks to individu-
als/units, mechanisms for management control, 
feedback and reporting 
(Bajjaly 1998) 
None provided; defines only “strategic informa-
tion systems,” a term which is used synony-
mously: “IS used to support or shape an organi-
zation’s competitive strategy, its plan for gain-
ing and maintaining competitive advantage” 
(Chan and Huff 1992) 
None provided (Galliers 1991), (Hayward 
1987), (Hatten and Hatten 1997) 
“lays plans and sets standards”; “a coordinated 
and integrated approach to the provision and 
management of systems over the next five years 
or more” 
(Hoey 1998) 
Search for competitive advantage through IS/IT 
use 
(Duhan et al. 2001) 
None provided (Bacon 1991) 
Information system(s) 
strategy, IS strategy 
None provided; used synonymously with IT 
strategy 
(Tai and Phelps 2000) 
Information technology 
strategic plan 
None provided (Wexelblat and Srinivasan 1999) 
 
IS strategic plan used synonymously with IS strategy (see there) (Bajjaly 1998) 
In a broad sense to incorporate the range of 
issues associated with strategy formation and 
implementation with respect to information 
systems 
(Galliers 1993a) 
Written plan comprised of projects for applica-
tion of information technology to assist an or-
ganisation in realising its goals 
(Gottschalk 1999a; Gottschalk 
1999b; Gottschalk 1999c) 
Using IT to gain competitive advantage (Brady and Targett 1995b) 
Plan to manage IT strategically (Knights and Morgan 1995) 
“sustaining competitive advantage using IT” (Hidding 2001) 
“document containing plans, intentions and 
policies for the organization’s current and future 
use of IT, and ‘softer’ IT related issues” 
(Brady et al. 1992) 
No explicit definition provided; referring to 
(Parsons 1983): “general frameworks which 
guide the opportunities of IT which are identi-
fied, the IT resources which are developed, the 
rate at which new technologies are adopted, the 
level of impact of IT within the firm” 
(Kanungo et al. 2001) 
Citing (Parsons 1983): “central tendencies 
which firms use to guide IT/IS within the busi-
ness” 
(Ward 1987) 
IT strategy 
None provided; used synonymously with IS 
strategy 
(Tai and Phelps 2000) 
IT/IS strategy Ways in which IT/IS is used to deliver a strat-
egy; used indiscriminately with strategic IS; 
(Atkins 1994) 
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referring to (Wiseman 1985): “information sys-
tems used to support or shape the competitive 
strategy of the organization” 
Long-range IS planning 
document 
Long range/strategic planning [document] […] 
considers three or more years into the future and 
involves the development of EDP/MIS objec-
tives and the implementation of strategies and 
policies to achieve these objectives 
(Conrath et al. 1992) 
 
MIS plan  The output of strategic IS planning (Pyburn 1983) 
MIS strategy set Will guide the design and development of the 
MIS; as derived from the organizational strategy 
set 
(King 1978) 
Strategic information 
plan 
A portfolio of computer-based applications that 
will assist an organization in executing its busi-
ness plans and realizing its business goals 
(Lederer and Salmela 1996) 
 
Strategic plan for In-
formation systems 
Output of the IS planning process (Teo and Ang 2000) 
Strategic plan for MIS None provided (Ein-Dor and Segev 1978) 
 
Strategies for informa-
tion systems 
Used synonymously with IT strategy (see there) (Ward 1987) 
Table 3: Terms and definitions for information strategy used in research 
2.3 FINDINGS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTIONS OF INFORMATION 
STRATEGY 
Following a more in-depth analysis of the articles, we find that despite the popularity of the 
terminology, the information strategy has mostly been used implicitly rather than serving as 
the object of thorough research. In fact, no article explicitly addressed the question of what 
the content of information strategy might be.  
18 out of the 52 articles allude to the content of information strategy even more peripherally. 
They deal with the following topics: eight articles are on the “meta” level, such as reviews of 
strategic information planning literature (e.g. Brown 2004), or provide instructions for doing 
research related to IP and strategy (e.g. Chan and Huff 1992; Venkatraman 1986); three arti-
cles exclusively discuss characteristics of information strategy content in terms of the imple-
mentability of the strategy rather than the content itself (Gottschalk 1999a; Gottschalk 1999b; 
Gottschalk 1999c); one further article looks at the usefulness of strategic IS plans without 
broaching their content (Teo and Ang 2000); three articles refer to “realized strategies,” a 
concept we rejected in the first chapter due to the unintentional nature of such strategies 
(Chan et al. 1998; Chan et al. 1997b; Holland and Lockett 1992); two very early articles con-
sider how to link a single IS to business strategy (Ein-Dor and Segev 1978; King 1978); fi-
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nally, one article (Abdul-Gader 1997) uses the term “IT strategy” but does not reference it 
later on; Orlikowski and Iacono (2001, p. 128) call this “nominal use.”  
However, even if the articles do not refer to the content and reasoning of information strategy 
directly, those that actively use any of the terms from Table 3 ought to elaborate their specific 
understanding or conception of it. A conception of information strategy answers the question 
“What is an information strategy?” or “How is it understood?” The articles do not provide 
explicit answers to these questions. We used the term conception also to imply that we had to 
reconstruct the understanding that was present latently in diverse statements. In contrast to a 
conception, the content of information strategy refers to the decisions that are part of an in-
formation strategy. This is to say that the 34 remaining articles (52 minus 18) were still vague 
as to what constitutes an information strategy.  
From the 34 articles, we identified five different conceptions of information strategy: informa-
tion strategy as the use of IT to deliver business strategy, as the use of IT to gain competitive 
advantage, as a plan for the IP domain, as a functional strategy, and as the tenor towards IP. 
We arrived at these conceptions inductively by finding statements that allowed us to recon-
struct the understanding of information strategy underlying the respective article. Many times, 
we found these statements e.g. in definitions provided by the author. We will use these state-
ments when describing the conceptions below. They refer to what we call the “anchor” of 
information strategy and the purpose of information strategy. The anchor of an information 
strategy constitutes the perspective from which the strategy is understood. It is the starting 
point for strategy-thinking and -making, while the purpose of an information strategy de-
scribes its end. The purpose raises the questions that must be answered by the strategy. The 
content of information strategy in turn comprises answers to these questions. However, most 
articles do not explicitly provide insights into information strategy content. Hence, we have to 
reconstruct them ourselves and call them “implications of the conceptions for the content of 
information strategy.” Table 4 compares the five information strategy conceptions side by 
side according to these characteristics. We describe the conceptions in more detail below.  
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Conception: 
information 
strategy as... 
… the use of IT 
to deliver busi-
ness strategy 
… the use of IT 
to gain competi-
tive advantage 
… a plan for 
the whole ‘IP 
domain’ 
… a functional 
strategy 
… the tenor 
towards IP 
Anchor Business strat-
egy 
Competitive 
theory 
IP domain Objectives of 
information 
function 
Management’s 
attitude or in-
dustry require-
ments 
Purpose (ques-
tion to be an-
swered) 
How can the use 
of IP support 
overall business 
objectives/ 
strategy? 
How can the use 
of IP support 
gaining and 
sustaining com-
petitive advan-
tage? 
What are the IP 
elements that 
have to be 
planned on a 
strategic level? 
Which re-
sources are 
needed to fulfill 
the functional/ 
departmental 
objectives? 
What is the 
overall attitude 
towards IP’s 
role in the or-
ganization? 
Implications for 
information 
strategy content 
Decisions on 
applications and 
investments in 
IT/IS that sup-
port business 
strategy 
Decisions on IS 
or IT and other 
IP resources that 
support com-
petitiveness 
Decisions on/ 
plans for all 
kinds of com-
pany-wide IP 
elements (tech-
nology, applica-
tions, human 
resources, or-
ganizational, 
financial) 
Decisions 
on/plans for 
departmental 
resources only 
(objectives, 
mission, staff, 
budget, etc.) 
Choice of role 
and general 
attitude towards 
IP 
Table 4: Information strategy conceptions in research  
Some articles exhibit characteristics of several conceptions. As none explicitly defined its 
own conception, such a hodgepodge of conceptions reflects rather internal inconsistencies in 
the article than a deliberate multi-conceptional perspective. 
2.3.1 Information strategy as the use of IT to deliver business strategy 
In this conception, information strategy is an integral part (or annotation) of business strategy. 
A given business strategy is seen as the anchor for an information strategy. That means that 
for a given business strategy, the information strategy is supposed to identify “ways in which 
information technology and systems (IT/IS) may be used to deliver th[is] strateg[y]” (Atkins 
1994; cf. Hatten and Hatten 1997) or “how the use of IT can support overall business objec-
tives” (Hoey 1998). This approach implies that information strategy does not exist separately 
from business strategy but rather is a part of it. It is like assuming an IT-perspective vis-à-vis 
business strategy. In support of this, Hatten and Hatten (1997) argue that with information 
strategy, “IS people took their rightful place in [business] strategy discussions” and that in-
formation strategy “helps us think about an IS response to business issues,” i.e. “find ways to 
use IS to deal with these issues.” (Duhan et al. 2001) insist that “IS/IT […] strategies should 
be linked directly to the objectives and strategies of the business unit and be considered as 
part of the overall business planning […].” 
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Information strat-
egy conception 
Information strategy definition Source 
A portfolio of computer-based applications that will 
assist an organization in executing its business plans and 
realizing its business goals 
(Lederer and Salmela 1996) 
Written plan comprised of projects for application of 
information technology to assist an organisation in real-
ising its goals 
(Gottschalk 1999a; Gottschalk 
1999b; Gottschalk 1999c)  
(derived from Lederer/Sethi) 
Information strategy 
as the use of IT to 
support business 
strategy/business 
goals 
Ways in which IT/IS is used to deliver a strategy; also 
used indiscriminately: information systems used to sup-
port or shape the competitive strategy of the organization 
(Atkins 1994) 
Table 5: Definitions of information strategy as the use of IT to deliver business strategy 
Indications for the content of information strategy can be derived by ascertaining its purpose, 
i.e. by answering the question “How can the use of IT support overall business objectives/ 
strategy?” Companies use IT in the form of applications or, more precisely, information sys-
tems (cf. first chapter). Hence, the content of information strategy in this conception consists 
of the choices of information systems to support the business strategy. The choice of IS repre-
sents an investment decision. Thus, some authors refer to investment decisions, whereas oth-
ers refer to the decision on a portfolio of IS13. Formulating an information strategy results in 
IS that cater to the company’s strategy or objectives. Which IS these are depends on the busi-
ness strategy model used (see the appendix in (Chan and Huff 1992) for a list of business 
strategy models). For example, information strategy content could comprise IS that 
• support the firm’s approach to differentiate itself on the market (e.g. low cost vs. quality 
leader) 
• support market penetration, product development, market development, or diversification 
(following Ansoff’s product market matrix model of strategy (Ansoff 1965)) 
• support the defender, prospector, analyzer, or reactor strategy (following Miles and 
Snow’s strategy types (Miles et al. 1978)). 
The definitions of business strategy also included a rather broad understanding of business 
strategy as all kinds of business objectives. Then, all IS that fulfill any business objective be-
come part of information strategy. Table 6 lists the business strategy models that we found in 
the articles along with the respective implications for information strategy content. Although 
                                                 
13
 The term “application portfolio” or “IS portfolio” is misleading. Originally, the term portfolio was used to 
express the need to balance the positive (return) and negative (risk) characteristics of investments. However, the 
articles mentioning an IS portfolio as the main decision object of information strategy do not necessarily seek to 
come to a balanced selection for the IS a company might want to develop. The portfolio here is simply the over-
all set of IS that support a given business strategy. A company might want to develop a number of other IS that 
do not directly support the business strategy; these IS would have to be included in an IS portfolio that tries to 
balance investments, as well. 
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we counted only six articles following this conception, one has to be aware that these account 
for almost twenty percent of our sample.  
Besides the articles included in Table 6, there are a number of other articles that look at which 
information systems companies use in order to support a given business strategy. However, 
these articles do not refer to information strategy per se (or any other related term) but only to 
the “strategic uses of IT” (e.g. Camillus and Lederer 1985; Segars et al. 1994, both looking at 
IS in support for Miles and Snow's strategy types). Other research works (e.g. McFarlan et al. 
1983) focus on how IS can support Porter’s generic strategies of cost leadership, differentia-
tion, or focus: “In any company, information technology has a powerful effect on [… com-
petitive strategy …] in either cost or differentiation” (Porter and Millar 1985, p. 156). These 
works propose the analysis of all activities of a company’s value chain (Porter 1985) and the 
links between them in order to identify how IT/IS can either cut costs (e.g. by automating 
activities) or provide differentiating value to the firm. As we cannot assume that the authors 
intended to make statements on information strategy content, their work was not included in 
our review. However, these works fit into this conception of information strategy. 
Strategy model/theory used
  
Source Information strategy content 
Ansoff’s growth matrix (Ansoff 
1965) 
Miles and Snow’s strategy types 
(Miles et al. 1978) 
(Atkins 1994) Investment proposals for IS to 
support chosen business strategy 
Any kind of business objectives
  
(Gottschalk 1999a; Gottschalk 
1999b; Gottschalk 1999c; Hoey 
1998) 
IS used to support the business 
objectives 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportu-
nities, Threats (SWOT) 
(Hatten and Hatten 1997) IS that support any business strat-
egy derived from the SWOT 
analysis 
Table 6: Information strategy content for supporting business strategy 
2.3.2 Information strategy as the use of IT to gain competitive advantage 
Just as for the previous conception, articles in this category share the feature that information 
strategy only exists as part of business strategy. However, these articles focus on a certain part 
of business strategy, namely competitive strategy. Competitive strategy is concerned with one 
major question of business strategy, namely how to gain competitive advantage (e.g. Hofer 
and Schendel 1978, p. 25). Most importantly – and eventually justifying a separate discussion 
– rather than anchoring information strategy in a given strategy, the anchor in this case is not 
the firm’s business strategy but competitive theory. Accordingly, the objective of many papers 
is to construct or test a certain theory on IT-based competitive advantage. Information strat-
egy then answers the question “How can the use of IT support gaining a competitive advan-
 32 
tage?” (Brady and Targett 1995a; Duhan et al. 2001; Hidding 2001). Duhan et al. (2001) pro-
pose that an information strategy’s intent is “to search for competitive advantage through its 
[IT] use.” The foundation for answering “How can firms achieve, and for how long can they 
sustain, a strategic IT advantage?” is “IT strategy logic” (Hidding 2001). 
Information strat-
egy conception 
Information strategy definition Source 
search for competitive advantage through IS/IT use (Duhan et al. 2001) 
using IT to gain competitive advantage (Brady and Targett 1995a) 
sustaining competitive advantage using IT (Hidding 2001) 
Information strategy 
as the use of IT to 
gain competitive 
advantage 
the analysis of the role that information systems can play 
in helping business units or companies to define a route 
to competitive strategy [defined as “the route to competi-
tive advantage” referring to (Porter 1980)] 
(Wilson 1989) 
Table 6: Definitions of information strategy as the use of IT to gain competitive advantage 
In the articles following this conception, strategy logic builds on two different theories of 
competitive advantage: the market-based view (MBV) and the resource-based view (RBV) as 
depicted in Table 7. It is not surprising to find these two theories given that they also happen 
to be the most common theories on competitive advantage in management studies (cf. e.g. 
Carr 2004a, p. 14; Kirsch 1996, pp. 204).14 
Theoretical basis Application of theory 
to information strategy 
Implications for in-
formation strategy 
content 
Sources 
Market-based view 
(Porter 1980) 
How can IT create com-
petitive advantage by 
influencing market or 
industry forces external 
to the company? 
Identification of Strate-
gic Information Systems 
(SIS) 
(Brady and Targett 
1995a) 
(Wilson 1989) 
Resource-based view / 
Core competencies 
(Prahalad and Hamel 
1990) 
(Williams 1992; Wil-
liams 1998) 
How can IT be a strate-
gic (valuable, rare, in-
imitable, etc.) resource? 
How can IT support 
strategic resources or be 
combined with other 
resources to gain and 
sustain a competitive 
advantage? 
Identification of strate-
gic IT-related resources 
 “The task [of develop-
ing an IS strategy] then 
becomes […] compe-
tence leveraging and 
building, and investigat-
ing the ways in which 
IS/IT can facilitate and 
enable these” 
Identification of IT 
resources that are essen-
tial for other (non-IT) 
resources to be strategic. 
(Duhan et al. 2001) 
(Hidding 2001) 
Table 7: Theories of competitive advantage applied in information strategy research 
                                                 
14
 Carr refers to the “industry-based view” and the “resource-based view”; Kirsch talks about an “outside-in” vs. 
an “inside-out” approach. 
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In order to derive the content of information strategy from these theories, it is necessary to 
discuss the application of these theories in IS research further in the following paragraphs. 
MBV and RBV theory in strategic management 
Both views recognize that competitive advantage can only be gained through a fit of the inter-
nal situation with the external situation. They differ significantly on what they regard as the 
predominant source or basis for competitive advantages, however: “privileged market posi-
tion” (MBV) vs. “unique firm-specific resources” (RBV) (Cool et al. 2002, p. 55). Thus, the 
source of competitive advantage in MBV theories is sought outside of the organization 
(within the industry or market), while in RBV theories, the source is sought within the organi-
zation, in its unique resources. The MBV has mainly been driven by Porter’s (1985) extension 
of industrial organization research, specifically his “five industry forces” (Porter 1980). 
In contrast to the MBV, the RBV proposes that the origin of competitive advantage lies within 
the firm, more specifically in a firm’s “resources” (Whittington 1995, p. 26). Consequently, 
the decisions to be made strategically (i.e. as part of the strategy) concern a firm’s internal 
resources much more than e.g. industry forces external to the company. Although the defini-
tion of resources themselves remains blurred (“‛resources’ [and capabilities] remain an amor-
phous heap to most of us” (Wernerfelt 1995, p. 172), there is considerable consensus (cf. 
Wade and Hulland 2004, p. 115) on the characteristics of those resources that are “strategi-
cally relevant,” i.e. that “can be a source of sustained competitive advantage for a firm” 
(Barney 1991, p.102). Barney (1991) summarizes four criteria for a resource to be considered 
of strategic relevance: it must be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not substitutable 
(similarly found in Grant 1991; Wernerfelt 1984). 
Applications of competitive theory in IS research 
Much literature has been written from the perspective of MBV and RBV theories on the im-
pact of IT on competitive advantage15. This literature is discussed below.  
Applications of MBV theory in IS research 
The use of IT (or its application in information systems) to gain competitive advantage has 
been said to be “one of the major business stories of the 1980s” (Vitale 1986). A concept that 
emerged from this discussion was that of “strategic information systems.” Strategic informa-
                                                 
15
 Even though much of this literature often does not refer explicitly to information strategy 
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tion systems (SIS) are IS that support or shape the competitive advantage of a company16 
(Senn 1992, p. 7; Wiseman 1985, p. 7). Most of the articles from that time make use of Por-
ter’s five forces model to explain the competitive impact of IS (Eardley and Lewis 1996). 
Several research articles address the question of how IT/IS can alter any one of the five forces 
(e.g. Bakos and Treacy 1986; McFarlan 1984; Porter 2001; Porter and Millar 1985). The evi-
dence for IT’s ability to do so is mostly provided in the form of anecdotal case examples; 
more than 60 examples are listed by Kettinger et al. (1994, Appendix A). Examples of SIS 
affecting almost all of the five forces can be found in the literature (e.g. Eardley and Lewis 
1996, p. 405, table 3 matches 8 SIS cases against the five forces addressed by each SIS; the 
appendix on pp. 407 gives a brief description of these cases). Hence, following the MBV the 
content of information strategy is a set of IS aimed at gaining competitive advantage. 
However, researchers criticize that the competitive impact ascribed to the SIS in these cases – 
and to IT in general – is not sustainable, i.e. only temporary (Senn 1992; Eardley and Lewis 
1996). One argument used is that of easy replication or imitation. This is because technology 
itself is “available to all firms” (Clemons and Row 1991, p. 289). This argument has been 
especially stretched by Carr (Carr 2003; Carr 2004a; Carr 2004b) in his well-known claim 
that “IT doesn’t matter.” He argues that as IT becomes a standardized commodity – just like 
energy or telephones – it loses its ability to lead to a sustainable competitive advantage. A 
number of authors retort that it is not IT itself that provides the advantage at all, but the way it 
is adopted and applied (Senn 1992, Hackney et al. 2000). However, Porter’s theory – with its 
external, market-based perspective – was deemed incapable of explaining differences in the 
internal use of IT. This criticism has certainly given rise to the use of other theories to explain 
the relation of IP to competitive advantage, especially the RBV, since it takes a firm-internal 
perspective. 
Applications of RBV theory in IS research 
Applications of the RBV in IS look at factors internal to a company. The focus is on IP re-
sources (not limited to IT itself) and whether they are strategic, i.e. fulfill the criteria of inimi-
tability, rarity, etc. (e.g. Mata et al. 1995). Among these IP resources are the management of 
external relationships, market responsiveness, IP-business partnerships, IP management skills, 
IP technical skills, IP infrastructure assets, IP innovation ability, and cost-effective IP opera-
tions (Wade and Hulland 2004, p. 111, especially Tables 1 and 2). In line with the criticism of 
                                                 
16
 Senn (1992) stresses that SIS are not a type of application or information system (such as operational systems 
or transactional systems). An SIS is defined merely by its impact on competition. Thus, any type of IS can act as 
an SIS whether it is a system for production or administration, a batch system or transaction system, etc. 
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the MBV-rooted works mentioned above, the RBV points out that most IP resources might 
not meet the criteria cited above: technologies, financial resources, technological skills, etc. 
are available to most firms and can thus be easily imitated (Mata et al. 1995). Hence, the no-
tion of “resource complementarity” came into focus (Powell and Dent-Micallef 1997). Re-
source complementarity means that a resource may influence another resource and that their 
combined use (in contrast to each individual resource) affects competitive advantage. Wade 
and Hulland (2004, p. 123) synthesize this in the following statement: “the RBV as currently 
conceived fails to adequately consider the fact that resources rarely act alone in creating or 
sustaining competitive advantage. That is particularly true of IS resources that, in almost all 
cases, act in conjunction with other firm resources to provide strategic benefits.” The latter 
part of the statement describes what is meant by resource complementarity: IP might contrib-
ute to a company’s competitive advantage if combined with other non-IP resources owned by 
a firm (e.g. Powell and Dent-Micallef 1997). For example, it might be that only when IT is 
used in a certain process (one kind of resource) that this resource pair (e.g. use of a certain IS 
and the specific process supported by the IS) comes together to form a competitive advantage 
for the firm (cf. Wade and Hulland, p. 130). This proposition emphasizes a firm’s specific 
way of employing IT over IT itself.  
While the resource complementarity proposition sounds intuitive, it nonetheless remains a 
proposition. The nature of the complementarity effect remains largely unknown (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993; Dierickx and Cool 1989): “the role of resource complementarity within the 
theory has not been extensively developed” (Wade and Hulland 2004, p. 123). However, what 
can be learned from the RBV is that the relation between IP and competitive advantage is 
more complex than assumed by MBV research as well as early RBV research in Information 
Systems. 
In the RBV, the main content of information strategy becomes identifying and using a set of 
IP resources that exhibit, either themselves or by complementing other (non-IP) resources, the 
strategic characteristics mentioned above. The concept of a “resource” is still very ambiguous, 
as is that of an “IP resource.” Three recent reviews present overviews of what potential IP 
resources might be (Melville et al. 2004, Table 3; Piccoli and Ives 2005, Table 1; Wade and 
Hulland 2004, Table 2). These proposals are compared in Table 8. They lack consensus, dis-
agreeing e.g. on whether and how the resources fulfill the characteristics of strategic IS re-
sources (see the role of IT infrastructure in Piccoli and Ives (2005) and Wade and Hulland 
(2004) in Table 8 or the different levels of categories such as “assets” and “responsiveness”). 
Wade and Hulland (2004, Table 4) hold that none of the proposed IP resources fully conforms 
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to the characteristics of strategic resources and hence cannot fully create or sustain advantage. 
Piccoli and Ives (2005) suggest that all of the resources mentioned can at least help in sustain-
ing the advantage. This suggests that RBV theory in IS is at a rather early stage.  
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(Melville et al. 2004) (Piccoli and Ives 2005) (Wade and Hulland 2004) 
Category IP Resources Category IP Resources Category IP Resources 
Infrastructure 
“shared technology and technology 
services across the organization” 
 
IT Infrastructure 
“the foundation for the delivery of business 
applications and services” 
As it takes a long time to develop an IT infra-
structure, its ability to act as a “barrier to erosion 
is likely to be very substantial” 
IS infra-
structure 
The “IS infrastructure resource has generally 
not been found to be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage” 
Techno-
logical IT 
resources 
Applications “that utilize the infra-
structure” 
IT assets 
Information repositories   
Technical skills  
“programming, systems integration, 
database development” 
 
Technical skills 
“ability to design and develop effective informa-
tion systems [… e.g.] systems analysis and de-
sign, infrastructure design, programming” 
“allow firms to more easily adopt and use IT” 
IS technical 
skills 
 
“held by the IS/IT employees of a firm” 
“some IS skills cannot be easily transferred 
[…] and, thus, these resources become a 
source of sustained competitive advantage” 
IT management skills  
“ability to provide leadership for the IS function, 
manage IT projects […]” 
“form the basis for envisioning and producing 
[…] IT-dependent strategic initiatives” 
 
IS planning 
and change 
manage-
ment 
“the capability to plan, manage, and use 
appropriate technology” 
Manage-
ment of 
external 
relation-
ships 
“ability to manage linkages between the IS 
function and stakeholders outside the firm 
[…] suppliers […] outsourcing partners […] 
customer relationships” 
Human IT 
resources 
Managerial skills  
“collaboration with business units 
and external organizations, project 
planning” 
IT capabili-
ties 
Relationship asset 
“rapport […] between the IS function and the 
business” “can take years to develop” 
Manage-
ment of 
internal 
relation-
ships (IS-
business 
partner-
ships) 
“integration and alignment between the IS 
function and other functional areas or de-
partments” “Such relationships help to span 
the […] gaps […] between functions and 
departments, resulting in superior competi-
tive position and firm performance” 
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(Melville et al. 2004) (Piccoli and Ives 2005) (Wade and Hulland 2004) 
Category IP Resources Category IP Resources Category IP Resources 
Technology 
characteris-
tics 
Visibility, uniqueness, complexity 
Implemen-
tation proc-
ess charac-
teristics 
Complexity, process change 
 
Market 
responsive-
ness 
“abilities to develop and manage projects 
rapidly […] and to react quickly to changes 
in market conditions” “A key aspect of mar-
ket responsiveness is strategic flexibility, 
which allows the organization to undertake 
strategic change when necessary” 
IS develop-
ment 
“capability to develop or experiment with 
new technologies [… and …] alertness to 
emerging technologies and trends”  
 
 
Cost-
effective IS 
operations 
“the ability to provide efficient […] IS opera-
tions on an ongoing basis [… to] develop a 
cost leadership position” “the ability to avoid 
[…] cost overruns, unnecessary downtime, 
and system failure is likely to be an important 
precursor to superior performance” 
Table 8: Comparison of recent IP resource classifications following the RBV 
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2.3.3 Information strategy as a plan for the whole “IP domain” 
While the previous conceptions emphasize the “strategy” part of information strategy, the 
articles counted in this conception focus on the “information” or “IP” part.  
The anchor for such an information strategy is neither business strategy nor competitive the-
ory but rather the elements of the IP “domain.” We define the IP domain as the collection of 
all IP artifacts and other objects (e.g. IP budget, applications, infrastructure, and personnel). 
The assumption underlying this conception is that different IP elements17 within the IP do-
main have to be planned. This planning happens on strategic, tactical, and operational levels. 
An information strategy is then the plan for IP elements on a strategic level: “the [information 
strategy] model is specifically structured to ensure that the necessary strategic issues have 
been examined, before information systems management are asked to draw up detailed tacti-
cal and operational plans” (Hayward 1987).  
An information strategy in this sense answers the question “What are the IP elements that 
have to be planned on a strategic level?” Unfortunately, the “strategic” part is rarely expli-
cated or substantiated with reasoning. Digging deeper into some of the (few) reasons pro-
vided, we found two of them. On the one hand, some articles allude to long-term firm per-
formance. For example, Reponen (1994) proposes that business performance18 “arises from a 
good understanding and good management of the whole IS field, and not only from the com-
petitive applications of IT.” Conrath et al. (1992) state that “a sound, strategic IS plan is able 
to induce significant change in the organization’s performance by fundamentally changing the 
way the organization does business”. On the other hand, we find the logic of avoiding risks or 
negative impacts. For example, Hayward (1987) states that strategic IP planning needs to 
“bring an out-of-control IS function into line” and to avoid the “technology traps” and “incon-
sistency” of technologies, because otherwise “an organization may be tied to” these decisions. 
Similarly, Lucas and Turner (1982) talk about “controlling information processing.” If a com-
pany has no control of information processing, “it may be depriving itself of the opportunity 
to gain a major competitive advantage through the creative use of technology.” They add that 
“effective control of information processing is a necessary prerequisite to the integration of 
technology with strategy. If information processing is viewed as a failure [out of control], 
managers will refuse to rely on it for a major role in the formation and execution of corporate 
strategy.” In summary, while we have found a “positive” logic underlying the strategic char-
                                                 
17
 We do not use the term “IP resources” in order to avoid confusion with RBV terminology.  
18
 In fact, he uses the term “competitive advantage” but uses it indiscriminately with desirable firm performance. 
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acter of IP decisions (use IT to gain positive strategic impacts) so far, we now find a rather 
“negative” logic (plan IP to avoid negative strategic – i.e. irreversible, significant, organiza-
tion-wide – impacts). 
The articles arrive at IP elements in one of two ways: either inductively or deductively. In 
those taking the inductive route, a list of IP elements (and related decisions on these ele-
ments19) to be included in an information strategy is presented. This list is generated bottom-
up through a literature review and potentially also validated empirically by asking practitio-
ners to rank the elements by perceived importance. In the deductive approach, a certain logic 
for structuring the information strategy content is presented up front. Here, the resulting deci-
sion areas (i.e. groupings of IP elements) are also related to each other. These two approaches 
are discussed below separately. 
2.3.3.1 Information strategy as an issue list 
Here, information strategy is defined through a list of decisions or decision areas (groups of 
IP elements comprising the IP domain) that are considered strategic. The proposed lists are 
derived inductively either from the authors’ experience (Pyburn 1983; Wexelblat and Sriniva-
san 1999) or stated in a normative fashion (Conrath et al. 1992; Lederer and Salmela 1996; 
Reponen 1994). Alternatively, propositions from the literature are accumulated eclectically 
(Das et al. 1991). In the end, an issue list can take a more or less structured form if the issues 
are grouped bottom-up. Table 9 shows a selection of the issues lists in our article base. 
Source Proposed content How is the list derived? 
(Conrath et al. 
1992) 
Statement of objectives for the MIS function  
Hardware plan  
Projection of the future MIS technology  
Recommended implementation plan 
Systems development plan including potential project descriptions 
with associated priority rankings 
Financial plan 
Personnel plan  
Facilities plan  
Projection of possible future user environment  
Organization plan 
Education plan 
With reference to 
(McLean and Soden 
1977). The items are 
ranked empirically 
through a survey. 
(McLean and Soden 1977, 
pp. 69) propose the list 
normatively and have it 
ranked through a survey. 
 
                                                 
19
 Given that we defined the content of information strategy as decisions, these would then be decisions on these 
elements. If these are not stated directly in the articles, they again have to be inferred. For example, if the appli-
cation portfolio is an IP element within the IP domain, there are still several decisions to be made vis-à-vis this 
element, such as selection of applications for the portfolio, definition of criteria for doing so, deciding on who 
will be making these decisions, etc. Hence, the application portfolio is a “decision area” rather than a decision in 
itself. 
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Projection of possible future industry environment 
Summary of strengths and weaknesses of staff 
Comparison of past IS performance vs. plan 
Alternate strategies 
(Lederer and 
Salmela 
1996)  
Summary of organization’s IT strategy 
Data and application plan (initial data entities, high-level specification 
of applications, requirements for data management, security and train-
ing, tools for system development and maintenance, cost, benefits, 
risks, and resource requirements resulting from the plan) 
Change management plan: actions that will facilitate adoption of IS 
plan 
HR plan: newly required IS skills, new roles/responsibilities 
Technical architecture of hardware, supporting databases and system 
software 
Migration plan: overall approach, key projects, their order of imple-
mentation with cost, benefits, risks of each project 
Process description: annually updating the plan 
Appendix 
The list is provided with a 
reference to (Lederer and 
Gardiner 1992). Their list 
relies on a planning 
method used by a consult-
ing company (Method/1). 
(Das et al. 
1991) 
Distinctive competence emphasized in strategic MIS planning (cost of 
information, information differentiation for different applications, 
specialized information for specific market niches) 
Dominant information processing technology 
Level of computerization of the MIS function 
Sources from which the firm obtains its IS technology 
Contribution of MIS department to systems design and development 
Medium through which MIS contributes 
Technical processes through which MIS are managed and controlled 
Organizational structure of the MIS unit 
Administrative policies used to motivate and manage employees in 
MIS department 
Derived from literature 
review including overall 
IS plans (not necessarily 
strategic). 
(Pyburn 
1983) 
A general hardware and software architecture 
A technology assessment program to identify new opportunities made 
feasible by new technology 
A prioritization and evaluation methodology to allocate scarce devel-
opment resources to the highest payoff areas 
An agreed upon relationship between business strategy and IS strategy 
to ensure that systems requirements that are most critical to the success 
of the firm are met 
Presented as summary of 
participating managers’ 
statements. 
(Tai and 
Phelps 2000) 
Three dimensions: 
IT vision: the main organizational impact that IT systems are intended 
to have/role of IT (automate, informate up and down, transform) 
Technological IT issues: choice and management of hardware, soft-
ware, networks, data systems 
IT support for knowledge management: ability to store and retrieve 
information relevant to tasks and decision processes 
Referencing Pervan 
(1998) who provides an 
empirically ranked list of 
CEO’s issues with regard 
to IT. 
(Wexelblat 
and Sriniva-
san 1999) 
Foundational definitions for the organization’s computing, networking, 
and telecommunications: policies, practices, methods, initiatives, op-
erational and maintenance concepts, guidelines, and so forth  
Proposals or even decisions on retiring older systems  
Guidance on what shall be done internally, what by contract, and what 
does not need to be done at all 
Normative proposal; 
partially based on one 
case. 
(Reponen 
1994) 
External opportunities for using IT as a competitive weapon Normative proposal. 
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Internal opportunities for supporting competitiveness by means of IT 
Other application areas of IT 
Organizing the information management function 
Rough architecture of IT 
Estimation of the IT capacity needs 
Estimation of the benefits of strategy realization 
Table 9: Articles understanding information strategy as an issue list 
The table documents that the proposed lists differ in several ways. First, they differ in the 
number as well as in the content of the items proposed as part of an information strategy. Sec-
ond, they provide different levels of detail. Some proposals remain rather vague regarding 
what has to be decided. For example, what is a “hardware plan”? Does it define capacities 
needed or should it go down to the level of actual products? Other proposals are very clear on 
the decisions that have to be made (e.g. decisions on retiring older systems). Consequently, 
there is no easy way to summarize all of the proposals that fall into this category other than by 
their formal representation (as a more or less structured list that has been built bottom-up) and 
their implicit aim to be fairly exhaustive in planning the “IP domain.” 
However, it is extremely difficult to assess whether the proposed lists are indeed exhaustive. 
One reason for this is that the authors do not explain why the lists can be assumed to be com-
prehensive. Another reason is that more often than not, no obvious structure is provided. An 
exception is given by Das, Zahra, and Warkentin (1991, p. 957), who sort their nine catego-
ries (see Table 9) into four groups. They come up with the groups “distinctive competence,” 
“information systems technology,” “systems design and development,” and “MIS infrastruc-
ture.” This structure reduces the complexity of the list. Still, such a structure remains artifi-
cial, because it is applied to a “range of issues” (Galliers 1993). Instead of presenting a logic 
up front and deriving the proposed items from this logic, the structure is applied to the collec-
tion of items ex post.  
2.3.3.2 Information strategy as a system of plans 
In contrast to the inductive approach, the deductive approach derives the elements of the IP 
domain (decision areas) and their relations by logical considerations a priori or top-down. By 
delineating decision areas and proposing relations between these areas, the structure becomes 
a system of decision areas or sub-strategies that are interrelated. The different sub-strategies 
address specific questions related to the long-term development of parts of the “IP domain” 
such as the application portfolio, the IT architecture, or the information function. The pro-
posed decision areas differ, as do the relations between them. Table 10 presents an overview 
of information strategy models used together with the logic provided to structure the content 
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of information strategy. Consider the following examples from the table to illustrate the dif-
ferences in components and logic: Earl (1989) proposes structuring the IP domain by asking 
for “the what,” “the how,” and “the who.”20 This results in the parts of information systems 
(IS: applications: what do the business users want?), information technology (IT: how are the 
applications delivered?) and information management (IM: who is responsible for delivering 
the systems via the technology?). Accordingly, information strategy is structured into IT, IS, 
and IM strategy. (Galliers 1991) argues that information systems are socio-technical systems 
and hence are not only about technology, but also about human resources. This leads him to 
add an IP-related HR sub-strategy. He structures information systems strategy into informa-
tion strategy, IT strategy, IM strategy, HR strategy, and change management strategy. Hen-
derson and Venkatraman (1993) propose structuring information strategy in analogy to what 
they believe to be the structure of business strategy (e.g. in IT scope, IT capabilities, etc.). 
Article Information strategy model used/components of informa-
tion strategy 
Logic for structuring IP 
domain 
(Henderson 
and 
Venkatraman 
1993) 
External domain: how the firm is positioned in the I/T market-
place 
1 IT scope: technologies (e.g. LAN/WAN) that support cur-
rent/shape new business strategy initiatives 
2 Systemic competences: attributes of I/T strategy (system 
reliability, flexibility, interconnectivity) can contribute posi-
tively to/shape business strategy 
3 I/T governance: mechanisms (e.g. joint venture) for obtain-
ing the I/T competences 
Internal domain: how the I/S infrastructure should be config-
ured and managed 
4 I/S architecture: choices defining the application portfolio, 
configuration of hardware/software/communication, data archi-
tecture 
5 I/S processes: work processes central to the operations of I/S 
infrastructure 
6 I/S skills: choices regarding the acquisition, training of the 
knowledge required to manage and operate I/S infrastructure 
However, it is unclear whether the external and internal do-
main are part of IT strategy. On the one hand, “I/T strategy 
should be articulated in terms of an external domain and an 
internal domain” (p. 6). On the other hand, Figure 1 in the 
article depicts only the external domain as part of “I/T strat-
egy.” 
Analogy to business strategy: 
business strategy is claimed 
to consist of scope, compe-
tences, and governance. 
Hence, an information strat-
egy should be built in com-
pliance with this structure.  
 
                                                 
20
 Earl changed original “wherefore” later to “who”  
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(Hayward 
1987) 
1 Strategic requirements plan: organizational objectives and 
strategies, IS mission related to business strategies; assessment 
of environment, IS policies, objectives & strategies  
2 Management strategy: policies, objectives and strategies for 
management of the IS function (reporting and control struc-
ture; degree of decentralization; standards, security, education)  
3 Application strategy: information requirement of the enter-
prise, resource/priority allocation, project planning; informa-
tion architecture  
4 Technology strategy: data strategy, communications strategy, 
distribution strategy, software strategy, supplier  
Applications are argued to be 
mainly inward oriented while 
technology is argued to be 
mainly outward oriented, i.e. 
dependent on the IT market. 
No logic provided for sepa-
rating the other two sub-
domains. 
(Lucas and 
Turner 1982) 
1 Selection of application areas/types of applications 
2 Operations needs 
3 Implications for staff and equipment 
4 Organizational structure of IS function (central vs. decentral) 
5 Charging 
Processual/sequential struc-
ture. 
(Smits et al. 
1997) (Smits 
and van der 
Poel 1996) 
“Scope, objectives, architectures, rules and plans” citing (Earl 
1989)  
Scope: “types of IT covered” 
Objectives: “targets set for the information function, and the 
linkages between these targets and the business objectives” 
Architectures: “applications, […] hardware elements that sup-
port the [applications …] in the form of an infrastructure [… 
and] the distribution of tasks and responsibilities for IT and IS” 
Rules: “guidelines and standards (or policies) […] such as a 
hurdle rate for investments [or] rules concerning make-or-buy 
decisions” 
Plans: “normally limited to priorities and budgets and do not 
include detailed design and project plans” 
The authors themselves do 
not provide reasoning; Earl 
(1989) provides a different 
structure (see below). 
(Brady et al. 
1992) 
(Earl 1989) “triangle model” IT domain should be broken 
down into “IS”, “IT”, “IM” in 
response to the questions 
“what,” “how,” “wherefore” 
(later changed to “who”) 
(Galliers 
1991) 
Claims to extend (Earl 1989); in fact, the model is quite differ-
ent. 
1 Information strategy: required information to support busi-
ness strategy formulation and business processes 
2 Information management strategy 
3 Information technology strategy 
4 Change management strategy 
5 Human resource (IS-related) strategy 
Change management and HR 
strategy are added because 
information systems (or the 
“IS domain” in Galliers’ 
parlance) are socio-technical 
systems. Hence, the human 
aspects are as important as 
the technological aspects. 
(Flynn and 
Hepburn 
1994) 
Relies on a previous edition of (Ward and Peppard 2004) 
Business IS strategy: IS strategy/policies (standards for data 
sharing); application portfolio; information architecture  
IT strategy: information resource management (definitions of 
central IT unit role); management issues; technical means  
IS/IT management strategy: IS/IT organization; investment 
policies; IS accounting  
Same as Earl (1989). 
Table 10: Articles understanding information strategy as a system of plans 
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Again, the proposals differ too widely in terminology, number of components, and decisions 
on the components (if any) as well as logic (if any) and do not go into enough detail to allow 
the formation of a final synthesis regarding the implied content of information strategy. 
What we also see is that many of the articles in Table 10 (the last four) refer to textbooks (e.g. 
Earl 1989; Ward and Peppard 2004) that have elaborated considerations rather than to re-
search findings presented in articles. In fact, books or book chapters (e.g. Earl 1989; Galliers 
2004; Ward and Peppard 2004) and non-research articles, such as editorials (Galliers 1999; 
Galliers 1993a), have elaborated much more on information strategy than articles. Earl (1989) 
presented a very well-received proposition (cf. e.g.Galliers 1991; Ragu-Nathan et al. 2001; 
Ward and Peppard 2004). Meanwhile, it has undergone several extensions (Earl 1996; Earl 
2000) (see Figure 7 for the original and extended models). Since most of the referenced text-
book models of information strategy go back to Earl’s model (see Figure 6 for an “inheritance 
tree” derived by tracking the references used between the original descriptions of the models), 
we will discuss this model in some more detail. 
Explicit reference
Legend:
Claimed isomorphism
Galliers (2004)
Ward/Griffiths
(1997)
Earl (1989)
Triangle: IS, 
IT, IM Strategy
Galliers (1991)
„Socio-technical
perspective“
Ward/Peppard
(2004)
Earl (1996)
Organizational
Fit Framework
Henderson/Venkatraman (1993)
Strategic Alignment Model
Earl (2000)
Extension 
 
Figure 6: “Inheritance tree” of the most popular information strategy models 
Earl identifies three sub-domains (the “triangle model”) called “Information Systems (IS),” 
“Information Technology (IT),” and “Information Management (IM)” by asking “What has to 
be done?” “How does it have to be done?” and “Who should do it where?” (see Figure 7, a): 
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• IS strategy (see Earl 1989, pp. 67-94) addresses the application portfolio. As such, IS 
strategy comprises an “application development portfolio […], a ‘shopping list’ of ap-
plications and projects” (Earl 1989, p. 68). Labeling the portfolio as a “shopping list” 
already indicates that such an application portfolio comprises all kinds of applications, 
not only those that are related to business strategy, competitive advantage, or any other 
strategic business goals. In this sense, it is different from those applications portfolios 
mentioned in the first conception. Nevertheless, Earl characterized IS strategy as busi-
ness-led and demand-oriented in that it is about “aligning IS development with busi-
ness needs.”  
• IT strategy (see Earl 1989, pp. 95-116) is concerned with technology policies and ad-
dresses questions related to computer, communication, data, and application architec-
tures. Each of these architectures is described by a set of design parameters, schemas 
(models or blueprints), policies and goals as well as plans to achieve these goals. Ac-
cording to Earl, the structure of IT strategy is a matrix of elements (computing, com-
munications, data, and applications) and levels (parameters, schemas, policies, and 
plans). IT strategy is regarded as the supply side of the IS strategy. This becomes evi-
dent when Earl equates IT strategy with the “how” in contrast to the “what” of IS 
strategy. Furthermore, he explicitly holds IT strategy to be supply-oriented and tech-
nology-focused, and sees its main purpose as being “to ensure efficient (especially re-
liable) and effective delivery of the IS strategy” (Earl 1996, p. 495). Thus, in his view, 
IT strategy is subordinate to IS strategy. 
• IM strategy (see Earl 1989, pp. 117-128) “guides how the organization should run 
IS/IT activities” (Earl 1989, p. 117). It includes decisions on “the role and structure of 
IT activities in the organisation,” “relationships between specialists and users and be-
tween the centre and divisions or business units,” “management controls for IT,” 
“management responsibilities,” “performance measurement,” and “management proc-
esses” (Earl 1989, p. 65). Earl summarizes IM strategy as being “concerned mainly 
with the relationship between the IS/IT function and the rest of the business” (Earl 
1989, p. 118).  
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Figure 7: Earl’s original information strategy model and its extensions 
Presenting information strategy as a system of plans extends enumerative lists with respect to 
structure and reasoning. Still, these systems leave important questions open. Especially the 
reasoning used to support the models is not based on theory but on common sense or analogy. 
This includes the reasoning for including exactly the proposed elements as well as the rela-
tions between them. 
• For example, Earl bases his mode on common sense, posing the three questions 
of “what,” “how,” and “who.” Accordingly, the strategic relevance of the plan-
ning sub-domains and the reasons for their distinction remain unproven. Earl 
(1996, p. 499) himself feels that his model is “not […] either complete or fully 
validated.” Thus, it is not surprising that he later (Earl 2000) adds another do-
main labeled “information as a resource” (see Figure 7, c). The interrelation-
ships among the domains – first covered in an extension of the original model 
(see Figure 7, b) – and the relations between each domain and business strategy 
remain ambiguous. However, Earl himself perceives this as a problem and ad-
dresses it in a later publication (Earl 1996) by proposing interrelationships be-
tween business strategy and the three information strategy domains presented 
earlier. But even in this work, he admits that his proposals remain “conjec-
tural” (Earl 1996, p. 491). Other authors have also observed that “the relation-
ship between […] IT, IS and information management (IM) are unclear” 
((Allen and Wilson 1996) citing (Boaden and Lockett 1991)). 
• Another example is furnished by Henderson and Venkatraman (1993), who 
make an analogy to an assumed mainstream understanding of business strategy 
to distinguish different decision areas of information strategy. Using analogy to 
propose components of strategy construes something that “looks like a strat-
egy,” but does not necessarily link to strategic impact. For example, they argue 
that scope is a component of business strategy and thus is also part of informa-
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tion strategy. However, they do not link the scope component of information 
strategy to the scope of the firm. They simply argue that if business strategy 
has a scope component, then information strategy should, too. While business 
scope refers to “which businesses to be in,” information strategy scope refers 
to the technologies to be used within the company.  
Merely from looking at the graphical representation of these models (e.g. Figure 7), some of 
the reasoning seems to be hidden in the ‘black box’ termed “business strategy”. This short-
coming in reasoning of the proposed decision areas has led other authors to question their 
strategic relevance: “‘IS strategy (which concerns the application portfolio) and ‘IT strategy’ 
(which includes technology policies such as architecture and standards) may be in no way 
strategic in themselves” (Knights et al. 1997, p. 31). 
Despite these open questions – which equally apply to the other models proposed or refer-
enced in the articles – a number of articles build on these models (see tables above) without 
questioning their validity.  
Information strategy in this conception is a strategy in its own right, i.e. separate from busi-
ness strategy. As a consequence, it has been demanded to “align” both strategies in order to 
achieve consistency in managerial decisions. This also becomes obvious from the graphical 
representations of the models proposed by the authors in which separate graphical elements 
(boxes) are used for business strategy and information strategy (cf. Figure 7, b).  
2.3.4 Information strategy as a functional strategy  
A number of authors define information strategy as a “functional strategy” (e.g. Adler et al. 
1992; Smits et al. 1997; Smits and van der Poel 1996). This perception is even more prevalent 
in textbooks (Boddy et al. 2005, pp. 90; Lehner 1993, p. 16; McLeod 1998, p. 40, 48). Label-
ing information strategy as a functional strategy advocates the classification of strategies into 
either corporate, business unit, or functional strategies, which goes back to Vancil and Lo-
range (1975) (see Section  1.1.1).  
However, very few authors go beyond the mere classification of information strategy as a 
functional strategy (see Table 11). Adler et al. (1992) understand information strategy as the 
strategy of the IT unit. In this sense, information strategy can be compared to strategies of 
other functional units, like the marketing or R&D unit, recognizing that “all the functions 
manage their internal operations strategically” (Adler et al. 1992, p. 19). This implicitly fol-
lows the stance taken by researchers looking at “technology strategy [which] is a functional 
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strategy: a set of means and ends chosen within a specific function within a business unit” 
(Weiss and Birnbaum 1989, p. 1014). Such a functional strategy defines e.g. the “function’s 
overall posture and directions” (Adler et al. 1992, p. 20).  
In the original sense, a functional strategy would encompass departmental decisions that help 
to implement requirements of business strategy. However, in the articles we found, the infor-
mation function is equated with the IT unit (one of potentially many organizational entities of 
the function). The IT unit is characterized as a “business within a business” (Adler et al. 1992, 
p. 20; Ragu-Nathan et al. 2001, p. 271) or an “organization within an organization” (Ragu-
Nathan et al. 2001, p. 277) that requires “due attention to its key processes, resources, and 
internal and external linkages” (Adler et al. 1992, p. 20). As a business (Ragu-Nathan et al. 
(2001) state that “it is in the business of providing services to users within the organization 
who, therefore, may be regarded as customers” (p. 277)), it also requires its own (functional) 
“strateg[y] […] directed toward developing an end product (i.e. information systems) which is 
sought by users” (p. 278). Following such an understanding, the functional strategy is more 
independent of the business strategy than in the original sense. 
The starting anchor for an information strategy as a functional strategy is the information 
function (or IT unit), with its objectives. The question that is answered by such an information 
strategy is, “Which resources are needed to fulfill the functional or departmental objectives?” 
Consequently – in terms of content – a functional information strategy is restricted to deci-
sions that affect the information function and the IT department associated with it: its mission, 
sourcing of departmental resources, resource allocation within the IT unit, organization, etc.  
That information strategy in this understanding is separate from business strategy becomes 
clear in statements like “the function has a clear sense of its purpose and [...] its own, local-
ized mission” (Adler et al. 1992, p. 21). These statements suggest that the IT functional unit 
has a strategy that is separate from the overall business strategy and the other units’ functional 
strategies. However, unlike other functions, the use of information, information systems, etc. 
permeates the whole enterprise in almost every process (Porter and Millar 1985). This means 
that certain IP decisions “are not located solely in the IS function” (Peppard and Ward 2004, 
p. 177) and are hence left out by a functional information strategy. To address this issue to a 
certain extent, a number of authors propose aligning the information strategy with all other 
departmental strategies and overall business strategy (see Figure 8 according to (Boddy et al. 
2005, p. 91)).  
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Figure 8: The need to align a functional information strategy with all other functional strategies  
 
Article Information strategy components 
(Adler et al. 1992) 1 Posture and direction: mission, objectives, strategic plans of the 
function 
2 Policies (on processes (recruitment, development, project selection, 
quality assurance), resources (funding, facilities) and internal/external 
linkages (organizational structure, interfaces with other functions, 
links to external actors, approach to regulatory compliance)); allow 
managing technology as a “business”, “guiding day-to-day decision 
making” 
3 Adjustment processes: in order to adapt the technical functions strat-
egy, the strengths/weaknesses of the function’s capability and oppor-
tunities/threats from the market are assessed 
(Ragu-Nathan et al. 2001) “deals with management of the entire information systems function” 
“views an organization’s IS as a stand-alone ‘business within a busi-
ness’” 
The IT unit is a “business within a business” or an “organization 
within an organization” “It is in the business of providing services to 
users within the organization who, therefore, may be regarded as cus-
tomers: it is also in competition with these same customers for alloca-
tion of significant levels of organizational resources” 
“providing quality services to organizational customers […] requires a 
set of management strategies that are directed toward developing an 
end product (i.e. information systems) which is sought by users” 
Table 11: Articles understanding information strategy as a functional strategy 
2.3.5 Information strategy as the tenor towards IP  
The previous two conceptions cover a broad range of decisions as part of information strategy 
content. Works we counted in this third conception basically equate information strategy with 
answering only one central question, namely “What is our organization’s tenor towards IP 
and the use of IT?”  
The anchor is management’s attitude towards IP and/or the needs of the industry. Agreeing 
on a tenor provides the whole organization with a fundamental guideline giving an orientation 
for subsequent IP-related decisions. Other IP-related decisions are hence contingent on the 
chosen tenor. For example, a common tenor ensures that “all members are heading in the 
same direction” (Tai and Phelps 2000). This leads to “building some consensus regarding the 
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role of IS vis-à-vis the rest of the firm and the resources that will be committed to achieving 
that role.” (Pyburn 1983)  
The content of information strategy in this conception includes the decision on which tenor 
towards IP the organization should adopt and potentially also includes principles or maxims 
for breaking this tenor down into other decision areas, such as investing in IP, the role of the 
IT unit, etc. We find different proposals for alternative tenors in our article base; these are 
listed in Table 12. 
Some authors express the tenor towards IP in terms of IT’s role and significance. For exam-
ple, McFarlan (originally McFarlan et al. 1983; more recently Nolan and McFarlan 2006) 
suggests that any company can assign one of four roles to IT. Here, the role of IT is based on 
the perceived current and future “importance” of IT (more recently changed to the strategic 
and operational dependence of IT). This way, IT’s role can either be supportive, factory, turn-
around, or strategic. Here, it is important to note that a company has an information strategy 
even if IT is not seen to hold a “strategic” role. This is in contrast to the second conception 
(information strategy as the use of IT to gain competitive advantage): following the second 
conception there would be no information strategy if the company did not aim at using IT to 
gain competitive advantage.  
Other authors go beyond the role or significance of IT. Their alternative tenors prescribe a 
certain impetus for investing in and using IT in a certain way. For example, Tai and Phelps 
(2000) use the term “vision” to refer to the different uses of IT within a company. Following 
Zuboff (1988) and Schein (1992), they propose that there is a “vision to automate,” a “vision 
to informate up,” “to informate down,” and to “transform.” Chan et al. (1998; 1997b) propose 
“action,” “armor (defensive orientation),” “analysis and risk aversion,” and “anticipation (fu-
ture orientation)” as potential basic orientations towards IT use. These orientations integrate 
several dimensions of attitudes, such as aggressiveness and defensiveness, proactiveness vs. 
reactiveness, etc. Similarly, based on Szyperski (1981), Teubner (2007) distinguishes four 
different types of attitudes towards IT: momentum strategy, defensive strategy, moderate de-
velopment strategy, or aggressive strategy. Finally, Parsons (1983) (used e.g. in Kanungo et 
al. 2001; Ward 1987)21 defines several roles played by IP in the form of “generic IT strate-
gies” (the use of generic IT strategies reinforces that information strategy is again viewed as a 
separate strategy here). As is already obvious from their labels, these generic strategies ex-
                                                 
21
 Notably, Parsons (1987) presented his ideas in a teaching note. The fact that research articles rely on teaching 
notes rather than other peer-reviewed research notes serves as another indication for the poor state of information 
strategy research. 
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press a tenor on at least two dimensions: on the one hand, the generic strategies labeled “lead-
ing edge,” “necessary evil,” and “scarce resource” reflect the management’s attitude towards 
IT. On the other hand, generic strategies such as “free market,” “centrally planned,” and “mo-
nopoly” express a stance that is more geared towards fundamental IP governance configura-
tions, i.e. the distribution of IP decision rights among organizational stakeholders (cf. Weill 
and Ross 2004). 
Source Proposed types of tenor towards IP as information strategies 
(Kanungo et al. 2001) Relies on “generic IT strategy types” (Parsons 1983): centrally planned, 
leading edge, free markets, monopoly, scarce resources, and necessary 
evil 
(Ward 1987) Relies on “generic IT strategy types” (Parsons 1983); mapping them to 
business strategies (Porter’s generic strategies), IS evolutionary stages 
(Nolan’s stage hypothesis), and role of IT (McFarlan’s strategic grid) 
(Ragu-Nathan et al. 2001) Dimensions of the strategy construct:  
1 Aggressive promotion of IS: strategies for marketing the product of 
the IS “business” to organizational customers 
2 Analysis-based development of IS: nature of management processes in 
planning, controlling, and making decisions about the IS function 
3 Defensive management of IS: management actions targeted to protect 
existing practices, procedures, and configurations (and IS) 
4 Future-oriented development of IS: forward-looking posture (e.g. 
systems to track future trends in place) 
5 Proactive management of IS: Does the IS function seek out new sys-
tems opportunities on its own? Is it at the forefront of trying out new 
technologies? 
6 Conservative management of IS: Are risks associated with strategic 
systems recognized in the planning processes? 
(Tai and Phelps 2000)  Adapted from (Schein 1992; Zuboff 1988): “Visions of the role of IT”: 
Vision to automate 
Vision to informate up 
Vision to informate down 
Vision to transform 
(Teubner 2007) following 
(Szyperski 1981) 
Momentum strategy 
Defensive strategy 
Moderate development strategy 
Aggressive strategy 
Table 12: Articles understanding information strategy as the tenor towards IP 
2.4 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES AMONG CONCEPTIONS 
Given the different conceptions, we would like to discuss three salient observations in terms 
of differences and commonalities among them: the first concerns the level of independence of 
information strategy from business strategy; the second concerns the reasoning or theoretical 
basis used to support the different conceptions; it also concerns the differences in information 
strategy content; the last one focuses on other aspects of strategic IP decisions stressed by 
each conception. 
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2.4.1 Information strategy: part of business strategy or strategy in its own right? 
The first two conceptions (referred to as the first group of conceptions) define information 
strategy in terms of the relation of IP (mostly centering around IT or IS) to business strategy. 
Following these two conceptions, information strategy is the part of business/competitive 
strategy that relates to IP. In the last three conceptions (the second group), information strat-
egy is defined as a strategy in its own right that exists separately from business strategy (see 
Figure 9 for a simplified visualization of the core differences of the two conceptions). 
Business 
strategy
Information 
strategyAlignment
needed
Group 2: Information strategy as a strategy in its own right
Group 1: Information strategy defined through the relation of IP to business strategy
Business 
strategy IPInformation 
strategy
Business 
strategy
Information strategy
= IP-related part of
business strategy
 
Figure 9: Information strategy as part of business strategy or as a strategy in its own right  
This difference has implications for theories that make use of the information strategy con-
struct. In particular, strategic IT alignment theory (Henderson and Venkatraman 1999) can 
actually only be applied if information strategy is understood as a strategy in its own right. 
Only the separation of information strategy from business strategy calls for the alignment of 
both strategies in the original sense. If information strategy decisions are part of business 
strategy, alignment is inherent: the question “How can IT support business strategy?” cannot 
be answered without considering alignment with business strategy.  
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2.4.2 Differences in reasoning and content 
Beyond viewing information strategy as a strategy in itself or as part of business strategy, 
there are other characteristics shared by the conceptions in each of the two groups. 
The two conceptions “using IT to support business strategy” and “using IT to gain competi-
tive advantage” rely on established business strategy concepts and theories from management 
studies, respectively. This provides accepted reasoning for the content proposals. In other 
words, the underlying theories provide backing for the claim that the respective decisions are 
strategic and should hence be part of an information strategy. In contrast, the last three con-
ceptions do not rely on established theories from management studies. 
Information strategy 
conception: informa-
tion strategy as … 
Information strategy content Reasoning 
… the use of IT to de-
liver business strategy 
Selection of information systems that support a given 
business strategy/objectives 
Support a given business 
strategy 
… the use of IT to gain 
competitive advantage 
Selection of strategic information systems (SIS) 
Selection of IP resources that are strategic (valuable, rare, 
not imitable, etc.) or that act as barriers to the imitation of 
a competitive advantage, either by themselves or in com-
bination with other (non-IP) resources. 
Support gaining and 
sustaining competitive 
advantage 
Table 13: Information strategy content and reasoning in the first two conceptions 
Unlike the first two conceptions, the other ones (information strategy as a separate strategy) 
are more detailed on the content, but often lack underpinning with reasoning. These concep-
tions do not rely on well-established strategy concepts and theories from management studies; 
instead, unique concepts have been created. But so far, these concepts have received relatively 
little theoretical grounding. The implication for research is that within these conceptions of 
information strategy, much more work on theory-generation is required. Also, the information 
strategy content in these conceptions usually stays on the level of decision areas (e.g. the ap-
plication portfolio, IT architecture, etc.) – i.e. IP elements or groups of IP elements – that re-
quire strategic decision-making. What the exact strategic decisions should be is not the focus 
of these works. Table 14 summarizes the implications for information strategy content and 
reasoning as derived from the second group of conceptions.  
Information strategy 
conception: informa-
tion strategy as … 
Information strategy content Reasoning 
… a plan for all IP ele-
ments 
Decision areas that comprise IP elements; what the deci-
sions within these decision areas are depends on the 
structure applied; (e.g. IS: application portfolio, IT: IT 
architectures, IM: functional issues) 
IP elements need to be 
planned strategically (to 
affect long-term per-
formance or avoid loss 
of control) 
… a functional strategy Decisions on functional/departmental issues, including its Every department needs 
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mission and objectives, as well as on all the resources 
needed to fulfill them (human, financial, technical, etc.) 
a strategy; need to run 
department as a business 
within a business 
… the principal tenor 
towards IP 
Choice of tenor towards IP (role and significance of IP or 
direction for the use of IT) 
Gives direction for all 
subsequent IP decisions 
Table 14: Information strategy content and reasoning in the last three conceptions 
From these tables, it is evident that the different conceptions emphasize different decisions as 
part of information strategy. In other words, the answer to the question “What constitutes an 
information strategy, i.e. what is its content?” depends very much on the conception of infor-
mation strategy being followed.  
2.4.3 Other aspects of strategic IP decisions 
The different conceptions also draw the attention to different aspects of strategic IP decisions. 
The first conception alludes to a positive relation of strategic IP decisions to strategic business 
decisions: strategic IP decisions are supportive of business strategy decisions. The second one 
implies that strategic IP decisions generate a certain impact regarded as strategic, namely 
competitive advantage. The third conception focuses very much on the different IP elements 
as objects of the strategic IP decisions. The fourth conception emphasizes the organizational 
level on which strategic IP decisions are made. Finally, the fifth conception stresses the co-
herence and guiding characteristic of strategic IP decisions. 
* * * 
Table 15 summarizes the discussion of the different conceptions of information strategy.
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Conceptions Information strategy defined 
through the relation of IP to busi-
ness strategy 
Inf. strategy as a strategy in its own right 
 
Inf. strategy 
as... 
… the use of IT 
to deliver busi-
ness strategy 
… the use of IT 
to gain competi-
tive advantage 
… a strategic 
plan for the 
whole IP do-
main 
… a functional 
strategy 
… the tenor 
towards IP 
Theoretical 
backing 
Strategy concepts and theories 
(MBV, RBV) from strategic man-
agement studies 
Concepts original to IS research are created; less theo-
retical grounding so far 
Implications 
for research 
Because information strategy deci-
sions cannot be made independ-
ently of business strategy, there is 
an intrinsic alignment 
Because information strategy decisions can be made 
independently from business strategy, an explicit 
alignment is needed 
Stressed aspects 
of strategic IP 
decisions  
Relation to 
business strat-
egy (strategic IP 
decisions sup-
port business 
strategy) 
Competitive 
impact (com-
petitive advan-
tage) 
IP decision 
objects  
Organizational 
level (functional 
level) 
Coherence 
through a con-
sistent attitude 
towards IP 
Table 15: Summary of information strategy conceptions and their differences 
We identified different content and reasoning of information strategy from literature. So far, 
these conceptions are only constructs used by researchers. Nothing has been said explicitly 
about the relevance of these conceptions in practice (e.g. which conception do practitioners 
follow? However, most probably, researchers assume that practitioners follow their concep-
tion). The next section looks at those articles in our research base that employed their concep-
tion in empirical work. This will give us a first hint of information strategy in practice.     
2.5 EXTANT RESEARCH ON INFORMATION STRATEGY IN PRACTICE 
Of the articles we identified in the literature analysis, slightly fewer than 50 percent had em-
pirical content from practice. Of those, not a single article was devoted to researching the 
practitioners’ original understanding and thinking vis-à-vis information strategy. Instead, all 
of the articles applied one of the conceptions described in the previous section.  
As stated before, most of these articles answered questions other than “What are the content 
and reasoning of information strategy in practice?” For example, empirical articles following 
the first two conceptions instead answered the question of how the use of IT has supported 
business strategies or how it has led to competitive advantage in practice.  
Hence, only a handful of the articles provide results that shed light on information strategy 
content in practice. Furthermore, the appropriateness of the findings following from this kind 
of research has to be considered warily for the following reasons: first, although there are 
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multiple conceptions of information strategy in academia, we don’t know which ones are used 
in practice. Simply assuming that the conception promoted in a given article is also prevalent 
in all companies in practice is a dangerous leap. Secondly, the conceptions of information 
strategy content in academia are mostly not well reasoned. The authors of the articles gener-
ally do not provide adequate reasons for choosing one conception over another. In this re-
spect, their choices seem to be random.  
Despite these shortcomings, the academic findings up to now should still be looked at, even if 
we know that they have to be considered warily.  
The findings of extant research cover three broad issues: first, the findings confirm that in-
formation strategies exist in practice. However, not all companies have information strategies. 
Practitioners’ own understanding of information strategy also seems to differ to a large extent 
from researchers’ understanding. Second, certain findings indicate that some practitioners 
perceive information strategy as a functional strategy, but that this is a minority view. Many 
practitioners seem to view information strategy as a way to gain competitive advantage. There 
are indications (though not representative) that practitioners do not use models proposed in 
academia that follow the conception of information strategy as a plan for the whole IP do-
main. Thirdly, we see that not all decision areas are accorded the same importance in informa-
tion strategies and that there is no consensus on which ones are important. We neither learn 
why the decisions are considered strategic in practice nor in which circumstances. These find-
ings are detailed in the following paragraphs. 
2.5.1 The existence of information strategies in practice 
Following our argumentation for the relevance of SIP in general and information strategy in 
particular in Chapter 1, it is self-evident that practitioners deal with information strategy (oth-
erwise, it would be difficult to explain why the topic is ranked among the top concerns of IT 
executives for many years now (e.g. Galliers 1993b; Luftman et al. 2006; McGee et al. 2005; 
Watson et al. 1997).  
Hence, it is not surprising that studies confirm that it is common to have an information strat-
egy in practice. For example, Wilson (1989) found that almost three fourths of the UK’s 
Times 500 companies claimed to have an information strategy. In financial services compa-
nies in the UK, 85% made the same claim. However, if adhering closely to his own character-
istics of an information strategy and the planning process (“formally documented […] initi-
ated by the Board […] monitored by planned reviews […]”), the figure drops to 13% (from 
75%!) for Times 500 and 22% for financial services companies.  
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These results demonstrate two aspects: first, not all companies seem to have an information 
strategy. Second, we have to be careful with the answer to the question of whether an organi-
zation has an information strategy or not. The authors of empirical studies use certain concep-
tions of information strategy. These conceptions not only differ from author to author, as we 
demonstrated in Section 2.3, but also seem to differ from the ones used in practice: the vaguer 
information strategy is defined, the more practitioners agree to have an information strategy. 
Apparently, practitioners seem to view different decisions as part of information strategy than 
the researchers of the studies (otherwise there would not be such an immense drop as reported 
in the study). This confirms our earlier statement made in Chapter 1 about the gap between 
research and practice with regards to information strategy content. Hence, the resulting ques-
tion (which is not answered by the extant empirical studies sufficiently) is: What exactly is the 
content of information strategy in practice and why do practitioners care about exactly this 
content? We deal with this question in Chapter 3. 
2.5.2 Conceptions used among practitioners 
As in the research literature, a number of conceptions seem to be employed in practice. How-
ever, there has not been any research aimed at identifying what these are. Up to now, re-
searchers have instead (implicitly) relied on their own conceptions. Hence, we can only re-
construct the findings of different works with the caveat that their results might not actually 
jibe with reality. 
In practice, information strategy is sometimes perceived as a functional strategy. However, 
this view is not necessarily widespread. For example, Wilson (1989) reports that around 6% 
of the UK Times 500 companies that have an information strategy state that “information sys-
tems strategy is a departmental function, rather than a corporate function.” Codington and 
Wilson (1994) report that of the insurance firms in the UK possessing an information strategy, 
9% perceive it as a “departmental matter.” Whether the “departmental matter” status means 
that the information strategy is considered a functional strategy remains unclear, however. 
Conrath et al. (1992, p. 376) find that information strategy in Canadian organizations is de-
veloped “from an IS rather than a corporate perspective.” While not directly supported by 
their survey data, they “expect to find that virtually every department develops their strategy 
from an internal perspective [due to…] organizational politics.” We might interpret this as an 
indication that they also expect information strategy to be understood as a functional strategy 
in organizations. 
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Practitioners do not seem to follow the most prominent models proposed in academia within 
the conception “information strategy as a plan for the whole IP domain.” At least this is is 
confirmed by earlier research reporting “differences within and between organizations, but 
particularly in comparison to the academic literature” (Brady et al. 1992, p. 183). Referring to 
Earl’s model of IT, IS, and IM strategy, Brady et al. (1992) state that “[w]hile it is useful to 
distinguish between these different types of information strategy, the research reveals that 
delineating between the three is infrequently done by organizations” (p. 187). For one UK 
metropolitan council, Flynn and Hepburn (1994) found major deviations between their “refer-
ence model” (based on an earlier version of the one proposed in (Ward and Peppard 2004)) 
and practices in the case company. These findings support the claim made in the introduction, 
namely that there is a disconnection between research and practice with respect to information 
strategy conceptions. On the other hand, practitioners find it possible to respond to question-
naires that present information strategy as a mere “list of issues” (Conrath et al. 1992; Wilson 
1989), which indicates that there are certain overlaps though. The findings also demonstrate 
the prevalent approach to empirical research in the field of information strategy up to now: 
despite the fact that the proposed models are not well reasoned and do not find wide support 
in practice, they are nevertheless used in research and assumed (despite evidence to the con-
trary) to be the conceptions that practitioners actually use. What becomes clear is that at this 
stage of research, it is much more sensible to investigate how practitioners understand and 
what they subsume under information strategies (which we do in the next chapter). 
2.5.3 Content of practitioners’ information strategies 
A few articles conducted surveys that asked practitioners to rank the relevance of a given list 
of decision areas assumed to be part of information strategy. Unfortunately, none of these 
articles explain the decision areas in detail; they merely provide names for the areas.  
The studies present a heterogeneous picture with no obvious conformity among decision ar-
eas, which makes it difficult to identify the dominant elements of an information strategy (see 
Table 16 below).  
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IT function objectives 1 7‡   X 
Role of IT / IT unit   X X X 
Technology trends to watch 3/9**     
Plan for HW/IT resources 2 3  X  
Plan for IS (portfolio, ranked list) 5 1,2,5,8 
*** 
 X  
Plan for financial resources 6     
Plan for human resources 7 8‡‡    
Plan for education 11 8‡‡    
Organizational plan 10  X† (X)†† X††† 
Plan for facilities 8     
Plan for implementation of strategy 4    X 
Industry trends to watch 12*     
Strengths and weaknesses of staff 13*     
Strategy review results 14*     
Alternative IT strategies 15*     
Overall IT architecture (data, applications, technology) and 
standards 
 4  X  
Standards only   X X  
Vendor policies    X  
Table 16: Items tested for their importance in practitioners’ information strategies 
Legend for Table 16: 
 * Fewer than 50% of respondents actually included this item in their information strategy 
 ** Survey differentiated between various application domains of IT 
 *** Survey differentiated between different types of IS 
 
‡ Specific goal mentioned: improved efficiency 
 
‡‡ 
“Development of appropriate staff resources” 
 
† Creation of decision committee (governance mechanism) 
 
†† Wide difference noted among organizations 
 
††† 40% of respondents included assignments of responsibilities and reporting mechanisms  
  (governance) 
2.5.4 Purpose of information strategy in practice 
We found only one article (Teo and Ang 2000) whose title (“How useful are strategic plans 
for information strategy?”) indicated some sort of reasoning vis-à-vis information strategy. In 
fact, it looked at “the usefulness of IS plans through a field survey of 136 IS executives” 
(p. 275) in Singapore. The questionnaire sent out by the researchers is based on “literature on 
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IS planning” rather than strategic planning. There is no mention of how a “strategic” IS plan 
differs from an ordinary IS plan. Indeed, the two terms are used interchangeably in this arti-
cle. The given definition of a strategic IS plan suggests a “portfolio of computer-based appli-
cations that will assist an organization in executing its business plans and consequently realiz-
ing its business goals” (p. 275). Hence, the article really refers to only one decision (which is 
assumed to constitute the whole IS plan), namely “which applications should be developed to 
support organizational objectives.” Again, we do not know whether practitioners actually 
view this decision as strategic or if they view any other decisions as strategic. 
The article presents the supposed purposes of these “IS plans” as ranked by practitioners. The 
results are shown in Table 17 (Teo and Ang 2000, p. 277). 
Rank Purpose: To … Rank Purpose: To … 
1 Better support business objectives 11 Facilitate managerial control 
2 Improve systems integration 12 Facilitate communication with users 
3 Better exploit IT for competitive advantage 13 Facilitate integration of diverse functions 
4 Prioritize IS development projects 14 Improve co-ordination of decision-making 
5 Improve top management support for the IS 
function 
15 Identify new opportunities 
6 To facilitate better system investment deci-
sions 
16 Motivate managerial action 
7 Improve resource allocation 17 Clarify the role of IS 
8 Forecast resource requirements 18 Evaluate IS performance 
9 Facilitate communication with top manage-
ment 
19 Anticipate surprises and crises 
10 Identify key problem areas 20 Adapt to unanticipated situations 
Table 17: Purposes of the application portfolio 
In support of the relative importance of gaining competitive advantage (rank 3), (Wilson 
1989) finds that almost 90% of Times 500 companies claimed that “CA [competitive advan-
tage] was a feature of their IT strategies.” Other researchers (Brady et al. 1992) agree that 
companies focus on gaining competitive advantage through the use of IT, but cannot sustain 
the advantages. They find that banks are so eager to gain competitive advantages through IT 
that they frequently run into “arms races” that no competitor can win (Brady and Targett 
1995a).  
* * * 
Summarizing the extant research on information strategy in practice, information strategy is a 
topic of concern in practice. However, practitioners perspective on information strategy seems 
to differ from the perspective in academia. Unfortunately, we have not learned much about 
the practitioners’ original thinking, because research so far has only applied selected concep-
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tions implicitly rather than trying to tease out the practitioners’ own understanding. We also 
do not know much about the practitioners’ reasoning, i.e. why they regard certain decisions as 
strategic. It is therefore necessary to conduct primary empirical research, which is presented 
in the next chapter. 
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3 PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE ON INFORMATION STRAT-
EGY  
The previous chapter identified content elements of information strategy by analyzing the 
proposals that have been made regarding information strategy and its content in academic 
literature. The indications for differences between practitioners’ and researchers’ perspective 
on information strategy lead us to conclude that it is necessary to understand what practitio-
ners understand as the content of information strategy. Hence, this chapter looks at what prac-
titioners argue to be the content of information strategy. The question addressed here is 
“Which IP decisions do practitioners consider as part of information strategy and why?” The 
answers are obtained by conducting original empirical research in practice.  
3.1 EMPIRICAL STUDY ON INFORMATION STRATEGY IN PRACTICE 
The shortfalls of extant research mean that we cannot rely solely on the literature to fulfill our 
research objective. Missing from it is an understanding of the practitioners’ own thinking on 
the content and reasoning, which contribute to an empirically valid proposal for information 
strategy content. Thus, the approach taken in the second step of our study comprises an origi-
nal investigation of practice. This section describes the assumptions underlying this investiga-
tion and the methodology used, followed by the findings. 
3.1.1 Assumptions and methodology 
All of the studies mentioned in the previous section took a positivistic approach that started 
with a given construct or at least with a “list of issues” derived from the literature to test the 
extent to which practitioners followed them. The use of the term “reference model” (Flynn 
and Hepburn 1994) describes very well which function the constructs serve in this context. 
This approach is limited in its capacity to really explain the practitioners’ thinking. And de-
spite the indications that practitioners do not seem to follow these models, no one has made 
the effort to find out which models practitioners do follow. However, researchers agree that 
understanding practitioners’ thinking or cognition is “far too critical to be ignored as it can 
impact on IS outcomes” (Tan and Hunter 2002, p. 39). They even argue that if the practitio-
ners themselves had a better understanding of other stakeholders’ thinking, more successful IS 
outcomes could result (Orlikowski and Gash 1994). This notion has also been proposed for 
the field of strategic management (Dutton et al. 1989; Walsh 1995). 
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Hence, the approach taken here is theory-independent (Cropley 2005), qualitative (Cropley 
2005; Miles and Huberman 1994) in an interpretive manner (Klein and Myers 1999; Or-
likowski and Baroudi 1991). That means that we will not rely on (information) strategy theo-
ries of or proposals for information strategy from research literature (see Chapter 2) to test 
them in practice. As indicated in Chapter 1, practitioners might consider completely different 
IP decisions to be strategic and for very different – but still valid – reasons. Their reasoning is 
neglected in an approach that only tests existing content and reasoning. 
To explore and really comprehend the “what’s” and “why’s” of information strategy concepts 
(i.e. content and reasoning) used in practice, a qualitative approach is more suitable than a 
quantitative approach (Cropley 2005, p. 37, p. 49; Miles and Huberman 1994, pp. 5). Follow-
ing a qualitative track allows us to obtain deep insights into practitioners’ understanding of 
information strategy. Face-to-face discussions yield far more insight into their understanding, 
use, and reasoning of information strategy than quantitative surveys. In using a qualitative 
approach, we are following other researchers (e.g. Brown 2004; Hackney and Little 1999), 
who state – again, with an eye towards the current situation in research – that “it may be ap-
propriate for more theory-generating research to be conducted, employing qualitative tech-
niques […]” in the field of SIP (Brown 2004, p. 27).  
Our idea is to capture the understanding of practitioners in an interpretive manner (Klein and 
Myers 1999; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). This helps to “understand phenomena through 
accessing the meaning that participants assign to them” and to “understand the deeper struc-
ture of a phenomenon” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p. 5). Accordingly, we do not impose 
our own a priori understanding (nor any other expressed in the form of a theory22 or construct) 
of information strategy on the practitioners. It is not our content that we wish to test and not 
our reasoning that we intend to verify. Rather, we allow the practitioners to elucidate their 
own understanding of information strategy in terms of their decisions and reasoning proc-
esses.  
The assumption that the practitioners’ actions are guided by their own thinking is backed by 
Kelly’s personal construct theory (Kelly 1955) and Argyris’ “theories of action” (Argyris and 
Schön 1974). Kelly uses the analogy of “man as scientist” because people are perpetually 
building and working on theories and models about how the world works. Argyris views “de-
liberate human behavior as the consequence of theories of action held by humans” (p. 5). 
Without delving too deeply into psychology and overstretching similarities, the assumption 
                                                 
22
 Hence, Cropley (2005) calls this a theory-independent approach in contrast to a theory-testing approach. 
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we borrow from these works is that practitioners have their own “theories” vis-à-vis which IS 
decisions are strategic and why. It is important to understand practitioners’ perspectives on 
information strategy because it underlies practitioners’ and organizations’ understanding 
(“sensemaking in organizations begins with the personal perspectives individuals use to un-
derstand” (Tan and Hunter 2002, p. 40)) and eventually their actions (Weick and Bougon 
2001). Hence, the assumption is that it is possible to better understand organizational cogni-
tion (or thinking) and hence organizational action by understanding individually held percep-
tions (Weick 1995; Weick 2001). Individual thinking becomes “the foundation […] of how 
organizations work and how people within organizations achieve shared action” (Jelinek and 
Litterer 1994, p. 33). However, we believe there is one caveat to this assumption: individuals’ 
understanding can only contribute to organizational understanding (and eventually organiza-
tional action) if these individuals (can) share their understanding and have the means to influ-
ence other stakeholders’ thinking.23 This has to be (and was) considered in the sampling ap-
proach.  
Understanding the actions of organizations thus requires understanding their stakeholders’ 
thinking. This is a prerequisite for improving organizational action (Argyris 1976; Argyris 
and Schön 1974; Tan and Hunter 2002). Conversely, maybe these theories of action can help 
to advance the understanding of information strategy in research, especially in the absence of 
better ones in academia at this time (compare current proposals from the research literature in 
Chapter 2). 
Another assumption we borrow from these theoretical works is that “If you don’t know what 
is proceeding inside a person, then ask him; he will tell you” ((Pervin 2000) citing Kelly 
(without source)).24 To allow practitioners to elaborate upon their thinking, we used open, 
non-standardized, qualitative interviews for data collection (Mayring 1996, p. 49). For the 
data analysis of the transcribed interviews, we used qualitative content analysis (Mayring 
1996; Mayring 2003). 
                                                 
23
 We interpret the statement that “personal constructs can be shared to a greater or lesser extent” (1986, p. 179) 
in this sense. The sampling has to ensure that the constructs of the chosen individuals are likely to be shared to a 
greater extent. 
24
 We agree with this, but add the caveat that people might not be able or willing to tell the “truth.” See our 
measures below employed to counteract this phenomenon (called espoused theories and theories-in-use by Argy-
ris (1976)). 
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3.1.1.1 Data collection 
We collected the data for answering the research questions from practice in 13 interviews 
with practitioners in different organizations. We first describe the sampling of interviewees 
and then how we conducted the interviews so that other researchers can retrace our conclu-
sions. 
3.1.1.1.1 Sampling 
For the interviews, we chose practitioners who could be expected to provide deep insights into 
information strategy. We wanted the interview partners to be practitioners who have dealt 
with strategic IP decisions not only marginally. They should deal with information strategy as 
one of their core tasks and hence have devoted much thinking to it. These people did not nec-
essarily have to be top managers; individuals responsible for preparing top-management deci-
sions, lead meetings or workshops on information strategy discussions, etc. are potentially 
even more suitable for our purposes. Selecting knowledgeable interviewees is important for 
our research because personal constructs and theories are built through experience (Kelly 
1955). Hence, people without much experience in developing information strategies are 
unlikely to have a well-developed understanding and would not be able to provide rich input.  
We were aware that more than one person might participate in developing an information 
strategy (cf. Smits and van der Poel 1996) and that each participant might have a different 
understanding. Hence, our sampling strove to ensure that the selected individuals’ understand-
ing had a high likelihood of being shared within the organization and hence of influencing 
others’ understanding (see section above). This criterion was in line with our assumption that 
personal thinking influences organizational action. 
To find such interviewees, we looked for people who had presented their organization’s in-
formation strategy at conferences, published the strategy elsewhere, or formally held titles 
such as “Head of IT strategy.” The sampling was therefore deliberately not random. This ap-
proach certainly restricts the generalizability of the results but is not without advantages. The 
decision to select the interviewees in this way was based on several assumptions: first of all, it 
provided evidence that the company in fact had an information strategy. Individuals who have 
presented their organization’s information strategy will have dealt with it extensively and ap-
parently seem to think it is worth publishing, which usually indicates that the practitioners 
think it is a successful information strategy in certain respects. As companies often require 
sign-offs for external communications in their name, the official strategy is what is portrayed 
in publications and presentations, not merely the wishful thinking of the individual practitio-
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ners. By presenting the strategy to other practitioners, these “ambassadors” are likely to shape 
the understanding of other practitioners beyond the borders of the organization. Hence, the 
chosen interviewees might even be expected to represent a whole group of other practitioners 
that has adopted their understanding. Hence, these practitioners could be described as “evan-
gelists” for their organizations in both an internal and external capacity, a role that serves to 
fulfill the above-mentioned criteria. The veracity of this claim was demonstrated in a number 
of cases. To illustrate, in case 4, the interviewee had conducted several company-internal 
“town hall” meetings to explain the company’s information strategy to staff:  
“Es trifft sich insofern ganz gut und ist ganz witzig, als wir z.B. gerade gestern Abend 
eines unserer sog. Townhall Meetings hatten, wo wir vom oberen Management aus re-
gelmäßig informieren […] [ich] lege ich Wert drauf, dass die Leute verstehen, was ist 
eigentlich eine IS Strategie, welche Komponenten hat sie und […] welchen Feldern ist 
Arbeit zu machen […] Das ist nicht ne einmalige Geschichte, sondern wir hatten vor 3 
Monaten auch ein All-Staff Meeting. […] das ist sehr sehr wichtig glaube ich, dass die 
Mitarbeiter einen bestimmten Rahmen haben, an dem sie sich alle halten und deshalb 
versuche ich diesen Rahmen in die Köpfe zu nageln, seit 1,5 Jahren, weshalb auch die-
ser Rahmen immer mal wieder auftaucht. Der taucht immer mal wieder auf.”25 
In our sample, we were successful in choosing people with oversight of information strategy 
development within their organizations. Even if they were not the sole participants in infor-
mation strategy development, they still knew which decisions were made and by whom. The 
chosen practitioners were all IT managers, at least one level below the board level. As stated 
above, we did not find it necessary to talk to the highest managers; we wanted to interview 
those people actually spending significant amounts of time on information strategy.  
The exclusive use of IT managers as interview subjects might be regarded as a bias in the 
sample. However, this choice does not seem to be unusual: according to a study by Deloitte 
Consulting, only 14% of companies involve board members in information strategy discus-
sions (NN 2007). Other researchers found that information strategy is primarily driven by the 
IT department (Flynn and Goleniewska 1993). Still, we have to be careful about transferring 
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 Translation by author: “It fits pretty well and is kind of funny, because just last night for example we have had 
one of our so called ‘town hall meetings’ where we from upper management regularly inform [staff …] [For me] 
it is important that people understand what an IS strategy actually is, which components it has and […] in which 
areas we have to do something […] This is not a one-off thing, just three months ago we have also had an all-
staff-meeting […] it is very, very important, I think, that the employees have a certain framework on which they 
can rely and therefore I have been trying hard to get that framework into their heads for already one and a half 
years now, that’s why this framework pops up once in a while. It keeps popping up.” 
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the findings to situations in which this is not the case. Another potential bias might be in the 
size of the companies in terms of revenue: all of the companies examined in this study are 
relatively large in this respect. 
Another requirement that drove our sample was to vary one of the probably most obvious 
situational factors, namely industry. To generate the variety that might help to obtain a com-
prehensive picture of information strategy in practice, we decided to include practitioners 
from organizations in diverse industries in the sample. 
Most of the interviewees were brought on board without our having had any prior contact 
with them. We looked for potential candidates by scanning the presentations of related practi-
tioner conferences (e.g. “Strategisches IT-Management 2005” by Handelsblatt) and practitio-
ner books (e.g. Bernhard et al. 2003) in which practitioners had published at least one chapter 
on information strategy. We contacted those practitioners whose presentation or chapter con-
tained the words “information strategy” or a related term (see Chapter 2) in its title or in its 
short description/abstract. We also selected people whose titles indicated responsibility for 
information strategy (e.g. “Head of IT Strategy”). We also searched the World Wide Web 
with google.de for these kinds of titles. After having obtained the e-mail address of a potential 
interviewee, we sent a request for participation in the research to the individual. The request is 
printed in the Appendix A. 
A few selected candidates denied our request for participation due to a lack of time or – in one 
case – confidentiality issues. But, the overall response was very positive. The candidates were 
open and willing to discuss their company’s information strategy with us. In no case did we 
detect any reservations or hesitation to speak about the topic. 
The sample is shown in Table 18. A brief description of each company is found in Appen-
dix B. 
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Industry Revenue26 p.a. Title of participant Organization of IS Location of IS strategy planning 
1. Insurance  2 bn. EUR Director IT Strategy Sub-unit of “Accounting & IT” Staff unit within IS department 
2. Insurance  1 bn. EUR Director IT Development Main department IS department 
3. Health care 4 bn. EUR CIO Profit center unit IS department 
4. Public institution n/a27 Director Information Sys-
tems 
Main department IS department 
5. Telecommunications  50 bn. EUR VP Corporate-IT-
Management 
Profit center unit & distributed across business 
units (BUs)  
Corporate unit 
6. Investment bank 24 bn. EUR Director IT Department Main department IS department 
7. Logistics 17 bn. EUR Head of IT Profit center unit & distributed across BUs Staff unit within globally distributed SBU  
8. Universal bank 320 bn. EUR Deputy Head of IT Strat-
egy 
Profit center unit & distributed across BUs Corporate unit 
9. Public transportation  n/a Head of IT Strategy Profit center unit & distributed across BUs Corporate unit 
10. Pure online bank 48 mio. EUR Head of IT strategy Fully outsourced, only two staff members remain-
ing 
Head of IT strategy 
11. Aviation 23 bn. EUR Head of IT strategy Profit center unit & distributed across BUs Corporate unit 
12. Home loan bank 1.4 bn. EUR CIO, Head of Process and 
IT Management, Director 
Organization 
Main department IS department 
13. Manufacturing-
ceramics 
1 bn. EUR CIO Main department IS department 
Table 18: Research sample 
 
                                                 
26
 2004 figures: premium income for insurance, assets under management for investment banks, credit volume for banks. 
27
 Supra-national, public administrative body.  
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We stopped after the thirteenth case as we had not found any new decisions proposed for the 
content of information strategy. According to our grouping of decisions into decision areas 
(see section  3.1.2 for how we build the decision areas), we did not discover any new decision 
areas after case 6 (see Table 19). While this is no evidence for completeness (there is no guar-
antee that we would not have found further decisions in a fourteenth case), it at least indicates 
that we had discovered the most common decisions of information strategy within the limita-
tion of our sample. 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
No. of decision areas 
identified (cumulative) 
1 5 7 10 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Table 19: Cumulative number of decision areas identified in sample 
3.1.1.1.2 Conducting the interviews 
We conducted open interviews (Cropley 2005). This means that there was no standardized set 
of questions that was asked in each interview. Instead, each interview took a different route 
depending on what the interviewee emphasized. This format allowed us to better concentrate 
on those aspects of information strategy that the interviewee thought of as being central. The 
open interview is meant to let the participants speak their minds (Mayring 1996, p. 1). In fact, 
the interviews were more a discussion than merely questions followed by answers. Hence, it 
is not possible to describe a structure for how each interview was conducted. The questions 
asked were very much dependent on what the interviewee said. However, even in an open 
interview, the interviewer has to ensure that what is discussed is relevant to the research ob-
jective. In our case, we had to focus on IP decisions and the reasons why these decisions were 
regarded as strategic. But we did not pre-specify what the decisions or the reasoning might be. 
The research questions helped to keep the interviews focused on the relevant topics.  
A number of issues had to be taken into account when conducting the open interviews. On the 
one hand, the concept of theories of action sensitized us to the difference of “espoused theo-
ries” – i.e. those communicated by practitioners when asked – and “theories-in-use” – i.e. 
those actually underlying their behavior: “When someone is asked how he would behave un-
der certain circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory of action for that 
situation. This is the theory of action which he […] communicates to others. However, the 
theory that actually governs his actions is his theory-in-use, which may or may not be com-
patible with his espoused theory” (Argyris and Schön 1974, p. 7). There is always a danger of 
confusing espoused theories with theories-in-use. Theories-in-use can neither be inferred 
strictly from behavior (e.g. because a person may hold a theory but may not be able to apply 
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it) nor from discussion alone (e.g. because of tacit knowledge) (Argyris and Schön 1974, p. 
10).  
We dealt with this difference in two ways during the interviews: first, we were aware that we 
could not ask the interviewees directly about their “theory” or understanding of information 
strategy (such as “What is your understanding or definition of information strategy?”). In-
stead, we asked which IP decisions they consider strategic and why. At this point, we asked 
for actual decisions and concrete examples thereof rather than about hypothetical situations. 
Second, we tried to complement the interviews with information strategy documents or pres-
entations. We let the individual confirm (or checked ourselves) that the stated decisions were 
also found in an actual information strategy document (or in presentations) wherever possible. 
Hence, from a mixture of interviews (discussion) and referrals to documentation (manifested 
behavior), we tried to approximate the theories-in-use.28 
We started the interview with an open question about the “general background of the com-
pany.” Usually, this got the interviewee talking about the company, and the discussion very 
quickly turned to the firm’s information strategy. If not, we asked “Which IT-related deci-
sions were strategic in the company?” This eventually led the interviewee to talk about the 
content of information strategy. Often the participants even used parts of the information 
strategy document to guide and structure their talk. If they did not do so, we asked whether 
there were official documents or presentations that contained references to the decisions they 
talked about.  
When an interviewee stopped talking, I tried to encourage him to continue, e.g. by asking 
whether there were any other strategic IT decisions. I then followed up by asking “Why were 
these decisions regarded as strategic?” hoping to uncover his reasoning process. We also 
asked whether the mentioned decisions had always been the same or whether there had been 
past information strategies that had had different content and why. Finally, we summarized 
the decisions and the reasons for their being considered strategic in order to check whether we 
understood the interviewee correctly. Each interview lasted between one and two hours. 
The interviews were conducted in the office of the respective interviewee, except for two in-
terviews (cases 5, 8) that were conducted over the telephone.  
All interviews except one were digitally recorded with the permission of the interviewees. In 
case 12, I made notes during the interview and wrote a memorandum two hours after the in-
                                                 
28
 The reader should be aware that our focus is on information strategy. Whether such plans actually get imple-
mented is beyond the scope of this work. 
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terview summarizing and organizing the notes into structured minutes. Although recording 
the interviews might have potentially inhibited the interviewees from talking openly, espe-
cially about a sensitive topic such as information strategy, the recordings nonetheless enabled 
a more detailed analysis. As the recorder was the size of a slim mobile phone and was not the 
only item on the table, we felt confident that it did not distract the interviewee. In fact, all of 
the interviewees were very candid during the interview, sometimes even starting their sen-
tences with “I shouldn’t tell you this, but …” (e.g. case 4).  
All interviews were conducted in German, the native language of both the interviewees and 
ourselves. Using German facilitated openness and precision of expression much better than if 
a foreign language had been used. In order to work with the original statements as closely as 
possible, the transcription were not translated into English. Only those statements that are 
quoted in the body of the thesis were translated in English; the original quotes in German can 
be found in the tables supporting the analysis.29 
3.1.1.2 Data analysis 
The recorded interviews were transcribed by a professional service firm that had signed a con-
fidentiality agreement. The transcriptions were checked by the author of the thesis and a sec-
ond person30 for correctness. The rules set for the transcription conformed to the ones pre-
sented in Mayring (2003, p. 49). The transcription firm was instructed to transcribe literally 
(word by word) but to leave out filler words like “um,” to use “…” for unintelligible passages 
that were later completed by us, and to precede our statements in the interview with (F) and 
the interviewee’s statements with (A).  
The transcribed and verified interviews were then analyzed according to the method of quali-
tative content analysis (Mayring 1996; Mayring 2003). This method was chosen because 
qualitative research has been accused for being unsystematic (Mayring 2003, p. 10, p. 27). 
Several authors talk about the “art of interpretation” (Mayring 2003, p. 27, citing Schleier-
macher). However, Mayring’s method of qualitative content analysis is a more systematic 
approach. It has been said to be useful for “determining the outline of the research object in its 
context, for demarcating it from other objects and for the general characterization of its inner 
composition” (Rust 1981, p. 196; translated by myself). This quote describes our intentions 
                                                 
29
 All transcribed interviews and minutes were made available electronically to the supervisors of this thesis. Due 
to the enormous number of transcription pages (more than 200), we did not attach them in written form to this 
document. 
30
 Mr. Alexander Pellengahr, at that time a Master of Science in IS student at the University of Muenster, per-
formed this task. 
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regarding information strategy and its content. In addition, qualitative content analysis em-
phasizes the use of systematic techniques, which allows for more intersubjective verification. 
In more concrete terms, using this method required us to go through each interview (intra-
case-analysis) and look for statements on information strategy content and reasoning. In this 
sense, the high-level code categories (decisions and reasons) were already given. We coded 
these parts of the interviews first using Atlas TI, but then switched to using the simple spread-
sheet function of Microsoft Excel, because Atlas TI was not able to produce overviews in 
tabular form, which would have prevented us from comparing across cases. Excel proved to 
be sufficient for our analysis. In order to increase inter-coder reliability, we had another per-
son do the intra-case coding independent of our coding (the same person checking the inter-
views was used). The results are found in (Pellengahr 2006). Afterwards, we compared the 
codings and discussed the differences. Although this was not set as a goal, we were able to 
agree on one of the codings for each difference through discussion. 
In order to enable other researchers to follow how we came to the findings presented below, 
we will try to describe how we went about doing the actual coding in some more detail here. 
As stated above, the unit of coding was any IP decision that was seen as strategic and the rea-
sons given therefore. We identified a decision in two ways: either the interviewee explicity 
identified it as such (e.g. “we had to make a decision on …,” “we decided to…”) or we de-
termined from the context that the interviewee was referring to our definition of decision, 
namely a formation of intentions for future action (which might be but is not limited to a 
choice between alternatives; see Chapter 1). Identifying those places in the transcription was 
straightforward, as the interview was geared toward content. We put those parts of the tran-
scription into the Excel table with the column heading “decision quote.” We tried to be parsi-
monious in this column, placing the lengthier quotes in another column titled “context/detail 
quote.” This latter column provided more space for transcribed quotes that gave more infor-
mation about the decision and its context. For both quotes – decision and context/detail – we 
prepared a summary of what was said in our own words and put this in the Excel table next to 
the respective columns. Our summaries provided an interpretation (every summary using own 
words is an interpretation) of what the decision was and what it was about. As stated above, 
the quotes have not been translated as this would have changed the original statements too 
much. However, the summaries are given in English. 
We followed the same procedure for the reasons given for a decision being strategic. Again, 
finding quotes that referred to the reasoning behind the decision was not difficult, as these 
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were often preceded by the question similar to “Why is this strategic?” Otherwise, we looked 
for statements that referred to any kind of reasoning (from sign, analogy, cause or generaliza-
tion (Toulmin et al. 1984)). Again, we summarized the statements with our own words in an-
other column. 
Having done this separately for each interview, we put the tables for each interview together 
in order to group them into similar decisions (inter-case analysis). The results of this inter-
case analysis are described below.  
3.1.2 Findings: Information strategy content and reasoning 
The following findings present the decisions identified over the course of the interviews as 
being strategic.  
In total, we collected 89 instances of decisions, which we then grouped into 12 decision areas. 
We arrived at this grouping by first clustering decisions related to the same object (e.g. appli-
cation, set of applications, technical infrastructure, personnel, finance). However, it became 
apparent that for our purposes, the object alone would be insufficient for distinguishing the 
decisions. For example, the decision to exchange a number of applications because of unsatis-
factory functionality, the general decision on the use of standard vs. custom-built software, 
and the decision on which applications to include in the application portfolio are all decisions 
on a set of applications. However, the nature or kind of decision differs fundamentally: the 
first decision is about functionality, the second is about standards as rules, and the last one is 
an investment decision. Hence, by combining both the object and nature of the decisions, we 
identified 12 decision areas: 
a. Application landscaping decisions: concern the functionality of a set of applications  
b. Application systems standards: concern rules for a set of applications  
c. Technical architecture standards: concern rules for a set of technologies 
d. Process standards: concern rules for a set of IP activities 
e. Investment portfolio decisions: concern the commitment of financial resources to a set of 
concrete IS/IT based initiatives 
f. Budgetary decisions: concern the allocation of financial resources to a set of business 
units/cost categories for them to make investment decisions 
g. IS/IT projects that support market activities: concern the commitment to individual pro-
jects with the intent of supporting market activities such as introducing a new product 
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h. Human resources (HR) and organizational plans of the IT unit: concern the organization 
of a set of activities and the people conducting these activities 
i. Role of the IT unit: concerns the demarcation of the scope of an organizational unit 
j. Rights and accountability: concern the internal allocation of responsibilities for decisions 
k. Sourcing decisions: concern the external allocation of activities  
l. IT security and continuity: concern the rules for avoiding negative impacts on the com-
pany through IT incidents or shortcomings 
These decision areas are described in detail below along with the reasoning provided by the 
interviewees for deeming the decisions within the area strategic. 
a. APPLICATION LANDSCAPING DECISIONS are related to the functional scope and composi-
tion (in contrast to the technical design) of the current or future set of applications as a 
whole. Decisions vis-à-vis the application landscape entail looking at a blueprint, i.e. a ho-
listic view of the applications required to support business processes. In this sense, the ap-
plication landscape is closely related to the processes supported by applications. Decisions 
within this area aim at answering the question of which applications are needed or need to 
be changed in order to support the business: “So we developed an IT strategy that was 
more like a plan for building out IT [Bebauungsplan] – with which solutions do we sup-
port the business in order to […] reflect the growth [targeted by the business strategy] 
[…]?” (case 3). The decisions subsumed under this decision area are: 
• Application lifecycle decisions, e.g. in which areas should the application landscape 
be extended, renovated, or exchanged in the future? (case 2) 
• Decision on which applications or application platforms (e.g. SAP R/3) to use for a 
certain process area (e.g. accounting, HR, production) or which business processes 
could be automated (cases 3, 12, 13) 
The reasons given for these decisions being strategic touched on the relation to business 
strategy, the need to anticipate change, and on the necessity of building “adaptability” into 
the landscape as well as the decisions’ long-term and corporate-wide impact.  
The decision on replacing existing parts of the landscape and selecting new platforms 
were considered part of information strategy because they supported the execution of a 
given business strategy (cases 3, 12, 13). In case 3, the existing system could neither 
support the growth in terms of transactions nor the new business requirements stemming 
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from entering new fields of business. Hence, current applications were an impediment to 
achieving these strategic business objectives. In case 12, the cost leadership strategy asked 
for increasing the cost-income ratio. Consequently, the question was which processes 
could be automated further in order to streamline the costs of business processes. 
In contrast, in case 2, the decision for designing the application landscape was argued to 
be strategic, because the decision-makers know that the environment of the company (in 
terms of business requirements) will change. Which changes will occur and when is un-
certain at the point in time when the decision is made. It is also not economically feasible 
to exchange the systems each time these changes occur. The applications built as an out-
come of the decision have a very long lifetime of 10-20 years. This tension between long-
term durability and change was argued to require designing the landscape in a way that 
accounts for these changes in order for it to remain adaptable or flexible (cases 2, 3). 
Decisions on exchanging parts of an application landscape are seen as long-term plans 
because they determine what has to be done in the next 3 years (cases 2, 13). Application 
landscape decisions are also said to have a major impact on the whole company. How-
ever, this is merely related to the fact that applications are used across certain regions or 
business units and hence standardized. This already leads over to the next decision area: 
application standards. 
Table 20 provides a basis for tracking the above-made interpretations for decisions, for 
mapping them to the decision area, and for tracing the reasoning behind them in that it 
displays these interpretations alongside quotes from the transcribed interviews that led us 
to the interpretations (if an interviewee mentioned multiple decisions that we had grouped 
into the same decision area, we indexed the case number with a letter. For example, if the 
interviewee in case 4 made multiple decisions, we would refer to them with 4a, 4b in the 
case column; the numbers in the “quote” columns refer to the line numbers in the tran-
scriptions; the underlined parts of the quotes emphasize those parts that our summary or 
interpretation was based on). 
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Ca
se  
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reasoning quote Reasoning summary 
2 
 
 
76: Im Grunde genommen 
beschäftigt man sich in der IT 
[Strategie] oder sollte man 
sich beschäftigen und haben 
wir eben deshalb auch getan 
immer mit der Frage: A) […] 
B) ja was ist eigentlich die 
richtige Anwendungsland-
schaft, wie wollen wir sie 
entwickeln, steuern?  
Decision on 
application 
landscape 
113: wo sind denn die Systeme, die 
in den nächsten Jahren, Schwer-
punkt von Ablösestrategien, von 
Erneuerungsstrategien sein sollten 
 
214: Typischer Weise ist der Ab-
lauf, der das man eben Bestand-
saufnahme der Anwendungsland-
schaft […] Wenn man da einmal 
systematisch drüber geht und über-
legt wo gibt’s […] Erweiterungs-, 
Änderungs-, Renovierungsbedarf 
[…]Da haben wir wieder eine 
gültige 3-Jahresplanung.  
In which 
areas should 
we extend, 
renovate, or 
change the 
application 
landscape? 
112: und das tut man nicht täglich  
81: nachhaltiges Wirtschaften […] Wir 
machen ja nicht IT für den Augenblick, 
sondern wir wissen, dass alle unsere 
Systeme, mehr als 10 Jahre Lebenser-
wartung haben, viele auch 20, auch die, 
die heute noch gebaut werden. Und 
selbst bei der Hardware wissen wir, 
dass die im Minimum vielleicht 4 
Jahre, i.d.R. auch eher 7-8 Jahre gilt. 
[...] ist jede Entscheidung die man trifft 
unter langfristigen Kosten-Nutzen-
Abwägungen zu sehen [...] wie baue 
ich sie denn am Besten so, dass sie 
auch wenn sich die Welt drum herum 
in den nächsten 10 Jahren verändert, 
immer noch weiter verwenden kann.  
224: Da haben wir wieder eine gültige 
3-Jahresplanung. 
Anticipate change and 
build “adaptability” into 
the landscape 
 
Is a long-term (3 yrs) plan 
- what has to be done in 
the next 3 years 
 
 
3 34: Und darauf hin haben wir 
eine IT Strategie gemacht, die 
sich eher als IT Be-
bauungsplan eigentlich dar-
stellen sollte, das hieß also 
mit welchen Lösungen unter-
stützten wir das Unternehmen 
um sowohl das Wachstum, als 
auch die notwendigen Flexi-
bilitäten, die man braucht in 
so einem Großkonzern voran 
zu bringen, abzubilden 
Selection of 
applications  
76: wie lösen wir, im Wesentlichen 
1:1, die Alt-Anwendungen so ab, 
dass wir auf den nächsten Level, 
der technologischen Sicherheit 
kommen. Sprich: höheres Transak-
tionsvolumen, aber gleichzeitig 
auch höhere Flexibilität in der 
Umsetzung neuer und neuester 
Geschäftsanforderungen.  
56: Wachstum im Bezug erstmal 
ganz brutal im Bezug auf Volu-
men. 
Which ap-
plication 
platform can 
replace the 
extant one in 
order to 
support 
business 
require-
ments? 
36: um sowohl das Wachstum, als auch 
die notwendigen Flexibilitäten, die man 
braucht in so einem Großkonzern voran 
zu bringen, abzubilden 
79: neue Geschäftsfelder, neue 
Geschäftsmodelle, für die wir eine neue 
IT brauchten. Konkret jetzt in dem 
Kontext, wir wollen mehr stärker in das 
Dialyse Service Geschäft rein. Also 
weg von dem reinen Produktselling. 
Wir wollen stärker rein in den Bereich 
[…] Krankenhausdienstleistungen. Und 
darüber wurde natürlich ein ganz neues 
Produkt und ein ganz neues Anfor-
derungsprofil an so eine EDV Land-
schaft notwendig. 
90: die Anwendung ist im We-
Support business strategy 
(growth in terms of vol-
ume and in terms of prod-
uct markets) 
Allow for flexibility for 
yet unknown business 
requirements 
Interface to users and 
business strategy for IT 
department 
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Ca
se  
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reasoning quote Reasoning summary 
sentlichen die Schnittstelle gewesen zur 
Unternehmensstrategie und zu den 
Anwendern.  
12 None (no transcription) Decision on 
process sup-
port by IT 
None Which proc-
esses can be 
automated 
through IT? 
None Supports the given busi-
ness strategy (cost leader-
ship, increase of 
cost/income ratio) 
 
13 162: Aus diesen Grundsätzen 
gibt’s dann eine IT-
Gesamtstrategie […] 
165: nach dem Motto: Wir 
wollen in den Standorten 
Schweden, Ungarn etc. ERP-
Systeme mit diesen und jenen 
Funktionalitäten liefern. […] 
Buchhaltung für den Kom-
plettkonzern durch entspre-
chende automatisierte 
Rechnungswesensysteme 
unterstützen. [...] 
 
Which appli-
cation to use 
for a certain 
process 
area/in cer-
tain regions 
None None 162: IT-Gesamtstrategie, die eingebun-
den ist in die Strategie des Finanzvor-
stands. 
165: Erst mal für die Gesamt-IT  
168: Also das sind Aussagen, strate-
gische Aussagen, die wirklich einen 
Blick von zwei ... ich sage mal, von 
einem oder eher in der Größenordnung 
von zwei bis drei Jahren hat.  
Supporting business strat-
egy (expansion) 
 
Corporate-wide impact 
(across all BUs) 
 
Long-term plan (2-3 yrs) 
Table 20: Application landscaping - interpretation of decisions and reasoning 
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b. APPLICATION SYSTEMS STANDARDS include decisions on the standardization of applica-
tion systems in functional or process domains, such as accounting or billing. Here it is not 
a question of “which functionality is needed” but rather to what extent business processes 
can use the same applications and whether they can use standard software or will require 
custom-built software (“For which process domains can we use standard software and 
where should we use custom-built software?” (case 5); “[…] we conduct mail business 
[…] in different countries, in very different facets – you have to make the decision once 
on whether we want to standardize, do we believe we can standardize that, yes or no” 
(case 7)). 
• Decision on the use of standard vs. custom-built software for processes/process areas 
(case 5) 
• Decision on standardizing applications and the underlying processes (cases 5, 7) 
• Decision on making all applications audit-ready (case 9) 
Again, the interviewees gave a number of different reasons for these decisions being stra-
tegic (see Table 21).  
The decision to use standard software vs. custom-built software involves a trade-off: on 
the one hand, using standard software – just as standardizing process areas, i.e. using the 
same software for different instances of the process (e.g. in different geographical re-
gions) – increases corporate-wide synergies or in other words decreases cost. Business 
units have to be regulated (i.e. driven to use standard software), because the natural ten-
dency of each unit is to regard itself as “too unique” for standard software and hence re-
quiring custom-built software reflecting its uniqueness. If every business unit were to be 
indulged accordingly, the result would be different applications for similar processes, re-
sulting in unnecessary costs. Application standards hence counter the business units’ 
expensive tendency towards being different (e.g. their desire for custom-built appli-
cations) that causes complexity. Standards do so by keeping the applications reusable 
and reusing applications (or parts of them) across processes (cases 5, 7).  
On the other hand, using standard software for business processes that really need to be 
specialized is counter-productive: business units deprived of specialized software were ar-
gued to risk losing customers. Using standard software in a process area for which differ-
entiation on the market is important (e.g. by offering special tariffs to customer groups, 
i.e. following a differentiation strategy), might lead to a loss of market share in these cus-
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tomer groups if the standard software does not support these specific features. To this end, 
the decision has to be made to not hamper business strategy: the processes that really 
need differentiation have to be allowed to use custom-built software or software that does 
not conform to the company’s standard, whereas those processes that do not need differ-
entiation should use standardized software (cases 5, 7). 
Furthermore, conforming to certain standards was seen as a strategic decision because it 
was necessary for strategic business initiatives. In case 9, the business strategy foresaw 
to become listed on the stock-exchange, which required the applications to comply with 
certain auditing rules. If these requirements had not been fulfilled, the strategy could not 
have been executed. 
Application standards were also viewed as strategic because other decisions depend on 
whether the applications become standardized: for example, if the applications become 
standardized, the underlying infrastructure will be affected as well. Other applications will 
be affected because the applications that become standardized are connected to those ap-
plications. And finally, responsibility-related decisions will be affected, such as where the 
applications should be developed and maintained: if they are standardized, the application 
management is likely to become centralized, too (case 7). 
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Case  Decision quote Decision summary Context/detail quote Context/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason summary 
5 42: Wo kann ich keine 
Standard-SW einset-
zen, wo gibt es keinen 
Dienstleister, der für 
mich genau diese IT, 
ja ich sag mal Module 
oder Domänen anbi-
eten kann. Wo muss 
ich es wirklich selber 
machen. 
60: Also kann ich’s 
am Markt einkaufen, 
gibt es Standardsoft-
ware dafür, gibt es 
Dienstleister die das 
für mich machen oder 
muss ich es eben doch 
selber machen, weil 
ich Spezifika habe. 
80: Das ist ein Teil der 
Logik natürlich, kann 
ich Standardsoftware 
einsetzen 
Decision on use of 
standard vs. cus-
tom-built software 
Reason quote: 
30: Warum denke ich in dem Sinne da drüber nach? Weil im Rahmen der [company] viel gesagt wird IT 
ist so wichtig, das man es selber gestalten muss und ich glaube, dass über die Zeit hinweg sich IT in 
vielen Gebieten zum Commodity entwickelt hat, was ich im Prinzip überall einkaufen kann und damit 
weniger strategisch wichtig wird. 
41: Also wo ist das ein Wettbewerbsvorteil. Wo kommt es auf hohe Prozesseffizienz und Prozessqualität 
über bestimmte Wertschöpfungsketten hinweg an. Wo kann ich keine Standard-SW einsetzen, wo gibt es 
keinen Dienstleister, der für mich genau diese IT[…] anbieten kann. Wo muss ich es wirklich selber ma-
chen 
62: Z.B. auch noch mal Billingsoftware oder insges. Kundenbetreuungssysteme bei uns im Konzern. 
Wenn ich auf Standardsoftware dort umschalten würde, kann ich nicht mehr jede Produkteigen-
schaft/Produktkonfiguration abbilden, die wir heute unseren Kunden anbieten. Und durch solche Pro-
duktkonfigurationen, also nehmen wir mal bei der [sub-company X], diese [product name]-Tarife. Das ist 
nicht Standard. Wenn ich dort dann auf Standardsoftware umschalten würde, könnte ich solche Tarife 
nicht mehr anbieten und würde damit natürlich am Markt entsprechen was verlieren an Potential. 
One the one hand, 
countering business 
units: every unit 
claims to have the 
need for specialized 
applications, leading 
to costly IT.  
On the other hand, 
using standard SW 
in a field with a 
need for differentia-
tion from competi-
tors makes differen-
tiation impossible. 
7 136: Beim Applika-
tionsbereich, da würde 
ich sagen, da ist so 
eine erste Frage, die 
man sich stellt, macht 
es Sinn zu standardis-
ieren 
Standardizing ap-
plications  
139: wir machen […] Delivery von 
Briefen[…] in verschiedenen Ländern, 
in unterschiedlichsten Facetten, da 
muss man einmal die Entscheidung 
fällen, wollen wir standardisieren, 
glauben wir das standardisieren zu 
können […] wenn aber die 
Entscheidung gefallen ist, die Prozesse 
sind so ähnlich, dass es Sinn macht, 
einheitliche Systeme einzusetzen, dann 
wird’s auf einmal zu einer strate-
gischen Entscheidung. 
192: und da haben wir jetzt schon die 
Decisions 
become strate-
gic only if 
they have an 
impact across 
regions 
 
Decision on 
application 
standardiza-
tion influences 
the other (sub-
sequent) deci-
147: wenn die aufzeigen, dass es viele Syner-
gien gibt, in einem größeren Verbund, 
 
205: weil es übergreifende Bedeutung hat 
 
209: Für mich sind einfach alle die Themen 
strategisch, die ne Visibilität über die Landes-
grenzen hinaus haben. 
 
224: da muss jemand mit ner übergeordneten 
Sicht dran, weil das eben genau strategischer 
ist, da sind verschiedene Einheiten, die zusam-
menarbeiten müssen und wenn ich jetzt einmal 
Gaining synergies 
across regions 
Corporate-wide 
impact 
Can be reused (is a 
blueprint) 
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Case  Decision quote Decision summary Context/detail quote Context/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason summary 
Entscheidung gefällt, Applikationen 
relativ standardisieren, demzufolge die 
Infrastruktur, also eigentlich baut sich 
alles über die Applikationen auf.  
354: Ausgangspunkt ist eigentlich wie 
ähnlich sind die Geschäfte, die wir in 
den einzelnen Landesgesellschaften 
haben.  
sions on stan-
dardizing 
infrastructure 
 
Applications 
become stan-
dardized if the 
underlying 
business proc-
esses are simi-
lar 
was für einen baue, dann möchte ich das gleich 
so aufbauen, dass ich das später mal für einen 
anderen Kunden in einem anderen Land auch 
noch mal nutzen kann und nicht ne super Spe-
ziallösung für Dich. 
 
229: also strategisch ist wirklich das, aus dieser 
Sicht, was über Landesgrenzen hinweg relevant 
sein kann und die Betonung liegt dann wahr-
scheinlich auf „sein kann”, und nicht 
zwangsläufig auf „ist”. 
195: Wenn ich sehe, dass die Prozesse ähnlich 
sind in den Landesgesellschaften, dann macht’s 
Sinn zu standardisieren und dann folgen die 
anderen Sachen auch, d.h., bestimmte 
Entscheidungen, die ich irgendwo fälle, be-
kommen sehr schnell strategische Bedeutung, 
da sie quasi ein Blueprint sind für irgendwelche 
anderen Gesellschaften 
9 910: Aber wenn Sie so 
ein Thema haben, zum 
Beispiel Auditfähig-
keit der IT-Systeme, 
weil Herr [CEO] den 
Konzern […] börsen-
fähig machen möchte 
[…], dann haben wir 
in der IT was zu tun, 
um die Auditfähigkeit, 
Basel 2, SOX und so 
ein Kram in Ordnung 
zu bringen 
Making IT systems 
conform to certain 
auditing standards 
- - 910ff: börsenfähig […] dann haben wir in der 
IT was zu tun, um die Auditfähigkeit, Basel 2, 
SOX und so ein Kram in Ordnung zu bringen 
Is needed to reach 
an important busi-
ness goal of the 
company (e.g. going 
public) 
Table 21: Application standards - interpretation of decisions and reasoning  
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c. TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE STANDARDS are concerned with the high-level technical 
structure underlying the application systems, i.e. the technical infrastructure. Architectural 
standards are the rules, policies, or guidelines that any application or technical solution 
has to follow: “[…] no one could bypass that. Like in Germany, ‘everybody drives in the 
right lane’” (case 3). Examples include the choice of databases or operating systems to use 
or the type of architecture (e.g. host-based vs. browser-based, service-oriented architec-
tures vs. monolithic architectures). In detail, the decisions subsumed under this decision 
area were: 
• Decision on design principles (e.g. 2+1/2 node concept, Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) vs. monolithic, method of connecting locations with networks, host-based vs. 
browser-based architecture, open source vs. proprietary software) (cases 4a, 5a, 7, 10a, 
12) 
• Decision on IT standards  
o Should we set internal standards at all? (case 2) 
o How many different technology standards are needed? (cases 5, 9) 
o Which technologies should we use as an internal standard? This decision in-
volved the selection of which platform technologies and standard software 
packages to use (e.g. use of SAP as the standard for ERP solutions; use of Ora-
cle as the standard for DBMS; use of Unix as the standard operating system; 
use of SUN computers as the standard for server hardware, etc.) (cases 1, 3, 4b, 
6, 8, 10b, 11a, 13) 
o Determining the timing of technology changes for applications (e.g. when to 
migrate to the next release, when to introduce “Netweaver” technology, etc.) 
(case 11b) 
The reasons given for arguing that these decisions are strategic were diverse. On the one 
hand, some participants (cases 5, 8, 10, 12) again stated that the decisions have to reflect 
the given business strategy. For example, different technologies will be chosen if the 
business strategy aims at a short time-to-market than if the business strategy aims at cost-
leadership (case 8). As another example, if the business required “flexibility,” this was 
translated into the need for a flexible technical architecture, hence moving to a “model-
based architecture” that promised more flexibility (case 12). In case 10, technology stan-
dards were seen as a way to ensure that the strategic business direction was not vio-
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lated on a technical level. For example, business units would have to be regulated to not 
use “Flash” technology: websites relying on that technology would exclude disabled peo-
ple from accessing the site, hence violating the strategic decision to extend the scope of 
the online bank to include disabled customers.  
On the other hand – and almost contrary to supporting a given business strategy – setting 
technology standards was seen as a counterbalance to business units and vendors (cases 
3, 4b, 6a, 8). This reasoning was explicitly stated by some interviewees to be “IT strate-
gic” rather than “business strategic” (cases 3, 6a, 11a, 11b). With this, they also implied 
that it was not meant to support business strategy. It was argued that business units are 
short-sighted and only interested in meeting their immediate business requirements (in the 
form of applications) with whatever technology it takes. Leaving this behavior without a 
counter balance, i.e. without regulation enforcing a longer-term, sustainable view, the IT 
infrastructure would soon become “a technology zoo” (case 8). Such a collection of het-
erogeneous technologies was said to not only be costly to operate but at some point in 
time too complex (“entropy”, case 8), eventually resulting in an overall inability to fulfill 
future business requirements. Even if they could be fulfilled in theory, it would not be 
feasible economically because large parts of the infrastructure would have to be changed 
(case 6). Hence, setting architectural standards aims at avoiding this complexity by en-
forcing orderliness, akin to the way the “police” (case 8) or traffic control enforces that 
“everybody drives in the right lane” (case 3). Hence, setting standards is a prerequisite 
for keeping up the overall ability to deliver IT solutions to business units and hence 
preserving the company’s capacity to act by using IT without compromising cost com-
petitiveness (case 5). Similarly, in one case (5), setting IT standards was seen as impor-
tant for facilitating organizational change. In this case, having fewer technologies was 
associated with the easier consolidation of systems that was frequently required due to 
constant reorganizations within the company. 
Reducing IT costs by finding synergies across the company was stated as a reason in 
itself for the strategic relevance of setting standards. These synergies were seen to materi-
alize through increased negotiation power in purchasing and through economies of scale. 
Using the same technology corporate-wide meant a higher purchasing volume for this 
technology and hence greater negotiating power if purchased from the same vendor, ulti-
mately leading to lower prices (case 8). Using fewer technologies was also seen to lead to 
fewer overhead costs. Regarding economies of scale, it was argued that each new technol-
ogy meant that specialists had to be hired to maintain these technologies. Hence, fewer 
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technologies mean fewer overhead costs. Thus, moving from multiple technologies to 
fewer technologies might result in lower costs through synergies in technology mainte-
nance (cases 5, 7, 9, 13). Almost all interviewees viewed cost-efficiency through syner-
gies as a strategic goal in itself, like an engineering goal that is worth fulfilling in itself, 
again independent of the chosen business strategy (i.e. independent of whether a cost-
leadership strategy was followed). 
Finally, the decision to choose a certain standard was seen as long-term binding, very 
difficult to reverse economically, and as having a huge financial impact (cases 1, 3, 4, 
6, 10, 13). This perceived irreversibility was partly explained by the decision’s company-
wide guiding impact on other decisions. For example, if a certain technology is chosen, 
this means that the people who will be dealing with the technology (programmers, admin-
istrators, etc.) have to be trained to work with it. Systems using different technologies 
have to be migrated or partially rewritten to be compatible with the new technology. The 
decision could restrict the company’s flexibility in the future (case 10). Hence, if the deci-
sion was changed frequently, this would mean an enormous investment in terms of time 
and money. Another reason for the irreversibility of technology decisions was more tech-
nical (case 1): because technologies are interdependent, the choice of a certain technology 
predetermines other technologies as well. This might lock the company into certain tech-
nologies as a side effect. Because the decisions are not easily reversible, they have to be 
planned very carefully in advance and the consequences and potential side-effects of these 
decisions have to be thought through (especially case 1). Switching to a new technology is 
hence seen as a fundamental change (case 6). Besides the potentially negative impact, 
the decision (which serves as a guideline) also has a positive effect: once the decision is 
made, it is not revisited and challenged all the time, but brings certainty for subsequent 
decisions, on which management can then rely (especially case 13). 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
1 287: dass Sie 
herauskristallisieren 
müssen, welche Tech-
nologien harmonieren 
miteinander, Tech-
nologiekonzepte, 
welche sind absolut 
diametral zu einander. 
Which 
tech-
nologies 
to use in 
the fu-
ture 
280: Ich hab das vor kurzem noch verglichen mit 
Brückenpfeilern. Sie bauen Pfeiler und diese Pfeiler 
pflanzen Sie in die Landschaft und wenn dann je-
mand eine Brücke bauen muss, dann ist der Weg 
dieser Brücke vorgezeichnet, weil die Pfeiler sind ja 
schon da, auf die man diese Brücke aufsetzen kann. 
[…] das Sie herauskristallisieren müssen, welche 
Technologien harmonieren miteinander, Technolo-
giekonzepte, welche sind absolut diametral zu 
einander.  
The decision 
on technolo-
gies to use in 
the future has 
to anticipate 
potential 
conflicts of 
technologies  
200: Das Problem ist ja, dass Sie sich […] bei 
Technologieentscheidung in eine […] nicht klare 
Abhängigkeiten begeben […]So dann sind Sie beim 
Internetexplorer und dann können Sie relativ 
schnell so eine Dominokette aufbauen, mit der Sie 
wieder ganz zum Schluss bei .NET landen. .NET ist 
also natürlich […] konträrer Ansatz zu der ganzen 
Java Entwicklungsphilosophie […]D.h. Sie müssen 
letztendlich eine Landkarte der Zusammenhänge 
haben, wie sich was wo eingruppiert. 
Not easily re-
versible; hence, 
dependencies 
between tech-
nologies have 
to be made 
explicit and 
anticipated 
3 97: Also die 
Fragestellung, die 
ganz klar hier auf dem 
Tisch lag war: wir 
haben jetzt eine An-
wendungslandschaft, 
jetzt brauchen wir 
noch ne Datenbank, 
jetzt brauchen wir 
noch ne Hardware-
plattform, jetzt 
brauchen wir ein 
Betriebsmodell. 
Decision 
on which 
tech-
nologies 
to use 
(technol-
ogy 
stan-
dards) 
beneath 
the new 
applica-
tions 
578: Fragestellungen, die sich aber immer orientiert 
haben an diesen Leitplanken, die man noch so nen-
nen kann, die da lauten „Technologieentscheidung 
trifft die IT” „SAP ist gesetzt” und „Governance 
bedeutet: wir sind interner Dienstleister für den 
Gesamtkonzern”. 
Choice of an 
application 
platform 
(SAP)  
90: die Anwendung ist im Wesentlichen die 
Schnittstelle gewesen zur Unternehmensstrategie 
und zu den Anwendern. Die Frage der Technologie 
war eine reine IT Interna und durch ganz andere 
Parameter getrieben. 
96: Die waren schon strategisch in Ihrer… aber rein 
IT strategisch getrieben, also IT intern getrieben. 
578: Fragestellungen, die sich aber immer orientiert 
haben an diesen Leitplanken, die man noch so nen-
nen kann, die da lauten […] „SAP ist gesetzt”  
UP: da kam dann auch keiner dran vorbei. Wie in 
Deutschland ‘ wir fahren halt rechts 
 
NOT because it 
is business 
strategic, dif-
ferent notion of 
strategic 
Is a guiding 
plank that regu-
lates business 
units and guides 
subsequent 
decisions to 
ensure orderli-
ness (like traffic 
control) 
4a 307: Product Archi-
tecture ist die Über-
setzung der Pro-
duktprioritäten und 
Produktwünsche in 
eine Architektur, wir 
haben eine Architek-
tur definiert.  
320: die Grobar-
chitekturen sind Ele-
Define 
high-
level 
architec-
tures, i.e. 
the struc-
ture of 
the 
products 
in the IS 
330: Ein sehr typisches Beispiel [...] der Technikar-
chitektur. [...] wir bauen unsere Systeme normaler-
weise nach dem „2 and a half node concept”. [...] 
müssen hier hoch sicher sein, wir müssen hoch 
verfügbar sein. Wir müssen im Falle eines Desas-
ters weiter arbeiten. Also werden die Applikationen 
normalerweise als Clusterlösungen gebaut, die an 2 
unterschiedlichen Standorten laufen können […]  
342: Das ist ne ganz essentielle technische Ar-
chitekturaussage, die wirklich ganz ganz starken 
IT architec-
tural deci-
sions are 
design prin-
ciples 
342: Das ist ne ganz essentielle technische Ar-
chitekturaussage, die wirklich ganz ganz starken 
Einfluss hat in alle Realisierungskomponenten. 
Rechenzentrumsstrukturen, Infrastruktur, alles. 
366: Weil man sich langfristig festlegt. Ist immer 
ne Frage des Festlegungszeitraums. Genau wie ein 
„2 and a half node concept”: ist eine langfristige 
Festlegung. 
392: Weil Architektur letztlich so wichtig ist im 
Sinne von Festlegung […]. Wenn ich mal einfach 
Influence on 
“lesser” deci-
sions. Guides 
subsequent 
decisions. 
 
Long-term 
binding, irre-
versible. 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
mente unserer Strate-
gie  
depart-
ment 
Einfluss hat in alle Realisierungskomponenten. 
Rechenzentrumsstrukturen, Infrastruktur, alles. 
über die Finanzen rede, die dahinter stecken, da legt 
man sich wirklich in Millionen und zig Millionen 
Beträgen fest. 
Huge financial 
impact. 
 
4b Same as above Same as 
above 
357: A: Das ist noch auf der Strategieebene, wenn 
man es jetzt wirklich auf die Ebene bringt, also 
welches Kernbetriebssystem ist es, welches Kern-
datenbanksystem ist es?  
IT architec-
tural deci-
sions include 
determining 
technology 
standards 
358: Also die Dinge, wo wir explizit oder implizit, 
eher explizit Entscheidungen treffen müssen, die 
uns auf die nächsten 5 Jahre Minimum binden. 
309: Architekturen sind absolut strategisch, die 
entscheiden darüber, ob man lieferfähig ist oder 
nicht lieferfähig ist [als IT Abteilung] 
311: Sustainability […] stellt aber sicher, dass sich 
Effektivität oder Effizienz nicht in kurzfristigen 
Dingen erschöpfen, sondern langfristig wirksam 
sein können. Architektur stellt dies Sustainability 
sicher, die oft auch von den Business Areas nicht in 
gewünschtem Maße eingespielt wird. […] Klar, die 
wollen es in den ersten 2 Jahren alles haben, was 
ich verstehe. Aber da müssen wir halt auch mal eine 
Gegenperspektive anbringen, deshalb definieren 
wir hier Architektur 
Long-term 
binding, irre-
versible 
Provides a 
counterbalance 
to short-sighted 
business areas 
to ensure sus-
tainable deliv-
ery of IT ser-
vices 
5a 80: wie sind IT Ar-
chitektur Leitplanken 
dazu 
Decision 
on archi-
tecture 
princi-
ples 
81: Also z.B. wenn ich in strukturell variablen 
Geschäftsfeldern drin bin, dann würde ich eher auf 
eine SOA basierte Architektur gehen und das als 
strategische Leitplanke festlegen. Wenn ich über 
strukturell stabile Geschäftsprozesse nachdenke 
Payroll, Finanz, also Accounting und solche The-
men, dann denke ich eher dass das eine von der IT 
Architekturleitplanke, dann ist es nicht SOA, son-
dern dann gehe ich’s schlicht auf eine Systemkon-
solidierung ein. 
238: wo spielt SOA ein Rolle […] das sehe ich so 
als wesentliche Architektur Leitplanken. 
Architecture 
principles are 
e.g. the type 
of technology 
architecture 
used in a 
given busi-
ness process  
87: wo ist IT so kritisch pro Geschäftsfeld, dass es 
keinen Sinn macht divisionsübergreifend IT-
Systeme zu betreiben und zu konsolidieren, und wo 
ist schlicht das Thema Synergienutzung der we-
sentliche Hebel 
94: es nutzen nicht 3 verschiedene Divisionen 3 
verschiedene Produkte, sondern nutzen ein Produkt 
im Optimalfall natürlich zusammengelegt auf eine 
Installation. […] Das ist in einem Großkonzern 
natürlich immer das kritische. Jede Reorganisation 
im Bereich der Personalsysteme erfordert umfan-
greiche Anpassungen: Personal muss von System A 
in System B transferiert werden, wenn man ver-
schiedene Systeme hat. Und wenn die jetzt unter-
schiedlich ausgestaltet sind, dann macht das Ganze 
Gaining syner-
gies (cost re-
duction) vs. 
differentiation 
Architecture 
should be de-
signed to not 
hamper fre-
quent organiza-
tional change  
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
natürlich noch mehr Mühe.  
5b 105: So was wie eben 
Technologie-
Standards zu setzen 
[…] was weiß ich der 
ganze Konzern nutzt 
jetzt DB2 
Decision 
on using 
technol-
ogy 
standards 
143: Aus der Konzernzentrale heraus, ist für mich 
eher die Frage, gibt es einen Standard oder gibt es 2 
Standards für eine bestimmte IT Domäne? Anstatt 
selber festlegen zu wollen, wir nehmen DB2 statt 
Oracle. […] das sind die gleichen Geschäftspro-
zesse, warum lauft ihr heute mit 7 Systemen durch 
die Gegend […] bitte reduziert das Ganze innerhalb 
der nächsten 2 Jahre auf 2 Systeme oder auf 1. 
Not which 
technology 
standards to 
use, but how 
many differ-
ent ones 
117: Schlicht Synergienutzung. Die Nutzung Ef-
fizienzsteigerung. Wenn man unterschiedliche 
Datenbanksysteme unten drunter liegen hat wird es 
ja noch komplizierter die Daten zusam-
menzuführen, man verliert im Einkauf z.T. 
Vorteile, man kann das Know-how nicht entspre-
chend nutzen im Bereich der Konfiguration und des 
Betriebes, also insofern macht es schon Sinn, auf 
Standards zu gehen.  
309: Geschäfte funktionieren auch, wenn Sie 7 
redundante Systeme haben. Aber man verliert auf 
der Kostenposition im Wettbewerb dann natürlich 
einiges an Vorteil 
Synergy and 
efficiency 
Cost competi-
tiveness 
6a 46: Core-
Applikationen, die 
versuchen wir auf 
unserer Enterprise-
plattform zu be-
treiben, dass ist Unix-, 
sozusagen Solaris-
Datenbanken 
Introduc-
ing a 
standard 
platform 
with 
technol-
ogy 
standards 
Reason quote: 
50: Auch das ist mal ein Grundsatz, welcher natürlich auch mit der Bank und den Anforderungen umgestoßen werden 
kann. Also wenn jetzt z.B. im Portfoliomanagement ein neues Tool evaluiert wird, wo wir sicherlich Teil des Evalua-
tionsverfahrens sind, aber schlussendlich ja eigentlich nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen, dann kann das schon sein, 
dass das ein microsoftlastiges Produkt werden kann. Zwar ein Coreprodukt nicht mehr auf diese Enterpriseplattform 
betreibbar und dann müssen wir ein bisschen schauen wie wir, wo wir das einerseits betreiben […] 
 
117: weil wenn wir nur business-driven wären, dann würden wir über kurz oder lang nicht mehr kosteneffektiv sein, weil 
das Business natürlich sehr schnell, sehr flexible Lösungen haben will. Longterm-mäßig funktioniert das einfach nicht 
über alle Grenzen hinaus, da muss man mit ner Menge fristigen Konzepten eben arbeiten, da muss man schon eben diese 
Grundsätze z.B. auch eben die Enterpriseplattformstrategie oder Environment, das muss man einfach unterstützen, um 
nicht mit jeder neuen Anforderungen auch hinten durch neue Infrastrukturen aufbauen zu müssen und die dann auch noch 
mit diesen Systemgrenzen hinaus zu integrieren. Das wird dann wirklich teuer. Wenn wir uns wirklich auf diese 
Grundsätze berufen können und darauf abstützen können, dann denk ich, sind wir relativ vielmehr in der Lage mit unwe-
sentlich steigenden Maintanance- oder Produktionskosten die Bank in ihrem Wachstum einerseits, aber auch in der Aus-
richtung vom Geschäft her, neue Geschäftsfelder, einigermaßen schnell zu supporten. 
 
214: Also ich denk was durchaus strategisch ist, ist natürlich, dass wir sehr kostenbewusst sind, eigentlich kostengetrie-
ben natürlich. Obwohl die Bank relativ stark wächst oder dürfen natürlich die Kosten nicht linear mitwachsen, das ist, das 
versteht sich von selber. 
Business rules 
and IT has to 
deliver; how-
ever, standards 
are needed to 
be able to 
- react quickly 
to business 
requests  
- stay cost-
competitive  
I.e. IT should 
not become a 
problem (cost-
wise or because 
it makes certain 
requests diffi-
cult to imple-
ment) for busi-
ness 
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sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
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mary 
 
326: Aber diese Entscheidung ist sicherlich in seinem Grundsatz, befähigt uns eben, skalierbar auf das reine Wachstum 
der Bank, […] entspannt abzufädeln, ohne eben grundsätzliche neue strategische Ausrichtung der IT entscheiden zu 
müssen. 
 
455: wie eben diese Ausrichtung auf diese ORACLE-Datenbanken damit verbunden, also man richtet sich ja nicht nur 
auf ORACLE ein, sondern man braucht die Leute dazu, man braucht die Mechanismen dazu und das Know-how. Man 
muss ja da auch, ich meine nur die ORACLE Datenbank zu betreiben, das ist das Eine, aber dass diese ganzen Mecha-
nismen von einem Business-Contingency-Management darin dann auch zu verpacken, dass ist das Andere und ich denke 
so eine Entscheidung ist schon sehr strategisch und die kann man von heute auf morgen, also kann man schon, aber sollte 
man eigentlich nicht von heute auf morgen ändern. 
This requires a 
counterbalance 
to “business 
drivency”  
Characteristics: 
- influences 
subsequent 
decisions 
- economically 
not reversible 
6b 439: […] wir müssen 
da etwas 
grundsätzlich ändern, 
entweder bauen wir 
ein SAN oder ein 
NAS, wir haben uns 
für das SAN 
entschieden und das 
ist sicher etwas strate-
gisches 
Choice 
of tech-
nology 
None None 439: Also was meine einzelnen Investitionen natür-
lich schon, aber das definiert eher wieder, also 
wenn ich jetzt sage: okay, die letzte infrastruk-
turelle Ausrichtungsänderung, sagen wir mal wir 
sind wegen des Wachstums langsam an die Ka-
pazitätengrenze gekommen, wir hatten bis dahin 
kosteneffektive Direct-Attached-Storage und haben 
uns irgendwann überlegen müssen, was machen wir 
jetzt, wir müssen da etwas grundsätzlich ändern, 
entweder bauen wir ein SAN oder ein NAS, wir 
haben uns für das SAN entschieden und das ist 
sicher etwas strategisches 
Fundamental 
change for IT 
7 126 Wenn es darum 
geht, Standorte, die 
wir in den USA ha-
ben, miteinander zu 
vernetzen und mit der 
Zentrale zu vernetzen, 
dann sehe ich das als 
eine strategische 
Entscheidung wie wir 
das tun wollen 
How to 
connect 
decentral 
locations  
123: Also wenn ich jetzt keinen Dienstleister hab 
mit dem ich Daten austauschen will, der in den 
USA sitzt, sondern wenn eine Tochtergesellschaft 
in den USA sitzt, wie der angebunden wird, ist mir 
nicht so wichtig. Das muss ja irgendwie funk-
tionieren, das kann vor Ort entschieden werden. 
Wenn’s drum geht, Standorte die wir in den USA 
haben miteinander zu vernetzen und mit der Zen-
trale zu vernetzen, dann sehe ich das als eine strate-
gische Entscheidung wie wir das tun wollen. 
Decisions 
that have 
only local 
impact are 
not strategi-
cally relevant 
129: das hat auf die Verfügbarkeit der Applika-
tionen, auf den Zugriff, auf die Daten, auf die 
Kommunikation relativ entscheidenden Wert [Ein-
fluss] 
 
209 : Für mich sind einfach alle die Themen strate-
gisch, die ne Visibilität über die Landesgrenzen 
hinaus haben. 
Influence on 
“lesser” deci-
sions. Guides 
subsequent 
decisions. 
 
Corporate-wide 
impact (across 
regions) 
8 89: ich frage mich, Choos- Reason quote: Long-term 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
nehme ich PC-basierte 
Systeme oder Intel-
systeme strategisch 
jetzt für 
beispielsweise ein 
Rechenzentrum oder 
bin ich verstärkt auf 
Host-System? Oder 
ich sehe es auf einer 
höheren Ebene, auf 
der Betriebssysteme-
bene, dass ich sage, 
geht ein Konzern jetzt 
strategisch, sagen wir 
mal, Richtung Micro-
soft oder will man auf 
Linux gehen oder 
fährt man eine Hy-
bridstrategie, Java, 
.NET, das sind so die 
großen aktuellen Wei-
chenstellungen. Stan-
dard ERP-Systeme 
versus Eigenentwick-
lungen.  
 
 
ing tech-
nology 
standards 
94: so die großen aktuellen Weichenstellungen 
117: Ergebnis der strategischen Überlegung, die auch wieder ganz oben beginnt, wenn ich ... wenn ich flexible schnelle 
IT haben will mit optimierter Time to Market, dann habe ich beispielsweise eben auch Systeme, die sehr, sehr einfach 
und schnell im Sinne von Rapid Prototyping, ja, Microsoftentwicklungssystem, so Visual Basic, ja, wo fast schon die 
Leute, die operativen Leute schnell mal im Corporate-Market Umfeld zum Beispiel, die haben eine Idee ein Derivat oder 
für irgendein Produkt und das coden die ein. Da ist dann Time to Market kritisch bei solchen Sachen. Und dann habe ich 
hier ... das ist dann meine Business-Idee, meine businessstrategische Optimierung und die spielt dann runter, dass ich 
sage, ja, mein Standard ist irgendwo zum Beispiel Microsoft. Das sind alles jetzt Beispiele. [...] Und andererseits sage 
ich, ja, gut, Zahlungsverkehr, das ist was, das ist millionenfach pro Tag wird das durchgeführt, da kommt es mir auf 
Stückkosten an. Weniger jetzt auf Time to Market. 
371: Strategisch, wenn man es so definiert, sind das die Leitplanken, innerhalb derer man möchte, dass sich die weitere 
Entwicklung also in einer Vielzahl von Fällen auch bewegt. Dass ich nicht den Einzelfall entscheiden muss, sondern 
sagen kann, es gibt gute Gründe, ich möchte mich beispielsweise auch auf eine IT-Plattform festlegen. Ein Beispiel, 
wenn ich Microsoft wählen würde und das im großen Stile ausrollen würde, könnte ich bei Lizenzen viel Geld sparen, 
weil ich dann einfach auch Discounts bekomme, ich kann dann ganz anders einkaufen. Wenn ich konzernweit auf ein 
System standardisiere, dann kann ich da natürlich Skaleneffekte beim Einkauf erzielen. […] Und im Betrieb, wenn ich 
eine homogene Landschaft habe in meinem Rechenzentrum, dann brauche ich nicht so viele Spezialisten, dann kann ich 
es in einem anderen Schichtbetrieb fahren, dann brauche ich weniger Leute, als wenn ich wirklich einen Zoo habe, nicht? 
Das ist auch so ein Begriff, der Zoo, das ist ... oder eine Vielzahl von Exoten und jeder braucht seinen Spezialisten und 
braucht sein Backup und das ist unendlich teuer, statt wenn ich einen möglichst homogenen Park habe. Und das sind eben 
Gründe für Standardisierung. Und, ja, gut, strategisch sind sie eben deshalb, weil sie längerfristig ausgerichtet sind. 
 
421: kann ich kurzfristig vielleicht ein gutes Schnäppchen machen, aber langfristig bin ich dann wieder in meinem Be-
triebsproblem und Anwendungs-Entwicklungsproblem. 
 
408:Dann kommt die IBM und schlägt dann also in blühenden Farben vor, mit dem System haben wir einen perfekten 
Business-Case und erreichen unsere Business-Needs. Und in der Sekunde muss ich sagen: Ja, vielleicht, es kann sein, 
aber unsere Strategie ist eben genau eine andere 
446: Governance und Strategie sind schon irgendwo Dompteure für die an sich sehr autonomen Agenten und auch diver-
gierenden Agenten. Weil jedes Business irgendwo, das ist auch im Menschen dann psychologisch verankert, ist be-
sonders und speziell und die Anforderungen sind besonders und speziell. Und jeder will eigentlich die geniale Lösung 
haben und alle Anbieter am Markt und alle Consultants wollen solche Speziallösungen verkaufen. Und damit hat man so 
eine Entropie und dem muss natürlich die IT-Strategie und Governance entgegenwirken.  
 
guidelines 
have to be 
made in-line 
with business 
strategy 
Synergies (re-
garding IT 
procurement, 
scale effects in 
IT develop-
ment/operations 
personnel) 
Counterbalance 
for short-
sighted busi-
ness units and 
vendors needed 
to ensure long-
term problem-
free and cost-
efficicent archi-
tecture  
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
827: polizeiliche Wirkung […] auch.  
9 394: weil wir ja kein 
so ertragreiches 
Unternehmen wie 
jetzt eine Bank sind, 
dann sind solche Ar-
chitektur- oder ar-
chitektonischen Aus-
sagen von enormer 
strategischer Bedeu-
tung. 
1113: Also Standard-
isierung ... hat auch 
was mit Strategie zu 
tun  
Decision 
on archi-
tecture 
standards 
1138: Die Strategiefrage, die wir bei dem Thema 
gestellt haben: Wie viel Entwicklungsarchitekturen 
brauchen wir, wenn wir von 100.000 bis 50 Mil-
lionen gehen? 
Decision on 
how many 
different 
technologies 
are needed 
749: Dann stellt die rein wirtschaftliche Frage: 
Müssen wir das für jeden Bereich mit einer anderen 
Technologie machen oder können wir eine Tech-
nologie einfach glatt machen und die macht alles? 
Also es hat dieses übergreifende Ding 
852: wo gibt es Gemeinsamkeiten […] wenn wir 
den ersten Schritt gemacht haben, gehen wir den 
zweiten Schritt, wo müssten wir denn Gemeinsam-
keiten sehen. 
1070: Und ein Teil der Strategieaufgabe ist eben 
auch, zu identifizieren, wo könnte es einen Benefit 
geben, wenn ich es eben nicht fünfmal mache, son-
dern nur einmal 
Synergies 
across the 
whole company 
10a 1126: […] wir gehen 
jetzt komplett auf 
Open Source und 
gehen nur noch auf 
Java-Technik 
  
Decision 
to rely 
on open 
source 
tech-
nologies 
10b 1154: eine strate-
gische Ausrichtung 
auf Lotus Notes  
1334: Das Strate-
giepapier selbst hat 20 
Seiten. Aber: Da steht 
z.B. auch drin: Lotus 
Notes […] 
Which 
tech-
nologies 
to use 
None Reason quote: 
1126: Weil die Entscheidungen, die da rauskommen, auch zum 
Beispiel jetzt auch einen IT-Wechsel vorzunehmen, ich sage mal, 
dass wir sagen, wir gehen jetzt komplett auf Open Source und ge-
hen nur noch auf Java-Technik, das bindet das Unternehmen für 
drei bis fünf Jahre, diese Technologie, ich kann die ja nicht, zack, 
wieder ändern. Das heißt, die Entscheidung, die wir dort treffen, 
um neue Systeme anzuschaffen oder in neue Richtungen zu gehen, 
das ist schon gravierend. Bleiben wir beim Produktverkauf, dass 
wir sagen, wir haben eine neue Software gefunden, wo wir glauben, 
einen höheren Produktverkauf zu machen, allein das anzuschubsen, 
also die Infrastruktur wieder aufzubauen dafür, die System 
anzuschaffen, das kann ich nicht unter drei bis fünf Jahren 
entwickeln. 
Fundamental 
decisions 
Long-term 
binding, not 
easily reversi-
ble and might 
consequently 
hamper future 
changes in 
business strat-
egy 
Regulates busi-
ness units in 
order to ensure 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
   829: […] wenn jemand eine neue Idee hat, dann kommt er zuerst zu 
mir und sagt: Oh, ich habe eine Idee, ich will das und das machen. 
Ich sage: Pass mal auf, was willst Du machen? […] Und dann 
musste ich sehen, ob die bei uns rein passt. Weil ja bestimmte for-
male Faktoren, ein Hardfact ist zum Beispiel, wir wollen nur noch 
alles barrierefrei machen. Wenn der also mit Javascript ankommt, 
mit Spezialzeug, das ist nicht barrierefrei. Tolle Sache, die Du 
haben willst, aber nein, sie wird nicht, weil wir haben strategisch 
festgelegt, die IT-Strategie ist Barrierefreiheit. Das passt nicht rein. 
Flash-Animation, also ein Blinder und die aufpoppenden 
Bilder[…]Keine Chance […]Das Marketing sitzt da und weint: Ich 
will Flash. […] Es geht nicht […]  
that strategic 
direction (hav-
ing barrier-free 
website access 
for disabled 
people) is not 
violated on a 
technical level 
(by using tech-
nologies that 
are not barrier-
free) 
11a 20: Es gibt darüber 
hinaus auf der Ebene 
auch eine paar 
grundsätzlichere Ar-
chitekturentscheidun-
gen, die natürlich 
dann auch im Rahmen 
der IT-Strategie quasi 
geplant werden […] 
Decision 
on which 
IT stan-
dards to 
use  
78: Also das heißt, sie haben eine Zielplattform für 
Middleware definiert und dann konsequent auch 
neue Anwendungen nur dort stattfinden lassen. Ich 
denke, so etwas geht wirklich nur, wenn man auch 
strategisch so eine Plattform festlegt, ja? 
Decision to 
concentrate 
on certain 
technologies 
(defined as 
the standard) 
80: Das ist also für mich sehr wohl schon eine IT-
strategische Entscheidung, die dann in den nächsten 
Jahren eine ganz klare Vorgabe letztlich enthält für 
alle IT-Anwendungen, für alle IT-Projekte. 
 
108: mit dem IT-Bereich beschäftigt hat, das war 
ganz klar eine Strategie des IT-Bereichs, sagen wir 
mal so 
A long-term 
guideline and 
regulation for 
all projects 
company-wide 
 
 
 
11b 138: Und dann gibt es 
noch die dritte Ebene 
einer IT-Strategie, 
dass nämlich, wenn 
ich irgendwo ein 
technologisches Pro-
dukt habe, zum 
Beispiel haben wir das 
SAP-Portal als Stan-
dardportal im 
Konzern, dann 
brauche ich da natür-
lich auch eine Strate-
Decision 
on de-
velop-
ment 
path of 
an IS 
  175: Also das ist eigentlich eine sehr tiefe tech-
nische Ebene […] Aus der Sicht des Produktes ist 
es eine ganz relevante Frage, also eine wichtige 
strategische Frage auch, weil da kuckt man sehr 
wohl, wenn man gerade sich SAP-Standardsoftware 
sich anguckt, schon sehr wohl drei Jahre in die 
Zukunft, ja? Aus der Konzernsicht ist es natürlich 
völlig irrelevant. Also es ist keine konzernstrategis-
chrelevante Fragestellung. 
Strategic be-
cause it is a 
plan for a long 
period in the 
future 
 
Strategic from 
the point of 
view of the IT 
artifact, not 
strategic for the 
corporation 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
gie im Sinne von: 
Wann führe ich zum 
Beispiel Netweaver 
ein, wie gehe ich 
technologisch vor und 
so weiter. Wo will ich 
drei Jahren stehen mit 
meinem Technologie-
portal? 
12 None Decision 
on tech-
nology 
princi-
ples 
None Examples: 
moving from 
host-based to 
browser-
based tech-
nologies 
None How business 
requirements 
and targets (e.g. 
flexibility or a 
certain 
cost/income 
ratio) translate 
to this lever: a) 
more flexi-
ble/cheap tech-
nology (e.g. 
model-driven 
architecture) b) 
using technol-
ogy to automate 
13 257: der Infrastruktur-
Strategie zum Beispiel 
definiert: Welche 
Rolle hat für uns 
Linux als Betriebssys-
tem 
258: Wie wollen wir 
den Client ausstatten? 
Welche Software-
strategie haben wir im 
Office-Umfeld und 
Decision 
on which 
technol-
ogy 
standards 
to use 
Reason quote: 
296: auf der einen Seite Synergie und Masseneffekte  
431: Auch Architektur-Entscheidungen kann man ja auch nicht so ohne weiteres ändern. […] Das kann ich jetzt ja auch 
nicht morgen und übermorgen ständig ändern. [...] Und insoweit sind das Maßgaben, die einfach eine Relevanz haben, 
eine Dauerhaftigkeit und auch im Sinne ihrer Bedeutung eine Architektur-Entscheidung treffen, die eine hohe Dauerhaf-
tigkeit hat 
277: Dann ist das im Sinne der Infrastruktur-Strategie aus Sicht der IT ein vorgegebener Standard, an dem ist auch nicht 
mehr zu rütteln. [...] die Standardsoftware, in der wir diese Applikationen dann letztendlich installieren, wieder ein Teil 
der Infrastruktur-Strategie ist. Es wird also mit dem UB nicht darüber geredet, ob wir Oracle oder SAP machen. 
288: SAP ist gesetzt 
Gaining corpo-
rate-wide syn-
ergies 
Is a guideline 
for subsequent 
decisions 
Not easily re-
versible 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
solche Dinge. 
277: Dann ist das im 
Sinne der Infrastruk-
tur-Strategie aus Sicht 
der IT ein vorgege-
bener Standard, [...] 
ob wir Oracle oder 
SAP machen. 
291: unserem stan-
dardisierten 
Werkzeugkasten 
Table 22: Technical architecture standards - interpretation of decisions and reasoning
  95 
d. PROCESS STANDARDS provide guidelines for developing or operating applications and the 
technical infrastructure. These may be guidelines on how to manage the lifecycle of appli-
cations (e.g. evolutionary vs. big-bang changes), which standard to use for IT operations 
processes (e.g. IT Infrastructure Library, ITIL), project management (e.g. PRINCE2, Pro-
jects in Controlled Environments), or software engineering (e.g. V-model vs. Rational 
Unified Process, RUP). 
In detail, the decisions in this decision area were:  
• Decision on the mode of evolution of application landscape (e.g. should we change 
our application landscape in an evolutionary approach or should we make “big-bang” 
changes?) (case 2) 
• Decision on which standards to use for software engineering (process modeling, pro-
ject management, etc.) (cases 4a, 9a, 9b, 12) 
• Decision on the adoption of standards of IT operations management (cases 4b, 6, 9a, 
11) 
These decisions were argued to be strategic for reasons very similar to those of IT archi-
tecture standards. 
First, the decisions have to be made in congruence with business strategy. In case 12, 
flexibility was stated to be one of the company’s overall objectives, i.e. the ability to react 
to changes quickly and easily. This was translated into the need to have a more flexible, 
incremental, and iterative software development process (in this case RUP). A similar line 
of reasoning can be found in case 11: the changes in the industry (introduction of low-cost 
competitors) increased the pressure for staying cost-competitive. The business strategy 
foresees staying as cost-competitive as possible, even though no low-cost strategy is being 
actively pursued. This was translated to IT processes, which have to be standardized in 
order to reduce IT costs, seen as a requirement dictated by the strategic environmental re-
quirements (and hence reflected in the business strategy as a strategic objective). 
Connected to cost competitiveness was the reason that standardizing IT processes would 
lead to corporate-wide synergies by having everybody follow the same process standard 
instead of having multiple processes (cases 9, 11) – independent of whether this was a 
strategic business requirement or not. 
Again, it was argued that being only “business-driven” (case 6) leads to a situation where 
IT services cannot be delivered at all, or at least not cost-efficiently. To counter the 
  96 
complexity introduced by business units, it was argued that certain process standards, 
principles, and abilities are needed: in contrast to architecture standards, these standards 
do not try to regulate business units (and hence avoid the complexity they cause) but try to 
deal with the unavoidable complexity. In one case (2), no technology standards were set 
for applications. Instead, the ability to deal with all kinds of technologies and “integrate 
everything with everything” was postulated as a guideline, allowing the company to han-
dle the complexity without regulating its business units with respect to which technologies 
they use. In another case (6), process standards were argued to ensure that IT services are 
delivered in an orderly and cost-efficient way. This was again argued to be on a different 
strategic level, not “business-driven” but “IT-driven” information strategy, which rein-
forces the notion of a counterbalance. 
Furthermore, setting process standards were again argued to exhibit strategic characteris-
tics: a decision to adopt a certain IT process standard (e.g. ITIL or RUP) is a fundamental 
change in how the IT department works and also changes the interface to the business 
units (cases 6, 12). Setting process standards also reduces the complexity of having very 
different ways of doing something (case 9). The way to do this is to set standards that not 
only serve as a principle or guideline, but as a forcing device for instilling an orderly 
way of doing things in compliance with the standard on a corporate-wide basis (cases 4a, 
9). For example, in case 4, the interviewee argued that no one would voluntarily undertake 
process modeling (which was argued to be important because it supports the IT unit’s 
ability to deliver its services) if it was not a strategic rule. Finally, the decision to adopt a 
certain process standard was seen again (just as architectural standards) as not being eas-
ily reversible (case 4). Once a certain standard was decided for, people would have to be 
trained, business units would have to adjust to a certain interface vis-à-vis the IT proc-
esses, etc.  
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summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
2 278: spätestens seit 
dieser Entscheidung 
eben nicht alles auf 
einmal sonder sukzes-
sive auszutauschen, ja 
klar, eine strategische 
Ausrichtung hatten, wir 
werden immer neue und 
alte Anwendungen ne-
beneinander haben. Das 
ist Grundprinzip. Darauf 
sind wir eingestellt eben 
auf Grund dieser 
Möglichkeit alles mit 
allem zu verbinden und 
das macht’s eben 
möglich nur die Systeme 
zu erneuern, die auch 
aus fachlichen Gründen 
möglich zu erneuern 
sind und ansonsten auch 
ruhig mal technisch 
veraltete Systeme zu 
behalten 
Decision 
on IT ar-
chitecture 
evolution 
principles: 
to run old 
and new 
systems in 
parallel; to 
have an 
evolution-
ary archi-
tecture 
rather than 
a planned 
one 
245: weil wir durch diese kleinteiligere Betrachtung der 
Fachbereiche für sich, zwar gezwungen sind, alte und 
neue Systeme immer miteinander zu integrieren. […] 
Andererseits sind wir dadurch eben auch stark geworden 
in dem Sinne, dass wir sehr gut verschiedene Architek-
turen miteinander integrieren können. Wir haben eine 
Plattform, dass ist von IBM die MQSeries, das alle 
technischen Plattformen miteinander verbinden kann 
[…] weil wir eben alles von Windows über OS/2 über 
Unix oder Z/OS oder was weiß ich nicht mit MQ ver-
binden. Wenn jetzt irgendeine Anwendung kommt, 
völlig egal ob sie gekauft ist oder selber gemacht und 
welche Architektur der Anbieter gerne hätte, wir in-
tegrieren es 
423: haben wir eben ein evolutionäres Modell für unsere 
Anwendungslandschaft (=Anwendungsarchitektur). Und 
da gibt es überwiegend nur die Ausrichtung an 
Geschäftszielen an der Stelle. Evolutionär heisst eben, 
dass wir nicht beschließen: in den nächsten 10 Jahren 
wollen wir eine komplett neue Anwendungslandschaft 
aufbauen und dann dieses Ziel verfolgen, sondern pro-
jektweise entscheiden: das ist jetzt das richtige. 
383: Das ist aber in einer Reihe von Projekten so ent-
standen, da gab es keine Planung davor, die besagt hat: 
wir gehen jetzt auf Thin Client. 
 
Decision on 
IT architec-
ture princi-
ples implies 
the (techno-
logical) ca-
pability to 
integrate all 
applications 
with each 
other in order 
to be able to 
fulfill BUs’ 
requirements 
No planning 
of technology 
standards 
(area c) 
239: sich die Entwicklung sehr stark 
an Geschäftszielen, Unternehmen-
szielen ausrichtet 
276: Weil die Beherrschbarkeit 
hiervon natürlich besser ist, als so 
eine Art Big Bang, wir machen mal 
alles neu.  
301: Die strategische Planung 
berücksichtigt nahezu 
ausschließlich Geschäftsanfor-
derungen und den Aspekt Betriebs- 
und Wartungsfähigkeit. Sprich 
wenn die Technik einfach aus der 
Wartung geht, dann wird man was 
tun müssen. Aber das lässt sich 
auch noch lange hinauszögern. 
 
 
Business re-
quirements have 
highest priority 
Hence, no IT 
constraints (e.g. 
through stan-
dards) are ac-
cepted 
As a conse-
quence, the archi-
tecture gets com-
plex. 
Hence, the ability 
to integrate all 
technologies with 
each other is 
needed. 
4a 345: […] wir wollen 
dafür Sorge tragen, dass 
wir unsere Aktivitäten 
insgesamt, die wir be-
treiben im Rahmen von 
Businessprozessen 
beschreiben. Mag trivial 
erscheinen, ist aber nicht 
trivial. Weil es nicht alle 
Policies for 
process 
modeling 
  350: Das ist deshalb so wichtig, 
weil es ein Zwangskorsett anlegt, 
andernfalls geschieht es nämlich 
nicht. Da gehen wir sogar mal ganz 
bewusst, ganz tief in der Aussage. 
Guidline: force 
people to act 
according to the 
policy. 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
tun. Und es wäre übri-
gens schon eine Strate-
gieaussage, obwohl Sie 
sie sehr stark auf die 
Toolebene reduzieren 
können, wir haben dafür 
ein Tool und das heißt 
ARIS.  
4b 399: Delivery Organisa-
tion and Processes 
beschreibt dann: da 
gestalten wir sozusagen, 
wie bauen wir unsere 
Aufbau- und Prozessor-
ganisation auf.  
Decisions 
about the 
processes 
of the IS 
unit 
401: Weniger gern genommen aus alten Zeiten heraus, 
ist die Prozessstruktur. Was weiß ich und wir bauen uns 
im Bereich Operations ITIL konform auf und etablieren 
die Prozesse 
Selection of 
IT process 
standards 
417: Genau, weil es einen 
mehrjährig bindet, wenn man diese 
Entscheidung neu getroffen hat, 
dann sollte man nicht ohne Not 
davon abgehen. 
Long-term bind-
ing, irreversible 
6 329:Was wir uns viel-
mehr in letzter Zeit auch 
mit der IT-Strategie dort 
beschäftigen, ist mit 
dem Prozessframework, 
also wir sind, wir haben 
uns dort schon auf die 
Fahne geschrieben, uns 
ein Prozessframework 
zuzumuten in Richtung 
ITIL 
359: also wir führen das 
überhaupt ein, also das 
hat auch wieder mit 
Umbau zu tun, heute an 
der Abteilung 
Introducing 
an IT proc-
ess stan-
dard and 
reorganiz-
ing the IT 
unit 
Reasoning quote: 
333: bis dato praktisch keine Ressourcen frei machen können für das, weil wir eben diese business-driven-
Strategie rausgegeben haben und jetzt meint das Business scheinbar, wir arbeiten nur noch für Business. Das 
ist eine kleine Gegenkorrektur, denke ich jetzt auch für das nächste Jahr 
 
350: also auch strategisch ansehe, das hat aber gar nichts mit business-driven IT-Strategien zu tun, sondern 
das ist IT-driven […], um jetzt wieder zurück zu kommen, auf einen normalen administrativen Level und 
dann wieder kosteneffektiv oder ressourceffektiv zu bleiben 
 
360: Morgen wird das nicht mehr funktionieren oder morgen will ich auch nicht mehr so funktionieren 
 
510:Weil sich dadurch ja auch die Zusammenarbeit und die Art und Weise wie wir in der IT funktionieren, 
verändert [...] 
Counter-balance 
business units to 
keep up ability to 
fulfill IT services 
in a cost-effective 
way 
 
 
Changes the way 
IT operates dra-
matically 
 
 
9a 922: Dass wir im Be-
trieb ITIL haben, das ist 
das Betriebskapitel hier 
[im Dokument IT Stra-
Decision to 
introduce 
ITIL 
  None  
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Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
tegie] 
9b 1016: Und meine Strate-
gieaussage ist: Ich 
möchte bei den Vorge-
hensmodellen mitreden 
Standardiz-
ing process 
models 
1017: in den Vorgehensmodellen die Schnittstelle zu den Kunden niedergelegt ist und ich finde es nicht in 
Ordnung, wenn der Personenverkehr andere Schnittstellen zu unserem Dienstleister hat und andere Ergebnis-
dokumente verlangt als der Station und Service, weil die sind dann wieder nicht vergleichbar. 
1043: ...das hat einen konzernweiten Impact 
Corporate-wide 
impact 
9c 883: Ich sage, dass wir 
sehr viel früher und 
intensiver als heute 
modellieren müssen, ob 
das ERM oder UML ist, 
das ist egal.” 
Decision to 
conduct 
process 
modelling 
  881: … um die Komplexität zu 
beherrschen 
Reduce complex-
ity 
11 663: Was wir jetzt ei-
gentlich machen in der 
Konzern-IT-Strategie, 
ist, wir gucken systema-
tisch durch alle 
möglichen Arbeitsfelder, 
die es gibt im IT-
Bereich, wo sehen denn 
irgendwelche Leute 
einen Handlungsbedarf. 
So. Und der wird in der 
Tat dann versucht, zu 
beschreiben. Und einer 
der Bereiche, wo man 
das sieht, ist in der Tat 
die Standardisierung von 
IT- und Support-
Prozessen. 
Standardiz-
ing IT 
processes 
corporate 
wide 
247: Es geht also nicht darum, wie kann IT eingesetzt 
werden, um irgendwo Kosten zu sparen, das heißt, um 
Geschäftsprozesse kostengünstiger zu machen, sondern 
eben wirklich eine interne Sicht der IT 
226: Jetzt ist eher der Tenor, zu gucken ... Es gibt einen 
hohen Kostendruck auf den [company]-Konzern und die 
Frage ist letztlich, wie kann die IT in ihrem eigenen 
Betrieb kostengünstiger produzieren. Und ein 
Hauptthema sind natürlich Skaleneffekte, die man real-
isieren kann, Wiederverwendbarkeit, Mehrfachnutzung. 
Und das ist jetzt der Schwerpunkt der IT-Strategie, dass 
wir gucken, in welchen Bereichen könnte man denn, 
wenn man es gemeinsamer macht, einfach die Kosten 
senken. 
  
Standardizing 
IT processes 
results in cost 
reduction 
235: Durch Synergien, genau. 
283: Was sind denn die strate-
gischen Herausforderungen des 
[company]Konzerns? Und die 
strategischen Herausforderungen 
sind die Tatsache ... Also was für 
die Airlinebranche relativ neu ist, 
das Geschäftsmodell verändert sich 
massiv im Moment. Und es gibt in 
Europa jetzt Low-Coster und keiner 
weiß, was sich mittelfristig daraus 
entwickelt. Deswegen ist sehr wohl 
die strategische Positionierung des 
<company>-Konzerns, wir müssen 
im Prinzip dicht an den Kosten-
führern sein und wir müssen in der 
Lage sein, sehr flexibel unsere Kos-
ten zu verändern. Das sind so die 
beiden Hauptvorgaben. Das sind die 
strategischen Ansagen des 
Konzerns. 
Synergies corpo-
rate-wide 
Cost competitive-
ness required as a 
result of industry 
changes 
12 None Decisions 
on IT proc-
esses and 
None E.g. the use 
of the Ra-
tional Unified 
Summary: Business requirements and targets (e.g. flexi-
bility or a certain cost/income ratio) translate IT proc-
esses into a more flexible IT development process and 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
organiza-
tion 
Process cut IT operations costs  
Organization of IT department strongly influences how 
IT communicates and works, and thus how it can add to 
business success 
Table 23: IT process standards - interpretation of decisions and reasoning
  101 
e. INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO DECISIONS focus neither on the functional nor the technical 
side, but on the prioritization of the allocation of financial resources to concrete initiatives 
(although functional and technical criteria might serve as a basis for this decision). The 
decision involves a trade-off between different requests, e.g. for projects to build applica-
tions or technical infrastructure. The main decision object is the application/project portfo-
lio: “The focus of the documents or the IT strategy work in the business units actually is 
the portfolio […] with mid- to long-term projects […] the decision on which applications 
so to speak get into the portfolio and will then be […] developed” (case 11). This decision 
was found in cases 4, 8, 11, and 13). 
The reasons for viewing investment decisions as strategic were the following: first of all, 
once the application portfolio has been decided, it is clear which applications will have to 
be developed in the coming years. Hence, this decision serves as a long-term work-plan 
(case 4) that prioritizes business requirements and is at the same time used for allocat-
ing IP (human and financial) resources (cases 4, 8, 11, 13). This argument was used inde-
pendently of whether the projects in the application portfolio were strategic or not. The 
main concerns here were that applications are in fact what the business units want and that 
there should be some kind of prioritization to serve as a guideline for allocating scarce 
resources. 
Only cases 11 and 13 focused on the kinds of projects in the portfolio: it was stated that 
projects enable business units to change and to develop their business further (case 11). 
It was further argued that application portfolio prioritization is strategic because it ensures 
that the resource allocations are in congruence with business strategy priorities and 
with the desired competitive position of the business units (case 13). 
In case 11, a “political” explanation was given: prioritization also means that certain ap-
plications will not be funded, but because each business unit wants its projects to receive 
funding, this dilemma can only be resolved by top management, whose intervention 
was seen as a characteristic of strategic decisions. 
Two aspects concern the time-span of the decision and the organization level: almost all 
portfolios are yearly plans that are re-evaluated in each annual planning cycle (although 
some projects span longer terms). The decision on the application portfolio is made at the 
business unit level rather than on the corporate level (cases 8, 11). The corporate level 
would at most be concerned with inspecting large projects affecting multiple business 
units. 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
4 164ff: sagen, 
wir setzen […] 
70% aus un-
seren Ressour-
cen, direkt 
Business Area-
wirksam ein 
und wir setzen 
30% unserer 
Ressourcen für 
die Infrastruk-
tur ein.[...] Die 
[Business Area 
wirksamen] 
könnten Sie 
noch mal 
unterteilen und 
sagen: wir 
setzen 30% 
unseres Portfo-
lios für das 
Thema „Geld-
mengen-
steuerung” ein 
Allocating 
resources to 
themes 
164: Und da steht schon und wir setzen einen beson-
deren Fokus hier drauf und wir setzen einen beson-
deren Fokus da drauf, aber es ist nicht eine Listung 
von einzelnen Projekten, dass wäre jetzt auf der näch-
sten Ebene. […] Das wäre nicht mehr strategisch! […] 
durchaus sagen, wir setzen 60% unserer Ressourcen 
oder 70% aus unseren Ressourcen, direkt Business 
Area-wirksam ein und wir setzen 30% unserer Res-
sourcen für die Infrastruktur ein.[...] Die [Business 
Area wirksamen] könnten Sie noch mal unterteilen 
und sagen: wir setzen 30% unseres Portfolios für das 
Thema „Geldmengensteuerung” ein.  
Investments 
not specified 
on the level 
of projects, 
but rather on 
the level of 
resource 
allocations 
(priorities) 
to certain 
business 
units and 
themes 
212: folgende Schwerpunkte in einem 
Mehrjahresplan. Eine Strategie schaut über 3-4 
Jahre. Oder sagen wir mal 3-5 Jahre, so in der 
Größenordnung 
Is a long-term 
plan 
Is a resource 
allocation to 
main topics 
(prioritization) 
8 158: Natürlich, 
das sind Einzel-
projekte. In-
vestments ... 
und dann ist 
natürlich die 
Strategie eine 
strategische 
Entscheidung, 
welche großen 
Projekte gehe 
ich denn an.  
Decision on 
which pro-
jects to in-
vest in (pro-
ject portfo-
lio) 
165: [wie] tue ich meinem Projektportfolio top down 
eine Struktur geben, zum Beispiel dass ich sage, also 
in diesem Jahr wollen wir einfach den Anteil von 
Vertrieb, Vertriebssystemen in unserem Projektportfo-
lio einfach mal erhöhen, also letztlich mehr Geld für 
den Vertrieb, für die Vertriebs-IT.  
178: das sind zweierlei Typen, wenn man so will, das 
eine sind die ... also wir sagen im Banking, da gibt’s 
run the bank, change the bank. [...] Und daneben 
gibt’s dann noch, [...][ die regulatorischen Anfor-
derungen, Basel II, davon haben wir nur sehr bedingt 
was, aber es muss halt getan werden.  
Decision 
about project 
portfolio 
prioritization 
(including 
all types of 
projects, not 
only strate-
gic pro-
jects!) 
 
Done by 
- Prioritization 
of topics 
Direction 
where to allo-
cate company 
and IT re-
sources 
   
103
 
Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
[...] Und diese drei Kategorien werden aber alle im 
Blickpunkt der IT-Strategie  
320: Also das Portfolio ist bei uns auch noch dezen-
traler, also es ist nicht so, dass Corporate das Portfolio 
festzurrt [… from 235] Aber wenn es eben drum geht, 
eine große ERP oder eine EAI-Plattform anzuschaf-
fen, dann ist das was, was im Rahmen von [corporate] 
IT-Strategie auch mal durchleuchtet wird. 
340: Entsprechend tun auch die Business-Units […] 
Portfolien zumindest stark vorschlagen und stark 
beeinflussen [...] Und die werden dann durch Corpo-
rate auch geprüft, aber eben der Einfluss ist da stärker 
bei den großen strategisch relevanten Projekten und 
geringer bei den Maintenance-orientierten Sachen 
business 
units 
Corporate 
strategy only 
includes 
evaluating 
the unit-
overarching 
projects 
11 17: Schwer-
punkt der […] 
der IT-
Strategie-
Arbeit in den 
Geschäftsein-
heiten ist ei-
gentlich das 
Portfolio-
Management 
mit mittel- oder 
langfristigenen 
Projekten. 
Decisions on 
the applica-
tion portfo-
lio 
66: Entscheidung, welche Applikation sozusagen 
kommen in das Portfolio, werden im nächsten Jahr 
dann eben entwickelt oder, was weiß ich, weil eben 
große Wartungen 
 
194: Die [Business unit 1] haben wir zum Beispiel wir 
haben die [BU2], wir haben [BU3] und in jeder dieser 
Gesellschaften wird ein eigenes ... gibt’s eine eigene 
IT-Abteilung erst mal und wird ein eigenes IT-
Portfolio entwickelt. 
 
200: Gibt’s auch ein konzernübergreifendes Portfolio 
oder ist das wirklich komplett dezentral? [...] Im Mo-
ment ist es noch komplett dezentral 
Which ap-
plications to 
develop for 
each busi-
ness unit 
separately 
 
Not on cor-
porate level 
180: „Was ist eine IT-Strategie?”, das ist das Port-
folio-Management unter anderem auch deswegen, 
weil das ist natürlich die engste Schnittstelle 
zwischen dem Business in den Geschäftsfeldern 
und den IT-Abteilungen. Und das ist sicherlich die 
höchste Erwartung an eine IT-Abteilung an eine 
interne IT-Abteilung, dass sie eben die Business-
Weiterentwicklung in Form von IT-Projekten unter-
stützt und ermöglicht. Deswegen ist das die Haupt-
fragestellung eigentlich. 
373: Also wann nenne ich etwas IT-Strategie? Und 
die erste Reaktion wäre: das, was Relevanz für den 
Vorstand hat. Das ist das, was ich IT-Strategie nen-
nen würde. [...] Deswegen ist das Portfolio-
Management mit Sicherheit einer der wesentlichen 
strategischen Bausteine, genau wegen dieser In-
teraktion mit anderen Business Units muss so ein 
Thema letztendlich in einem Vorstand, nämlich in 
dem Vorstand dieser SBU entschieden werden. 
Damit ist das per se ein Vorstands-Thema. 
389: jedes Portfolio beinhaltet Themen, die man 
Is closest to 
business re-
quirements: 
how IT can 
support busi-
ness develop-
ment/change 
Is a resource 
allocation/ 
prioritization 
Has relevance 
for top man-
agement: 
every unit 
wants a share 
of the budget; 
thus, top man-
agement 
needs to re-
solve the issue 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
nicht macht. So, und da will natürlich jeder Bereich, 
dass seine Themen zu denen gehören, die man 
macht. Das heißt, letztlich ist es etwas, was auf der 
Vorstandsebene in einer SBU erst entschieden wer-
den kann oder aufgelöst werden kann. 
397: Und jeder Bereich wird letztendlich durch 
einen Vorstand repräsentiert und dann müssen eben 
diese Vorstände halt gemeinsam als Organ für ihre 
SBU eben sagen: Okay, dahin schicken wir unser 
Geld. 
13 349: Projekt 
Roadmap […] 
pro Unterneh-
mensbereich 
345: Menge 
von Applika-
tionen, die 
sozusagen 
eingeführt 
werden soll 
Decision on 
application 
portfolio by 
BU 
445: Das sind diese Projekt-Roadmaps, wo dann sehr 
stark darauf geachtet wird, wie priorisiere ich jetzt die 
Projekte. Wenn man eine Architektur-Entscheidung 
getroffen hat und dann heißt es „Wir machen CRM, 
wir machen Kassen-Lösungen am Point of Sale, wir 
machen Retail, wir machen das und das”, damit habe 
ich mein Haus definiert. Jetzt stellt sich natürlich die 
Frage, wenigstens IT-technisch geht das so, mit was 
fange ich jetzt an? 
454: Also ist das CRM-System […] wichtiger 
vielleicht als eine Supply-Chain-Management-
Lösung. Oder ist es […] so, dass wir gerne ein BW 
hätten, aber […] wir sagen das ist notwendig, […] 
aber eher aus der strategischen Betrachtung nice to 
have, bringt uns im Sinne der Wettbewerbssituation 
mal eher wenig. 
484ff: […] jährliche Projektpiorisierung im Rahmen 
eines IT-Planungsprozesses und in diesem Zusam-
menhang wird die jährliche Projekt-Roadmap unter 
dem Blickwinkel der Business-Strategie immer über-
prüft, wo man sagt: Jetzt haben wir uns für dieses Jahr 
eigentlich Business Warehouse vorgenommen, aber 
E-Shops sind wichtig, also werden die vorgezogen. In 
der Ressourcen-Planung wird dann festgelegt, wie viel 
IT-Ressourcen in dieses Thema eingekippt werden[...] 
Project pri-
oritization in 
terms of 
strategic 
relevance 
(not: innova-
tion plan-
ning or iden-
tifying SIS) 
BUs make 
suggestions 
and IT helps 
in prioritiz-
ing 
 
 
450: Jetzt stellt sich natürlich die Frage, wenigstens 
IT-technisch geht das so, mit was fange ich jetzt an? 
462: So versuchen wir dann im Sinne der Projekt-
Roadmaps die strategische Relevanz für den 
Unternehmensbereich zu adressieren, also zu sagen, 
das haben wir ... Man kann es vielleicht ganz gut 
vergleichen bei der Tischkultur. Wir haben bei der 
Tischkultur im Sinne einer Entscheidung gesagt: 
Okay, wir setzen bestimmte Softwarelösungen ein, 
wenn wir mal eine E-Shop-Lösung machen. Jetzt 
kam es […] vorletztes Jahr [dazu], dass man das 
Thema Relevanz am Point of Sale im Sinne einer 
Internetpräsenz sehr hoch bewertet hat und sagte, da 
kommt ein Markt, da müssen wir unbedingt was 
tun. Also haben wir im Sinne der Projekt-Roadmap 
dieses Thema hoch priorisiert […] 
Prioritizing 
investments 
for business 
strategy and 
competitive 
position: en-
sure that busi-
ness strategy 
priorities are 
also seen in 
resource allo-
cations 
Resource 
planning for 
IT 
Table 24: Investment decisions - interpretation of decisions and reasoning
  105 
f. BUDGETARY DECISIONS concern the overall volume of the budget for IP as well as the 
general apportionment of the budget to business areas or to budget categories, such as per-
sonnel, hardware/software investments, external service provision, etc. The questions here 
are “How much do we want to spend on IP?” and “How do we want to distribute the over-
all budget to different categories?” (in contrast to “Which concrete initiatives should we 
fund?”): “[here, we decide that] we use […] 70% of our resources directly for business ar-
eas and we use 30% of our resources for the infrastructure” (case 4). These decisions were 
mentioned in cases 3, 4, 5, 10, and 14. 
These decisions were argued to be strategic due to the uncertainty inherent in setting pri-
orities over a long period of time and apportioning large sums; money is a resource that 
has to be planned and prioritized in order to be used optimally. 
Determining the size of the IP budget was seen as a decision that is made under uncer-
tainty from the IT executive’s perspective (case 3): it has to be decided how much money 
to spend without knowing how much will be available or necessary (case 3). 
As the budget is the amount of money that will be spent on IP, the decision to set its size 
was seen to be about a resource that has to be planned (case 10) and optimized, espe-
cially because it has to be regulated if it is not spent wisely (case 5). 
Deciding on the distribution of the budget was argued as strategic because it involves set-
ting priorities for main themes (e.g. business units or business initiatives, but not yet 
concrete projects) over a longer time period (three to five years) (case 4). In this sense, 
setting these main themes through allocating budget to them is not only a work-plan but 
also represents a longer-term commitment. Here, the decisions on the budget distribution 
and on concrete investments are linked: we categorized the prioritization of concrete ini-
tiatives as an investment decision and the mere distribution of resources to business units 
(who then decide on the actual investment) as belonging to the budget decision. 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote Context/ 
detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason 
sum-
mary 
3 712: Setting the IT budget Setting 
the IT 
budget 
  719: Das ist total strategisch. […] 
727: Ja, unter der Definition: Strategisch: ich 
entscheide etwas unter unklaren Rahmenbedingungen. 
Ich musste ja entscheiden […] ohne zu wissen, ob 
mein Budget durchkommt. Hätte ja sein können, der 
streicht mir mein Budget auf die Hälfte zusammen, 
dann sieht’s aber dumm aus. Dann habe ich Aussagen 
meinen Kunden ggü. getroffen, die ich aber nicht fi-
nanzieren kann. 
735: weil es enthält Komponenten wie Unwägbarkeit, 
aber ist am Ende doch sehr konkret, weil ich habe 
genau einen Headcount, die Aufwände, Abschreibun-
gen, Materialkosten, etc. pp. 
Decided 
under 
uncer-
tainty 
4 186ff: Und da steht schon und 
wir setzen einen besonderen 
Fokus hier drauf und wir setzen 
einen besonderen Fokus da 
drauf, aber es ist nicht eine 
Listung von einzelnen Projek-
ten, dass wäre jetzt auf der 
nächsten Ebene. […] Das wäre 
nicht mehr strategisch! […] 
durchaus sagen/sein, wir setzen 
60% unserer Ressourcen oder 
70% aus unseren Ressourcen, 
direkt Business Area-wirksam 
ein und wir setzen 30% unserer 
Ressourcen für die Infrastruk-
tur ein.[...] Die [Business Area 
wirksamen] könnten Sie noch 
mal unterteilen und sagen: wir 
setzen 30% unseres Portfolios 
für das Thema „Geldmengen-
steuerung” ein.  
Allocat-
ing the 
amount 
of re-
sources 
to busi-
ness 
areas 
164: und umfasst […] ein analytisches Portfolio, 
wir müssen Informationen über alles und jedes zur 
Verfügung stellen, ein Transaktionsportfolio, wir 
machen die Geldversorgung oder steuern die Geld-
versorgung in Europa, mit allem was daran hängt, 
ein Transaktionsportfolio 2, wir stellen zur Ver-
fügung die Banknotenversorgung in Europa oder 
steuern die, ein [...] Transaktionsportfolio 3, [...] 
wir stellen unsere internen Servicesysteme zur 
Verfügung [...] und letztlich ein Infrastrukturportfo-
lio, wir stellen die darunter liegende Infrastruktur 
europaweit zur Verfügung.  
186: Wenn Sie so wollen, sind es 2 Dimensionen, 
es ist einmal in welchen Feldern, und das sind diese 
Portfolien und das andere ist: wie tief […] und wie 
tief heißt, wir entwickeln, wir machen 
Maintanance, wir stellen die Betriebsservices zur 
Verfügung […] 
Each busi-
ness unit 
has a sepa-
rate portfo-
lio (i.e. this 
decision is 
one level 
above the 
portfolio 
level) 
The budget 
has two 
dimen-
sions: 
business 
units and 
services 
212: folgende Schwerpunkte in einem Mehrjahresplan. 
Eine Strategie schaut über 3-4 Jahre. Oder sagen wir 
mal 3-5 Jahre, so in der Größenordnung 
Long-
term 
plan 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
sum-
mary 
Context/detail quote Context/ 
detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason 
sum-
mary 
5 213: das IT Budget […] Natür-
lich strategischer Bestandteil. 
Vor allen Dingen wenn Sie 
sagen wir mal den Eindruck 
haben, dass das Budget nicht 
an jeder Ecke optimal einge-
setzt wird Redundanzen, keine 
Standards etc. Aber jetzt unter 
dem Aspekt, ist ein hohes oder 
niedriges IT Budget gut, das ist 
bei uns nicht so sehr im Fokus, 
sondern wirklich die Frage, 
setz ich es heute wirklich wert-
bringend ein das IT Budget. 
Is the IT 
budget 
being 
used in 
the right 
way? 
213: das IT Budget […] Natürlich strategischer 
Bestandteil. Vor allen Dingen wenn Sie sagen wir 
mal den Eindruck haben, dass das Budget nicht an 
jeder Ecke optimal eingesetzt wird Redundanzen, 
keine Standards etc. Aber jetzt unter dem Aspekt, 
ist ein hohes oder niedriges IT Budget gut, das ist 
bei uns nicht so sehr im Fokus, sondern wirklich die 
Frage, setz ich es heute wirklich wertbringend ein 
das IT Budget. 
The size of 
the IT 
budget is 
not viewed 
as a strate-
gic deci-
sion in this 
case 
213: Natürlich strategischer Bestandteil. Vor allen 
Dingen wenn Sie sagen wir mal den Eindruck haben, 
dass das Budget nicht an jeder Ecke optimal eingesetzt 
wird Redundanzen, keine Standards etc. Aber jetzt 
unter dem Aspekt, ist ein hohes oder niedriges IT 
Budget gut, das ist bei uns nicht so sehr im Fokus, 
sondern wirklich die Frage, setz ich es heute wirklich 
wertbringend ein das IT Budget. 
 
10 1033: Dann gibt’s ein Pricing 
von den Kosten, die wir im IT-
Bereich haben. Nach dem 
Motto: Das sind die bis jetzt 
aufgelaufenen Kosten, wie 
sieht es fürs nächste Jahr aus? 
Was glauben wir, wie sich die 
Kosten entwickeln werden? Ich 
habe zwar feste Verträge, aber 
da sind die Kosten natürlich 
auch variabel, weil wir natür-
lich uns komplett im Outsourc-
ing bewegen. Umso mehr Last 
drauf kommt, um so mehr muss 
ich bezahlen. 
Forecast 
of how 
much 
will be 
spent on 
IT next 
year 
- - - - 
Table 25: Budgetary decisions - interpretation of decisions and reasoning
  108 
g. DECISIONS ON LAUNCHING IS/IT PROJECTS THAT DIRECTLY SUPPORT MARKET ACTIVI-
TIES entail engaging in individual projects that are considered relevant for the market-
oriented business strategy (cases 6, 13): “[Whether introducing an application is strategic] 
depends on what we are talking about. If we’re talking about an accounting reporting soft-
ware, then I’d say that cannot be strategic […] If it is really [an application for] business 
scope extension […], then it takes on strategic relevance” (case 6). 
The reason for viewing such a decision as strategic is thus due to the fact that it supports 
the business strategy in that the projects form part of a market-oriented initiative (e.g. in-
troducing a new product). In case 6, the project supported introducing a new financial 
product. In case 13, the project supported a new online distribution channel.  
However, the introduction of applications for new products or markets was also seen as 
having a strategic component, because these kinds of applications would introduce func-
tional overlaps with other applications (case 6). For example, an application to support a 
new product might have overlaps in the billing functionality with applications supporting 
other products. These overlaps introduce inconsistencies and redundancies into the 
application landscape and require overhauling the landscape in its entirety (see decision 
area a). 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason summary 
6 479: ne Geschäftsfelder-
weiterung ist, relevante 
Geschäftsfelderweiterung 
[…] und das auch re-
sultiert in neue Applika-
tionen  
Introducing 
new applica-
tions that 
support new 
products 
Reason quote: 
469: Also sobald es natürlich neue Geschäftsfelder, neue Ausrichtungen, damit verbunden neue 
Akquisitionen sind, dann sind diese schon strategisch, weil die haben natürlich auch von Ihrer 
Auswirkung her, eine große Relevanz. Kommt natürlich immer drauf an, was reden wir, wenn wir 
jetzt von einer Buchhaltungsreportingsoftware reden, dann sag ich also, das kann kaum strategisch 
sein [...] Wenn es wirklich ne Geschäftsfelderweiterung ist, relevante Geschäftsfelderweiterung[...] 
dann hat das sehr schnell strategische Relevanz, weil dann denkt man grundsätzlich noch mal über die 
ganze Applikationslandschaft nach. Weil dann kommen ja Überlappungen und dann sind sie immer 
mit funktionalen Überlappungen konfrontiert und die gilt es zu identifizieren und dann gibt es die 
neue Applikationslandschaft zu zeichnen  
Supporting business 
strategy changes 
(new products, new 
areas of business) 
 
Introducing new 
applications for new 
businesses leads to 
rethinking the appli-
cation landscape 
because of func-
tional overlaps 
13 349: Projekt Roadmap 
[…] pro Unternehmens-
bereich 
345: Menge von Ap-
plikationen, die so-
zusagen eingeführt wer-
den soll 
Decision on 
application 
portfolio by 
BU 
- - 462: So versuchen wir dann im […] die strate-
gische Relevanz für den Unternehmensbereich 
zu adressieren, also zu sagen, das haben wir ... 
Man kann es vielleicht ganz gut vergleichen bei 
der [BU 1]. Wir haben bei der [BU 1] im Sinne 
einer Entscheidung gesagt: Okay, wir setzen 
bestimmte Softwarelösungen ein, wenn wir mal 
eine E-Shop-Lösung machen. Jetzt kam es […] 
vorletztes Jahr [dazu], dass man das Thema 
Relevanz am Point of Sale im Sinne einer In-
ternetpräsenz sehr hoch bewertet hat und sagte, 
da kommt ein Markt, da müssen wir unbedingt 
was tun. Also haben wir im Sinne der Projekt-
Roadmap dieses Thema hoch priorisiert […] 
Investing in projects 
that support business 
strategy opportuni-
ties 
Table 26: Launching IP-based market-oriented projects - interpretation of decisions and reasoning
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h. HUMAN RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATIONAL PLANS OF THE IT UNIT: Like any organiza-
tional unit, the IT unit needs human resources, which need to be organized so that the re-
quired activities can be executed. The decisions related to these resources are laid down in 
the human resources and organizational plans of the IT unit. Decisions include the IT 
unit’s organization into sub-units, its personnel, and their skills: “How do we develop our 
[the IT unit’s] employees, which core competencies do we see in our employees, and how 
do we ensure employee training?” (case 13). In detail, the decisions were: 
• Decision on which skills are important for IP staff (cases 6, 12, 13) 
• Decision on which skills are needed in which quantity (skill gap) and from which 
source 
o Decision on filling the gap with internal skill development vs. external re-
cruitment (case 4c) 
o Decision on introducing and defining skill development for IP staff roles (case 
4e) 
• Determining the organization of the IT unit (case 4b) 
• Decision on introducing limited contracts for IP staff (case 4d) 
• Determining important cultural values for the IT unit (case 4a) 
Reasons for viewing these decisions as strategic were rare and differed significantly from 
case to case. However, IP staff was generally regarded as a very (if not the most) impor-
tant resource of the IT department. 
As with financial resources in budgetary decisions, human resources have to be planned 
carefully in order to know how many people are needed, which skills are required, and 
whether hiring should be done from outside or if inside employees should be trained (case 
4c). Careful planning is important, as the decisions made are not easy to reverse: once 
staff is hired or trained in a certain skill, these skills cannot be adapted easily because 
training takes time and people cannot be hired or laid off quickly (case 4e). Hence, meas-
ures that address this irreversibility are also included in the information strategy, such as 
the decision to employ people in fixed-term contracts only (case 4d). 
Otherwise, IT staff was argued as being central to the implementation of information 
strategy, regardless of what the strategy entails (case 6).  
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In case 13, the term “core competency” was applied to the “competencies” of the IT 
unit’s personnel, which included “speaking English fluently” or “project management 
skills.” Here, the essence of core competencies – i.e. competencies that a company bases 
its business on – is transferred to the IT unit and refers to the most important skills that IT 
unit staff must possess. This is an instance of reasoning by analogy, in which the original 
context (make decisions on the scope of the business on the basis of core competencies 
rather than on market attractiveness) gets lost in the shuffle. That means that the strategic 
business decision (scope expansion) is no longer present or got turned into the scope of 
the IT unit (what kinds of services the IT unit can provide).  
Finally, decisions on values were seen as strategic, because they represented a major shift 
in how the IT department operates. In case 4a, the “working mode” within the company 
was to “get things done quickly” in a “wild west manner.” Once the overall goal of the or-
ganization was achieved and a phase of more stable operations had been reached, it was 
recognized that this approach was leading to silos, as employees were only working on 
their individual duties. As this was perceived as dysfunctional over the long term, a new 
culture that fostered teamwork across these silos had to be instilled.  
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Cas
e 
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
4a 22: Culture, Values and Commu-
nication wird oft vergessen im 
Rahmen einer Strategie, ist aber 
ein wichtiges Thema 
Decision 
about the 
culture and 
values of 
the IS 
unit’s staff 
641: . Also das fängt ja damit an, was ist 
Kultur? […] Das sind Werte, Denkhaltun-
gen, die übersetzt werden in Regelwerke, 
die mit Anreizen und Bestrafungen verse-
hen werden, um für eine gewisse Einhal-
tung zu sorgen. 
648: Wir definieren da für uns schlicht weg 
Kultur auf der strategischen Ebene, eher im 
Prozesssinne, also wir setzen uns re-
gelmäßig zusammen als Management und 
geben gewisse Verhaltensdevisen aus, die 
wir beispielhaft vorleben wollen und von 
denen wir wollen, dass die Mitarbeiter 
denen folgen. 
664: […] im Augenblick wichtigste Kultur-
thema an dem wir arbeiten, ist Teamarbeit 
quer zu den Einheiten. So und dann ist die 
strategische Devise momentan dieses 
müssen wir als Managementgruppe vorle-
ben 
Which values 
and desired 
behaviors 
should be 
adopted by IS 
staff members 
658: Die Bank musst als Start up ent-
stehen ein bisschen in Wild West Ma-
nier. [...] Sie konnten nicht lange 
drüber nachdenken innerhalb weniger 
Jahre musste der Euro zum laufen 
gebracht werden. Die einzelnen 
Unternehmensbereiche sind vormasch-
iert und haben ihre Teile der Lösungen 
beigetragen ohne all zuviel Abstim-
mung. Damit sind Kamine entstanden. 
Ging nicht anders. Dieses muss man 
jetzt aber ändern bei dieser Größe der 
Organisation, in dem mal formal Pro-
zess quer legt, informell Teamarbeit 
fördert. 
Counter meas-
ure to ensure a 
sustainable 
modus operandi 
for the IT unit 
(in teams rather 
than in silos) 
4b 399: Delivery Organisation and 
Processes beschreibt dann: da 
gestalten wir sozusagen, wie 
bauen wir unsere Aufbau- und 
Prozessorganisation auf.  
Decisions 
about the 
static or-
ganization 
of the IS 
unit 
400: Das sind die typischen Themen, die 
kennt jeder, das und das ist unsere Linien-
struktur.  
Decision on 
the departmen-
tal structure 
- - 
4c 447: die wichtigste Ressource, die 
wir haben, nämlich unsere ei-
genen Mitarbeiter.  
Decisions 
about the 
IS staffs 
and their 
skills 
448: Und das Kernthema hier ist eigentlich 
Entwicklungsplanung. Basierend auf, wir 
haben letztlich die Themen, was brauche 
ich, was habe ich. Als erstes machen Sie 
natürlich das Thema irgendwo auch Re-
cruitment Planung: was wollen wir uns 
reinholen, wie entwickeln wir die Leute 
[…] wie phasen wir sie denn Notfalls auch 
mal aus, wenn die Performance anders ist, 
What kind of 
skills are 
needed and 
which ones are 
present: where 
new IS staff 
members 
should be 
recruited 
- Resource plan-
ning for human 
resources 
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Cas
e 
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
als wir sie uns vorstellen. 
4d 453: die neuen Arbeitsverträge – 
sicher auch ein sehr sehr strate-
gisches Element hier – nur noch 
auf 3 oder 5 Jahre laufen. Das 
gibt keine Dauerverträge mehr. 
Jetzt seit Kurzem. 
Decision 
that IS staff 
contracts 
are only 
fixed-term  
- - 454: Jetzt seit Kurzem. 
448ff: […] Ist sehr schwierig hier in 
dieser Bank wie phasen wir sie denn 
Notfalls auch mal aus, wenn die Per-
formance anders ist, als wir sie uns 
vorstellen. 
Is a new, com-
plete innovation 
for a public 
organization; 
counters irre-
versibility  
4e 456: aus den oberen Elementen 
[Market und Product architecture] 
kommt quasi, was brauchen wir 
an Leuten und wo wollen wir die 
einsetzen. Aus dem Staffelement 
kommt dann raus, was haben wir 
an Leuten und an Skills und da 
werden dann Entwicklungspläne 
gemacht. Auf der Ebene Strategie 
wird beschlossen: wir machen 
Entwicklungspläne und die haben 
die und die Dimensionen. In der 
Umsetzung wird dann 
beschlossen: und der einzelne 
Mitarbeiter ist in dem Entwick-
lungsplan jetzt in diesem Stadium 
und wenn er entwickelt wird in 
den nächsten 3-4 Jahren, dann 
sollte er das und das lernen und 
sich durch die und die Einheiten 
bewegen und so. [...] auf Strate-
gieebene wird aber pro Rolle sag 
ich mal beschlossen, wie die 
Entwicklung ist oder für einen 
Architekt meinetwegen sieht das 
so und so aus und der muss fol-
gende Dinge haben 
Decision to 
use skill 
develop-
ment plans 
and related 
skills for 
each role 
within the 
IS depart-
ment. 
- - 564: ich entwickle Staff in eine bes-
timmte Richtung, die Richtung kann 
ich nicht ohne weiteres rückgängig 
machen. Die Leute sind dann erstmal 
dort.  
Long-term 
binding, irre-
versible re-
source alloca-
tions 
6 528: Also wenn die IT oder wenn Deciding   531: und je besser diese Fähigkeiten Important for 
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Cas
e 
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
die IT-Mitarbeiter mit ihren 
Fähigkeiten nicht strategisch 
wären, dann wäre die ganze 
Strategie und die Relevanz, dass 
IT strategisch in einem 
Unternehmen wäre, nicht mehr 
da. Also für mich sind die absolut 
[…] das ist der Kernpunkt, die 
Mitarbeiter und Ihre Fähigkeiten 
[…] 
on skill 
require-
ments and 
how to 
attain them 
sind, desto einfacher ist unsere Aus-
richtung, egal ob nach links oder nach 
rechts, umsetzbar. Und da investieren 
wir auch relativ viel in der Ausbildung 
z.B. der Mitarbeiter, also da gibt’s z.B. 
bei unserem Co-Banking-System diese 
Zertifizierung und diese Zertifizierung, 
das ist für mich absolut key, dass un-
sere Mitarbeiter das durchlaufen 
strategy imple-
mentation 
Means huge 
investments 
12 None Decisions 
on IT em-
ployees 
and their 
qualifica-
tion 
None Skills, train-
ing, etc. 
None None 
13 327: wie entwickeln wir unsere 
Mitarbeiter, welche Kernkompe-
tenzen sehen wir bei unseren 
Mitarbeitern, wie stellen wir die 
Mitarbeiter-ausbildung sicher, 
wie stellen wir das Management, 
die Qualifikation des Manage-
ments sicher. Das sind also 
mehrere Themen, wie wir vom 
Management und Personal und 
letztendlich aufstellen 
What are 
the core 
competen-
cies of the 
IT staff and 
manage-
ment? 
336: Als Kernkompetenz würden wir sagen, 
wir sehen Projektmanagement als eine 
Kernkompetenz für einen IT-Mitarbeiter. 
Wir sehen ein kommunikationssicheres 
Englisch als eine Kernkompetenz. Wir 
sehen eine Prozesskompetenz als 
Kernkompetenz. 
Core compe-
tencies of the 
IT staff are: 
- Project man-
agement skills 
- Fluent Eng-
lish 
- Process 
knowledge 
- Analogy to 
business strat-
egy concept 
Table 27: HR and organizational plans for the IT unit - interpretation of decisions and reasoning
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i. DECISIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE IT UNIT determine its self-conception (e.g. as a service 
provider, technologist, consultant, etc.). These decisions affect the positioning of the IT 
unit towards the business areas and the board of directors, towards its employees and ex-
ternal stakeholders (such as external customers; e.g. should the IT unit serve the external 
market or not), and potential competitors for providing IT services (e.g. “providing ser-
vices at a competitive price with ongoing benchmarking” (cf. case 13)). The purpose of 
these decisions is marketing the IT unit to different stakeholders: “the mission expresses 
in which area we [the IT unit] are active. The vision [of the IT unit] […] is the eventual 
expression of strategy, which by the way is a very attractive vision for the employees [of 
the IT unit] here, really showing a way forward” (case 4). The decisions subsumed in this 
decision area were: 
• Determining the mission/vision of the IT unit (cases 4a, 4b) 
• Determining the role of the IT unit (i.e. its self-conception as a service provider vs. 
technologist vs. consultant vs. business driver) (cases 2, 3a) 
• Determining certain principles for the IT unit (e.g. whether it should be benchmarked 
and try to be cost-efficient/competitive with external providers) (case 13) 
• Determining the customers that the IT unit serves and the products/services it provides 
(cases 4c, 4d) 
• Should the IT unit also serve the external market with its IT products and services? 
(case 3b) 
These decisions were argued to be strategic because explicating the role of the IT unit 
(e.g. as a service provider) is seen as important for gaining acceptance from users (case 
3a), which is critical for the implementation of any strategy. These decisions also lay a 
common ground for all internal stakeholders, who can relate to a set of common princi-
ples (case 13).  
In addition, these are the most fundamental decisions for the IT unit (cases 3, 4a, b, c, d). 
In the same way that defining the mission, vision, goals, and scope (i.e. customers and 
products) of a company define what it is about, the same can be said of the mission, vi-
sion, and scope for any of the company’s units, including the IT unit. Hence, the argument 
is that these are the most essential decisions in a strategy, or “the eventual expression of 
strategy” (case 4). Strategies are believed to include decisions like the ones mentioned. 
The reasoning here resembles the analogy to business strategy (case 4): just as a busi-
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ness needs a business strategy, the IT department needs an information strategy. Both 
strategies include the same decisions, to be applied to the whole company or to the IT 
unit, respectively. 
Finally, the decision to let the IT unit also serve the external market alters the scope of 
the overall company and hence changes its business strategy: with this decision, the 
company has extended its lines of business to the IT service or product market (case 3b).
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Case  Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
2 309: […] dass IT die 
Rolle eines Dienstleis-
ters einnehmen will und 
soll. Vor 4 Jahren 
Gegenstand unserer 
strategischen Entwick-
lung gewesen.  
Decision on 
the role of the 
IT unit 
- - - - 
3a 140: also sagen wir mal 
so: das Selbstverständnis 
der IT, so würde ich es 
mal nennen. Wie agiert 
IT im Konzern? Welche 
Rechte und welche 
Pflichten hat es? 
Determining 
the role of the 
IT unit within 
the company 
143:Ist es eine Abteilung die Standards setzt und 
Standards auch entsprechend durchdrückt? Oder 
ist es eher eine Abteilung beispielsweise die 
Standards vorschlägt und über den Vorstand 
eskaliert? Ist es eine Abteilung die eben ein 
reines Cost center ist es ein Profit center, ver-
rechnet sie ihre Leistung, verrechnet sie sie nicht 
ihre Leistung, gibt’s Service Level, gibt es 
Pönalen bei Service Level Über- oder Unter-
schreitung? Das sehe ich alles unter IT Selbstver-
ständnis. Governance ist so ein bisschen abgedro-
schen. Selbstverständnis der IT. Also wie be-
treibe ich IT. Jetzt nicht technisch, nicht funk-
tional, sondern vom Selbstverständnis her inner-
halb eines Konzerns. 
173: unser […] Modell – auch um Akzeptanz zu 
gewinnen – ist ein dienstleistungsorientiertes 
Defines the role 
of the IT unit vis-
à-vis the business 
units (e.g. service 
provider vs. in-
novator, cost vs. 
profit center 
 
 
38: Man muss dazu sagen, man hatte 
auch versucht im Vorfeld viele solcher 
Strategien zu entwickeln. […] Ja das 
waren soviele Ansätze, aber die sind alle 
im Wesentlichen an folgenden Punkten 
gescheitert. Erstens: Kein Buy-in der 
Anwender 
165: Weil es für mich in der Mengelage 
ein ganz wichtiger Aspekt war in der 
Verbindung: ich hab jetzt ne An-
wendungslandschaft, die ich gerne ein-
führen würde. Wie mache ich das am 
besten. Unter welcher Rahmenbedingung 
mach ich das. Das heißt, das bedingt sich 
in irgendeiner Form. [...] unser […] 
Modell – auch um Akzeptanz zu gewin-
nen – ist ein dienstleistungsorientiertes. 
195: dass man zwar mit viel Mühe, aber 
doch die Anwender hinter sich bekom-
men konnte […] 
It is important 
to obtain buy-
in/acceptance 
from users. 
The role of the 
IT unit is an 
important 
determinant of 
this acceptance 
Important for 
implementing 
the strategy 
Trade-off 
between gain-
ing acceptance 
from and regu-
lating business 
units 
 
3b 215: das war jetzt auch 
wieder ne strategische 
Fragestellung 
281: So, zu sagen o.k. 
wo ist ein Markt, wo 
[company] tätig ist, wo 
auch IT eine Rolle 
spielt: Healthcare – fein, 
Decision that 
the IT unit 
will serve the 
external mar-
ket, i.e. that 
IT becomes a 
business unit 
in itself 
288: Projektleistung und sogar ein eigenes Pro-
dukt. Wir haben wirklich eine Firma kreiert und 
haben unser eigenes Produkt versucht zu posi-
tionieren. 
 
 
IT unit offers 
services and a 
product to exter-
nal clients 
 
 
319: Ja wir haben gesagt hier, aus den 
drei Geschäftsfeldern werden vier. 
599: Was ich dann aber wirklich wieder 
als Strategiezäsur ansehen würde, wäre 
die Ausgründung, […] die komplette, 
sagen wir noch mal Neuausrichtung 
meines Bereiches 
Extends the 
scope of the 
company, 
spawns a new 
business 
Is a dramatic 
change of 
direction for 
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Case  Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
Krankenhäuser sind ein 
hochproblematischer 
Bereich, keine richtige 
DV Lösung, also wir 
gehen mit [IT unit] ganz 
bewusst in diesen 
Healthcare Dienstleis-
tungsmarkt. 
the IT unit 
4a 17: Für uns hat IS 
Strategie immer letztlich 
diese 8 Aspekte […] 
Mission & Vision […] 
Determining 
the mission 
of the IS unit 
122: Bei uns ist die Mission relativ einfach: Wir 
stellen alle Informationstechnikdienstleistungen 
zur Verfügung, sowohl was die Entwicklung und 
Maintenance von Applikationen angeht, als auch 
was den Betrieb angeht; für im Wesentlichen 2 
Kundengruppen: das Eine ist die [case organi-
ation’s name] und das andere ist das Netz der 
Nationalen Notenbank für die gemeinsamen 
Anwendungen  
115: Ja, das ist die Mission und Vision von [IS 
unit’s name], die kompatibel sein muss, mit der 
Mission und Vision der Bank. […] die Mission 
der Bank [...] Und daraus abgeleitet werden dann 
die Missions der einzelnen Business Areas [and 
the IT unit is one of them] 
Determining the 
IS unit’s cus-
tomer groups and 
services provided 
to them by the IS 
unit 
 
The mission of 
the company gets 
broken down into 
missions for each 
function 
 
145: Ja ich würde mal einfach sagen, 
weil die Mission drückt aus, in welchem 
Feld sind wir tätig. Die Vision drückt 
aus, was ist unsere Zielsetzung für 5 
Jahre von heute in diesem Feld und für 
mich ist das der Treiber von Strategie. 
Also oder der letzte Ausdruck von 
Strategie 
Determines 
field of activ-
ity/scope of 
the IT unit 
4b 17: Für uns hat IS 
Strategie immer letztlich 
diese 8 Aspekte […] 
Mission & Vision […] 
Determining 
the role (vi-
sion) of the 
IS unit 
129: Vision sagt ja immer, wo wollen wir hin, wo 
sehen wir uns in Zukunft. Die Vision heißt, wir 
sehen uns als Captain, […] auf der Ecke IT. Also 
wir sehen uns als der Captain für alle IT Fragen 
im Bereich Europa […].  
 
 
Determining the 
future role of the 
IS unit towards 
its customer 
groups 
 
Role of IS unit is 
coordination and 
control among 
customers 
145: Ja ich würde mal einfach sagen, 
weil die Mission drückt aus, in welchem 
Feld sind wir tätig. Die Vision drückt 
aus, was ist unsere Zielsetzung für 5 
Jahre von heute in diesem Feld und für 
mich ist das der Treiber von Strategie. 
Also oder der letzte Ausdruck von 
Strategie 
Determines 
future (long-
term) goals of 
the IT unit  
 
4c 155: Der Markt als Ele-
ment strategischer Be-
Determining 
the customers 
32: Ja der Kunde sind die Fachabteilungen, 
sowohl innerhalb der [organization’s name] aber 
Departmental 
view: the cus-
- Determines the 
customers of 
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Case  Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
trachtung: das ist die 
Frage welche Kunden 
haben wir, mit welchen 
Produkten wollen wir 
die versorgen.  
of the IS unit auch die nationalen Notenbanken, sind potentiell 
Polizeibehörden, rund um die Welt ist potentiell 
die Fed, die Bank of Japan, also alle für wir die 
letztlich direkt oder indirekt Informationsdien-
stleistungen erbringen. [...] Wir [IS unit’s name]. 
tomers are the 
customers of the 
IS unit 
the IT unit 
4d 162: Und bei den Pro-
dukten können Sie es 
dann entsprechend 
durchdeklinieren [...] 
Das sind unsere Pro-
duktfelder. 
Determining 
the products 
of the IS unit 
186: Wenn Sie so wollen, sind es 2 Dimensionen, 
es ist einmal in welchen Feldern, und das sind 
diese Portfolien und das andere ist: wie tief. 
[...] Gruppen von Fachbereichen [...] Und das 
andere ist wie tief und wie tief heißt, wir 
entwickeln, wir machen Maintanance, wir stellen 
die Betriebsservices zur Verfügung und die Be-
triebsservices, ja da kommen wir dann, auf das 
was sie letztlich sagen. 
 
The products are 
the IS services 
provided for 
various custom-
ers 
 
- - 
13 124: Also erstens haben 
wir eine Vision, sage ich 
mal, die besteht aus vier 
Kernsätzen, was die IT 
bei [company] aus-
machen soll.  
134: die Positionierung, 
die sich letztendlich 
[company] für die IT 
vorstellt 
Vision de-
fines the role 
of IT 
149: wir wollen Standardsoftware einsetzen, wir 
definieren uns aus einer optimalen Unterstützung 
der Geschäftsprozesse, wir betrachten Security, 
allerdings in einem vernünftigen Kosten-
Leistungs-Verhältnis, wir unterstellen uns einem 
konsequenten Benchmarking und wollen 
wettbewerbsfähige Leistungen zu ... Ich sage mal, 
wir wollen keine Pioniere sein in der IT. 
 
The vision con-
sists of normative 
guiding princi-
ples 
906: Die Schweden haben uns gefragt 
Warum machen wir das überhaupt? Und 
ich konnte eigentlich keine Antwort 
drauf geben. […] Aber dann sind wir 
gekommen und haben gesagt: Ja, aber 
wir wollen doch als Shared-Service-
Organisation eine gleiche betrieb-
swirtschaftliche Software-Landscape 
eigentlich über alle Standorte aufbauen. 
[…] Und dann kam: Ah, ja, stimmt. […] 
Und so kam man eigentlich dann in eine 
Gesamterklärung. 
Provides a 
guideline for 
subsequent 
decisions  
Is a common 
frame of refer-
ence (set of 
principles) that 
one can rely 
on to reach 
consensus 
Table 28: Role of the IT unit - interpretation of decisions and reasoning 
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j. RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY DECISIONS regulate the way in which (other) IP decisions 
are made within the organization. First and foremost, this involves the distribution of in-
ternal responsibilities for decision rights among different stakeholders within the overall 
organization and thus goes beyond the IT unit itself. This distribution might be among the 
IT unit and business stakeholders as well as among corporate- and business unit-level 
stakeholders. Rights and accountability decisions also include the introduction of IT con-
trol mechanisms, such as introducing service level agreements (SLAs) or charge-back 
provisions for IT services: “I […] always see IT strategy in connection with governance. 
[…] it determines who is allowed to do what, how budgets are determined, investments, 
all these regulations” (case 8). The decisions in detail were: 
• Allocating responsibilities for IP decisions between corporate and business units (cen-
tralization vs. decentralization) (cases 5c, 6a, 7, 8, 9) 
• Allocating responsibilities for specific IP decisions between the IT unit and business 
management (e.g. for decisions on budget, application portfolio) (cases 2, 3b, 6b, 9) 
• Introduction of IP control mechanisms (e.g. charging mechanisms for IP services, 
SLAs, performance measurement, decision committees, and criteria for prioritizing, 
steering the IT unit as a cost or profit center or shared service center, etc.) (cases 3a, 4, 
5a, 5b, 6b, 8, 11, 13) 
Choosing between decentralizing and centralizing decision rights was regarded as strate-
gic because the decision has to be brought in congruence with a given business strat-
egy (cases 6a, 7, 8). For example, in case 8, a high cost pressure was reported, and the re-
sponsibilities for IP decisions were hence centralized. Once the company changes to a 
growth strategy, decision rights will be decentralized again.  
Allocating decision rights between business units and the IT unit as well as between the 
corporate level and business units incentivizes business units to act in a desired way. On 
the other hand, decisions on the rights and responsibilities represent rules that have to be 
adhered to company-wide (cases 6, 9, 13). These decisions were seen as strategic because 
they regulate or control business units (cases 7, 8). This is regarded as a measure for 
countering the “entropy” (case 8) that business units cause if left unregulated due to 
their claimed inherent interest in being different from other business units. It also helps to 
ensure that business units act to benefit the whole group rather than solely act in their 
own interest (cases 3, 5b, 5c, 8). This is done with the aim of gaining synergies (case 7) 
and staying cost-competitive (case 5).  
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At the same time, giving responsibilities to business units (i.e. regulating them less) 
helped them to better satisfy business requirements and stay agile and flexible (case 6). 
In case 6, the business strategy entailed geographic expansion. It was regarded important 
that the unit could make platform decisions independently from the corporate-wide stan-
dard. Not being forced to conform to the group-wide standard allowed for unbureaucratic 
and hence quicker adjustments for certain countries. If the group-wide standard had been 
used, this would have meant long rounds of syndication with the group. However, a latent 
reason behind not following the group-wide standard was also politically motivated: it 
was considered important by the managers of the company to be independent from the 
group.  
Giving business units control over IP decisions was also argued to help in gaining accep-
tance from the business units (case 3) or to better satisfy business requirements (case 
2) and also played a central role as a facilitator for implementing other strategy deci-
sions (case 3). Involving business units in IT decisions and introducing performance 
measurement decisions was also a reaction to address the business units’ criticism of 
the intransparency of IP decisions and the IT unit’s performance (cases 4, 6).  
Besides that, decisions to introduce certain control mechanisms (such as SLAs) constitute 
a long-term plan that can only be implemented in 3-5 years (case 11). Initiatives such as 
score cards for measuring the performance of the IT unit influence how people act; hence, 
the metrics cannot be changed every year, which makes them not easily reversible 
(case 4). In case 4, the decision to introduce an IP performance measurement system was 
argued to be part of information strategy also because it was completely new (an innova-
tion) to the whole institution. It hence was said to require special attention as it was re-
garded to set a company-wide precedence. 
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Cas
e #  
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
2 76: Im Grunde genommen 
beschäftigt man sich in der 
IT oder sollte man sich 
beschäftigen und haben wir 
eben deshalb auch getan 
immer mit der Frage: A) wie 
steuern wir uns und wie 
werden wir gesteuert und B) 
[…] 
Decision on 
how to steer 
the IT unit 
394: Das regelt sich also sozusagen von 
selbst 
421: Ausrichtung an den Geschäftszielen 
des UN’s ist ja immer da durch die 
Fachbereiche  
184: […] früher als es die Budgets noch 
nicht gab,[…] gab es eine Institution die 
nannte sich Bewertungskommission. Da 
wurden […] Projektanträge eingereicht, 
so viele wie man zusammen bekam[…] 
Und dann wurden eben von denen […] 
so viele ins Portfolio aufgenommen, bis 
das Budget bzw. die Kapazitäten der IT 
aufgebraucht waren. So das machen wir 
nicht mehr, weil durch die betrieb-
swirtschaftliche Steuerung über Budgets 
das Ranking jetzt praktisch jeder 
Fachbereich für sich macht.  
Decision rights 
for budget and 
application 
choices is made 
in a feudal 
fashion (each 
business unit 
decides for 
itself) 
239: sich die Entwicklung sehr stark an 
Geschäftszielen, Unternehmenszielen aus-
richtet 
301: Die strategische Planung berücksichtigt 
nahezu ausschließlich Geschäftsanforderungen 
184ff: […] Was klar erschwert fachbereich-
sübergreifende Themen anzugehen. Was aber 
ansonsten im Grunde genommen schon die 
Ehrlichkeit in den Bewertungen eher ver-
bessert. 
IP decision 
rights are made 
to give power to 
business units; 
IT unit is only 
service provider 
(decentralized 
power) 
Change in gov-
ernance was 
needed to de-
crease “I want a 
big share of the 
cake” mental-
ity: incentivize 
business units 
to act in an 
economic way 
3a, 
3b 
125: es gibt noch eine dritte 
Komponente, die wir gleich 
mit abgefrühstückt haben: 
das war das ganze Thema IT 
Governance. 
140: IT Governance […] 
Welche Rechte und welche 
Pflichten hat [the IT unit]? 
Determining 
the role of the 
IT unit within 
the company 
143ff:[…] verrechnet [the IT unit] ihre 
Leistung, verrechnet sie sie nicht ihre 
Leistung, gibt’s Service Level, gibt es 
Pönalen bei Service Level Über- oder 
Unterschreitung?  
126: Das haben wir aber in 2 Stufen 
gemacht. Die 1. Stufe war […] die IT als 
interner Dienstleister auszurichten. Das 
war ne klare Governance-Entscheidung. 
Also eine Entscheidung gegen ein Cost-
plus Modell, gegen ein Modell IT kostet 
nichts, […] die 2. Runde der Govern-
ance: eben zu sagen, wir zentralisieren 
die EDV über der Maßgabe einer zen-
tralen Anwendungslandschaft und einer 
zentralen Infrastruktur […] 
 
3a: Defines 
which govern-
ance mecha-
nisms (SLAs, 
charge-backs) 
are used 
3b: Determines 
centralization 
of decisions in 
IT application 
landscape and 
infrastructure  
205: Das heißt wir haben immer versucht, ich 
nenn das immer so schön Kaufkraft meiner 
Anwender abzuschöpfen, damit die auf keine 
dummen Ideen kommen. 
227: So, also Governance-Regel war eindeutig 
 
 
Allows regula-
tion of the busi-
ness units and 
drives them in a 
desired direc-
tion 
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Cas
e #  
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
4 568: So bleibt das Perform-
ance Management, das wir 
im Rahmen von Strategie 
besonders […] hervorge-
hoben haben, weil die Bank 
es historisch nicht hatte 
573: Diese Score Card ist 
Teil der Strategie, haben wir 
wirklich gesagt, die inklusive 
der Metriken sogar. 
Decision to 
introduce a 
scorecard of 
IT unit’s 
performance 
and on the 
specific met-
rics of this 
scorecard 
570: Also haben wir gesagt: wir bauen 
über all diese Dinger hinweg, einen for-
malen Regelprozess auf. Und das ist ne 
Score Card, die hat momentan 28 
Metriken, also Obermetriken und da 
hängen dann weitere Metriken drunter.  
Scorecard is a 
set of metrics 
for the per-
formance of the 
IS unit 
568: […] im Rahmen von Strategie besonders 
deshalb hervorgehoben haben, weil die Bank 
es historisch nicht hatte. Deshalb haben wir 
gesagt, es hat eigenständig den Wert, auf 
Ebene Strategie gehoben zu werden. 
612: wenn Sie es entscheiden, legen Sie sich in 
der Auswirkung auf jedenfall für 3 Jahre fest, 
selbst wenn ich es nach 1 Jahr wieder ändere, 
mache ich ja nicht rückgängig, das was im 
letzten Jahr war, wo ich z.B. Staff in eine bes-
timmte Richtung entwickelt habe. Ich hab 
Skills geschaffen, die würde ich jetzt vernich-
ten, wenn ich radikal in eine andere Richtung 
gehe. 
New to the 
organisation 
(innovation)  
Long-term 
binding, irre-
versible be-
cause it influ-
ences subse-
quent actions 
5a 163: Dann aber aber auch 
jetzt hier im Konzern die 
Frage: wie steuere ich den 
internen IT Dienstleister, 
steuere ich den internen IT 
Dienstleister im Prinzip als 
Costcentre oder steuere ich 
ihn als Profit Center oder 
eigenständige Geschäftsein-
heit? 
How should 
we steer the 
internal IT 
provider? 
- - - - 
5b 283: […] Standards 
festlegen[… zur] IT Pro-
jektsteuerung und Pro-
jektportfoliosteuerung. Dass 
ein Projekt mit ganz klaren 
Kriterien nur gestartet wer-
den darf […] auch re-
gelmäßig auf den Prüfstand 
kommt, dass es […] re-
gelmäßige Ampelberichte 
[…] gibt […] auch Standards 
Guidelines 
for how cer-
tain man-
agement 
processes 
should be 
conducted 
(criteria, etc.) 
  309: diese Fragen [...] spielen für mich eher 
rein in eine Effizienz der IT und sind von 
daher auch mit dem Anteil den die IT Kosten 
ausmachen strategisch, da reden wir einfach 
über einen strategisch wichtigen Kostenblock, 
aber eigentlich mit zweiter Priorität 
 
Syn-
ergy/efficiency, 
less wasted 
money 
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Cas
e #  
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
Richtung Budgetierungspro-
zess […] 
5c 261: D.h. eine Organisa-
tionsdebatte die bei uns im 
Augenblick ansteht, ist […] 
die Frage, wie können wir 
intelligent und geschickt 
Verantwortlichkeiten der IT 
dezentral allokieren, die aber 
dann für den Gesamtkonzern 
zuständig sind […] klas-
sisches Thema IT Govern-
ance Auftraggeber-seitig. 
Decision on 
allocation 
responsibili-
ties centrally 
or decentrally 
  261ff: […], wie können wir intelligent und 
geschickt Verantwortlichkeiten der IT dezen-
tral allokieren, die aber dann für den Ge-
samtkonzern zuständig sin 
Incentivizing 
business units 
to act coopera-
tively rather 
than only to 
benefit them-
selves 
6a 61: Jetzt strategisch […] ist 
die IT denke ich, […] die 
Bewahrung der Unabhängig-
keit gegenüber der Gruppe, 
Sie wissen wir sind [group]-
Group, das hat eine gewisse 
Brisanz [...] [company]bank 
hat mit der Entscheidung 
1998/1999, ihre Core-
Applikationen zu erneuern 
und zwar nicht auf die 
[group]-Plattform […] 
160: der große Schritt […] 
war wirklich […] Durchset-
zen des Entscheids, […] dass 
man eben eine eigene Soft-
ware […] selbstständig 
evaluiert […,]einführt und 
betreibt, unabhängig von der 
Gruppe, das war sicherlich 
eine strategische 
Entscheidungen 
Selecting an 
enterprise 
platform that 
is independ-
ent from the 
group stan-
dard 
Reason quote: 
113: Von dem her denke ich spielt die IT in verschiedensten Aufträgen eine wichtige Rolle. Einerseits in 
der Unabhängigkeit, andererseits in der schnellen flexiblen Unterstützung der Business-Requierments. 
75: die IT an und für sich ist strategisch ein wichtiges Mittel für die [caompany]bank und ihre weitgehende 
Unabhängigkeit von der [group]. Ich denke mir, wir können uns auch durch diese Strategie eben und durch 
diese Unabhängigkeit der IT eben auch schnell auf veränderte Situationen einstellen, wenn die Bank sich 
entscheidet im strukturierten Produktebereich sich zu verstärken, dann können wir das IT-mäßig sehr 
schnell umsetzen. Wir brauchen nicht lange Entscheidungswege um solche Sachen nachzuvollziehen. Gutes 
Beispiel z.B. die Expansion im asiatischen Raum. [...] das war natürlich auch nur möglich, weil wir unab-
hängig [...] die Expansion der Bank, die sie ja auch durch ihre Wachstumszahlen oder -vorhaben formalis-
iert hat, optimal und schnell und unbürokratischer denke ich auch, als wenn wir bei der [name]Group 
wären, umsetzen. Also da sind wir, wir können in No-Time eigentlich irgend eine neuen Repräsentanzen 
aufstellen, in Monaco steht letztendlich auch vor der Tür, wir hatten das in Libanon, Beirut, wir werden das 
in Dubai haben nächstes Jahr, Jakarta wird dazukommen [...] dass wir auch dort diese minimal kleinen 
Büros optimal eigentlich so unterstützen können [...] Einfach absolut problemlos skalierbar 
It is important 
for the man-
agement to 
remain inde-
pendent from 
the group (po-
litical reason) 
Independence 
enables the IT 
unit to fulfill 
the require-
ments from the 
opportunistic 
flexibility and 
geographic 
growth: no need 
to go through 
group decisions 
(bureaucracy) 
Adjustments in 
the platform can 
be made more 
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Cas
e #  
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
flexibly 
6b 41: unsere IT-Strategie de-
finiert und mehr eigentlich 
auf die Mechanismen wert 
gelegt 
170: Ja wie wir uns aufstel-
len oder das wir eben diese 
business-driven-Strategie 
umsetzen können. Das wir 
eben auch die Mechanismen 
zur Verfügung stellen […], 
das auch das Bewusstsein 
eigentlich damit auch in der 
Geschäftsleitung noch mal 
bestärkt, dass sie gemeinsam 
entscheiden, wohin die Reise 
geht für die nächsten 2-3 
Jahre. Also wir haben dann 
mit dieser business-driven- 
IT Strategie. ein sog. Pro-
jektportfolio-Board lanciert 
Introducing a 
project port-
folio invest-
ment com-
mittee  
Reason quote: 
18:Wir [IT unit] waren verschiedenen […] Kritikpunkten ausgesetzt. Besser gesagt, das war so die Intrans-
parenz die […] außerhalb in die IT gesehen […] und andererseits war das subjektive Empfinden da, dass die 
IT sagt, was dann schlussendlich an Funktionalität dann umgesetzt wurde für die neuen Projekte. Dem ha-
ben wir uns einfach entgegengestellt und haben eine sogenannte business-driven IT-Strategy definiert 
179: um auch diesen Vorwurf zu entgegnen, wo immer unterschwellig uns unterstellt wurde, dass wir [IT 
unit] quasi die Prioritäten machen. Wir haben uns einfach so bewegt, dass der, der am lautesten geschrieen 
hat, der hat es halt bekommen. 
284: Weil es die Steuerung, die aktive Steuerung und nicht nur diese unterschwellige Steuerung, die ja … 
stattgefunden hat, die hat es dann auf ein ganz anderes Level gehoben, auf eine wirklich aktive mit einem 
Mechanismus dazu, der jedem eigentlich klar ist, jedem Geschäftsbereich klar ist, wenn er was will, wenn 
er was Großes will, dann muss er sich diesem Mechanismus unterwerfen, dann muss er dieses Vorhaben in 
dieses Projekt-Portfolio bringen und sonst gibt’s einfach nichts, es gibt keine Wege dran vorbei, im Normal-
fall. 
Countering the 
criticism of the 
business (in-
transparency)  
Giving power to 
business units 
Getting in con-
trol of IP deci-
sion-making 
(moving away 
from a political 
and unregulated 
to a regulated 
decision-
making proc-
ess) 
7 117: IT so in drei Teile zer-
fällt. Das eine ist die An-
wendungslandschaft[...] Das 
zweite sind Infrastruktur-
Themen [...] das dritte ist IT-
Management. […] was sind 
denn jetzt strategische 
Entscheidungen, dann kann 
man […] in jeden dieser 
Bereiche getrennt rein-
gucken. […]  
Decision on 
standardizing 
and centraliz-
ing IP man-
agement 
decisions (IP 
governance) 
146: Managementprozesse sind für mich 
ne Konsequenz aus den ersten beiden. 
Wenn ich das Gefühl hab, ich kann sehr 
viel standardisieren, dann macht’s auch 
Sinn bei den Managementprozessen 
mehr Eingriff zu nehmen und damit 
bekommen die eine höhere strategische 
Bedeutung. Wenn ich das Gefühl hab, 
ich hab lauter isolierte Gesellschaften, 
die ganz unterschiedliche Dinge tun, das 
ist so ein Sammelsurium, das ich da 
managen muss, dann würde ich quasi die 
lokalen IT Fürsten auch mehr 
Entscheidungsgewalt geben über 
Decision de-
pends on uni-
formity of IT 
infrastructure 
and IT applica-
tion landscape; 
if they are to be 
standardized, 
then IT man-
agement proc-
esses should be 
standardized 
and centralized 
as well 
117ff: […]wenn also die ersten zwei Funk-
tionen, Infrastruktur, Applikation, wenn die 
aufzeigen, dass es viele Synergien gibt, in 
einem größeren Verbund, dann sind natürlich 
auch die Management-Prozesse auch strate-
gischer Natur.” 
166: bei den Managementprozessen mehr 
Eingriff zu  
Control and 
synergies from 
standardizing 
and centralizing 
decisions 
Has to fit the 
business situa-
tion (do we 
have to be dif-
ferent or not?) 
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Cas
e #  
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
Entscheidungen, weil die müssen halt 
dann gucken, dass sie das Geschäft 
bestmöglich unterstützen 
8 229: Also ich persönlich sehe 
IT-Strategie immer im 
Zusammenhang mit Govern-
ance […] die legt fest eben, 
wer was tun darf, wie Budg-
ets laufen, wie investiert 
wird, die ganzen Regularien  
Decision on 
IP govern-
ance (respon-
sibilities for 
budget, etc.) 
249: wenn ich es halt zentral mache, 
habe ich mehr Durchgriff, vielleicht 
letztlich mehr Kosteneffizienz. Zentrale 
Verantwortung, ja, wenn ich es dezentral 
mache, habe ich vielleicht mehr Entre-
preneurship, ich habe bessere Time to 
Market, ich habe mehr Identifikation und 
so weiter. Das kommt drauf an. Wir 
hatten historisch jetzt eine Phase oder, 
gut, die Bank ist da nicht raus, aber sie 
war extrem, wo man IT-Kosten massiv 
zurückgefahren hat, und da wurde lo-
gischerweise dann alles zentralisiert. 
Und in dem Rahmen, wo man sich öffnet 
und wieder wachsen will, kann man auch 
dezentralisieren.  
Choice of gov-
ernance (decen-
tralized/ cen-
tralized) de-
pends on busi-
ness strategy 
446: Governance und Strategie sind schon 
irgendwo Dompteure für die an sich sehr 
autonomen [...] und auch divergierenden 
Agenten. Weil jedes Business irgendwo, das 
ist auch im Menschen dann psychologisch 
verankert, ist besonders und speziell und die 
Anforderungen sind besonders und speziell. 
Und jeder will eigentlich die geniale Lösung 
haben und alle Anbieter am Markt und alle 
Consultants wollen solche Speziallösungen 
verkaufen. Und damit hat man so eine En-
tropie und dem muss natürlich die IT-Strategie 
und Governance entgegenwirken.  
799: Corporate würde dann sagen: Na ja, aber 
wir brauchen nicht wieder redundante Funk-
tionen auch in den Fachbereichen, da könnte 
man rationalisieren. Na ja, dann geht eben da 
die Diskussion.  
827: polizeiliche Wirkung dann der CIO-
Einheit auch.  
Counter-
measure, regu-
late business 
units in their 
urge to be spe-
cific and get 
their business 
needs done 
quickly and the 
impact of IT 
vendors! 
Regulate busi-
ness units (Po-
lice) 
Governance has 
to be brought 
in-line with 
business strat-
egy 
9 1233: Was sehr detailliert da 
drin [IT strategy document] 
steht, ist die Governance-
Aufgabenverteilung  
 
Decisions on 
IT govern-
ance, distri-
bution of 
tasks 
 
982: das ist ja auch eine strategische 
Frage […] was machen wir zentral und 
was machen wir dezentral 
Decision on 
what to do 
centally or 
decentrally 
 
586: wir haben hier 250.000 Leute, wie gesagt, 
ich habe eine Truppe von einer handvoll 
Leute, […] wir sind auch drauf angewiesen, 
dass es so [Verantwortlichkeits-]Kaskaden gibt 
[…] So haben wir gesagt, nee, die haben ja 
auch die Verantwortung und wir machen ein 
Rahmenwerk und die Leute müssen das in ihre 
Bereiche tragen. Das ist die einzige Chance in 
so einem Laden, der so groß ist, wenn Sie 
nicht wirklich mit der Pistole im Anschlag 
regieren wollen  
Is a policy for 
others to act 
11 126: Also bei uns im Bereich Decision that  Reason quote: Strategic be-
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Cas
e #  
Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
Konzerninformationsman-
agement gibt es die Konzern-
IT-Strategie. […] Da steht 
zum Beispiel jetzt drin, fürs 
nächste Jahr ist uns ganz 
besonders wichtig, dass alle 
Produkte, die wir vertreiben, 
transparente Kosten-Treiber-
Mechanismen haben und 
SLAs vereinbart haben mit 
den Kunden. 
the costs of 
all of the IT 
unit’s “prod-
ucts” have to 
be transpar-
ent 
 
Decision that 
SLAs have to 
be defined 
for all of the 
IT unit’s 
“products”  
131: Das sind für uns strategisch relevante Themen, die werden 
ganz klar in den nächsten Jahren mit Aktionen auch hinterlegt, 
werden also Bedeutung haben.  
701: Und wenn ich sage, mein Ziel ist eben, nicht die Kosten 
durch Gemeinsamkeit zu senken, sondern die Geschwindigkeit 
dezentral in Prozessen zu optimieren, dann hat das, glaube ich, 
eine andere Beantwortung der Frage, wie organisiere ich die IT, 
welche Governance-Strukturen habe ich, als wenn ich sage, 
mein Ziel ist, ein IT-Servicecenter aufzubauen und alles dort 
zentral abzuwickeln. Das wäre wieder einen andere Governance-
Form. 
cause it has a 
long-term im-
pact 
 
Has to be made 
in line with 
business strat-
egy 
13 162: Aus diesen Grundsätzen 
gibt’s dann eine IT-
Gesamtstrategie, die einge-
bunden ist in die Strategie 
des Finanzvorstands. [...] das 
sind [...] fünf, sechs High-
lights, wo wir in ganz groben 
Zügen wesentliche Ecklinien 
unserer Projektierung und 
Weiterentwicklung darstel-
len. Erst mal für die Gesamt-
IT [...] 
Below the 
vision, there 
is a set of 
corporate-
level IT ini-
tiatives (cor-
porate-level 
information 
strategy) 
165: nach dem Motto: […] Wir wollen 
eine Shared-Service-Organisation […] 
Important cor-
porate level IT 
initiatives in the 
next 2-3 years, 
e.g. 
centralization 
of the IT unit 
(as shared ser-
vice center) 
165: Erst mal für die Gesamt-IT  
168: Also das sind Aussagen, strategische 
Aussagen, die wirklich einen Blick von […] in 
der Größenordnung von zwei bis drei Jahren 
hat.  
Long-term plan 
(2-3 yrs) 
Table 29: Rights and accountability - interpretation of decisions and reasoning
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k. SOURCING DECISIONS are related to the allocation of IP activities between the company 
and external parties. Only those activities that are not outsourced are potentially conducted 
by the internal IT unit. Hence, this decision area goes beyond decisions on the IT unit. In 
contrast to rights and accountability decisions, sourcing decisions concern the distribution 
of responsibilities among internal and external stakeholders and thus cross the boundary 
of the organization. The decisions counted in this decision area were the following: 
• Deciding which IP activities to outsource (e.g. should we run our data center ourselves 
or not?) (cases 3, 4a, 8, 13) 
• Selection of type of outsourcing contract to use (e.g. fixed price, frame contract, etc.) 
(case 4b) 
• Decision on contract design (mechanisms for steering outsourcing provider) 
(case 10b) 
• Decision on whether to change the supplier (case 10a) 
• Decision on number of suppliers (single vs. multi-vendor) (cases 5, 11) 
• Decision on sourcing principles (e.g. “buy before make”; “never have an in-house data 
center”) (case 12) 
The decision to outsource certain IP activities was regarded as strategic because it was ex-
pected to decrease IP costs, which form a large portion of overall expenditures (case 4a) 
and was hence hoped to increase cost competitiveness (cases 5, 11). However, this was 
seen as strategic with only “second priority” in case 5. In case 8, competitiveness was al-
luded to when the interviewee stated that competitors’ outsourcing decisions have to be 
watched. 
Much more important for arguing the choice between outsourcing and insourcing as stra-
tegic were other reasons: one was that the decision must be made in congruence with 
business strategy: if IT is a “critical success factor” for a business process – meaning that 
IT is important for differentiation from competitors – then these IT activities cannot be 
outsourced. If they were, the differentiation strategy might be jeopardized (case 5). 
Another reason is that as-yet-unknown changes in strategic business requirements have to 
be taken into account when making the sourcing decision. Because outsourcing decisions 
eventually end up in contracts, these contracts must be flexible enough to avoid increases 
in the provider’s service charges due to unanticipated changes in business requirements 
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(case 10); otherwise, necessary changes in business requirements may be rendered 
economically impossible. In this scenario, outsourced activities may inhibit strategic 
change of the company. 
Sourcing decisions were also regarded as strategic because they bind the company to the 
direction taken for a long time and hence are not easily reversible (cases 4b, 13). This is 
because many subsequent decisions are affected by the decision to out- or insource certain 
activities. For example, if a certain activity is outsourced, it cannot be insourced again 
quickly, because the skills needed to conduct this activity would have to be rebuilt in-
house first (case 4b). If the decision is made to keep an activity in-house, then this will be 
reflected in hiring and training staff and in the way that contracts are designed (case 13).  
Maybe because of this, the decision to outsource or insource was regarded as valid for a 
certain time period. As such, the decision is thus not questioned during that time period, 
but remains stable and can hence be built upon in other planning decisions (case 13, but 
also 8 and 12).  
      
130
 
Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
3 97: Also die Fragestellung, die 
ganz klar hier auf dem Tisch lag 
war: wir haben jetzt eine An-
wendungslandschaft, jetzt brauchen 
wir noch ne Datenbank, jetzt 
brauchen wir noch ne Hardware-
plattform, jetzt brauchen wir ein 
Betriebsmodell. 
Decision on 
sourcing 
99: Also Betriebsmodell heißt, also 
wie betreiben wir das? Machen wir 
das intern? Machen wir das extern 
etc. pp.? Outsourcing, Insourcing 
Decision made 
only by IT 
unit, no BUs 
involved 
- - 
4a 509: in der Delivery Organisation. 
Da wird dann sozusagen, da ist ja 
die Prozesskette, dass sind die 
[…]prozesse, die wir selber haben, 
unsere eigenen [of the IS unit], und 
dort legen wir fest: und diesen Teil 
der Prozesskette machen wir intern 
und diese Teile machen wir extern. 
[…] Und damit ist sozusagen fest-
gelegt, wo muss der Staff und wo 
gehen wir an den externen Markt  
Decision 
about which 
activities of 
the IS unit 
should be 
conducted 
internally (by 
the IS unit) 
and which 
ones should 
be conducted 
externally 
(outsourced) 
- - 509ff: War jetzt auch grade Element dieser 
letzten strategischen Übung: zu sagen, wir 
trennen uns von einzelnen internen Feldern, da 
wir nie die Economies of scale haben […] und 
weil wir nie die Core Competence dort haben, 
weil es nicht Kern unseres Geschäftes ist, dies 
zu tun. Da machen wir ein Outtasking. 
Gaining 
economies of 
scale 
analogy 
4b 525: Es gibt letztlich 4 Typen von 
Sourcing über die wir reden in 
einer Strategie würde festgelegt, 
dann wird festgelegt zu sagen in 
welchen Feldern, in welcher Quan-
tität gehen wir auf welchen Typ 
von Vertrag. 
Decision 
about which 
type of out-
sourcing 
contract 
should be 
used for 
which activ-
ity 
520: nachdem wir wissen, wie viel 
wir von außen uns holen, so und so 
viel geben wir wirklich über […] 
Outtasking [...] das machen wir 
über fixed price contracts und das 
machen wir über Framework Con-
tracts und das machen wir 
schließlich über individuelle Con-
tracts. 
Decision be-
tween 4 types 
of contracts 
562: Ja, auch da, es ist eine langfristige 
Entscheidung, wenn ich mal gesagt habe, ich 
mache Outtasking für einen bestimmten 
Bereich, den hol ich mir nicht im halben Jahr 
wieder zurück.  
Long-term 
binding, irre-
versible 
5 161:Klassischer Weise gehört 
natürlich zum Thema IT Strategie 
auch das Thema Providermanage-
ment dazu, im Sinne: auf der einen 
Seite Single vs Multi-Vendor 
Decision on 
use of multi-
ple vendors 
or one vendor 
Decision on 
- - 275: wo ist IT Kernerfolgsfaktor für die 
Geschäftsprozesse, dann kann es sein, dass ich 
dort stark in eine interne Vergabe rein gehe. 
Wenn es eben kein kritischer Erfolgsfaktor ist, 
dann kann es eben auch sein, dass ich stark am 
The outsourc-
ing decision has 
to take into 
account in 
which activities 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
Strategie. 
272: was macht ein externer Dien-
stleister, was machen wir selber 
which activi-
ties to out-
source 
Marktmechanismen spielen lasse bei der Ver-
gabe 
309: diese Fragen Sourcing, IT Prozessstan-
dards spielen für mich eher rein in eine Ef-
fizienz der IT und sind von daher auch mit 
dem Anteil den die IT Kosten ausmachen 
strategisch, da reden wir einfach über einen 
strategisch wichtigen Kostenblock, aber ei-
gentlich mit zweiter Priorität 
IT is a success 
factor. These 
cannot be out-
sourced 
Outsourcing 
leads to cost 
reduction and 
hence staying 
competitive  
8 742: Ist es definitiv. Also ich habe 
es nicht explizit genannt, weil es 
eigentlich implizit natürlich dabei 
ist. Sourcing ist extrem wichtig 
[…] Und spannend ist natürlich 
dann das Sourcing, In- und Out-
sourcing von Services 
Decision on 
which IT 
activities to 
outsource 
- - 742:Und wir betreiben es momentan sehr 
zurückhaltend. Also wir schauen auch an, was 
andere Player tun wie die Deutsche Bank, die 
ihr Rechenzentrum vergeben hat an IBM, da 
sind die ersten Meldungen naturgemäß erst 
mal sehr gemischt. Da denken wir einfach, 
dass auch die Dienstleister da in der Erfah-
rungskurve noch ein bisschen hoch rutschen 
können mit unseren Wettbewerbern  
Competitors 
have to be 
watched 
10a 953: Glauben wir, dass für die 
nächsten drei bis fünf Jahre das der 
richtige Outsourcer noch ist? 
[…] Wollen wir eine Vertragsver-
längerung mit denen machen?  
Decision on 
whether to 
continue with 
this provider 
or with a 
different one 
10b 270: Das heißt, ich muss natürlich 
meine Verträge so bauen, dass 
wenn ich etwas habe, was ich heute 
noch nicht weiß, ... dass mir das 
nicht kostenmäßig auf dem Ruder 
läuft.  
 
Decision on 
contract de-
sign 
957: Weil, ich habe ja unter-
schiedliche Verträge und 
Laufzeiten. Das heißt, die stehen 
immer zur Disposition  
 
Many activi-
ties are out-
sourced al-
ready, so the 
decision is 
more on 
whether to 
continue and 
with whom 
rather than 
what to out-
source  
270: Das heißt, ich muss natürlich meine Ver-
träge so bauen, dass wenn ich etwas habe, was 
ich heute noch nicht weiß, ... dass mir das 
nicht kostenmäßig auf dem Ruder läuft.  
734: Ich will nichts Spezielles haben, sonst 
komme ich von Dir nicht weg 
957: [wenn ich] den Zahlungsverkehr wech-
seln würde, dann muss ich mindestens zwei 
Jahre vorher mit einem neuen verhandelt ha-
ben und ich brauche mindestens ein Jahr zum 
Umzug. Weil ich kann es ja kaum ... Die 
Daten, die Struktur muss ... Also Zahlungs-
verkehr, das Wertpapiersystem umzuswitchen, 
das ist ein Akt, also das muss ich hinterfragen, 
ob das noch die richtigen sind. 
Contracts have 
to be designed 
such that they 
ensure that 
dependency on 
providers or 
unanticipated 
changes do not 
increase costs 
in a way that 
makes change 
economically 
impossible  
Not easily re-
versible 
11 349: Ein Element, was ich jetzt 
noch nicht erwähnt habe, ist das 
Decision on 
number of 
  75: Und die haben auch konsequenterweise 
vor zwei, drei Jahren praktisch die gesamte IT 
Cost decrease 
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Case Decision quote Decision 
summary 
Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason sum-
mary 
Thema Sourcing-Strategie. 
450: Also da steht zum Beispiel 
drin: Wir fahren eine 27-Provider-
Strategie 
suppliers outgesourct und einen Fixpreis quasi gemacht. 
Und das sind Früchte, die die geerntet haben, 
die sie ein paar Jahre vorher letztlich auch 
festgelegt hatten. 
12 None Decisions on 
general IT 
principles 
None Principles of 
sourcing (buy 
before make; 
no in-house 
data center) 
None Is a principal 
guideline 
13 303: Bei Sourcing ist die Frage: 
make or buy? Ganz klassisch. Was 
machen wir selbst, was machen wir 
nicht selbst? 
Which IT 
processes 
should be 
conducted 
internally, 
which ones 
should be 
outsourced 
319: Es gibt uns keiner eine Out-
sourcing-Strategie, außer vielleicht 
der Finanzvorstand vor, sondern 
der Unternehmensbereich dem 
liefern wir seine Applikationen und 
ob wir im Hintergrund achtzig 
Prozent extern sourcen oder intern, 
das muss ihm eigentlich egal sein 
oder ist ihm auch egal. 
Not relevant 
for business 
units and their 
requirements. 
Purely focused 
on how the 
services are 
delivered 
362: Zum Beispiel […], wir haben 
entschieden […] den Betrieb der Rechenzen-
tren weiterhin selbst zu machen […] der Ei-
genbetrieb ist jetzt mal für drei Jahre gesetzt 
und damit haben wir hier eine feste Größe, an 
der wir uns auch planerisch orientieren kön-
nen. 
386: Also eine Frage, mache ich Eigenbetrieb 
oder source ich aus, kann ich ja nicht … […] 
dass eine gewisse Verlässlichkeit auf so eine 
Entscheidung ist […] brauche aber eine ge-
wisse strategische Fixierung, um halt dann im 
Sinne des Taktisch-Operativen mich an klaren 
Rahmenbedingungen zu orientieren 
407: […] Wir haben entschieden, wir machen 
das Netzwerkmanagement für die nächsten 
drei Jahre mal selbst. Das heißt, wir haben 
damit einen […] ergänzenden Mann aufge-
baut, wir haben eine Weiterbildung gemacht 
und wir haben mit unseren Providern unter 
diesen Gesichtspunkten verhandelt. [...] Wenn 
ich dann in jeder einzelnen Entscheidung die 
Frage wiederum thematisiere […] Also wenn 
ich […] dann sagen würde „Wir lagen das […] 
aus”, dann habe ich einen Mann zu viel. 
Provides guide-
line for subse-
quent decisions: 
can be relied on 
for planning 
purposes 
Not easily re-
versible, be-
cause other 
decisions are 
affected by the 
sourcing deci-
sion 
Table 30: Sourcing - interpretation of decisions and reasoning
   133   
l. SECURITY AND CONTINUITY PLANS AND POLICIES are concerned with avoiding or allevi-
ating technical threats to business continuity or security. In comparison to architectural 
standards, their aim is more specific than ensuring a technically sound architecture. They 
address “[…] issues such as disaster recovery work. If something massive happens, how 
quickly are we able to support the business again?” (case 7). The decisions in detail were: 
• Decision on introducing disaster recovery mechanisms (cases 4, 7) 
• Decision on security policies and mechanisms (cases 10, 11) 
• Decision on security vs. cost trade-off principle (cases 12, 13) 
The reasons for viewing these decisions as strategic are the criticality of IP for business 
(i.e. a highly negative impact if security and continuity are not ensured), the fact that the 
topic typically gets neglected in day-to-day work, is a company-wide topic, and involves a 
trade-off between security and cost. 
If the IT systems are not working, there will be a negative impact on business (e.g. inabil-
ity to carry out business processes (case 4), loss of revenue (case 7), reputation (case 11), 
etc.). For companies that are pure online players, the company ceases to exist for the cus-
tomer if certain IT systems are not available (case 10). In summary, security and continu-
ity topics are said to be critical to business operations.  
The topic was argued to be featured prominently on the information strategy agenda be-
cause external threats have increased a lot, and therefore require urgent attention (case 
12).  
Another reason provided for why security should be on the strategy agenda is that it gets 
buried in day-to-day operations too easily. Security is perceived as costly and does not 
show immediate benefit (case 7). Thus, putting security on the strategy agenda is seen as 
forcing people to care about it. Furthermore, it has to be handled centrally, because no 
single business unit or region has an interest in implementing security measures; just as 
the state has to take on tasks that individual citizens would not willingly perform. Hence, 
security has company-wide importance across all parts of the business (cases 7, 11). 
In case 11, ensuring security was considered important for the ability to integrate and dis-
integrate companies. As merging and divesting parts of the company was seen as a strate-
gic business requirement, security was seen as a necessary prerequisite for executing 
this business strategy.  
   134   
Finally, the principle that security is important – but at a reasonable cost – was seen as a 
guideline for further decisions and one that would set expectations (case 13). 
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Case Decision quote Decision summary Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason 
summary 
4 330: Ein sehr typisches 
Beispiel [...] wir bauen un-
sere Systeme normalerweise 
nach dem „2 and a half node 
concept”. [...] müssen hier 
hoch sicher sein, wir müssen 
hoch verfügbar sein. Wir 
müssen im Falle eines Desas-
ters weiter arbeiten. Also 
werden die Applikationen 
normalerweise als Cluster-
lösungen gebaut, die an 2 
unterschiedlichen Standorten 
laufen.  
Decision to make sys-
tems redundant in differ-
ent locations 
- - 330: müssen hier hoch sicher sein, wir 
müssen hoch verfügbar sein. Wir müssen im 
Falle eines Desasters weiter arbeiten. […] 
dass die Services der [company] weiter ver-
fügbar sind.  
Availability 
is important 
because pub-
lic services 
depend on it. 
7 131: Rechenzentrumsbetrieb 
würde ich auch als strate-
gisch ziemlich wichtig anse-
hen 
133: am Ende des Tages ist 
mir wichtig, dass solche 
Sachen wie Desaster-
Recovery funktionieren. 
Also wenn irgendetwas Mas-
sives passiert, wie schnell 
sind wir in der Lage wieder 
das Geschäft zu unterstützen, 
dass wir keine Zeit verlieren. 
Decision about introduc-
ing desaster recovery 
267: Also wir hatten jetzt in den USA 
z.B. in den letzten 12 Monaten ein 
paar Geschichten, Eisstürme die 
irgendwie die ganzen Standorte lahm 
gelegt haben, für – nicht wie es bei 
uns immer so üblich ist – so 2-3 
Stunden, sondern für 48 Std., was 
dann ne katastrophale Auswirkung 
auf den Rest des Geschäftes hat. 
289: kam sozusagen auf die Agenda, 
weil es ein konkretes Problem gab 
Can cause 
significant 
problems 
3: “also wenn irgendetwas Massives passiert, 
wie schnell sind wir in der Lage wieder das 
Geschäft zu unterstützen, dass wir keine Zeit 
verlieren.”  
263: das liegt einfach daran[…] dass das 
etwas ist, was im Tagesgeschäft schnell mal 
nicht die Bedeutung haben kann, die es ha-
ben muss, also vielleicht kann man […] IT-
Strategie auch ausdehnen, auf Sachen, […] 
[bei denen] man die Landesgesellschaften 
auch stärker unterstützen [muss] 
269: was dann ne katastrophale Auswirkung 
auf den Rest des Geschäftes hat. 
275: je kleiner ne Landesgesellschaft ist, 
desto mehr muss man da […] Einfluss neh-
men, weil die nämlich mit höherer Wahr-
scheinlichkeit hinten runter fallen. 
282: es bringt ja erstmal nichts, das kostet ja 
nur Geld und Mühe und nur im Fall wenn 
was passiert, hat man was davon. Und da 
auch Akzeptanz dafür zu erzielen, dass man 
Critical im-
pact on busi-
ness continu-
ity 
Gets ne-
glected/burie
d in day-to-
day opera-
tions, does 
not get the 
focus it de-
serves and 
needs be-
cause it only 
avoids nega-
tive impact, 
does not have 
direct posi-
tive impact  
Needs to be 
put on strat-
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Case Decision quote Decision summary Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason 
summary 
da was braucht, dass ist was, was vielleicht 
auch noch ein Kritierium sein kann für 
strategische Entscheidungen, wo quasi so 
eine Landesgesellschaft auch Unterstützung 
braucht, sich durchzusetzen, dass das ne 
sinnvolle Sache ist. 
egy agenda 
so that it 
cannot be 
ignored 
10 975: Penetrationstest wird 
immer mitgeführt [in der IT-
Strategie] […]BSI-Standard 
1057: Datenschutz. Auch ein 
… Thema  
1049: IT-Sicherheit ist natür-
lich ein extra Punkt, ganz 
klar 
 1056: Also das Ausfallrisiko 
wird bei uns ganz klar be-
trachtet 
Decision on security 
standards, data privacy, 
measures against exter-
nal attacks, measures 
against downtime 
  591: wenn wir irgendwo ein Sicherheitsleck 
hätten, dann können wir das Unternehmen 
dicht machen 
Ciritical for 
business 
existence 
11 719: Also was bei uns auch 
Thema der Konzern-IT-
Strategie ist, ist, weil es auch 
ein gemeinsames Thema ist, 
ist Sicherheit, IT-Sicherheit  
Decisions on IT security 747: Sicherheit ist so für uns der 
Oberbegriff rund um das Thema 
Rollen […]. Also wir haben in der 
Airline-Branche zum Teil relativ 
offene Systeme und dadurch, dass 
auch Fremdfirmen, Fremdpersonal 
direkt auf unsere Buchungsmaschi-
nen zugreift, auf unsere Re-
servierungs- und Check-In-Systeme, 
ist das einfach ein großes Thema. An 
dem zeigt sich letztlich, wie gut kann 
ich andere Firmen integrieren oder 
eben auch wieder raus nehmen und 
welche Sicherheitslücken bleiben 
drin. Also es gibt immer wieder Fälle 
von Missbrauch, sage ich mal.  
Security is 
about access 
to systems 
Is strategic 
because it 
determines 
the ability to 
integrate or 
disintegrate 
other compa-
nies in merg-
ers and disin-
vestments 
721: Das hat eine strategische Bedeutung, 
weil es zum einen dort Handlungsbedarf 
gibt, der alle betrifft, und zum anderen auch 
was zu tun hat mit der Frage, wie effektiv 
kann der [company]-Konzern Firmenüber-
nahmen durchführen oder auch Firmen 
wieder desintegrieren. 
728: das ist natürlich auch eine der strate-
gischen Geschäftsanforderungen des [com-
pany]-Konzerns, zu sagen, das möchte ich 
beides können, und da muss dann natürlich 
auch der IT-Sicherheitsecke heraus eine 
Antwort drauf gefunden werden. Deswegen 
ist das bei uns auch ein strategisches Thema. 
Corporate-
wide topic 
 
It influences 
how well the 
company can 
integrate and 
disintegrate 
other compa-
nies, which is 
business 
strategy 
12 None Decisions on general IT None Principles on None Threats 
andimpost 
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Case Decision quote Decision summary Context/detail quote C’txt/detail 
summary 
Reason quote Reason 
summary 
principles security have in-
creased 
13 124: Also erstens haben wir 
eine Vision, sage ich mal, die 
besteht aus vier Kernsätzen, 
was die IT bei [company] 
ausmachen soll.  
Vision is part of the 
broader concept of in-
formation strategy. It 
defines the role of IT in 
terms of guiding princi-
ples 
149: wir wollen Standardsoftware 
einsetzen, wir definieren uns aus 
einer optimalen Unterstützung der 
Geschäftsprozesse, wir betrachten 
Security, allerdings in einem vernün-
ftigen Kosten-Leistungs-Verhältnis, 
wir unterstellen uns einem konse-
quenten Benchmarking und wollen 
wettbewerbsfähige Leistungen zu ... 
Ich sage mal, wir wollen keine Pi-
oniere sein in der IT. 
 
 
It is a guiding 
principle that 
security is 
important but 
follows 
cost/benefit 
considerations 
124: Kernsätzen, was die IT bei [company] 
ausmachen soll 
Provides a 
guideline for 
subsequent 
decision.  
Table 31: Security and continuity - interpretation of decisions and reasoning 
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c Architectural standards 12 5a 8, 12 10     
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11a  
5a, 5b 
8, 9, 13 1,10   6a 5a 4b, 6a, 8 
 
 
d Process standards           11    12  6 2, 9c 
e Portfolio/investment   11, 13    11     
 
      
 
 
f Budget            
 
      
 
 
g Projects for market activit. 6, 13           
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
h HR plan/org of IT unit            
 
    
 
 
4a  
 
i Role of IT unit      3b      
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
j Rights/accountability   7, 8    2 3, 5c 2, 6b, 
8 
 5b, 7    6a  8  
 
k Sourcing  5        4a, 5, 11  
 
10     
 
 
 
 
l IT security and continuity   11          
 
    
 
 
 
 
 Table 32: Decision areas and reasoning (1/2) 
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a Application 
landscaping  2, 13 13               
b Application 
standards   7               
c Architectural 
standards  11b 3, 7, 11a 
1, 4a, 4b, 
6a, 10, 13 
1, 6b, 8, 
10  
3, 4a, 6a, 7, 
11a, 13 4a          
d Process stan-
dards   9b 4b  6, 12 4a           
e Portfo-
lio/investment 4, 8, 11, 13 4, 13     8     11   11   
f Budget 5 4       3         
g Projects for 
market activities                  
h HR plan/ 
organization of IT 
unit 
4c   4e  
 
 6   4d  13     
i Role of IT unit      3b 13       
4a, 4b, 
4c   3a 
j Rights/ 
accountability  11, 13  4   4    4    6a  6b 
k Sourcing    4b, 10, 13  
 
12, 13      4a     
l IT security and 
continuity    11    
 
  7      4, 7, 10, 12  
Table 33: Decision areas and reasoning (2/2) 
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3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF CONTENT BY REASONING 
Table 34 displays the decision areas by case and hence provides an overview of the previous 
section across cases. A number (e.g. “1”) in the cell in row x and column y indicates the num-
ber of decisions that were mentioned in case y that we grouped into decision area x. The last 
column (headed by the Greek sigma) contains the sum of the decisions across all cases within 
this decision area. The second to last column contains the number of cases that included the 
respective decision area in their information strategy. 
Cases (numbers indicate the number of decision instances) #Cases Σ Content of information 
strategy (decision areas) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 # 89 
a. Application landscaping   1 1         1 1 4 4 
b. Application standards     1  1  1     3 3 
c. Architectural standards 1  1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 12 17 
d. IT process standards  1  2  1   3  1 1  6 9 
e. Portfolio/investment     1    1   1  1 4 4 
f. Budget   1 1 1     1    4 4 
g. Projects for market act.      1       1 2 2 
h. HR plan/org of IT unit    5  1      1 1 4 8 
i. Role of IT unit  1 2 4         1 4 8 
j. Rights & accountability  1 2 1 3 2 1 1 1  1  1 10 14 
k. Sourcing    1 2 1   1  2 1 1 1 8 10 
l. Security/continuity     1   1   1 1 1 1 6 6 
Table 34: Information strategy content by case 
Table 32 and Table 33 summarize the reasons provided by the interviewees within each deci-
sion area for arguing the respective decisions as strategic. A number (e.g. “5”) in the cell with 
the coordinates row x and column y means that a decision in the decision area x was part of 
the information strategy in case 5; the decision was reasoned to be strategic with reasoning y. 
The exact decision can be traced by going back to the respective decision area in the previous 
section. 
Several observations can be made from looking at these tables: first, analyzing Table 34 or 
Table 32 and Table 33 row-wise reveals that no one decision area was present in all cases. 
Our sample size, as well as the qualitative approach, does not allow for generalizable statisti-
cal analysis. Still, some decision areas feature more often in the information strategies of our 
sample than others. Architectural standards are on the information strategy agenda in almost 
all cases. Similarly, rights and accountability decisions are frequently viewed as part of in-
formation strategies. Similarly, sourcing decisions frequently form part of the content of in-
formation strategies. In contrast, interviewees hardly mentioned decisions concerned with 
launching (strategic) IS/IT projects to support market activities in their information strategy. 
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Also, decisions on application landscaping standards, portfolio/investment, budget, HR and 
organization, and the role of the IT unit were less often part of information strategies.  
Second, analyzing Table 34 column-wise, we do not see any immediately visible patterns or 
combinations of decision areas: no two cases exhibit exactly the same combination of deci-
sion areas. The impression we get is that the combination of decision areas in information 
strategies is somewhat idiosyncratic. At least, there is no dominant design of information 
strategy content. However, reasons and decision areas reoccur across cases. 
Third, each decision area was argued to be strategic for multiple reasons. Interviewees used 
several reasons to argue the same area as strategic (e.g. decision area a, case 3: reasoning 1, 7 
and 14; decision area k, case 10: reasoning 12 and 22; or decision area e, case 11: reasoning 3, 
7, 19, 30 and 33). Also, most interviewees provided different reasons across different decision 
areas.  
Going beyond description, we will discuss the reasoning used by practitioners to argue the 
decisions as strategic in the next section. 
To this end, we now analyze the different reasons summarized in Table 32 and Table 33 in the 
previous chapter. To obtain better insight into the practitioners’ reasoning, we grouped the 
reasons into categories in order to avoid repeated discussion of each reason for different deci-
sions.  
A useful classification of reasoning is found in argumentation theory (Toulmin et al. 1984). 
This theory tries to be helpful in answering “what does it mean to ask if someone’s statement 
[…] is sensible or well reasoned […]?” (Toulmin et al. 1984, p. 4). In this view, statements 
“succeed or fail only to the extent that they can be ‘supported’ by arguments, reasons, evi-
dence, or the like and that are able to carry the reader or the hearer along with them only be-
cause they have such a ‘rational foundation’” (p. 5). When we look for practitioners “reason-
ing”, we look for “reasons in support of a claim” (p. 6), namely the claim that certain IP deci-
sions are strategic. Toulmin et al. (1984, pp. 216) distinguish four kinds of reasoning: reason-
ing from analogy, reasoning from sign, reasoning from cause and reasoning from generaliza-
tion.31  
The following sections classify the reasons provided by practitioners according to these cate-
gories. 
                                                 
31
 Reasoning from generalization was not employed in our sample. This is not surprising, as generalizing from a 
certain representative sample is more likely to be found in academia than in practice. 
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3.2.1 IP decisions reasoned as strategic from sign: Characteristics of strategic IP 
decisions  
A number of IP decisions were argued to be strategic because they exhibit certain characteris-
tics. These characteristics are understood to signal strategic decisions. The underlying as-
sumption is that these characteristics are common to all strategic decisions and as such help to 
identify decisions that are strategic in nature. Interviewees used the following characteristics 
to portray strategic decisions (see decisions 19-30 marked with “Characteristics” in Table 33): 
• Irreversibility (reason 22 in Table 33): once made, certain decisions (decision areas c, d, h, 
j, k) were argued to be difficult to reverse in a technical or economic sense; the organiza-
tion is tied to the respective decision for a long time. Interviewees mentioned a binding 
duration of at least 2-5 years (cases 2, 4, 10, 13). Changing the decision would incur high 
costs, rendering a change economically unfeasible. Interviewees emphasized this infeasi-
bility for decisions that influence a number of subsequent decisions and entail large re-
source commitments: 
“wie eben diese Ausrichtung auf diese ORACLE-Datenbanken damit verbunden, also 
man richtet sich ja nicht nur auf ORACLE ein, sondern man braucht die Leute dazu, 
man braucht die Mechanismen dazu und das Know-how. Man muss ja da auch, ich 
meine nur die ORACLE Datenbank zu betreiben, das ist das Eine, aber dass diese gan-
zen Mechanismen von einem Business-Contingency-Management darin dann auch zu 
verpacken, dass ist das Andere und ich denke so eine Entscheidung ist schon sehr 
strategisch und die kann man von heute auf morgen, also kann man schon, aber sollte 
man eigentlich nicht von heute auf morgen ändern.” (decision area c, case 6a)32 
• Guideline purpose (reason 25): some decisions serve the purpose of guiding or directing 
subsequent decisions (decision areas c, d, e, i, j, k, l). For example, the selection of tech-
nology or process standards has implications for the skills required of IT unit staff in order 
to employ the chosen technology or processes. 
• Company-wide effects (reason 21): certain decisions (areas a, b, c, d, l) were also argued 
to have a company-wide effect, i.e. they affect all business units or functions. 
                                                 
32
 Translation by author: “Just like this focus on the ORACLE-databases is connected (with it), you know, you 
don’t just choose ORACLE, but you need the people for it, you need the mechanisms for it and the know-how. 
You have to, I mean, just operating the ORACLE-database, that’s one thing, but also put all these mechanisms 
together to a business-contigency-management into it, that’s another story and I think such a decision is very 
strategic. And this decision you could, well, you could, but you should not change them all of the sudden, from 
one day to another. 
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• Fundamentality (reasons 23 and 24): the choice of technology standards (area c) was 
stated to entail the elimination of various alternatives, i.e. that one alternative had to be 
chosen to the exclusion of others. Other decisions were said to fundamentally change the 
way IT operates (areas d, i).  
• Prioritization of resource allocations (reason 19): decision areas e (portfolio), f (budget), 
and h (HR plan/organization) were argued to be trade-offs in the form of prioritizations of 
resource allocations.  
• Magnitude of (financial) impact (reason 26): some decisions were argued to have a dra-
matic (financial) impact on the organization (areas c, h).  
• High level of uncertainty (reason 27): a number of decisions were regarded as being made 
under a high level of uncertainty (e.g. setting the budget (f)) or leading to uncertain de-
pendencies (e.g. sourcing (k), architectural standards (c)).  
• Long-term perspective (reason 20): decisions (areas a, c, e, f, j) were regarded as long-
term plans laying out what the organization would do in the future (again, over the next 2-
3 years). These decisions are considered part of a master plan that prescribes future activi-
ties.  
• Burial in day-to-day operations (reason 28): the planning of measures to ensure IT conti-
nuity was argued to be a strategic decision because they otherwise tend to get buried in 
day-to-day operations (case 7). Because the benefit of planning only becomes obvious in 
hindsight, namely in the case of outages, this decision is usually ignored and de-prioritized 
compared to (day-to-day) decisions with a more obvious impact. 
• Novelty (reason 29): decisions in areas h (HR and organization) and j (rights and account-
ability) were argued to be completely new for the organization and hence regarded as stra-
tegic. 
• Decision-maker (reason 30): one decision area (e, portfolio) was argued to be strategic by 
virtue of having to be made by top management, i.e. only executives can resolve the pri-
oritization conflicts among the various stakeholders. In other cases (e.g. in case 3), other 
decisions (e.g. on architectural standards) were argued to be strategic, but did not have to 
be made by top managemers because were not regarded to have the competence to make 
the decisions. 
For reasoning from sign, (Toulmin et al. 1984) states that the “central question is, simply, just 
how certainly any sign is associated with what it is supposed to signal” (p. 223). In other 
words, the question is how accurately the signals really indicate that the respective decisions 
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are strategic. In fact, ‘What differentiates strategic decisions from non-strategic ones?’33 or 
‘What are the characteristics of strategic decisions?’ were key quiestions in the formation of 
early strategy (e.g. Ansoff 1965) and still are today (Grant 2005). However, there is no defi-
nite set of characteristics that sharply distinguishes strategic from non-strategic decisions. 
Rather, we find a number of different proposals. The most commonly found characteristics 
are listed below (see Table 35): 
• Long-term perspective: most authors agree that strategic decisions have a long-term per-
spective while the perspective of non-strategic decisions is of a shorter term. There are 
various interpretations of the meaning of long-term perspective. One interpretation is that 
strategic decisions have a long planning horizon, i.e. they concern what an organization 
will do in the next 5-10 years. The practitioners we interviewed cited that reason, as well. 
However, they defined a shorter time period, 2-5 years at the most. Another interpretation 
of “long-term perspective” is that strategic decisions take a considerable amount of time 
before they are fully implemented because they have a transformative character that entails 
significant changes (Johnson et al. 2005, pp. 6) (see comment on significant impact be-
low). A third interpretation focuses on the duration of the effect. Here, strategic decisions 
are said to have long lasting, enduring effects that cannot be easily reversed (Ackoff 
1970; Angell 1990). Ghemawat ((Ghemawat 1997) pp. 22; citing Robert Townsend) 
briefly describes the practical logic of irreversibility as an inherent strategic characteristic: 
if a decision does not lock the decision maker into a certain direction, but can instead be 
reversed easily later on, there would be no reason to think about this decision for more 
than “three seconds.” As an example, the decision to compete as a low-cost producer 
rather than to differentiate cannot be reverted quickly, because it involves e.g. changing a 
whole brand image that has been built up by many operational marketing decisions, cus-
tomer perceptions, etc. As indicated above, practitioners relied to a large extent on this 
characteristic to argue decisions as strategic. 
• Directional nature: strategic decisions provide a direction or guideline for other decisions. 
They serve as a framework in which other decisions are made, a point of orientation. 
Thus, they affect non-strategic decisions and “trigger whole series of other decisions” 
(Johnson et al. 2005). Once a direction is chosen, it cannot be changed without changing 
                                                 
33
 Different authors assign different names to non-strategic decisions. Johnson et al. (2005) distinguish between 
strategic and operational decisions, Ackoff (1970) between strategic and tactical decisions and Ansoff (1965) 
between strategic, administrative and operational decisions. 
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all the decisions that have already been affected by the strategic decision. Again, a number 
of decision areas were argued to posess this characteristic. 
• Broad impact: strategic decisions have a broad impact in several ways: first, their impact 
is organization-wide and cross-functional. Decisions that only impact individual functions 
are less strategic (Johnson et al. 2005). Secondly, they imply a significant change 
(Johnson et al. 2005) that has major resource implications (in terms of financial resources, 
human resources, etc.) and are thus expected to influence the success of the organization 
substantially (Steinmann and Schreyögg 2002) – in terms of resource investments and 
generated effects. For example, the decision to extend the scope of a company by either 
acquiring an existing company or building up a new workforce, machinery, etc. requires 
significant resource investments. Practitioners alluded to the (financial) magnitude of the 
decisions’ impact, to its company-wide effect as well as trade-offs regarding the allocation 
of resources (see above). 
• Concerning internal and external fit: an organization’s strategic decisions take into ac-
count both, the external environment and internal factors. Strategic decisions are about fit-
ting these internal factors to external characteristics. Ansoff (1965) states that they are 
“concerned with establishing an ‘impedance match’ between the firm and its environ-
ment”. One specific variant of this characteristic asserts that strategic decisions focus on 
competition (Steinmann and Schreyögg 2002). Practitioners did not use this characteristic 
directly; it may be seen as implicitly included in their discussions about external cost pres-
sure or trying to “fit” IP decisions to a given business strategy. However, in general, prac-
titioners were more inward-oriented when arguing decisions as strategic rather than seek-
ing a fit between internal and external factors.  
• Difficult to make: because of the aforementioned characteristics, it should come as no 
surprise that strategic decisions are difficult to make. For example, a decision that cannot 
be reversed easily and that affects the whole organization and its success has to be consid-
ered carefully and requires considerable thought. But even beyond the characteristics 
mentioned above, strategic decisions may be characterized as complex: this is because 
they involve making a selection from a range of alternatives (“choices” according to 
(Rumelt et al. 1994)). This holds true even more if one follows Ansoff (1965) who stated 
that strategic decisions are infrequently made, novel and non-routine. If a decision is made 
on a routine basis (such as booking accounts receivable), then it is not strategic. Adding to 
the difficulty of making strategic decisions is their future orientation: strategic decisions 
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are made about the uncertain future with a set of assumptions about future trends and de-
velopments (Johnson et al. 2005). Thus, their outcome cannot be easily predicted. By 
mentioning the uncertainty, fundamentality, and trade-offs of resource prioritizations, the 
practitioners also alluded to these characteristics found in the literature. It has to be ques-
tioned, though, whether a decision that is new to the organization can always be consid-
ered strategic. 
Comparing the reasoning given by interviewees with that found in the literature, we see that 
they are very similar (apart from practitioners not relying on the “internal/external fit” crite-
rion very much, however). Hence, arguing decisions as strategic from sign is generally backed 
by literature. Taking into account that each decision (apart from launching IS/IT projects sup-
porting market activities) was argued to exhibit at least one of the characteristics, can we rea-
son that all of these decisions should be part of an information strategy? Two aspects make it 
difficult to build a construct based solely on this type of reasoning. 
First, it is unclear whether a strategic decision has to exhibit all of the characteristics or only 
some. Hickson et al. (1990, p. 28) only state that “a strategic decision is likely to shape what 
happens because it has some or all of certain features [see above] to a greater extent than do 
other decisions.” Second, what most authors agree on is that these characteristics are relative 
to the person making the judgment, i.e. subjective. For example, Hickson et al. (1990, pp. 27) 
answer the question “What makes strategic decisions strategic?” by stating that “A strategic 
decision is one in which those who are involved believe will play a bigger rather than a 
smaller part in shaping what happens for a long while afterwards. This is a relative judgment, 
relative to the organization in which the decision is being made […]” They go on stating that 
“it is not impossible for what is a big matter in one [organization] to be less weighty in an-
other […]” (pp. 27). Similarly, Ackoff (1970, p. 5) notes that the “distinction between tactical 
and strategic planning is often made, but is seldom made clear. Decisions that appear to be 
strategic to one person may appear to be tactical to another. This suggests that the distinction 
is relative rather than absolute.” 
The subjective nature of the characteristics as well as the fact that it is unclear which of these 
have to be fulfilled in order for a decision to be deemed strategic indicates that a personal as-
sessment of the criteria (whether by an interviewee or any researcher) cannot be regarded as 
the only and ultimate benchmark for strategic decisions. For arguing the content of an infor-
mation strategy, the decisions’ characteristics are only indicators. Hence, the characteristics 
provided by the interviewees can only serve as necessary – but certainly not as sufficient – 
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conditions for the respective decisions to qualify as strategic. However, the exhibition of cer-
tain characteristics reinforces the strategic nature of the decisions mentioned by practitioners. 
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Ackoff (1970, pp. 
5) 
1 “The longer the effect of a plan and the more difficult it is to 
reverse, the more strategic it is […] decisions that have enduring 
effects that are difficult to reverse” (p. 5) 
2 “The more functions of an organization’s activities are af-
fected […], the more strategic [...]broad in scope” (p. 6) 
    1   2               
Johnson, Scholes, 
Whittington (2005), 
pp. 6 
1 “concerned with the long- term direction of an organisation 
[…] transformation […] would take a considerable amount of 
time” (p. 6) 
2 “can be seen as the search for strategic fit” 
3 “require major resource changes for an organisation in the 
future” 
4 “are likely to be complex in nature” 
5 “have to be made in situations of uncertainty about the future” 
6 “are likely to affect operational decisions [...] trigger off a 
whole series of new operational activities” 
7 “cross functional and operational boundaries” 
8 “involve significant change” 
9 “affected [...] by the values and expectations of those who 
have power [...] - the stakeholders” 
  1   1,6 7 8 3   2 4   5 9 
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Steinmann & 
Schreyögg(2002, p. 
154) 
1 “sind konkurrenzbezogen, d.h. sie bestimmen das Handlung-
sprogramm der Unternehmung in Relation zu den Konkurren-
ten” 
2 “nehmen Bezug auf die Umweltsituation und -entwicklungen, 
auf Chancen und Bedrohungen” 
3 “spiegeln die zentralen Einstellungen, Wünsche und Wertvor-
stellungen der bestimmenden Entscheidungsträger wider” 
4 “sind auf das ganze Geschäft gerichtet [...] und nicht nur [auf] 
einzelne[r] Funktionsbereiche” 
5 “haben eine hohe Bedeutung für die Vermögens- und Ertrags-
lage [...] und weitereichende Konsequenzen, was die Ressour-
cenbindung anelangt; [...] ‘große’ Entscheidungen” 
6 “sind zukunftsorientiert [...] basieren auf Erwartungen über die 
Entwicklung”34 
        4 5 5 5 1,2     6 3 
                                                 
34
 Translation by author: 1 “are related to competition, i.e. they determine the action program of the company in relation to the competitors” 2 “relate to the environmental situa-
tion and developments, to opportunities and threats” 3 “reflect the main attitudes, wishes and values of the decision-maker in charge” 4 “focus on the entire business [...] and not 
only [on] single functional units” 5 “have a high impact on the asset and profit situation [...] and far reaching consequences concerning the resource commitment [...] ‘big’ decisi-
ons” 6 “are oriented towards the future [...] are based on expectations concerning the development” 
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Ansoff (1965, pp. 
3, pp.9) 
1 “are primarily concerned with external, rather than internal, 
problems of the firm […] concerned with establishing an ‘im-
pedance match’ between the firm and its environment” 
2 “Decisions nonrepetitive” 
3 “Decisions not self-regenerative […] they make no automatic 
claims on top-management attention. Unless actively pursued, 
they may remain hidden behind operational decisions” 
                1   2,3    
Hickson et al 
(1990, pp. 27) 
Also cited in 
(Wheelen and 
Hunger 2006, p. 
20) 
1 “is one in which those who are involved believe will play a 
bigger than a smaller part in shaping what happens for a long 
while afterwards” 
2 “it is about something that does not come up very often. It is 
more rare and non-routine than most […] and therefore com-
paratively novel [...] There will be few if any direct precedents 
for it, yet it is likely to set precedents for subsequent decisions” 
3 “it commits substantial resources” 
4 “it sets off ‘waves’ of lesser decisions [...] and so is compara-
tively organization-wide in its consequences” 
“In short, it is relatively unusual, substantial, and all-pervading” 
1   1 1, 4 4 1 3      2    
Grant (2005, pp. 
14) 
“Strategic decisions […] share three common characteristics: 
[1] They are important 
[2] They involve a significant commitment of resources 
[3] They are not easily reversible” 
    3     1 2           
Table 35: Characteristics of strategic decisions stressed in literature
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3.2.2 IP decisions reasoned as strategic from analogy: Building analogies to busi-
ness strategy 
In a few instances, IP decisions were argued to be strategic because they “look like” or are 
analogous to business strategy decisions (reasons 31 and 32 in Table 33). In other words, the 
content structure of information strategy was modeled according to the content structure of 
the business strategy. For example, elements assumed to be part of the business strategy con-
struct, such as mission, vision, scope (i.e. products and markets), core competences, etc., were 
transferred to the information strategy construct. 
It was argued in case 4 that business strategy concerns the mission and vision of a company 
and also includes decisions on its market, products, and distribution channels. These terms 
were transferred to IP, resulting in an information strategy construct that consists of decisions 
on the mission and vision of the IT unit (decision area (i - Role)), its “products,” and “cus-
tomers” (i.e. IT services provided to business units, decision area (e - Portfolio) and (i - Role), 
respectively) and committees that decide which “customers” (business units) receive which 
“products” (IT services) (decision area (j - Rights)).  
Similarly, the interviewee in case 13 stated that determining the “core competences” of the IT 
unit staff is a strategic IP decision (decision area (h - HR plan)). Examples of these “core 
competences” were “speaking English fluently” and having “business acumen.” 
Such an application of business strategy terms to determine information strategy content is a 
form of reasoning by analogy. Arguing by analogy assumes “that there are enough similarities 
between two things to support the claim that what is true of one is also true of the other” 
(Toulmin et al. 1984) (p. 216). Here, the claim is that because business strategies include cer-
tain decisions on companies’, information strategies should contain these types of decisions, 
as well.  
We have come across this kind of reasoning with regards to the information strategy construct 
in literature in the model proposed by Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) (see Chapter 2). 
However, these authors derived different information strategy decisions through analogy: 
“technology scope”, “systemic competences” and “governance”. This disparity is already an 
indication for the need to handle reasoning from analogy with care. It is difficult to argue 
against one or the other analogy as most analogies have certain shortcomings. 
Indeed, analogical reasoning is considered controversial in strategic management literature. 
On the one hand, analogy is claimed to be “a form of managerial reasoning that we believe is 
prevalent among practicing strategists yet is largely absent from scholarly analysis of strat-
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egy” (Gavetti et al. 2005 p. 692). The power of analogy lies in allowing people confronting a 
novel situation to use their past experience or insights from similar situations and transfer 
them to the novel situation. In our context, the novel situation is ‘constructing an information 
strategy’ and the past experience consists of ‘constructing a business strategy’. The sources of 
experiences in building a business strategy might be diverse. They could range from practical 
experience to mere textbook or common-sense knowledge. From our discussion with inter-
viewees who used reasoning from analogy, we can assume the latter rather than the former to 
hold in these cases.  
On the other hand, this reasoning has to be viewed with a critical eye, especially because 
“though analogical reasoning is a powerful and prevalent tool, it is extremely easy to reason 
poorly through analogies […] Dangers arise when strategists draw an analogy on the basis of 
superficial similarity, not deep causal traits” (Gavetti and Rivkin 2005, pp. 3).  
We break our discussion of this kind of reasoning into three parts (Toulmin et al. 1984): 1. Is 
the basis of the analogy justified (i.e. is the assumption of similarity between the two objects 
valid)? 2. Has the statement made about the original object (business strategy) been trans-
ferred correctly to the other object (information strategy)? 3. If the answer to the first two 
questions is “yes”, what are the potential consequences of using this reasoning for information 
strategy?   
Ad 1: Challenging the similarity of companies and IT units: reasoning by analogy is only 
valid if the objects involved in the analogy are similar: “clearly, the power of analogy depends 
on the validity of the similarity mapping between source and target contexts” (Gavetti et al. 
2005 p. 695). Here, the IT unit is equated with a company. Based on their similarity, it is de-
rived that the respective strategies have similar contents: just as a company needs a mission 
and makes choices about its customers, products, core competences, etc., so does the IT unit. 
We also find this comparison in the IS literature in statements such as “running IT like a busi-
ness” and viewing the IT unit as a “business within a business” (Ragu-Nathan et al. 2001) (see 
Chapter 2). While similarities may exist between the IT unit and a company, it is also impor-
tant to pinpoint the differences between the two. For example, an IT unit is part of a company 
rather than a company in itself. The IT unit is integrated into a hierarchy of control. Hence, it 
does not have autonomy over all the decisions a company has (e.g. whether or not to serve 
certain customers, determining product prices, etc.). The IT unit cannot be considered a com-
pany unless it has been hived off as an independent business unit. In this case, the structure of 
the business strategy of such an IT service provider is similar to the structure of the business 
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strategies of other IT services providers or any other company. It is important to note that this 
strategy is in fact a business strategy and not an information strategy. The demarcation be-
tween the two might be blurred because in this case, IP-related services are also products of 
the provider. 
Ad 2: Looking at transferring the components of business strategy to information strategy: 
while the terms get transferred, the underlying theory gets lost in the analogy. For example, 
core competences are seen as a basis for extending the scope of the company and gaining 
competitive advantage (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). These core competences get translated 
into IT unit staff’s skills like “speaking English fluently” or an “project management” ability. 
On the one hand, these “competences” cannot serve as a basis for extending the scope exten-
sion or competitive advantage of the IT unit. It is not even clear whether competitive theory 
(and hence the term “competitive advantage”) can or should be applied to company-internal 
functions.  
Ad 3: Clarifying the consequences for information strategy content: from the previous para-
graph, it should be clear that reasoning solely from analogy could result in the loss of certain 
strategic IP decisions, namely those on how IT can affect the scope and competitive advan-
tage of the overall company (in contrast to the IT unit). The IP decisions derived from analogy 
can only be part of information strategy if one understands information strategy as a business 
strategy for the IT unit. This is applicable if an IT unit is run as a profit center and potentially 
serves external customers. In that case it needs a strategy for determining its market, its cus-
tomers, etc. Information strategy understood in this way is equal to the business strategy of an 
(external) IT service provider. This comparison shows that this line of reasoning cannot serve 
as a sufficient basis for constructing an information strategy for the whole company. For ex-
ample, if the entire IT unit were to be outsourced all strategic IP decisions would be made by 
the outsourcing provider with such an information strategy. This might not be in the com-
pany’s best interest due to potential conflicts of interest. Of course, analogy may be used as a 
communication or motivational device (case 4: common mission and vision to motivate IT 
unit staff). Such “figurative analogies” “may be dismissed as being merely rhetorical […] 
They may be helpful as ways of making some point clearer, but they cannot actually warrant 
any claim” (Toulmin et al. 1984, p. 217). One has to be aware of the limitations of analogy. 
Analogy should not be used as the sole form of reasoning for information strategy content, 
because it omits important aspects and could potentially cause alignment problems. “Manag-
ers who wish to […] sidestep [analogy’s] pitfalls must master multiple modes of thought” 
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(Gavetti and Rivkin 2005, p. 10). The other types of reasoning discussed below might repre-
sent some of these modes of thought. 
3.2.3 IP decisions reasoned as strategic from cause: Strategic impacts  
In a third type of reasoning, interviewees argued that the decisions cause a desired effect: 
transforming the company into a desired state or helping it to reach a certain objective that 
they deemed strategic. This line of reasoning is based on a causal relationship rather than on 
structural similarity or signs: if the decision is made, a desired state is reached. This logic is 
found in Table 32 (reasons 1-18) as well as in Table 33 (reasons 33-35). 
The interviewees talked about the following effects (see Table 32 and Table 33): 
1. Effects related to business strategy: the decisions fulfill requirements of business strategy 
(reasons 1-3, 5), help to ensure that these requirements get fulfilled (reasons 4, 8, 9) or 
change business strategy formulation (reason 6). 
2. Decisions that help to satisfy business units’ requirements or to gain acceptance from 
business units (reason 7, 35) 
3. Effects concerned with IP cost containment: the decisions lead to a reduction of IP costs 
through scale effects and synergies (reasons 10, 11). 
4. Decisions that affect the company’s flexibility: the decisions aim at supporting (or at least 
not hampering) the company’s ability to react to external or internal changes (reasons 12-
16). 
5. Decisions that help to avoid or mitigate IP complexity: the decisions reduce complexity or 
prevent business units from causing complexity to preserve the IT unit’s ability to deliver 
IT services: (reasons 17, 18). 
6. Decisions that aim at avoiding critical impacts on operational security and continuity (rea-
son 34) 
7. Decisions made for political reasons: the decisions aim to fulfill political goals (such as 
strengthening the autonomy of a business unit) (reason 33). 
We discuss the decisions argued to cause any of these effects in the following paragraphs: 
Ad 1: Effects related to business strategy 
A number of decisions were argued to have effects on business strategy. They either aimed at 
fulfilling requirements of business strategy (reasons 1-3, 5), helped to ensure that these re-
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quirements get fulfilled (reasons 4, 8, 9, 35) or change the formulation of business strategy 
(reason 6). 
Decisions that fulfill or ensure fulfilling requirements of business strategy  
Decisions were argued to be strategic because they fulfill requirements of a chosen business 
strategy. Two quotes help to illustrate this reasoning: 
81: wir brauchen neue Geschäftsfelder, neue Geschäftsmodelle, für die wir eine neue 
IT brauchten. Konkret jetzt in dem Kontext, wir […] wollen stärker rein in den 
Bereich Krankenhaus, Krankenhausdienstleistungen. Und darüber wurde natürlich ein 
ganz neues Produkt und [damit auch] ein ganz neues Anforderungsprofil an so eine 
EDV Landschaft notwendig. (case 3)35 
Here, the business strategy foresaw to enter into new areas of business (i.e. extend the scope 
of the company). The chosen business strategy poses a number of requirements on IP and 
hence, IP decision have to be made in order to fulfill these requirements. In the quote, the 
whole application landscape had to be redesigned and new applications were needed to reflect 
the functionality needs of the new products to be offered. 
719: Also was bei uns auch Thema der Konzern-IT-Strategie ist, […] ist IT-Sicherheit 
[…]. Das hat eine strategische Bedeutung, weil es […] was zu tun hat mit der Frage, 
wie effektiv kann der [company]-Konzern Firmenübernahmen durchführen oder auch 
Firmen wieder desintegrieren. […]Und das ist natürlich auch eine der strategischen 
Geschäftsanforderungen des [company]-Konzerns, zu sagen, das möchte ich […] kön-
nen, und da muss dann natürlich auch der IT-Sicherheitsecke heraus eine Antwort 
drauf gefunden werden. Deswegen ist das bei uns auch ein strategisches Thema. (case 
11)36 
In this second example, the business strategy foresaw to refocus the company’s areas of ac-
tivities (i.e. the scope of the company) through mergers that help to enter into new markets or 
to extend in existing markets as well as through disinvestments of areas that shall be discon-
tinued. Again, in order to be able to conduct such strategic initiatives (mergers, disintegra-
tions) the company is building an ability to integrate new companies and disintegrate existing 
parts of the business quickly and smoothly. The company recognized that it needs an ability in 
order to make use of it when pursuing the business strategy. Whenever the company conducts 
                                                 
35
 Translation by author: “81: we need new business areas [in the sense of areas where the company is active], 
new business models, for which we need new IT. In this context, we […] wanted to go more into the business 
with hospitals, services for hospitals. And this way, we required a completely new product and [hence in turn] a 
completely new set of requirements for the EDP landscape” (case 3) 
36
 Translation by author: “719: So what is also a topic of the corporate IT strategy is […] is IT security […]. That 
has strategic significance, because it […] has to do with the question of how effectively can the [company] group 
conduct acquisitions or disintegrate companies again […] And that is of course one of the strategic business 
requirements of [company] group, to say, this is what I want […] to be able to, and of course, I have to find an 
answer to this from the point of view of IT security. This is why this is a strategic issue. (case 11) 
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a merger it makes use of such a “merger and disintegration capability”. Here, it is argued that 
IP security plays a significant role in this capability. Hence, again the business strategy poses 
requirements on IP. The IP decisions that aim at fulfilling these requirements are regarded as 
strategic. 
The two quotes also demonstrate that interviewees subsumed different aspects under the label 
“business strategy”. Among these aspects were decisions on the scope of the company, (see 
the first example above (case 3): growth through product development (case 3) or using new 
distribution channels (case 13); case 6 provides an example of expanding the geographic 
scope of the company by entering into new regions), the vehicles used to change the scope of 
the company (see the second example above (case 11): growth through mergers and acquisi-
tions) as well as differentiation from competitors (e.g. through being a low cost provider (case 
12)). However, all these aspects subsumed under the label “business strategy” have in com-
mon that they are market oriented: they determine which markets the company serves, how it 
enters new markets or how it differentiates itself from other players on the market.  
In these cases, interviewees regarded business strategies as given and as posing requirements 
on IP. The IP decisions were considered strategic because they influence whether the chosen 
business strategy can be pursued. Hence, the decisions either facilitate or stymie business 
strategy execution: 
• If the applications and application platforms within the application landscape cannot han-
dle the targeted growth in volume, the growth strategy cannot be implemented. Hence, IP 
must be prevented from becoming a disabler of the chosen strategy (decision area a, case 
3). 
• Automating business processes through information systems can reinforce a low-cost 
strategy by allowing the reduction of business process costs (decision area a, case 12). 
• Deciding to use standard software for processes that are essential for differentiation can 
hamper a differentiation strategy (decision area b, case 5). 
• The decision to make systems compliant with certain audit rules was seen as strategic be-
cause it was a prerequisite for executing the business strategy: otherwise, the strategy of 
going public would have been forestalled (decision area b, case 9). 
• Deciding to prescribe technology standards for systems that require differentiation (and 
might only be implementable with a specific technology) can handicap a differentiation 
strategy (decision area c, case 5a). On the other hand, following technology standards can 
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support a low-cost strategy (decision area c, case 12); beyond the decision of whether to 
set technology standards or not, the selection of which technology standard to employ has 
to be made in line with business strategy. For example, a low-cost strategy was argued to 
be better supported with low-cost technologies (e.g. open source databases), whereas a 
rapid time-to-market strategy was argued to be better supported with programming lan-
guages and tools able to support rapid prototyping (decision area c, case 8).   
• A low-cost strategy can be supported by cutting IT operations costs, e.g. through standard-
izing IP processes company-wide (decision area d, case 12). 
• The selection of projects to pursue (i.e. the project portfolio) has to reflect the company’s 
strategic priorities (decision area e, cases 11, 13). 
• For a chosen business strategy, individual projects have to be started in order to execute it. 
For example, if a business strategy foresees developing a new product, applications are 
needed to support all activities (e.g. sales) related to the product (decision area g, cases 6, 
13). 
• Allocating IP decision rights between the business units and the corporate center have to 
be made in order to avoid hampering a given business strategy: centralizing decision 
rights will impede business areas from differentiating themselves through the use of IT; 
likewise, decentralizing IP decision rights might thwart a low-cost strategy (decision area 
j, cases 7, 8). 
• Outsourcing certain IP activities may harm business processes that require differentiation 
through IT and that the outsourcing partner cannot provide economically (decision area k, 
case 5). 
• If IT security rules are not designed to ensure the rapid integration of acquired companies 
(i.e. ensure access to corporate data) or are disconnected from disinvested companies (i.e. 
no longer have access to corporate data), a strategy based on mergers and acquisitions as 
well as on disinvestment might be hampered (decision area l, case 11). 
Some of these decisions were argued to be strategic not because they fulfill requirements of 
business strategy themselves, but because they ensure that the requirements for IP get fulfilled 
or that fulfilling the business requirements is not hampered. In other words, the decisions did 
not aim at providing a certain deliverable themselves, but aimed at ensuring that these deliv-
erables get built or at avoiding that certain required deliverables get affected negatively. 
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829: […] wenn jemand [von der Geschäftsseite] eine neue Idee hat, dann kommt er 
zuerst zu mir und sagt: Oh, ich habe eine Idee, ich will das und das machen. Ich sage: 
Pass mal auf, was willst Du machen? […] Und dann musste ich sehen, ob die bei uns 
rein passt. Weil ja bestimmte formale Faktoren, ein Hardfact ist zum Beispiel, wir 
wollen nur noch alles barrierefrei machen. Wenn der also mit Javascript ankommt, mit 
Spezialzeug, das ist nicht barrierefrei. Tolle Sache, die Du haben willst, aber nein, sie 
wird nicht, weil wir haben strategisch festgelegt, die IT-Strategie ist Barrierefreiheit. 
Das passt nicht rein. Flash-Animation, also ein Blinder und die aufpoppenden Bilder 
[…] Keine Chance […] Das Marketing sitzt da und weint: Ich will Flash. […] Es geht 
nicht […] (case 10)37 
In this example, the pure-online bank had decided to enter into a new market by also targeting 
blind customers. An IP decision that was argued to be strategic is setting rules that limit the 
technologies available to business units to those technologies that can be accessed by blind 
customers. Allowing business units to use certain technologies (that are not accessible to blind 
customers, such as “Flash”) would lead to applications that hamper this strategy (due to the 
inaccessibility to websites using this technology for blind users). Here, the strategic IP deci-
sion does not aim at providing deliverables required for the strategy (e.g. an application for 
selling the products to blind customers), but ensures that these requirements get fulfilled (i.e. 
all applications are accessible to blind customers). 
In a sense, these decisions aim at regulating business units or incentivize them to act in a de-
sired (here: strategy-conforming) way (reasons 4, 8, 9). These decisions included the follow-
ing: 
• Architectural standards were argued to be rules that have to be followed company-wide 
and therefore constrain business units (decision area c, cases 3, 11a, as well as the exam-
ple from case 10 quoted above).  
• Decisions on rights and accountabilities were seen as strategic because they ensure that 
business units act in a desired way (decision area j, cases 2, 6b). Another solution to the 
same problem was to introduce charging mechanisms that allowed the IT unit to make 
certain investments with the monetary gains (case 3). In case 8, the reason was that gov-
ernance decisions constrain the business units from acting freely and only for their own 
good. 
                                                 
37
 Translation by author: “829: […] if someone [from business] got a new idea, then the first thing he will do is 
to come to me and say: Oh, I got an idea, I want to do this and that. I say: wait a minute, what do you want to 
do? […] And then I have to check whether it fits. Because certain formal factors, one hard fact is for example 
that we want everything to be barrier-free [accessible online for blind customers]. So if he wants to use 
Javascript, with special stuff, that is not barrier-free. Nice things that you want to have, but no, it’s not going to 
work, because we have made the strategic decision, the IT strategy is being barrier-free. And that [idea] does not 
fit. Flash-based animation, a blind person and these pop-ups […] no chance […] the marketing department sits 
there and cries: I want Flash […] but its not allowed […]” (case 10)  
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• An important prerequisite for strategy implementation were IP staff skills (decision area h, 
case 6). Obviously, without the right skills, no plan can be implemented. This could also 
affect how well business strategy can be supported or enabled through the use of IT.  
Decisions that change business strategy formulation 
In case 3, it had been decided that the IT unit should also serve the external market with IT 
services and products (i.e. a change in the role of the IT unit: decision area i), which effec-
tively changed the scope of the company:  
282: wo ist ein Markt, wo [company] tätig ist, wo auch IT eine Rolle spielt: Healthcare 
– fein, Krankenhäuser sind ein hochproblematischer Bereich, keine richtige DV 
Lösung, also wir gehen mit [company’s IT unit] ganz bewusst in diesen Healthcare 
Dienstleistungsmarkt.[…] Wir haben wirklich eine Firma kreiert und haben unser ei-
genes Produkt versucht zu positionieren. […] ein Stück Software für den Betrieb von 
Krankenhäusern.38 
319: Ja wir haben gesagt hier, aus den drei Geschäftsfeldern werden vier. (case 3) 
In this case of a health service provider, the business strategy was not seen as given. Instead, 
it got re-defined. The company made the decision to also become an IT service provider, 
which meant to serve existing customers (hospitals) with new products (IT services). 
By definition, business strategies intend to affect the long-term performance of a company. 
However, we still have to discuss whether the above mentioned IP decisions fit our view of 
strategy in the next chapter. 
Ad 2: Decisions that help to satisfy business units’ requirements 
The previously mentioned decisions were linked to business strategy. Some IP decisions were 
argued to be strategic because they fulfill any kind of requirement uttered by business units, 
independent of whether these requirements were part of strategy or not (reason 7). 
181: Portfolio-Management unter anderem auch deswegen, weil das ist natürlich die 
engste Schnittstelle zwischen dem Business in den Geschäftsfeldern und den IT-
Abteilungen. Und das ist sicherlich die höchste Erwartung an eine IT-Abteilung an 
eine interne IT-Abteilung, dass sie eben die Business-Weiterentwicklung in Form von 
IT-Projekten unterstützt und ermöglicht. (case 11) 
The decisions reasoned like that included the decision on which applications are needed, 
which projects to include within the portfolio as well as the decision to decentralize decision 
rights in order to better serve business requirements. 
                                                 
38
 Translation by author: “282: where is a market, in which [company] is active, in which IT also plays a role: 
healthcare – great, hospitals are a highly problematic area, [they have] no real IT solution, so let’s move deliber-
ately into this market of healthcare services […] We really created a company and tried to position our own 
product […] a piece of software for running hospitals. 
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Regardless of whether the requirements themselves were actually strategic or not, satisfying 
them was seen as strategic for the IT unit. A number of decisions were argued as either satis-
fying these requirements or helping to satisfy them: 
• The application landscape (area a, case 3) and the application portfolio (area e, case 11) 
have been argued to be “the interface to […] users” (case 3) or “the tightest interface be-
tween the […] business areas and the IT units. And this is certainly the highest expecta-
tion towards an IT unit […] that it supports and enables business development in the form 
of IT projects” (case 11). Here, it is not the impact of the projects that is at issue but the 
mere fact that it is what business units want. From the point of view of the IT unit, deliv-
ering this is seen as its raison d’être. 
• In case 2, it was proposed that the principle of “business rules” was the driving reason 
behind the policy of not setting technology standards that might limit business units as 
well as behind rearranging the allocation of IP decision rights to business units (e.g. giv-
ing full budgetary control to business units without any central oversight) (decision 
area j). 
Furthermore, practitioners argued that gaining acceptance from business units was strategic 
(reasoning 35).  
• Defining the role of the IT unit (e.g. making it a service provider) was seen as necessary 
for gaining acceptance from business units. This was argued to be important for imple-
menting other decisions (decision area i, case 3a). As claimed in case 3, the lack of busi-
ness unit acceptance was the main reason that other information strategies failed to be im-
plemented. 
• Shifting the rights for the decision on which applications have to be developed from the IT 
unit to a committee consisting of business areas was cited as important for countering the 
business units’ criticism that the IT department had been making intransparent or unilat-
eral decisions. Reallocating decision rights helped the IT unit to regain acceptance from 
the business units. 
Fulfilling business requirements is an important task of the IT unit. However, not all business 
requirements are strategic. Hence, the meaning of strategic here is different from the meaning 
of strategic in the previous section. Not all business requirements are of strategic relevance to 
the business – only from the point of view of the IT unit, satisfying its customers’ (the busi-
ness units’) requirements may be regarded as ‘strategic’.  
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Ad 3: Effects concerned with IP cost containment  
A number of decisions were argued to be strategic because they helped the company to stay 
cost-competitive by reducing IP costs (reasons 10, 11). This was achieved either through lev-
eraging external providers’ economies of scale (through sourcing, decision area k) or by in-
creasing internal synergies. An example is provided by case 11: 
226: Es gibt einen hohen Kostendruck auf den [company]-Konzern und die Frage ist 
letztlich, wie kann die IT in ihrem eigenen Betrieb kostengünstiger produzieren. Und 
ein Hauptthema sind natürlich Skaleneffekte, die man realisieren kann, Wiederver-
wendbarkeit, Mehrfachnutzung. Und das ist jetzt der Schwerpunkt der IT-Strategie, 
dass wir gucken, in welchen Bereichen könnte man denn, wenn man es gemeinsamer 
macht, einfach die Kosten senken. (case 11)39 
The aviation company is threatened by the entrance of new low-cost carriers. It tried to stay 
competitive (N.B.: it did not try to become a cost leader) through lowering overall cost, in-
cluding IP cost. Hence, although the company did not follow a low-cost strategy itself, the 
reduction of IP cost was regarded as strategic. The reason was that IP cost represented a huge 
part of the overall cost and hence played a role in determining whether the companies stayed 
competitive.  
However, practitioners were also somewhat hesitant to argue these decisions as strategic. For 
example, in case 6, the interviewee stated that the company was sensitive to cost on the one 
hand, but he also argued that mere cost-cutting would not be viewed as strategic. 
214: Also ich denk was durchaus strategisch ist, ist natürlich, dass wir sehr kostenbe-
wusst sind, eigentlich kostengetrieben natürlich. Obwohl die Bank relativ stark wächst 
oder dürfen natürlich die Kosten nicht linear mitwachsen, das ist, das versteht sich von 
selber. (case 6) 
243: Also ich habe immer etwas Mühe, wenn wir von reinen kostengetriebenen Ak-
tionen von Strategie reden. […] rein kostengetriebene Aktionen, ob die jetzt wirklich 
strategisch sind sei dahingestellt (case 6).40 
In a similar vein, the interviewee in case 5 argued IP cost to be a strategic cost factor but that 
decisions that purely aim at reducing IP costs were strategic with “second priority”: 
                                                 
39
 Translation by author: “226: There is a high cost pressure on [company] group and at the end of the day, the 
question is how can the IT unit produce its own operations cheaper. And one main topic are scale effects that can 
be realized, reuse, multiple use. And that is now the main focus of the IT strategy, to look out for areas where 
costs could be reduced by doing it jointly. 
40
 Translation by author: “214: So what is potentially strategic, is of course, that we are very cost-aware, actually 
cost-driven. Although the bank is growing, costs must not grow linearly, that is self-evident” (case 6). “243: I am 
always having trouble, if we use the term strategy when we are talking about purely cost-driven activities. […] 
purely cost driven activities, if they are really strategic is open for discussion.” (case 6) 
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309: Geschäfte funktionieren auch, wenn Sie 7 redundante Systeme haben. Aber man 
verliert auf der Kostenposition im Wettbewerb dann natürlich einiges an Vorteil 
[…]diese Fragen [standardization and sourcing ...] spielen für mich eher rein in eine 
Effizienz der IT und sind von daher auch mit dem Anteil den die IT Kosten aus-
machen strategisch, da reden wir einfach über einen strategisch wichtigen Kosten-
block, aber eigentlich mit zweiter Priorität. (case 5)41 
The decisions argued to be strategic because they help to reduce IP cost were the following: 
• The decision to use standard software instead of custom-built software was argued to re-
duce costs. This decision typically has to be made against business units, because they 
tend to request custom-built systems. They do so because they assume themselves to be 
unique in having special requirements. In terms of cost, however, applications should be 
standardized and reused as far as possible as long as they do not hamper a differentiation 
strategy (decision area b, cases 5, 7). 
• The decisions of introducing technology standards or reducing the number of technology 
standards were also claimed to decrease IP costs by reducing the variety of technologies 
that have to be maintained. This in turn increases economies of scale and synergies across 
business units, and helps to obtain economies of scale in procurement (decision area c, 
cases 5a, 5b, 8, 9, 13). Again, this decision counteracts the business units’ tendency to 
want whatever technology fits best  
• Similarly, standardizing IT processes was argued to reduce IP costs by creating synergies 
across the company (decision area d, case 11). 
• Centralizing IP decision rights also has a cost-reducing effect (decision area j, 
cases 5b, 7). 
• Outsourcing certain IT activities was again argued to reduce costs because the external 
provider could offer economies of scale (decision area k, cases 4a, 5, 11). 
We follow practitioners by not viewing all decisions that reduce cost as strategic per se. Of 
course, cost reduction impacts firm performance. However, the question is whether the deci-
sion aims at a long-term increase in firm performance or simply a short term “operational” 
relief. For example, other than the decision to cut down e.g. the number IP projects, the deci-
sions to set technology standards as well as the decision to centralize IP decision rights do not 
                                                 
41
 Translation by author: “309: businesses also work if you have 7 redundant systems. But you lose some advan-
tage regarding the cost position in competition […] these questions [standardization and sourcing ...] play a role 
for the efficiency of IT in my point of view and hence are strategic with the share of IT cost they represent; we 
are talking about a strategically important share of the cost, but with second priority” (case 5) 
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aim at reducing IP cost in the short term. They are meant to ensure that cost stays in the focus 
in future decisions. They might in fact play a role in building an ability to contain IP costs 
continuously. Such an ability would be benefitial (and probably a prerequisite) when follow-
ing a cost leader strategy in order to maintain a competitive position. However, it would also 
be needed for companies with other strategies in order to survive as the interviewee in case 11 
argued (see quote above). These decisions may be viewed as aiming to avoid competitive dis-
advantage through a loss of cost competitiveness. They may represent a trade-off between 
optimally executing present business strategy and keeping the long-term cost competitiveness 
of the company. Hence, we will have to discuss these decisions in the next Chapter. 
Ad 4: Decisions that affect the company’s flexibility 
A number of decisions were argued to be strategic by virtue of affecting a company’s ability 
to react to predictable and unpredictable changes, i.e. its flexibility. These changes might be 
caused by both external and internal factors (reasons 12-16). The following three quotes serve 
to illustrate this reasoning: 
81: […] wie baue ich sie [die Applikationslandschaft] denn am Besten so, dass sie 
auch wenn sich die Welt drum herum in den nächsten 10 Jahren verändert, immer 
noch weiter verwenden kann. (case 2) 
75: Ich denke mir, wir können uns auch durch diese Strategie eben und durch diese 
Unabhängigkeit der IT eben auch schnell auf veränderte Situationen einstellen, wenn 
die Bank sich entscheidet im strukturierten Produktebereich sich zu verstärken, dann 
können wir das IT-mäßig sehr schnell umsetzen. [Denn] Wir brauchen nicht lange 
Entscheidungswege um solche Sachen nachzuvollziehen. Gutes Beispiel z.B. die Ex-
pansion im asiatischen Raum. [...] das war natürlich auch nur möglich, weil wir unab-
hängig [vom Konzern sind in der IT-Entscheidungsfindung ...] die Expansion der 
Bank […] optimal und schnell und unbürokratischer denke ich auch, als wenn wir bei 
der [name]Group wären, umsetzen. Also da sind wir, wir können in No-Time eigent-
lich irgend eine neuen Repräsentanzen aufstellen, in Monaco […] Libanon, Beirut, 
[…] Dubai […] Jakarta [...] (case 6) 
117: […] weil das Business natürlich sehr schnell, sehr flexible Lösungen haben will. 
Longterm-mäßig funktioniert das einfach nicht über alle Grenzen hinaus, […] da muss 
man schon eben diese Grundsätze z.B. auch eben die Enterpriseplattformstrategie […], 
das muss man einfach unterstützen, um nicht mit jeder neuen Anforderungen auch hin-
ten durch neue Infrastrukturen aufbauen zu müssen […]. Das wird dann wirklich teuer. 
Wenn wir uns wirklich auf diese Grundsätze berufen können und darauf abstützen 
können, dann denk ich, sind wir relativ vielmehr in der Lage mit unwesentlich stei-
genden Maintanance- oder Produktionskosten die Bank in ihrem Wachstum einerseits, 
aber auch in der Ausrichtung vom Geschäft her, neue Geschäftsfelder, einigermaßen 
schnell zu supporten. (case 6)42 
                                                 
42
 Translation by author: “81: […] how do I build [the application landscape] in a way that I can still use it, even 
if the world around it changes in the next 10 years?” (case 2) 
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Here, the interviewees acknowledge that the environment of the company changes. They rec-
ognize that the company might have to react to these changes (e.g. through introducing new 
products or changing existing product offerings). These reactions will in turn change the re-
quirements that are posed on IP (see “Ad 1” above). However, in this type of argumentation, 
the requirements are not fully known (either it is unclear whether changes will happen, when 
they will happen or what kind of changes will happen). Hence, the company has to make pre-
requisites that enable it to deal with the changes smoothly when they occur: the company has 
to build an ability to react with the help of IP to changes (i.e. to build IP-based flexibility). IP 
decisions were argued as strategic if they either facilitate or hamper the company’s flexibility. 
Interviewees argued that a number of decisions play a role in a company’s ability to deal with 
change: 
• The application landscape has to be designed so that it will still work even in the face of 
unpredictable changes in the environment, which can cause unpredictable changes in the 
business units’ requirements (decision area a, cases 2 (see quote above) and 3). 
• Setting technological standards will lock the company into these standards for a long time 
(decision area c, cases 1, 10). Being tethered to a certain technology is a problem in that 
some technologies might make certain new business requirements difficult to implement; 
building up new technologies takes a long time and hence hampers a company’s flexibil-
ity. Hence, the decision has to be made deliberately and cautiously, with an understanding 
of all the kinds of dependencies and side effects that might result from that technology 
(case 1). 
• Setting technology standards was also seen as a necessary precondition for a quick re-
sponse to new business requirements (decision area c, case 6a (see quote above)): a stan-
                                                                                                                                                        
“75: I think, we can adapt quickly to changed situations due to this independence of IT; if the bank decides to 
change in terms of products, then we can implement that with regards to IT very quickly. [Because] We do not 
need long chains of decisions to realize these issues. A good example is e.g. the expansion into Asia […] that 
was of course only possible, because we are independent [from the group in terms of making IT decisions]; we 
can implement the expansion of the bank, optimally and in a fast and a much more unbureaucratic way, I think, 
as if we were integrated [decision-wise] into the [company] group. We are actually able to set up a new subsidi-
ary in almost no time, in Monacao […] Lebanon, Beirut, […] Dubai […] Jakarta [...] (case 6) 
“117: […] because business of course want to have very flexible solutions very quickly. But that is not going to 
work forever in the long term […] you have to support certain principles, e.g. this enterprise platform strategy 
[…], in order to not be required to build new infrastructures in the back for each new requirement […]. That is 
going to be really expensive. If we can rely on our principles, then, I think, we will be much more and much 
easier able to support the growth of the bank on the one hand and the determination of the scope – new areas of 
business – with marginally increasing maintenance and production costs” (case 6) 
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dardized infrastructure allows to react to new requirements much quicker and in a less 
cost-intensive way. 
• The use of standardized technologies was seen as facilitating organizational (internal) 
change: frequent reorganizations within the company require the consolidation of data and 
systems, which is much easier if the systems use the same technology (case 5a). 
• IP process standards were also argued to influence a company’s flexibility: for example, if 
rapid prototyping process models for software development are used (e.g. the Rational 
Unified Process) rather than waterfall-like process models, the IT unit will be able to react 
more quickly to changing business requirements (decision area d, case 12). 
• The ability to make IP decisions independently from the corporate center was regarded as 
a necessary precondition to react to as-yet-unknown local needs in an efficient (i.e. unbu-
reaucratic) way. This independence also facilitates a rapid response time to changing 
business needs (decision area j, case 6a (see quote above)). 
• The design of an IP outsourcing agreement was also argued to be a potential disabler of a 
company’s agility: for example, if the contract does not foresee certain changes or provide 
the ability to renegotiate new requirements, pursuing these changes might be too costly 
and hence render them impossible to implement (decision area k, case 10). 
In summary, various IP decisions are seen to play a role in a company’s ability to deal with 
change. Notably, it is not only the aim to positively influence flexibility but also to mitigate a 
stymieing effect of IP decisions on the company: the application landscape runs the risk of 
obsolescence in the face of change. In addition, IT standards and outsourcing decisions lock 
the company in and could potentially render it unable to maneuver quickly. Furthermore, the 
emphasis was on the ability to react to changes rather than to induce change or seek opportu-
nities for change. 
Ad 5: Decisions that help to avoid or mitigate IP complexity 
Decisions were also argued to be strategic if they ensure that the company (usually through 
the IT unit) stays in control of IP complexity: if these decisions were not made, the IT unit 
would no longer be able to deliver IP services effectively and cost-efficiently to business units 
(reasons 17-18). Then, the execution of business strategy through the use of IP would be 
hampered (see “Ad 1”), business units’ requirements for IP could not be fulfilled (see “Ad 
2”), the company would become less flexible to react with the help of IP (see “Ad 4”) and IP 
cost would increase due to higher efforts to deal with complexity (see “Ad 3”). In other 
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words, containing complexity is a major prerequisite for the IT units’ ability to provide IP 
services which in turn affects the company’s ability to act on the basis of IP. 
Hence, in comparison to the previous effects, the ability to control IP complexity is even more 
fundamental: if this ability is not present, the company will not be able to support any busi-
ness initiatives (strategic or otherwise), regardless if induced by frequent change or not. As 
the interviewees argued, this ability to deliver IP services in a cost-efficient and effective way 
is eroded by the “short-sighted view” of the business units (cases 4 and 10): because they 
want their immediate needs fulfilled in the cheapest and most effective way they increase IP 
“entropy” (case 8). Hence, either business units have to be regulated or incentivized to stop 
acting in that way. Alternatively complexity has to be accepted as given and an ability to deal 
with complexity and still be able to deliver IP services in an appropriate way has to be built 
up. The following quotes illustrate this reasoning: 
446: […] Strategie und [insbesondere] Governance schon irgendwo Dompteur für die 
an sich sehr autonomen Agenten und auch divergierenden Agenten. Weil jedes Busi-
ness irgendwo, das ist auch im Menschen dann psychologisch verankert, ist besonders 
und speziell und die Anforderungen sind besonders und speziell. Und jeder will ei-
gentlich die geniale Lösung haben […] Und damit hat man so eine Entropie und dem 
muss natürlich die IT-Strategie und Governance entgegenwirken. (case 8) 
309: Architekturen sind absolut strategisch, die entscheiden darüber, ob man liefer-
fähig ist oder nicht lieferfähig ist [als IT Abteilung] […] Sustainability […] stellt aber 
sicher, dass sich Effektivität oder Effizienz nicht in kurzfristigen Dingen erschöpfen, 
sondern langfristig wirksam sein können. Architektur stellt diese Sustainability sicher, 
die oft auch von den Business Areas nicht in gewünschtem Maße eingespielt wird. 
[…] Klar, die wollen es in den ersten 2 Jahren alles haben, was ich verstehe. Aber da 
müssen wir halt auch mal eine Gegenperspektive anbringen, deshalb definieren wir 
hier Architektur (case 4)43 
The quotes emphasize both, the assumption that business units (inherently, but not de-
libereately, as a side-effect of pursuing their own interests) increase IP complexity if left un-
regulated (IP complexity in this context is largely characterized by the amount of different 
technologies used). This complexity is not sustainable and has to be countered in order to pre-
                                                 
43
 Translation by author: “446: […] strategy and [especially] governance are somehow a dompteur for the 
autonomous and divergent agents.Because every business somehow, that is ingrained in people psychologically, 
is different and special and their requirements are different and special. And everybody actually wants the ingen-
ious solution […] And this causes entropy which you have to counter with IT strategy and governance” (case 8) 
“309: architectures are absolutely strategic, because they determine whether you [as the IT unit] are able to de-
liver or not […] Sustainability […] ensures that effectiveness and efficiency are not limited to the short term, but 
are valid longer term. Architecture ensures this sustainability, which is often not considered by business ares […] 
Clearly, they want everything in the first 2 years, and I understand that. But there we simply have to introduce a 
counter perspective, this is why we define an architecture here” (case 4) 
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serve the company’s long-term ability to act with IP. IP decisions are strategic because they 
help to contain IP complexity and in consequence foster the company’s ability to act on the 
basis of IP (e.g. launch IP-based initiatives). These IP decisions represent a counter-
perspective with regards to business units and their requirements and might eventually 
counter the smooth execution of a business strategy. Hence, setting technology standards or 
distributing decisions rights and accountabilities might have to deliberately “dis-aligned” with 
business strategy. Again, these decisions lead to trade-offs e.g. between supporting business 
strategy (see “Ad 1”) in the easiest way and preserving the mentioned fundamental ability to 
act based on IP.  
The following decisions were reasoned to be strategic in this way: 
• Setting technology standards was regarded as being helpful in regulating business units 
from introducing a “technology zoo” that is too costly and complex to maintain, hence 
eroding the ability to integrate systems easily (decision area c, cases 4b, 6a, 8). 
• Relying on certain process standards (case 6) or bolstering the IT unit’s ability to deal 
with all kinds of technologies (because in the latter case it was supposed that no standards 
should be set in a decently run company) were means of coping effectively with high 
complexity (decision area d). 
• In cases 2 and 9c, process standards were seen as a way to reduce potentially stymieing IP 
complexity. In case 2, an evolutionary approach to changing the architecture (rather than a 
“big bang” approach) was argued to be easier to handle and thought to reduce the risk of 
spinning “out of control”: a big-bang approach might lead to unmanageable consequences. 
In case 9, having many different ways of conducting IP processes (e.g. software develop-
ment) increased the complexity of steering the processes. 
•  In case 4a, the need to adapt the culture of the IT unit in order to avoid future “silos” (de-
cision area h) was acknowledged. 
• In case 8, centralizing IT decisions was also seen as a way to “counter” the business units’ 
tendency to increase IP complexity. 
Interviewees saw these decisions as a way to “counter-balance” business units. On the one 
hand, they felt that IP decisions had to be made so that they would not hamper – or even sup-
port or enable – business units from conducting their chosen or future strategic initiatives. On 
the other hand, the (same) decisions are made to regulate and counter business units in order 
to retain control over IP. 
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Ad 6: Decisions that aim at avoiding critical impacts on operational security and 
continuity 
Some IP decisions were argued (reason 34) to be strategic because they aimed at avoiding 
critical impact on business operations and business continuity through security threats or dis-
asters (hackers, viruses, natural disasters, etc.) 
591: wenn wir irgendwo ein Sicherheitsleck hätten, dann können wir das Unternehmen 
dicht machen. (case 10)44 
Breakdowns of operational IS can impact firm performance. For example, customers cannot 
access the web site of the company in order to make transactions. In the extreme case – e.g. if 
the company is only accessible to the customer online (such as in case 10) – the company is 
not existent for the customer when the systems are offline. Hence, decisions on IT security 
and continuity measures have to be made in order to ensure that business operations can con-
tinue (decision area l, cases 4, 7, 10, 12, 13). 
As argued in case 12, security and continuity decisions become more and more important due 
to climbing external threats from a rising number of viruses, hackers or even terrorist attacks. 
Deciding on an appropriate level of security and continuity measures is a trade-off between 
the required investments and inconveniences on the one hand and the potential downside of a 
damage on the other (case 13). 
However, the question is whether decisions concerning security and continuity are strategic. 
The reasoning used here, to appeal to the critical impact on business operations is a purely 
operational one (as the name implies already). Ensuring that operations continue is not strate-
gic per se. 
Ad 7: Decisions made for political reasons 
Two decisions were argued to be strategic due to their politically sensitive nature (reason 33): 
in case 11, the application portfolio decision was seen as a political decision because it in-
volves trade-offs between stakeholders, all of whom have their own interests. Hence, it was 
claimed, this decision could only be resolved by top management. The implication was that 
all decisions made by top management are strategic. In case 6a, maintaining independence 
from the corporate group in terms of IT decision rights was also seen as a relevant topic for 
company-internal politics: if the company had not been independent in terms of IT decision-
                                                 
44
 Translation by author: “591: if we had a security whole somewhere, then we could close our company” (case 
10) 
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making, it would have been easier to integrate the company into the corporate group which 
would have reduced the company’s degree of freedom. Not all politically sensitive decisions 
are also strategic. We also see indications that not all strategic decisions are being made by 
top managers in other areas (Varadarajan and Clark 1994). Hence, we do not consider this 
reasoning further. 
* * * 
This chapter described and classified the decisions that formed part of practitioners’ informa-
tion strategies as well as their reasons to argue the decisions as strategic. In the next chapter, 
we will have to assess inter alia whether these reasons really warrant viewing the decisions as 
strategic. As argued above, we will concentrate on reasoning from cause in this assessment. 
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4 PRACTICABILITY AND RATIONALE OF INFORMATION 
STRATEGY  
In the previous two chapters, we identified IP decisions considered as part of information 
strategy in both the research literature (Chapter 2) and practice (Chapter 3). The ensuing ques-
tion with respect to the objective of the thesis is which of these IP decisions can be reasoned 
to be strategic as well as practically relevant. To this end, we need to weigh the arguments for 
the practical relevance and theoretical backing of the proposals found in literature (Section 
4.2) as well as of the proposals found in practice (Section 4.3). The next sections describe our 
approach to weighing the arguments and present the results. 
Especially concerning theoretical backing, we need to come to a clearer perspective on what 
is strategic. After having described in the previous chapters what academics and practitioners 
each view as strategic, we need to establish our own view of strategy. Doing so allows us to 
evaluate the other proposals against this view. Hence, we first revisit the discussion on strat-
egy. 
4.1 STRATEGY REVISITED 
We sketched the meaning of the term “strategy” in Chapter 1, broadly defining it as an inte-
grated set of directional and difficult-to-reverse decisions that are made deliberately with the 
expressed intention of influencing a company’s long-term performance. Now we would like 
to elaborate upon this broad understanding and demonstrate that there are indeed good reasons 
to adopt this view of strategy.  
As indicated in Chapter 1, although there are discussions on what is and what constitutes 
strategy, there is no final consensus and hence no all-inclusive framework of strategy. This 
lack of accord is underscored by the diverse understandings of “strategic” found in the litera-
ture on information strategy (Chapter 2) as well as in practice (Chapter 3). Faced with this 
dilemma, it is helpful to go back to the roots of strategic thinking in military strategy. The 
word “strategy” stems from the Greek “strategos” for “general” which in turn means “army” 
and “lead” (Bracker 1980). Many authors therefore infer the concept of strategy is rooted in 
ancient Greek militaristic thinking (cf. Cummings 1993). Carl von Clausewitz (1976)45 is 
credited with giving the term its modern meaning and with being the first to draw parallels 
                                                 
45
 The original work “Vom Kriege” was published in 1832. 
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between military and business, thus paving the way for the transfer of military thinking into 
economics (cf. Müller-Stewens and Lechner 2001).  
Clausewitz (1976, p. 160) defined strategy as “the employment of the battle as the means to-
wards the attainment of the object of the War.” In this role, “[s]trategy forms the plan of the 
War”. He viewed strategy as a deliberate expression of will, guiding the decisions that come 
afterwards: “Strategy must go with the Army in the field in order to arrange the particulars on 
the spot”. 
He goes on to state that “[p]roperly speaking it [strategy] has to do with nothing but the battle, 
but its theory must include in this consideration the instrument of this real activity – the armed 
force – […] for the battle is fought by it, and shows its effects upon it in turn” and that strat-
egy “must […] give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in accordance with 
the object of the War” (p. 160). Hence, military strategy determines foremost which battles to 
fight. However, it is also about the resources needed to fight these battles. It includes the lo-
gistics (i.e. the “assembly of forces” in time and space (pp. 200)) but also encompasses ensur-
ing the morale of soldiers as well as the “continual development of new forces” (p. 207). 
These considerations are also strategic in that they are intended to serve the objective of war. 
If they were not, they would not be counted as strategic, because “How could any one in fact 
justify in the eyes of reason the expenditure of forces […], if acting was not the object? The 
baker only heats his oven if he has bread to put into it […]” (p. 216).  
Hence, besides choosing the battles to fight and the opponents with whom to fight them, strat-
egy has to take care of the prerequisites that allow leading the chosen battles. This includes 
e.g. the armies’ skills (e.g. building naval warfare skills), their willingness to fight and suc-
ceed (e.g. through incentives) and the organization of the armies.  
Building on these thoughts, we view business strategy on the one hand to be about positioning 
the business system in the market by choosing the environment of the system: the choice of 
markets (including competitors) in which to make market offerings and the kind of market 
offerings to make. This follows the notion of choosing opponents and battles.  
On the other hand, akin to the notion of the “armed forces”, business strategy has to take care 
that the prerequisites necessary to fulfill the requirements of the chosen markets and market 
offerings are built. These prerequisites take time to set up and are critical in fulfilling the 
company’s objective (success in terms of survival and long-term performance or prosperity 
(Grant 2005, p. 18)). According to the logic of building potentials raised by Clausewitz with 
the analogy to bakeries above, these potentials are strategic because they are targeted to fulfill 
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the market requirements or to serve the market offerings and hence intended to influence 
long-term performance.  
Alluding to the morale and organization of the army, strategic decisions also have to ensure 
that these potentials are actually built, maintained and used to make the market offerings and 
hence to influence the success of the company. Thus, governance decisions (including incen-
tive systems) are meant to influence the behavior of stakeholders accordingly. These decisions 
are not the decisions “on the field” (i.e. strategy execution or tactics) but rather ensure that 
strategy becomes ingrained in the business system and hence goes “with the Army in the 
field”. 
Table 36 summarizes our comparison of military and business strategy. 
Strategy components Military strategy  
examples 
Business strategy  
examples 
Markets What shall be accomplished on 
markets? 
Which battles to fights, 
which countries to attack, 
etc. 
Which markets to serve in 
which geographic areas, 
etc. 
What resources and capabili-
ties are needed to accomplish 
this? 
Soldiers, ability to conduct 
naval warfare, etc. 
Financial or human re-
sources, ability to develop 
a new product, etc. 
Potentials 
How to set up the resources 
and capabilities to accomplish 
this? 
Arrangements of battles, 
etc. 
Organization of company, 
etc. 
Governance  How to steer the system to en-
sure that the resources and 
capabilities are built and used 
to accomplish this? 
Militaristic reporting 
structure, rank and promo-
tion system, etc. 
Incentive systems, etc.  
Table 36: Comparison of our view of strategy with military strategy 
It should not go unnoticed that historic analyses of the parallels between business and military 
strategy criticize that “too often it has been presumed (as opposed to being proved) that there 
is a continuity in the idea of strategy that leads back to its etymological origin in ancient 
Greece […] ‘Self-evidently’ strategy enters business from the military domain” (Hoskin et al. 
1997, p. 2). Strategy researchers have also expressed skepticism about the contribution of 
military strategy thinking to business strategy thinking (e.g. Gälweiler 1981, pp. 39; Ghe-
mawat 1997, p. 21; Grant 2005, pp. 14). The main reasons provided by these authors for this 
view include military strategy’s antagonistic character and its focus on a specific point in 
time. They contend that the purpose of business strategy is not solely to defeat an enemy46 
                                                 
46
 While military strategy is often described as a zero sum game (i.e. the winner wins exactly what the loser 
loses), business strategy is described as a non-zero sum game (cf. e.g. Ghemawat 1997, p. 21) 
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(Grant 2005, p. 15) and that it is not limited to a certain time span but is ongoing (Gälweiler 
1981).  
Hence, grounding our understanding of business strategy solely in military strategy is not suf-
ficient. In the previous chapter, we argued that analogical reasoning alone can be misleading; 
analogies between business and military strategy indeed have their limitations. We neverthe-
less see an illustrative value in comparing business strategy and military strategy, because the 
latter is less abstract and therefore probably easier to understand. At the same time, it is evi-
dent that we also have to ground our understanding of business strategy in actual discussions 
in strategic management literature.  
Hence, the following sections relate the three parts of business strategy we identified above to 
discussions in strategic management to show that they can be expected to influence a firm’s 
long-term performance. Figure 10 summarizes these parts (markets, potentials, and govern-
ance), which will be put into the context of strategic management thinking below. 
Resources, capabilities 
and their organization 
representing potentials 
for market offerings
What resources and 
capabilities are needed to 
fulfill the requirements 
implied by the intended 
market offers?
How to set up resources and 
capabilities to accomplish 
the market requirements? 
Markets and market 
offerings placing 
requirements on the 
organization
Which markets does the 
company intend to serve?
What does the organization 
want to accomplish on the 
market?
Governance (e.g. incentive 
systems)
How to steer the build-up 
and use of capabilities and 
resources to ensure that 
the requirements of 
markets and market 
offerings are achieved?
Long-term firm
performance 
 
Figure 10: Strategic purposes 
Markets: There is little dispute among strategy researchers that a company’s decisions on the 
markets it wants to serve and on what it wants to offer on the markets are strategic. These 
decisions are typically referred to as decisions on the scope of the company as well as on how 
to succeed within the chosen scope through market activities. Much of the early strategy lit-
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erature focused on scope decisions (especially on the question of diversification, cf. Capon et 
al. 1987, p. 164, 166) and especially on scope extension. Scope decisions address decisions 
around the question “which areas do we want to be active in?” A famous example for a view 
of strategy that addresses these decisions is provided by Ansoff’s (1965, p. 109) product mar-
ket matrix (cf. Figure 11). It depicts the decision on scope extension (the so-called “growth 
vector”) as the choice among four alternatives: penetrate current markets with current prod-
ucts; develop new products for current markets; develop new markets for existing products; or 
diversify into new markets with new products. 
Products
Markets
Present New
Present
New
Market
pentration
Product
development
Market
development
Diversification
 
Figure 11: Ansoff’s product market matrix 
Another well known example is given by Miles and Snow (1978) who argue that the main 
decision of an organizational strategy is the decision of scope (p. 546: “alternative ways in 
which organizations define their product-market domains (strategy)”) and the decision on how 
this scope will be altered.47 
Some authors limit the understanding of scope to the decision on the product/market segments 
a company is active in (e.g. Ansoff 1965). Others (e.g. Hofer and Schendel 1978; Porter 1987) 
define scope more broadly as an organization’s range of interactions with its environment. 
This broader definition includes decisions on the geographic scope, the choice of distribution 
channels and of the level of vertical and horizontal integration.  
Beyond mere decisions on the market offerings, Hambrick and Fredrickson (Hambrick and 
Fredrickson 2001, p. 51) also include decisions on the “vehicles” of these decisions as strate-
gic decisions. Here, the question whether e.g. the scope should be extended “by relying on 
organic, internal […] development, or are there other vehicles – such as joint ventures or ac-
quisitions – that offer a better means for achieving our broadened scope”. We follow this 
                                                 
47
 Based on these decisions they classify organizations into “Defenders” (narrow scope, defending their niche), 
“Prospectors” (broad scope, extending it frequently), “Analyzers” (combining both approaches for different parts 
of the business) and “Reactors” (unable to consequently follow any of the three other strategies consistently). 
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broader understanding and include all those aspects that deal with the choice of markets and 
offerings made within the markets as well as the requirements placed by these markets here. 
Potentials: The choice of markets a firm wants to serve places requirements on the firm itself: 
to fulfill these requirements, the company needs a number of resources and capabilities. Un-
fortunately, neither of these terms is well defined in strategic management literature (cf. 
Chapter 2). Hence, we need to elaborate this part of strategy in some more depth. We follow 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993, p. 327) who are among the few authors to provide a clearer dis-
tinction by defining resources as tangible and intangible “stocks of available factors” includ-
ing human resources (i.e. employees and their skills), intellectual property (e.g. patents and 
licenses) or financial resources.48 In contrast, they describe capabilities as “a firm’s capacity 
to deploy Resources, usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a de-
sired end” (p. 327).  
We find two types of capabilities currently discussed in strategic management literature: ge-
neric (or dynamic) capabilities and specific (or ordinary) capabilities. “Dynamic capabilities” 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Teece et al. 1997; Winter 2003) differ from specific capabilities 
in that they can be used to build new (specific) capabilities and resources. In this sense, dy-
namic capabilities are higher order (meta) capabilities (Winter 2003). First-order capabilities 
introduce change (e.g. by introducing a new product). Dynamic capabilities allow a company 
to rebuild and reconfigure resources and capabilities in a routine way. Examples of dynamic 
capabilities are organizational learning or flexibility and agility (the ability to sense and 
quickly respond to changes49) with the most fundamental dynamic capability probably being 
the ability to act (see zu Knyphausen-Aufseß 1995, pp. 100, for a compilation of dynamic 
capabilities). The notion of the relevance of dynamic capabilities is grounded in the theory of 
“hypercompetition” (D'Aveni 1994). The assumption is that in turbulent i.e. rapidly changing 
and highly competitive environments, market offerings have to be changed quickly (e.g. be-
cause competitors copy them or provide better offerings themselves). When a company must 
quickly provide new market offerings (or even enter new markets) this may in turn require 
new or changed resources and capabilities. Hence, a firm’s ability to continuously respond to 
                                                 
48
 See Grant (1991) for a classification of different types of resources. 
49
 Reasoning decisions as strategic that support the company’s ability to change rather than just supporting the 
immediate strategic initiatives is discussed in strategic management literature under the term “agility”. “Agility” 
is not a well-defined term in IS research: “a consensus on a definition of agility has not yet emerged” (Ooster-
hout 2006, p. 133). It is also not clearly differentiated from flexibility. However, most definitions state that a 
company’s agility concerns its ability “to cope with external and internal changes, which are unpredictable and 
uncertain” (Oosterhout 2006, p. 133).  
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new market requirements (e.g. by making new or improved market offerings) is more impor-
tant for its long-term performance than any specific market offering or any specific capability: 
“dynamic capabilities […] impact the ability of firms to launch many and varied competitive 
actions [in our sense: to act in the market] and […] these competitive actions are a significant 
antecedent of firm performance” (Sambamurthy et al. 2003, p. 237). It follows that decisions 
can be strategic even if they “do not directly lead the firm to a position of superior sustained” 
firm performance, because “they may nonetheless be critical to the firm’s longer-term com-
petitiveness in unstable environments if they help it to develop, add, integrate, and release 
other key resources [which includes capabilities according to the notion of these authors] over 
time” (Wade and Hulland 2004, p. 131). However, even the proponents of the positive impact 
of dynamic capabilities on firm performance recognize that investing in these capabilities 
only makes sense if there is a real need for continuous change (e.g. in turbulent, highly-
competitive or rapidly changing markets). Investing in dynamic capabilities will otherwise 
constitute an unnecessary cost burden, because they will not be used frequently enough to 
amortize the cost of capability building (Teece et al. 1997). 
Resources and capabilities represent potentials, as investments in them do not directly show in 
a change of performance. They only change the set of opportunities available to the firm. Re-
sources and capabilities have to be used (applied or exploited) in order to show an effect (zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß 1995, p. 95).50  
In this sense, all those decisions that are intended to build or maintain these potentials are stra-
tegic (Gälweiler 1981) in that they affect “the system of all business-specific prerequisites that 
are relevant for success” (Gälweiler 1987, p. 26).51 Kirsch (1996) even goes so far as to define 
“strategic” as “significantly concerning the capabilities”52 of a company. As potentials, capa-
                                                 
50
 It should be noted that we go beyond viewing only those decisions that affect ‘strategic’ resources according to 
the RBV (see Chapter 3) as strategic. Strategic resources according to the RBV should in fact be labeled “com-
petition-relevant” resources as they are defined as resources that may be the source of competitive advantage. In 
fact, most “strategy theories” focus on how to gain competitive advantage. Fahey and Christensen (Barney and 
Hesterly 2006, p. 5) also criticize that “It has become popular to proclaim that the purpose of strategy is to create 
and sustain competitive advantage.” In fact, many researchers define gaining and sustaining a competitive ad-
vantage if not as the only, then at least as the single most important purpose of a strategy (e.g. (Porter 1985, p. 
12): “a firm’s strategy is defined as its theory about how to gain competitive advantages”; (Teece et al. 1997, p. 
509): “competitive advantage is at the heart of any strategy”; (Grant 1991): “The fundamental question in the 
field of strategic management is how firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage”). Those theories would 
be more appropriately termed “theories of competitive advantage” (as e.g. Grant does in his article “The Re-
source-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: Implications for Strategy Formulation” (Treacy and Wiersema 
1993)). 
51
 Translated by author; originally “Gefüge sämtlicher jeweils geschäftsspezifisch erfolgsrelevanter Voraus-
setzungen”. 
52
 Translated by author; originally “die Fähigkeiten signifikant betreffend”. 
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bilities and resources are relevant for success because they are needed to fulfill the market 
requirements and to make the market offerings which ultimately affects firm performance. 
Decisions on using, building and preserving these potentials are then strategic, as well. The 
question here is “Which potentials are needed to be able fulfill the market requirements and 
the decisions with regard to markets (such as to make the intended market offerings)?” 
In addition to the resources and capabilities themselves, the question of how they are set up or 
organized in order to enable the market decisions is a strategic aspect, as well (zu Kny-
phausen-Aufseß 1995, p. 93). This becomes particularly obvious in management concepts 
such as business process reengineering (BPR) (Davenport 1995; Davenport and Short 1990; 
Hammer 1990) or core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). 
BPR has been defined as “a radical redesign of broad, cross-functional business processes 
with the objective of order-of magnitude performance gains, often with the aid of information 
technology” (Davenport 1995, p. 1). BPR does not focus on the market offerings of the busi-
ness, but on “how we organize and conduct our business” (Hammer 1990, p. 104; emphasis 
added). In other words, it focuses on redefining “job designs, work flows, control mechanisms 
and organizational structures […]” (p. 104).  
Core competencies have been defined as “the collective learning in the organization, espe-
cially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technolo-
gies” (Prahalad and Hamel 1990, p. 82) and hence fit into our view of capabilities as abilities 
needed to provide certain market offerings (or in the words of Prahalad and Hamel (1990, p. 
83): “products […] are the physical embodiments of core competencies”). However, the or-
ganization of these competencies constitutes a strategic decision, as does the question of 
which competencies are needed. In fact, Prahalad and Hamel (interestingly alluding to mili-
tary strategy themselves by referring to “battles”) propose that building core competencies 
requires a different organization than the prevalent structuring of the company into strategic 
business units (SBUs) because “the SBU prism means that only one plane of the global com-
petitive battle, the battle to put competitive products on the shelf today, is visible to top man-
agement” (p. 87). This “distortion” leads to “underinvestment in developing core competen-
cies”, “imprisoned resources” and “bounded innovation” (pp. 87) and hence hampers the 
building of core competencies.  
Both concepts, BPR and core competencies, highlight the strategic relevance of organizational 
issues in “structural inertia” (Hannan and Freeman 1984) in the form of either the “inertia of 
old processes and structures” (Hammer 1990, p. 112) or the “tyranny of the SBU” (Prahalad 
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and Hamel 1990, p. 86). These inertia are caused by organizational flaws that hamper the 
creation of the resources and capabilities needed to fulfill the requirements of markets and 
market offerings. The organization of potentials is hence an important strategic decision for 
achieving what the company intends, as well.   
In both approaches, the organization of resources is viewed as strategic because it determines 
what the company can in fact do. For example, in multi-business corporations, the way in 
which resources are organized affects the firm’s ability to extract synergies e.g. for the sake of 
making combined market offerings (e.g. in cross-selling between business units). Synergy 
between different business units has been argued to be an explicit strategic objective (Ropella 
1989) (see also Chapter 1). “Synergy” is also cited as a decision area within business strategy 
(Collis and Montgomery 1999; Hofer and Schendel 1978; Porter 1987; Prahalad and Hamel 
1990). Porter (1987, p. 43) claims that “corporate strategy is what makes the corporate whole 
add up to more than the sum of its business units”, which is the common definition of synergy 
(Shirley et al. 1976, p. 62: "synergy is best described as the '2+2=5' effect, or alternatively, the 
'whole is greater than the sum of its parts'"). 
While the inclusion of organizational issues in our concept of strategy may seem to counter 
the general notion of “structure follows strategy” (Chandler 1962), we would like to empha-
size that Chandler himself stated that the new market (sic!) strategies of American companies 
were only possible through the development of organizational capabilities: “organizational 
capabilities were the collective physical facilities and human skills as they were organized 
within the enterprise. […] Such organizational capabilities, of course, had to be created and 
once established, they had to be maintained. […] One of the most critical tasks of top man-
agement has always been to maintain these capabilities and to integrate these facilities and 
skills into a unified organization […]” (Chandler 1990, p. 594). Hence, the intended market 
decisions are only possible through the (ex-ante) creation of adequate capabilities and re-
sources and their proper organization. In fact, these potentials define the radius of activities 
(or market offerings) available to the firm: they delineate the company’s boundaries (Teece et 
al. 1997).  
For us, the logical conclusion is to integrate the planning and organization of these potentials 
into our view of strategy, as the planning of potentials actually determines possible market 
strategies and may explain why market decisions cannot be changed quickly. In the same 
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vein, zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (1995, p. 93) confirms that “organization does indeed play an 
important role in relation to questions of strategy.”53 
Governance: Besides the capabilities and resources that are needed to be able to make the 
intended market decisions, a company also requires a governance system that ensures that the 
resources and capabilities are built up and used in order to fulfill market requirements and to 
make the actual market offerings. Governance decisions purposefully design a frame for ac-
tion. They influence the behavior of stakeholders (i.e. the actions performed in the execution 
of strategy) e.g. through organizational rights and incentive systems. Hence, these decisions 
are not the implementation of strategy itself but they steer the implementation. In other words, 
a company has to ensure that the requisite potentials actually get built and used. For example, 
a company may decide to merge with another company. The question of governance in this 
case is how to ensure that managers actually do engage in value-creating mergers even when 
they might not inherently be willing to do so (e.g. because they run the risk of losing their 
jobs). If that question is not solved (e.g. by installing “golden parachutes”, a measure to pro-
vide an incentive to these managers), the potential required for conducting mergers will either 
never be built or never be applied to execute a merger (zu Knyphausen-Aufseß 1995, p. 91).  
In general terms, prerequisites have to be made to reduce the tendency of short-sighted actions 
potentially motivated by self-interest of stakeholders or other factors. The “structural inertia” 
mentioned above already hinted at factors that might prevent building or even destroy certain 
capabilities and resources. This idea is extended by the notion of “strategic liabilities” (Arend 
2004). These liabilities represent the “inability of a firm to make a beneficial change resulting 
from embedded resources and capabilities that were Strategic Assets in an earlier context” (p. 
1012). Certain decisions that were originally meant to positively influence firm performance, 
might bring strategic liabilities with them as a by-product. Hence, maintaining and preserving 
potentials by avoiding the buildup of strategic liabilities is a strategic purpose as well. Gov-
ernance decisions are not merely meant to encourage building resources and capabilities, but 
also discourage the creation of strategic liabilities (encourage desired behavior and discourage 
undesired behavior). 
* * * 
                                                 
53
 Translated by author; originally: “in der Tat [kommen] im Zusammenhang mit Strategiefragen der Organisa-
tion eine wichtige Rolle zu”. 
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Decisions that concern any one of these elements of strategy (markets, potentials and govern-
ance) can also be argued to fulfill the characteristics of strategic decisions we mentioned in 
Section  3.2.1, thus providing further backing for their strategic nature. 
For example, they all of these elements are intended to influence a company’s long-term suc-
cess. They try to achieve this success by directing subsequent decisions and behavior to be in-
line with the company’s purpose achieved through market actions and through building the 
required potentials. They are not the activities that are necessary to act on the market or to 
build the potentials, but guide these activities with an intention in mind. Each of the decisions 
is geared towards generating a fit between the intended market decisions and market require-
ments in the external environment and the potentials inside the company. Decisions on build-
ing and organizing potentials have been argued to take time as they are sometimes prone to 
“inertia”. This makes them rather difficult to reverse quickly, an attribute that transfers to the 
market decisions, which are based on these potentials. As governance decisions shape the 
behavior of stakeholders, they also cannot be switched easily.  
These three elements of strategy help us to evaluate the strategic relevance of IP decisions. 
They constitute the purposes of strategic IP decisions. An IP decision can therefore be consid-
ered strategic according to our view of strategy when its purpose is to influence the market 
decisions of a company, to build or maintain resources and capabilities required by market 
decisions or when it serves to steer the company’s stakeholders (governance) to build and 
maintain the required resources and capabilities as well as to make market activities. 
4.2 PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF CONCEPTIONS FOUND IN RESEARCH LITERA-
TURE 
First, we consider the content and reasoning proposed in literature (Chapter 2) and its practi-
cal relevance. We probe the practical relevance of the content of information strategy found in 
research literature in three steps. First, we check whether the proposals from research are used 
in practice. To do this, we compare the content and reasoning derived from or proposed in the 
conceptions of information strategy (Chapter 2) with the content and reasoning elicited from 
practitioners (Chapter 3). But also if we find matches, we have to argue for why the content is 
strategic in the sense of our view of strategy. A difference between research and practice indi-
cates that the respective conception from research is not followed by practitioners. However, 
this does mean that the proposal from research is not intrinsically irrelevant; practitioners 
might have various reasons for not embracing a proposal from research. For example, they 
might not be aware of it, their current situation might not warrant its application or there 
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might be other pragmatic “barriers” that impede the application of the proposal. A proposal 
from research can only be deemed practically irrelevant if practitioners can argue its general 
inapplicability.  
Second, to determine whether a proposal from research is in fact practically irrelevant, we 
asked practitioners why they did (not) include the proposals from research in their information 
strategies. We asked the practitioners interviewed in our empirical study in structured inter-
views to explain why they did (not) follow the information strategies found in the literature. 
These structured interviews were conducted after the open interviews presented in Chapter 3. 
Each lasted around 10 to 20 minutes. These interviews were performed in cases 3, 6, 8, 11 and 
12; in the other cases, we briefly discussed some of the questions, but could not complete a 
full interview due to time constraints. 
We started such an interview by asking the practitioner whether he used any kind of literature 
to aid him in his endeavor to develop an information strategy. If so, we asked for the concrete 
sources used. We then structured our discussion with the practitioner according to the findings 
from the literature presented in Chapter 2 (Appendix C presents the interview guide we used). 
For example, according to the second conception found in practice, we mentioned that re-
search literature would propose to consider the identification of information systems to gain 
competitive advantage as part of information strategy. We asked whether the practitioners 
included information systems that change the industry structure (e.g. lower the bargaining 
power of customers or suppliers) as part of an information strategy to favorably position the 
company against competitors. If they did, we asked whether they had just forgotten to men-
tion this decision during the open interview. If so, we reinstated the decision as part of the 
content of information strategy presented in Chapter 3. If they had deliberately excluded the 
decision and not merely neglected to mention it in the open interview, we asked for their rea-
sons for doing so. In the ensuing discussion, we took the position of a proponent of the re-
spective conception of information strategy, provided that the research articles had suffi-
ciently established the conception’s underlying reasoning to defend its relevance (see results 
of Chapter 2). 
These interviews were recorded and transcribed. However, we analyzed these transcribed in-
terviews in a different manner from the open interviews presented in Chapter 3. In this in-
stance, we were only interested in learning whether or not the practitioners followed the pro-
posal from research literature, and if they did not, we asked what their objections were. 
Hence, in presenting the findings, we will only mention whether practitioners followed the 
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proposal and summarize their reasons for (not) doing so. For illustrative purposes, we will 
intersperse the presentation of the results with quotes from the interviews. 
Third, in addition to the structured interviews with practitioners, we conducted interviews 
with three experts on information strategy. The aim of these interviews was to obtain the per-
spective of more independent individuals acquainted with both practice and academia on po-
tential differences between research findings and practical relevance. For those decisions 
where we found striking differences between research and practice that could not be easily 
resolved, we asked experts to get an ‘independent’ point of view. These experts were chosen 
especially for their ability to bridge research and practice. On the one hand, they are well-
versed in information strategies from their practical experience (as board members of compa-
nies or consulting firms with responsibility for information strategy or the information strat-
egy consulting practice, respectively). On the other hand, as former researchers with doctorate 
degrees (PhD) in information systems, they are familiar with the academic perspective. Table 
37 summarizes the qualifications of the experts that led us to choose them for our interviews. 
Expert Qualifications for expert role   
1 Member of the Board of a German wholesale company 
Responsible for IT (CIO) and other business functions 
PhD in Information Systems 
Frequent citations in practitioner-oriented IT reports  
Several research publications on Information Systems related topics 
Frequent speaker on Information Systems-related academic and practitioner conferences 
2 Member of the Board of a German wholesale company 
Responsible for IT (CIO) and other business functions 
PhD in Information Systems 
Several research publications on Information Systems-related topics 
Listed on IT competence web sites 
3 Principal of a world-wide leading management consulting firm, based in New York, USA 
Global leader of the IT strategy practice of that firm 
PhD in Information Systems 
Frequent citations in practitioner-oriented IT reports 
Several research and practitioner publications on Information Systems-related topics 
Frequent speaker on IS related practitioner conferences 
Listed on IT competence web sites 
Table 37: Qualifications of experts interviewed 
Although it has been used a lot, the technique of expert interviews has received little attention 
in terms of methodology (Bogner and Menz 2005). We were interested in the experts’ reflec-
tions on the differences between the practitioners’ and literature’s information strategy con-
tent. Obtaining such a more independent reflection is considered a prime application domain 
of expert interviews (Meuser and Nagel 2005). 
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A specific characteristic of expert interviews is that the experts’ knowledge is looked upon as 
being separate from the expert as a person. In contrast to the content provided by the practi-
tioners in our open interviews (Chapter 3), the experts’ insights are not understood as an idio-
syncratic expression of how they perceive the world as individuals (Meuser and Nagel 2005). 
Although we did not prevent the experts from using examples from their own companies to 
illustrate their standpoint, we made it clear to them that we were talking to them as experts 
and not as representatives of their companies. 
The special nature of the knowledge provided by experts impacted how we conducted and 
analyzed the interviews: we decided that qualitative, semi-structured interviews were appro-
priate for allowing the experts to share their wisdom (Meuser and Nagel 2005). Our inter-
views required some structure to ensure that we obtained the experts’ opinions on the differ-
ences between research and practice regarding information strategy. The questions we asked 
referred the decisions deemed strategic in research literature (strategic IS, strategic IP re-
sources, information strategy models, functional decisions and the tenor towards IP; see Ap-
pendix D for a brief interview guide used to structure the discussion with the experts). For 
example, assuming that practitioners we interviewed stated that they did not make decisions 
on IS to gain competitive advantage, we asked the experts why they thought that might be. 
We then followed this by a discussion of the arguments provided by literature (e.g. MBV and 
RBV theory) and by practitioners. Beyond that, we did not structure the interview themes any 
further; we did not want to impose our potentially biased structure on the experts. We wanted 
to let the experts share their expert knowledge regarding the application and usefulness of 
theory in practice as well as their thoughts vis-à-vis other practitioners. As stated above, we 
were not interested in their idiosyncratic situations at their own workplaces other than for il-
lustrative purposes.  
Each of the three interviews took between thirty and sixty minutes. They were recorded and 
then transcribed by the same external company that transcribed the practitioner interviews54. 
The author of the thesis checked the transcription for accuracy. The analysis of the transcrip-
tion centers on its content rather than on the experts as individuals or the structures they them-
selves use to interpret the world (Meuser and Nagel 2005). Hence, we did not conduct an in-
tra-case analysis for the expert interviews.  
                                                 
54
 Just as the open practitioner interviews, the transcribed expert interviews were made available electronically to 
the supervisors of this thesis. 
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According to the approach described above, the presentation of the results is structured by the 
conceptions found in literature: for each conception, we first summarize its central notion 
briefly as a reminder (see Section 2.3 for details). Then we lay out the results about its pres-
ence in practice. Based on these findings, we discuss the relevance of the conception. This 
includes discussing the reasons given by practitioners for following or rejecting the concep-
tion, the arguments provided by the experts as well as our own reasoning. Finally, we synthe-
size the discussion by drawing conclusions for our question, namely whether the proposal 
from research literature can be considered practically relevant or not. 
4.2.1 Conception 1: The use of IT to deliver business strategy 
A number of articles in the literature looked at how IT can be used to deliver a given business 
strategy. The given business strategy is the anchor of information strategy. In fact, informa-
tion strategy forms part of business strategy. In this conception, information strategy answers 
the question of how the use of IT can support this given business strategy. The main decision 
to be made within such an information strategy therefore concerns the selection of IS that sup-
port the given business strategy.  
4.2.1.1 Presence in practice 
In general, our interviewees did not follow this conception: all practitioners perceived infor-
mation strategy as a strategy in its own right. In no case was information strategy an integral 
part of business strategy. This position was already indicated through the fact that the infor-
mation strategies were manifested in separate documents. However, and probably not surpris-
ingly, practitioners linked information strategy to business strategy: as described in Chapter 3, 
the interviewees referred to certain links to business strategy in order to argue a number of IP 
decisions as strategic (see Section  3.2.3: Ad 1, Decisions that fulfill or ensure to fulfill re-
quirements of business strategy). 
Still, the interviewees deviated from the conception in two aspects: with regards to the deci-
sions that supported business strategy and with regards to the implicit assumption that IP de-
cisions positively support business strategy.  
First, when considering the link of IP decisions to business strategy, practitioners did not limit 
themselves to investments in or uses of IT: while the decisions described in the literature con-
centrated on IT investments and the use of information systems, practitioners also considered 
how a number of other IP decisions supported business strategy. It were not merely decisions 
on the application landscape (decision area a, cases 3, 12), the investment portfolio (decision 
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area e, case 13), and individual projects (decision area g, cases 6, 13) that were considered to 
support a chosen business strategy. They also considered decisions on application standards 
(decision area b, case 5), technology standards (decision area c, cases 8, 10, 12), IT process 
standards (decision area d, case 12), rights and accountabilities (decision area j, cases 6a, 7, 
8), sourcing (decision area k, case 10) as well as those on IT security and continuity (decision 
area l, case 11) to be related to business strategy. Hence, practitioners have a broader view of 
information strategy content than implied by this conception. 
Second, practitioners went beyond the intuitively supporting relations between information 
strategy and business strategy. The first conception identified in literature assumes that IP 
decisions have to support the chosen business strategy. A supportive relation between IP and 
business strategy seems to be broadly assumed in information strategy literature55. In line with 
this, one of the interviewees’ concerns was to avoid making a decision that worked against the 
chosen business strategy. For example, if the strategy was aimed at growth or emphasized a 
short time-to-market, the rights and accountabilities for IT decisions were decentralized with 
the intention to give more freedom to business units and not to hamper their growth. When 
cost containment was the focus of the business strategy, decision rights were centralized, with 
the expectation that this would help to contain IP costs. Or if the current application landscape 
hampered the targeted growth, it had to be redesigned to enable the growth strategy. 
However, some of the relations between IP decisions and business strategy expressed by prac-
titioners were also more counter-intuitive: certain IP decisions were not focused on how to 
support a given business strategy, but deliberately strove to counter-balance it (Table 38 pre-
sents examples for this different logic). 
Case Quote Summary 
3 10: wir waren natürlich an vielen Stellen sehr stark getrieben von der 
Unternehmensstrategie […] 
90: die Anwendung ist im Wesentlichen die Schnittstelle gewesen zur 
Unternehmensstrategie und zu den Anwendern. Die Frage der Tech-
nologie war […] durch ganz andere Parameter getrieben. 
96: Die waren schon strategisch in Ihrer… aber rein IT strategisch 
getrieben, also IT […] getrieben.  
Two parts of an information 
strategy: IP decisions con-
cerned with business strategy 
and IP decisions that are stra-
tegic for other reasons 
                                                 
55
 For example, in the Strategic Alignment Model (Henderson and Venkatraman 1993, pp. 9), all “four dominant 
alignment perspectives” assume a directly positive relationship by demanding that information strategy “sup-
port[s] the chosen business strategy” (“strategy execution” perspective), “best support[s] the chosen business 
strategy” (“technology transformation” perspective), seeks out the “best set of strategic options for business 
strategy” (“competitive potential” perspective) or makes “the internal service business succeed” (“service level” 
perspective). 
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6 117: wenn wir nur business-driven wären, dann würden wir über kurz 
oder lang nicht mehr kosteneffektiv sein 
334: weil wir eben diese business-driven-Strategie rausgegeben haben 
und jetzt meint das Business scheinbar, wir arbeiten nur noch für Busi-
ness. Das ist eine kleine Gegenkorrektur 
350: [was ich] also auch strategisch ansehe, das hat aber gar nichts mit 
business-driven IT-Strategien zu tun, sondern das ist IT-driven […], 
um jetzt wieder zurück zu kommen, auf einen normalen […] Level und 
dann wieder kosteneffektiv oder ressourceffektiv zu bleiben  
Not solely “business [strategy] 
driven”, but also IT-driven;  
information strategy has to 
include counter-balances; 
these counter-balances have to 
ensure a sustainable cost con-
tainment 
Table 38: Awareness of the need for an information strategy beyond supporting business strategy  
Here, practitioners expressed the need to deliberately dis-align from the business strategy and 
from merely fulfilling the requirements to execute it. This logic suggests that information 
strategy is also configured to fulfill needs that go beyond supporting current business strategy.  
While the practitioners did not dispute that information strategy has to support business strat-
egy execution, they complemented this positive relation between the two strategies with a 
deliberate dis-alignment. In the next section, we discuss these different points of view. 
4.2.1.2 Discussion 
We find a number of explanations for practitioners not following the first conception found in 
research literature. 
A potential explanation might be grounded in our sample. We chose to interview practitioners 
who deal with information strategy development as one of their core tasks and who can be 
viewed as “evangelists” of information strategy. These practitioners might have a vested in-
terest in viewing information strategy as a separate entity because large parts of their job de-
pend on it.  
The practitioners themselves offered different reasons (see Table 39). They argued that their 
companies had no explicit business strategy (case 6), changed the strategy in an opportunistic 
way (case 6), or did not share it with the IT planners (case 8). In these cases, the business 
strategy was described as unclear. If there is no articulated business strategy, or if it is simply 
not shared with information strategy planners, then information strategy can neither be part of 
business strategy nor is there something that dictates what to align against.  
Case Quote Summary 
4 Sustainability […] stellt aber sicher, dass sich Effektivität oder Effizienz nicht 
in kurzfristigen Dingen erschöpfen, sondern langfristig wirksam sein können. 
Architektur stellt dies Sustainability sicher, die oft auch von den Business 
Areas nicht in gewünschtem Maße eingespielt wird. […] Klar, die wollen es in 
den ersten 2 Jahren alles haben, was ich verstehe. Aber da müssen wir halt 
auch mal eine Gegenperspektive anbringen, deshalb definieren wir hier Archi-
tektur 
Architekturen sind absolut strategisch, die entscheiden darüber, ob man liefer-
Certain decisions (e.g. 
on architecture) have 
to take a longer-term 
perspective and focus 
on more generic abili-
ties (e.g. the ability to 
deliver IP services) 
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fähig ist oder nicht lieferfähig ist [als IT Abteilung] 
6 man müsste eigentlich meinen, da gibt’s ne festgeschriebene Geschäftsstrate-
gie, so auf 3-5 Jahre, auch das würd ich jetzt mal sagen, ist wahrscheinlich in 
der Theorie wünschenswert, in der Praxis findet das einfach nicht statt. Es 
kommt noch mal dazu, dass die [company]-Bank an und für sich sehr oppor-
tunistisch handelt. Also dort wo sich Chancen auftun, da werden die wenn 
möglich wahrgenommen. [...] Das ist so der Grundsatz der Geschäftsstrategie 
und das macht für uns jetzt in der IT natürlich nicht einfacher, weil wir immer 
wieder von neuen dann raus finden müssen, wo dann die Schwerpunkte liegen. 
There is no stable 
business strategy; IT 
hence has to remain 
flexible 
8 Und grundsätzlich, je volatiler ein Sektor ist, eine Industrie ist und je volatiler 
dann auch ein Unternehmen ist, desto volatiler wird die IT-Strategie. Das ging 
bis dahin, dass man einfach auch opportunistisch war […] dann ordnet sich da 
halt auch die IT unter […] 
The more volatile a 
company’s environ-
ment and own strategy 
are, the more volatile 
the information strat-
egy 
8 [...] also der IT gelingt es immer nie, das Business festzulegen [...] Business 
Units. Wir können von der IT jetzt nicht hingehen zu einem Head of Business 
und sagen: So, gib mir jetzt mal Deine Strategie für die nächsten fünf Jahre. 
Und im nächsten Jahr wiederkommen und sagen: So, gib mir ein Update. Das 
geht nicht.[...] dann sagt er: Ich weiß es nicht, ich weiß nicht, wie sich der 
Markt entwickelt, wir sind noch nicht durch und drittens habe ich es noch 
nicht mit meinem Chef besprochen und viertens geht’s Dich gar nichts an.[...]  
Business units either 
do not have a business 
strategy or do not want 
to share it with IT 
planners 
Table 39: Reasons for separating information strategy from business strategy 
A further interpretation of the ‘deliberate dis-alignment’ of information strategy with business 
strategy is based on the expressed need for ‘counter-balancing’ the short-sightedness of busi-
ness units described in case 4 (see Table 39): while business units may focus on the firm’s 
market offerings and on those resources and capabilities immediately needed to make these 
market offerings (and thereby proclaim market strategy as the only part of ‘business strat-
egy’), information strategy has to also ensure that generic, longer-term capabilities are pre-
served. The interviewee in case 4 (see Table 39) mentioned that architectural decisions help to 
maintain the ability to deliver IP services which determines the company’s overall ability to 
act via the use of IP (cf. Section 4.1). If these decisions were not made, future market strate-
gies based on IP might be compromised. In other words, certain decisions supporting current 
market requirements might represent strategic liabilities for future (possibly unknown) market 
strategies (see the discussion of strategic liabilities in Section 4.1). Hence, information strat-
egy planners need to do more than merely support current market offerings. They also have to 
be wary of the creation of IP-based strategic liabilities by these initiatives, such as increased 
complexity of the IT infrastructure (see the reasoning presented in Section  3.2.3, Ad 5: Deci-
sions that help to avoid or mitigate IP complexity).  
A further backing of this argument is found in the “alignment paradox” (Tallon and Kraemer 
2002). The “alignment paradox” asserts that “strategic alignment may lead to greater payoffs 
from IT, but [… only] up to a certain critical level […] Beyond this point, further strategic 
alignment in fact leads to a decline in IT payoffs” (Tallon and Kraemer, p. 19). An overly 
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rigid alignment with a given business strategy may hamper the flexibility of the business to 
implement changes. The strategic need for flexibility is also supported by recent literature 
emphasizing IP’s role in a company’s agility (Oosterhout et al. 2006). It is also reflected in 
practitioners’ reasoning presented in Section  3.2.3, Ad 4: Decisions that affect the company’s 
flexibility). 
Hence, we interpret deliberate dis-alignment as evidence of practitioners’ cognizance of the 
dangers of overly rigid support for alignment with a given market strategy. Independent of 
any current market strategy, an information strategy has to maintain the company’s ability act 
on the basis of IP and its flexibility; this ability is threatened if strategic alignment is too rigid 
and if the side effects of strategic business initiatives on IP go unchecked. As we have defined 
strategy to also encompass generic capabilities, we are not really talking about a dis-
alignment with business strategy, but rather with current business strategy. In that sense, prac-
titioners argue that strategic IP decisions involve a trade-off between the optimal support of 
current market strategy and strategic potentials (especially generic capabilities such as flexi-
bility and the ability to act on the basis of IP). 
Discussing the identified differences between research and practice with the experts, we found 
some discordance. The first expert took a pragmatic point of view and agreed with the practi-
tioners that there are practical reasons that preclude the full integration of information strategy 
into the business strategy. Beyond the reasons stated by practitioners above, he mentioned the 
pressure from external auditors asking for an explicit information strategy: 
120: […] getriggert durch Wirtschaftsprüfer, wird ja auch in IT-Prüfungen, […] darauf 
hingewiesen [… dass es] eine explizite IT-Strategie [geben muss] (expert 1)56 
The expert also confirmed that the complete alignment of all IP decisions with business strat-
egy might not always be a good idea: 
“258: Teilweise müssen Entscheidungen getroffen werden, die […] überhaupt nicht in 
line mit der Geschäftsstrategie sind oder mit bestimmten Zielen, die man sich aufs 
Geschäftsseite gesetzt hat, einfach weil ich sozusagen auf der IT ja ein Stück weit an-
ders denken muss und im Endeffekt langfristiger denken muss im Sinne von der 
Entwicklung der IT-Architektur” (expert 1)57 
                                                 
56
 Translation by author: “120: Often triggered by auditors, also in IT audits [… companies] are instructed to 
have an explicit IT strategy.” (expert 1) 
57
 Translation by author: 258: “Sometimes decisions have to be made, which […] are not at all in line with the 
business strategy or with certain aims you’ve set yourself on the business side, simply because in the field of IT 
you have to think somewhat different and at the end of the day more the long term in terms of the development 
of IT architecture” (expert 1) 
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 “276: ich muss an der Stelle sehr langfristig denken, denn wenn ich das nicht tue […] 
dann muss ich im Prinzip zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt vermutlich mehr Geld in die 
Hand nehmen oder irgendeine Entscheidung treffen, die ich heute eigentlich schon ab-
sehen kann, dass sie dann schmerzhaft wird [...] Das muss ich im Prinzip möglichst 
langfristig vordenken. Und ich muss im Prinzip ja auch die Entwicklung vorweg neh-
men.” (expert 1)58 
The second expert argued that ideally, information strategy would not be about IP, but solely 
about business, hinting at the convergence of information strategy and business strategy: 
771: Und das zeigt eben auch, dass da immer noch nicht klar, es geht nicht um IT, es 
geht darum, wie machen wir unser Business. (expert 2)59 
This view is also held by some researchers, who state that “the most successful approach we 
have seen is where there are no IT strategies, only business strategies” (Earl and Feeny 1994). 
4.2.1.3 Results and insights  
Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings: first, one has to be very clear on what 
is meant when referring to “business strategy” and the relation between information strategy 
and business strategy. This is not always the case in articles following the first conception of 
information strategy (especially when vaguely defining strategy as all kinds of objectives (see 
Chapter 2)). When referring to a company’s market strategy (i.e. its choices of markets and 
market offerings, etc. (see Section 4.1)), the support of market strategy is viewed a main pur-
pose of information strategy in practice and research. When making an IP decision, decision-
makers apparently do consider how this decision can support or enable market strategy.  
However, secondly, we find the reasoning of practitioners (and the first expert) convincing 
that supporting a given market strategy is not the only aspect to take into account. Trade-offs 
between the best support of current market strategy through IP on the one hand and even 
longer-term potentials such as generic capabilities (e.g. the company’s overall flexibility or 
agility as well as the ability to act on the basis of IP) on the other hand have to be considered, 
as well. For example, not considering the complexity of the IT architecture might risk the 
company’s ability to support future market strategies. These trade-offs can be viewed as a 
deliberate dis-alignment between market strategy and longer-term generic capabilities. How-
ever, these capabilities also form part of our understanding of strategic purposes (see Section 
                                                 
58
 Translation by author: “276: I have to think very much in the long term at this point, because if I don´t do this 
[…] I probably have to spend a lot more money at a later point in time or make a decision about which I already 
know today that it will be painful […] So basically I have to think that through in advance. And basically I have 
to anticipate the development.” (expert 1) 
59
 Translation by author: “And that simply shows that it is still not clear: it [information strategy] is not about IT, 
it is about how we conduct our business.” (expert 2) 
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4.1). Thus, deliberate dis-alignment still seeks for improving long-term firm-performance, but 
through “global” optimization (i.e. by taking into account the whole spectrum of strategic 
purposes beyond current market strategy) rather than through local optimization of a given 
market strategy. This “global” optimization may necessitate a sub-optimal support of current 
market strategy for some time. 
For these reasons, it is not only impractical (due to the mentioned, mostly pragmatic barriers 
such as an undefined business strategy) but also misleading to fully integrate market strategy 
and information strategy. We propose to keep information strategy and market strategy as 
separate but related entities. One (important) relation is the support of market strategy. Thus, 
in terms of decisions that are part of information strategy, we also agree that those proposed 
by research, namely the selection of information systems, are strategic IP decisions if they 
support market strategy execution. However, other decisions may support market strategy, as 
well. Others counter market strategy in favor of emphasizing potentials (e.g. through introduc-
ing certain governance decisions that discourage IP decisions that might harm generic capa-
bilities such as flexibility). Which ones these are will be discussed in Section 4.3 when we 
turn to the decisions proposed by practitioners. 
4.2.2  Conception 2: The use of IT to gain competitive advantage 
As discussed in Chapter 2, many IS research efforts have been dedicated to understanding 
IP’s role in gaining and sustaining competitive advantage. The anchor of information strategy 
following the second conception is a competitive theory (foremost the MBV and RBV). The 
question answered by an information strategy is how the use of IT can help to gain and sustain 
competitive advantage. Accordingly, its content focuses on decisions on strategic IS (SIS) 
aiming at competitive advantage or on other IP resources that qualify as strategic resources by 
virtue of being rare, inimitable, valuable, etc.  
Wilson (1989) reported that competitive advantage was considered in practitioners’ informa-
tion strategies (see Chapter 3). 
4.2.2.1 Presence in practice 
In our sample, almost none of the IP decisions included in our interviewees’ information 
strategies were related to competitive advantage. There were few instances of competition 
being taken into account at all: in the use of standard software as a potential disabler for pur-
suing a competitive strategy based on differentiation (decision area b, case 5; see Section 
 3.2.3, Ad 1) and in decisions supporting the cost competitiveness of the company (e.g. deci-
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sion area d, case 11, see Section  3.2.3, Ad 3). Hence, in contrast to the literature, the focus of 
the interviewees who considered competition at all was less on generating positive effects 
(competitive advantage) but more on avoiding negative effects (reducing competitive disad-
vantage to stay at competitive parity). In the latter cases, IP was not looked upon as a source 
of competitive advantage (i.e. as a “competitive weapon”, “strategic asset” or “strategic re-
source”) but as a competitive burden e.g. due to its high cost or to the difficulty of reversing 
IP decisions.  
4.2.2.2 Discussion 
An explanation for the striking difference between and our sample and the conception in re-
search literature as well as in comparison to earlier surveys (Wilson 1989) might be that using 
IT to gain competitive advantage was “hyped” in the 1980s and early 1990s, but that practi-
tioners now look “beyond competitive advantage” (Galliers 1993a). While this explanation 
would appear to lower the significance of competitive advantage for information strategy, it 
certainly does not argue for the complete irrelevance of competitive reasoning in practice. In 
the interviews, practitioners cited other reasons for diverging from the conception (Table 40). 
On the one hand, there are practical barriers that keep practitioners from applying the reason-
ing around competitive advantage. On the other hand, practitioners argued that the logic of 
gaining competitive advantage was not always applicable to their situation. 
Barriers to adoption 
Some interviewees claimed that they could not apply competition-oriented reasoning as part 
of their information strategy even if they wanted to (cases 3, 11, 12); they were either not en-
couraged to think about competitive issues or that they lacked credibility among their peers 
(business unit executives); they also felt unwilling to devote time to thinking about competi-
tive advantage because there was simply no incentive to do so. 
Barrier 1: Distraction and diversion 
The CIO in case 3 reported that the climate within the company impeded him from looking 
beyond providing cost-efficient service to business units. He was charged with all strategic IP 
decisions as well as with all operational decisions related to running the IT unit. Because he 
feared that the IT unit would be dissolved if it became too expensive, the CIO concentrated 
his efforts on cost containment and on delivering IT services that were not too expensive. 
Hence, there was little time to devote to other topics. This also meant that IT unit staff mem-
bers focused on the efficiency of their current tasks rather than exploring new technologies 
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and their competitive uses. Hence, IT staff was not selected or trained for discussing competi-
tive impacts of IT with business unit staff. Eventually, the IT unit’s employees lost the ability 
to think in terms of IT and its competitive use for business (see Table 40). 
Barrier 2: Lack of credibility  
In cases 12 and 13, the IT executives argued that they were not accepted as strategic thought 
partners in their companies. They claimed to have no credibility because their IT units had not 
performed well on an operational level in the past. In case 12, business managers told the CIO 
that he “had to get [his] business under control before talking about changing [their] busi-
ness.” Hence, the IT executive was “not allowed” to talk about IT-based process improve-
ments or the innovative and competitive uses of IT before he had brought IP back under con-
trol. The interviewees in these cases principally argued that if a lack of control over IP or sub-
standard performance of the IT unit were perceived, the competitive use of IT was unlikely to 
feature on information strategy agendas. In support of this, Lucas and Turner (1982) propose 
that if a company has no control over IP, “it may be depriving itself of the opportunity to gain 
a major competitive advantage through the creative use of technology” because “effective 
control of information processing is a necessary prerequisite to the integration of technology 
with strategy. If information processing is viewed as a failure [out of control], managers will 
refuse to rely on it for a major role in the formation and execution of corporate strategy” (see 
Chapter 2, conception 3). A similar argument is found in (McNurlin and Sprague 2006), who 
cite a consultant.  
The ‘distraction barrier’ described above illustrates that preoccupation with controlling the 
costs and overall success of IP service delivery tends to distract the planner from adopting a 
competition- and innovation-oriented perspective on information strategy. At the same time, 
the ‘credibility barrier’ suggests that paying too little attention to IP cost and service delivery 
will have the same effect. One can conclude that only an adequate level of attention to these 
issues might not hamper the competitive perspective. What this ‘adequate’ level is, remains 
unresolved so far.  
Barrier 3: Lack of incentives  
Yet another barrier to following the logic of competitive advantage was described in cases 8 
and 11. According to the interviewees, stakeholders were simply not willing to spend time 
thinking about how IT could be used to benefit the business. In case 8, the pricing model for 
IT services was set up such that the introduction of new technologies would have increased 
service charges. This made introducing new technologies unattractive or even unaffordable 
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for the business units (see Table 40). Hence, neither the business units nor the IT unit seri-
ously considered making these kinds of decisions. The interviewee in case 11 reported that his 
company was innovative enough even though IT-based innovations happened only by chance, 
i.e. without any prior planning. His argument was that things worked “well enough” without 
planning. 
Applicability of conception 
In addition to citing the various barriers that kept their companies from following the concep-
tion, practitioners also argued that competitive-oriented reasoning was not really relevant to 
them. Some clearly did not perceive IT as serving a strategic role (e.g. in case 13 (ceramics 
producer): “we don’t want to be pioneers in IT”; in case 9 (logistics company), we were told 
that “here at <company-name>, IT is a tool”. Case 4 was a public institution and was hence 
not concerned with competition. These companies did not see any reason to apply the logic of 
competitive theories. 
However, no practitioner disputed the idea of IT being relevant to gaining and sustaining a 
competitive impact. The interviewees did not object to the overall possibility of gaining com-
petitive advantage with IT. 
* * * 
The experts confirmed that certain barriers prevent companies from looking at the competitive 
impact of IT. The credibility barrier in particular was supported from their experience: 
 “22: Die Theorie impliziert immer, dass man auf einem sehr guten Stand ist oder auf 
einem Stand, wo man seine Probleme gelöst hat. Und der Zustand der Informationssys-
teme in Unternehmen ist eher dergestalt, dass sie zunächst mal Probleme zu lösen haben. 
Das heißt, sie kommen gar nicht auf den Gedanken zunächst mal, an Wettbewerbsvorteile 
zu denken, weil sie erst mal sehen, dass es überhaupt funktioniert” (expert 2)60  
In addition to confirming the barriers mentioned above, the experts discussed the capabilities 
of those charged with developing an information strategy:  
“372: Kompetenz insbesondere auf den Ebenen, wo sie eigentlich erforderlich wäre, gar 
nicht vorhanden ist […] also auf Vorstandsebene ist sie definitiv nicht vorhanden […] und 
                                                 
60
 Translation by author: “22: Theory always implies that you have a very good position or being at a point 
where you have solved all problems. The state of information systems in companies however is that they first of 
all have to solve problems. That means they don’t even get the idea of thinking in terms of competitive advan-
tage, because to begin with they have to make sure everything is working.” (expert 2); 
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zwar ich glaube nicht nur, dass da IT-Kompetenz nicht da ist, ich glaube insgesamt, dass 
Fachkompetenz per se da unterausgeprägt ist” (expert 2).61  
“30: And most people haven’t cracked the code of how one can systematically use tech-
nology competitively. For the most part, it has been fortuitous happenstance and not a real 
part of strategy” (expert 3).  
The last quote also underscores at the difficulty of planning the effective, systematic use of 
information systems to gain competitive advantage and to ensure their incorporation into an 
information strategy. One explanation the experts gave for this is that it is not one decision (or 
‘strategic initiative’) in particular that leads to competitive advantage but many small details 
that work together in a complex way. However this “working together” is difficult to predict:  
“62: es ist die Perspektive dessen, was ein Wettbewerbsvorteil ist [… in der Literatur] 
immer geprägt davon, dass Sie Dinge tun können, die andere nicht tun können und dass 
das ein Wettbewerbsvorteil ist. Und so gravierend ist der Unterschied durch IT dann nicht. 
Das heißt aber nicht, dass es nicht einen strategischen Wettbewerbsvorteil gibt. Der ergibt 
sich aber zum Beispiel in unserem Geschäft, im Handel, durch die Summe an Details 
[…][alle glauben,], dass es diesen Rieseneffekt geben muss. Und dass die Summe der De-
tails einen Wettbewerbsvorteil macht, daran denkt keiner.” (expert 2)62 
As a consequence of the complex interaction between IT and competitive advantage as well 
as the planners’ inability to predict how it will unfold, decisions aimed at gaining a competi-
tive advantage through IT are hard to justify:  
“852: [wenn ich eine Entscheidung treffe] dann muss ich ja irgendeinen Grund haben, das 
zu tun. [Wenn dieser Grund in der Erreichung von Wettbewerbsvorteilen läge,] dann 
müsste ich ja wirklich auch irgendwann mal einen quantifizierbaren Wettbewerbsvorteil 
daraus generieren. […] Ich meine, da müsste ich mal fragen, wo ist der quantifizierbare 
Vorteil? Denn den kann mir keiner nennen […]” (expert 1)63 
Overall, the combination of the difficulty to know how a competitive advantage is gained, the 
difficulty to plan it up front and to measure and hence justify it, paired with a potential lack of 
competence on the planning level all work against the inclusion of competitive advantage on 
the information strategy agenda in practice. 
                                                 
61
 Translation by author: “372: Competence particularly doesn’t exist on the levels where it is needed, […] on 
board level there is definitely no competence […] and I don’t only think that there is nobody with IT expertise, 
but in general functional [business] competence itself is suboptimal on that level” (expert 2). 
62
 Translation by author: “62: it depends on the perspective of what is a competitive advantage […in literature] it 
[the perspective] always involves that you can do things that can’t and that this is a competitive advantage. But 
the difference IT makes is not that big in the end. But that does not mean that there is no strategic competitive 
advantage. But that advantage, for example in our business, retail, is a results of the sum of details […] [every-
body believes] that there has to be a huge effect. But nobody realizes that the sum of all details makes up the 
competitive advantage.” (expert 2) 
63
 Translation by author: “852: [When I make a decision] I have to have some kind of reason to do so. [If this 
reason was achiving competitive advantage, ] I would have to get a quantifiable competitive advantage at some 
point. […] What I want to say is: I would have to ask, where is my quantifiable competitive adavantage? But 
nobody can pinpoint it […]” (expert 1) 
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Regarding the applicability of the overall logic of competitive theory, the experts confirmed 
that a company’s attitude towards IT influences whether the competitive use of IT is consid-
ered at all. They stressed that in most situations, IT is not perceived as a source of competitive 
advantage: 
 “29: For the most part, technology just plays a very supporting role […] the fact of the 
matter is that most traditional IT shops are typically run as cost centers. Most of the IT 
strategy work is mostly offshoring and outsourcing to ensure keeping costs down” (ex-
pert 3). 
The experts suggested that this trend may stem from companies’ previously (negative) experi-
ence in their attempts to use IT in endeavors targeting competitive advantage. 
“385: da haben wir uns eine blutige Nase geholt.” “878: Der Kostenvorteil, den wir 
gehabt haben, ist ruckzuck wieder von den anderen aufgeholt worden” (expert 1, using 
an example from his own company to stress the point in general)64 
“25: the current practice of technology, hasn’t caught up with the expectations of tech-
nology”; “34: So the practitioners seem to be a little bit more conservative, given their 
experience” (expert 3) 
While this explains why companies do not apply the logic, the experts also argued that the 
application of competitive theory might simply not be warranted at all in a number of situa-
tions. The first expert firmly rejected the notion that IT plays any role in gaining and sustain-
ing competitive advantage.  
295: “Also ich halte das für Nonsens oder ziemlichen Nonsens, dass IT wirklich eine 
Möglichkeit bietet, Wettbewerbsvorteile zu erarbeiten. [Das] ist Unfug”; 313: “[Ich 
bin] heutzutage nicht mehr der Ansicht, dass man IT-Strategie im Sinne von Wettbew-
erbsvorteile erarbeiten sehen kann”65 
Experts 2 and 3 stated that the question is “not if the theory of IT and competitive advantage 
is right or not, but when should it actually be applied, when should they actually think about 
it” (expert 3). They thus hinted at situational factors that affect the incentive for companies to 
seek competitive advantage. The consideration of innovation and competitive advantage 
might only be required if a company is being attacked or wants to attack incumbent compa-
nies. The principle argument was that using IT competitively is a risky and costly undertak-
ing. Hence, a company would only apply this thinking when it really needs to do so. If a com-
pany is not in a situation that requires competitive action, innovating or using IT competi-
                                                 
64
 Translation by author: “385: we got ourselves a bloody nose there.” “878: The cost advantage we had was in 
no time made up by the others” (expert 1) 
65
 Translation by author: “295: Well, in my opinion it’s nonsense or pretty much nonsense to say that IT provides 
an opportunity to achieve competitive advantage. [That] is rubbish”;”313: [ I am] not convinced any more that 
you can view IT strategy in the sense of generating competitive advantage.” 
  196 
tively was suggested to be too risky and too costly. The experts implied that situations war-
ranting the competitive use of IT might be less frequent than is assumed in research: 
“107: [The question is] are you performing well with respect to competition or are you 
ahead of the competition? […] very often, one falls into the trap of making the as-
sumption that by definition innovation is a good thing. Innovation is not always a good 
thing. […] If there was no competitive threat, there was no new business model which 
threatens their existence, it would not innovate. They don’t have to innovate because 
innovation is expensive, it’s risky. It actually cannibalizes your own business. [...] 
unless there is an attacker who play in that stage, the incumbent does not have an in-
centive to innovate” (expert 3) 
“82: And you’ll think more of that in, you know, not in the incumbents […] who have 
frankly no incentive to innovate. There is absolutely no reason why the incumbent 
should innovate. The innovations are risky and very expensive and the only reason 
why you would do that is if you were attacked by an attacker [...] there is absolutely no 
reason to introduce a new online channel and to introduce a new online bank [...] and 
then the brick-and-mortar people have to put some money in it. But as a rule, the in-
cumbent has no incentive to innovate” (expert 3) 
“136: there are a few myths around technology’s strategy. One of those myths is this 
that technology innovation is always good. I think technology or the usage of technol-
ogy for competitive advantage, it’s going to happen depending on the business con-
text, right? So you’re not going to see an incumbent who is doing very well trying to 
get too innovative and creative about anything. [...] It’s only when the incumbent is ei-
ther attacked by an attacker or their performance is not keeping up with the other 
competitors. That’s when they’re going to say: I need to use technology somehow to 
give me at better cost advantage, more revenues or whatever. An attacker is more 
likely to use technology for competitive advantage than an incumbent.” (expert 3) 
4.2.2.3 Results and insights 
In summary, decisions on competitive and innovative uses of IT were argued to be unlikely to 
feature on the information strategy agenda if IT’s role was not regarded as strategic or if cer-
tain barriers precluded its consideration as such. There might also be situations in which the 
logic of gaining competitive advantage with IT may not be applicable. 
However, neither practitioners nor experts presented convincing arguments for not thinking 
about IT and competitive advantage at all. Hence, the question is when this thinking should be 
applied. Depending on how many situations really warrant expecting a competitive advantage 
from IT, the question is whether researchers are well advised in concentrating their efforts on 
IT and competitive advantage given the potentially low applicability in practice. While this 
question is beyond the scope of this thesis, further research on situational factors that support 
the application of competitive logic seems worthwhile. 
Gaining competitive advantage fits our view of strategic purposes introduced in Section 4.1. 
Both competitive theories, the MBV and the RBV, emphasize gaining and sustaining an ad-
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vantage vis-à-vis competitors, i.e. other companies making comparable market offerings. 
Hence, both theories look at long-term firm performance through distinguished activities on 
the market. However, while the MBV takes the outside-in perspective (starting from the 
choice of a favorable position within the market and then asking which potentials have to be 
built in order to take and defend this position), the RBV takes the inside-out perspective 
(starting from potentials that exhibit certain characteristics and then looking at how these can 
be used to conduct favorable market activities; the latter is implicitly included in the demand 
characteristic of ‘being valuable’)66.  
The conclusion for us is that IP decisions proposed in literature that aim at gaining and sus-
taining competitive advantage (and at avoiding disadvantage) are strategic, even though this 
logic may be applicable only in certain situations. There is no consensus in research yet, on 
how this advantage can actually be achieved (see Chapter 3, conception 2). 
What also became clear from the various barriers expressed by practitioners and confirmed by 
experts is that  if a company intends to use IT for competitive advantage, the it seems crucial 
to design the appropriate governance system (e.g. incentives) so that stakeholders are allowed, 
able and willing to make competition-relevant IP decisions.  
                                                 
66
 Compare the discussion of the MBV and RBV in Chapter 3, conception 2; as well as Footnote 50: in our un-
derstanding, besides resources that promise being a source of competitive advantage, we also consider those 
resources as strategic that are competitively necessary because they are required for market activities 
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Case Quote Summary 
3 […] der Vorstand hat ja gemerkt, dass er von einer gewissen Abhängigkeit getrieben war. […] von der IT [unit] […] Was hätten die 
denn entscheiden sollen? Die müssen uns doch glauben. 
Wir sind so cost-efficient, dass ihr an keinen anderen Dienstleister gehen wollt oder gehen könnt […] D.h. immer diese competitive 
situation zwischen internem und externem Dienstleister […] so dass der Kostenhebel für uns [IT Unit] auch irgendwie ein survival 
Hebel war.” 
“Was dabei völlig runtergefallen ist [...] wir waren dann irgendwann auch nicht mehr Innovationsstark, Innovation war nur noch aus 
dem Projekt heraus getrieben. [...] Die IT Leute hatten auch gar keinen Blick mehr für sowas [...] mal aus den normal day-to-day 
operations raus an was Neues denken” 
“Weil wir immer die Angst hatten, dass wenn wir Projekte an Externe verlieren, wir den ersten Schritt in die Auflösung [...] der Ab-
teilung machen würden”  
All IT decisions (operational and 
strategic) resided in the IT unit 
 
The pressure to deliver cost-
efficient IT services to business 
units hampered thinking about 
innovative uses of IT 
8 Also es gibt irgendwo verzerrende Preise, das ist ein interessantes Phänomen, [...] einige Services billiger sind als andere, obwohl das 
dann Innovationen behindert. […] Und wenn ich jetzt ein neues innovatives System machen würde, was mich irgendwo […] weiter-
bringen würde, dann müssten die erst mal viel zahlen, viel mehr als fürs alte System. Entsprechend haben die kein Interesse daran 
Charging mechanisms incentiv-
ized sticking with old technolo-
gies rather than adopting and 
using innovative technologies 
11 53: Das hat was mit unserer dezentralen Philosophie zu tun, also auch in den Business Units sind wir dann auch wieder dezentral 
organisiert, das heißt, solche innovativen Ideen kommen dann aus den Prozessen, aus den Geschäftseinheiten und entstehen dann, 
sage ich mal […] zufällig 
323: Also es funktioniert, wir sind hoch innovativ [obwohl wir nicht] eben systematisch nach solchen Themen zu suchen 
319: Deswegen ist, glaube ich, im Moment gar kein Bedarf  
321: wobei man eben manchmal vielleicht noch mal gucken müsste, was wirklich die Vor- und die Nachteile wären, wenn man so 
was machen würde  
487: Die Frage ist ja, was ist in so einer Welt wirklich die Rolle so einer IT-Organisation. Weil letztlich sorgen sie dafür, dass die 
Projekte, die aus dem Business kommen, umgesetzt werden. Das ist deren Hauptaufgabe. Und dass sie danach, wenn sie eine Ap-
plikation ist, vernünftig betrieben wird. Gut, das ist eine klare, verständliche Aufgabe. Aber erwarten, dass die mithelfen, zu über-
legen, was sind denn die richtigen Projekte, das erwartet kaum einer. […] Deswegen ist es sehr schwer, im Sinne einer Top-Down-
Strategie und einer langfristigen Vorgabe eine Strategie zu machen, wie gesagt, die über das Portfolio hinausgeht.” 
625: In einer idealen Welt, glaube ich, hätte man einen Prozess, der IT und Business so früh zusammenbringt, dass man technolo-
gisches Potenzial erkennen kann und sich für seine Businessanforderungen, für seinen Wettbewerbsvorteil letztlich, bereitstellt. Das 
wäre, glaube ich, die ideale Welt. Das wäre der eine Part der IT-Strategie. […] Aber der erste Teil, das ist da, [wo es] schon noch 
einfach aus dem Bauch raus hohes Verbesserungspotenzial gibt. Ohne das jetzt benennen zu können. Wie gesagt, man sieht eben, bei 
[company] zumindest funktioniert es gut. Die Frage ist, wie viel besser könnte es funktionieren, wenn es anders wäre? 
There is no need for looking for 
innovation through IT  
The view towards those who are 
responsible for IT planning (and 
who understand IT) is that IT is 
a deliverer rather than a strategic 
partner 
 
 
12 794: Underdog position […] war so, definitive […] es war kurz vor einem Outsourcing, sage ich mal, aus […] Kostengründen. […] 
Wir waren […] sehr wenig akzeptiert. 
806: dadurch, dass wir […] eine engere Dienstleisterrolle aufgenommen haben […] Sie müssen erst mal Kostenoptimierung errei-
IT was well regarded because it 
was too costly. 
Hence, the focus had to be on 
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chen, um dann als strategischer Partner akzeptiert zu werden. Also eine IT, die viel zu viel kostet, die kann so viel Strategie machen, 
aus meiner Sicht, wie sie will, die wird man nicht ernst nehmen. 
815: In erster Linie muss man Kostenmanagement machen, das Kostenmanagement muss Akzeptanz finden, Gehör finden, dass man 
sagt: Oh kuck, da beherrscht jemand sein Thema. Und dann können Sie über ein sauberes Kostenmanagement auch im Sinne von 
funktionalen Benefits, Unterstützungsleistungen, Prozessunterstützung diese Dinge positionieren.  
managing the cost of IT because 
if IT costs too much, it has no 
credibility as a strategic partner. 
Table 40: Explanations for omitting competitive advantage in information strategy 
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4.2.3 Conception 3: A plan for the whole IP domain 
A large number of articles conceive of information strategy as a plan for all kinds of IP ele-
ments that together constitute the IP domain (see Chapter 2). Decisions on these various IP 
elements were more or less well structured into decision areas. The conception was rather 
weak with regards to reasoning: the articles we counted as utilizing this conception had in 
common that they listed a number of decision areas or used common sense or analogy to pre-
sent an up-front structure and derived decision areas from this logic. Hence, we only used this 
conception to check whether practitioners used a similar structure and what the logic behind 
these structures was. 
4.2.3.1 Presence in practice 
The decisions mentioned by the interviewees can be mapped to the decision areas found in the 
lists or in one of the models presented in the literature. For example, we could map the 12 
decision areas (a-l) we identified in practice to Earl’s categories of IS, IT, and IM. However, 
the practitioners did not use these exact lists or models. Those who communicated their own 
models of information strategy (cases 2, 4, and 7) used idiosyncratic structures (Table 41). 
Case  Quote Summary 
2 76: Im Grunde genommen beschäftigt man sich in der IT [Strategie] 
oder sollte man sich beschäftigen und haben wir eben deshalb auch 
getan immer mit der Frage: A) wie steuern wir uns und wie werden wir 
gesteuert und B) ja was ist eigentlich die richtige Anwendungsland-
schaft, wie wollen wir sie entwickeln, steuern? 
Information strategy consists 
of two elements: governing 
the IT unit and the application 
landscape 
4 17: Für uns hat IS Strategie immer letztlich diese 8 Aspekte, die hier 
aufgeführt sind […] Letztlich kommt es alles dann mal raus auf eine 
Mission und Vision. […] Das Zweite steht auch noch am Anfang, 
kommt auch am Ende letztlich, ist Culture, Values and Communication 
[…] Eigentlich sind die beiden oberen eher auf der Soft-Seite und dann 
geht’s mit der harten Seite los. Markt und das sind für uns Kunden und 
Produkte. Es ist nicht so sehr die dritte Dimension, die da oft genannt 
wird, die Vertriebswege. Vertriebswege spielt für uns nicht so eine 
Rolle. Vom Markt in die Produktstrukturen, ich übersetze sozusagen 
das, was der Kunde sieht, in die komplexen Produktstrukturen, die wir 
nach innen haben. Da ist jetzt das Thema Architektur […] Pro-
duktstrukturen, die dahinter liegen, die natürlich für den Kunden als 
Ganzes gar nicht sichtbar sind, sondern das ist alles intern. Von den 
Produktstrukturen geht es dann in die Delivery Organisation, mit ihrer 
Aufbau- und Ablauforganisation, sprich mit Ihrer Prozessstruktur, die 
optimal aufgestellt sein muss, um diese Produktstruktur zu liefern, die 
wir dann an den Markt bringen. Hinter der Delivery Organisation ste-
hen die einzelnen Ressourcen, das wichtigste ist Staff mit seinen Skills, 
das Zweitwichtigste sind die externen Ressourcen und das ist das 
Thema Sourcing. Und das Ganze wird abgerundet über ein Perform-
ance-Management, was für uns eine eigenständige Dimension im 
Rahmen von Strategie ist, um sicher zu stellen, dass wir sozusagen ein 
selbst lernendes System haben. So dies sind für mich die 8 Elemente 
einer Strategie, die man durchdenken muss, die man gestalten muss, 
IS strategy consists of eight 
elements that resemble ele-
ments of a business strategy. 
IS strategy contains decisions 
on the mission and vision of 
the IT unit, its culture, its 
customers and products, its 
organization and internal and 
external resources as well as 
on its performance 
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Case  Quote Summary 
[…] Das ist unsere Philosophie der Welt, wie wir über Strategie nach-
denken. 
7 […] IT so in drei Teile zerfällt. Das eine ist die Anwendungsland-
schaft, […] Das zweite sind Infrastruktur-Themen, also Rechenzentren, 
Leitungen, Netzwerke usw., und das dritte ist IT-Management. [… 
Für] strategische Entscheidungen [...] kann man […] in jeden dieser 
Bereiche getrennt reingucken. […] weil es übergreifende Bedeutung 
hat 
Information strategy as a set of 
strategic decisions across three 
areas of IT: application land-
scape, infrastructure, and 
management. Strategic deci-
sions are those that have com-
pany-wide relevance 
Table 41: ‘Structures of the IP domain’ in practice 
4.2.3.2 Discussion 
One explanation for practitioners not following the structure of the models presented in re-
search literature is that they were unaware of them. When we asked them, all interviewees 
immediately negated to use any literature as a direct input for developing their information 
strategies. Only two (cases 4 and 5) of them were able to name the most recent publications 
they used in the context of SIP after some time of thought. Both referred to the book “IT 
Governance” (Weill and Ross 2004) and to the article “IT doesn’t matter” (Carr 2003). One 
participant (case 4) stated that he used a book about team building as a reference. Another one 
(case 12) said that he had read a book edited by practitioners and consultants (Bernhard et al. 
2003; Bernhard et al. 2004). Two participants (cases 1 and 9) stated that they used online re-
sources provided by practitioner magazines to stay up-to-date. The other interviewees (except 
case 3) said that they relied much more on recommendations made specifically for their com-
pany by management consultants who had advised the company in the past or on reports by 
industry analysts such as Gartner, IDC and others. One interviewee (case 4) stated that rather 
than plowing through the wealth of literature, he would much prefer to write his own articles 
and books, because that “would make [him] think the whole thing through [him]self”. 
In summary, most of the interviewees did not use academic literature and were therefore un-
familiar with the respective proposals. Because there were no convincing reasons presented 
within these proposals, which would have allowed us taking the position of a proponent of 
any of the models or issue lists presented in literature, we did not discuss them further with 
practitioners or experts. Hence, we did not ask the practitioners for their reasons for not em-
ploying a specific model (such as Earl’s model). 
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4.2.3.3 Results and insights 
Rather than adopting any of the models proposed in the academic literature, the practitioners 
had devised their own structures. Many of the decision areas can be mapped, though. This 
demonstrates two things: a) there seems to be a desire (in both research and practice) to struc-
ture information strategy and b) strategic IP decisions touch upon several decision objects, 
and are not just limited to one decision area (such as the application portfolio), as some au-
thors assume. 
Consequently, we will base our proposal for information strategy content on a structure of the 
IP domain, as well. However, as the lack of reasoning in those models that are only based on 
such a structure shows, the structure of the IP domain cannot serve as the sole basis of our 
proposal.  
4.2.4 Conception 4: Functional strategy 
A number of research articles we studies viewed information strategy as a functional strategy 
(see Chapter 2). The starting point for such an information strategy is the objectives that the 
function has to fulfill. The contents implied by this conception were decisions on functional 
and departmental issues including its mission as well as on all the resources needed to fulfill 
the objectives. The decision object of these decisions is the set of IP activities rather than the 
IP assets (systems, technologies, etc.) themselves. Again, little in the way of reasoning was 
provided for viewing these decisions as strategic beyond an allusion to the organizational hi-
erarchies of strategy that include functional strategies, implying that these decisions are made 
on a departmental level and that they are meant to help execute business strategy. 
That information strategy is sometimes considered a functional strategy was empirically sup-
ported, but this view was found to be held by a minority of practitioners (Wilson 1989).  
4.2.4.1 Presence in practice 
In the interviews, a number of decisions concerned the company’s information function (IF) 
and its organization. These decisions include those made on IT process standards (decision 
area d), the organization of the IT unit and HR plans (decision area h), the role of the IT unit 
(area i), the sourcing of IT activities (area k), and to some extent, the distribution of responsi-
bilities for IT decisions (decision area j). As shown in Chapter 3, these decisions were part of 
information strategies for very different reasons. Concordantly with the original meaning of 
functional strategy (Vancil and Lorange 1975), namely to make decisions on the departmental 
level that support the execution of the business strategy, decisions from areas j and k have 
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also been argued to be strategic for exactly this reason. Decisions from these areas have to be 
made in a way that supports the execution of the business strategy: the business unit-level 
strategy sets a number of requirements for execution that have to be taken into account on a 
departmental level. 
In the literature, the decisions pertaining to functional strategies are thought of as being lo-
cated on the department level within an organization. However, the interviews show that not 
all strategic IP decisions are made on a departmental level. Practitioners argued that informa-
tion strategy decisions are made on different levels within the organization. Beyond the de-
partmental level, they also referred to the corporate and business unit levels (Table 42).  
Furthermore, not all strategic IP decisions are concerned with the IT department or the infor-
mation function (e.g. architectural standards). 
Case  Conception quote Conception summarized 
8 200: Wer macht noch IT-Strategie?, da gibt’s bei uns eben Corporate, 
in der Group, in der Holding gibt’s die zentrale CIO-Funktion und 
dann gibt es noch eine dezentrale CIO-Funktion, die ist jeweils bei den 
einzelnen Business-Units. 
Information strategy at the 
corporate and business unit 
levels 
11 14ff: wenn wir über IT-Strategie redden, dann reden wir mindestens 
mal über eine [...] für jede Business-Einheit und eine für den Konzern 
gesamt […]  
133: ist in meinen Augen eher so eine Geschäftsstrategie als eine IT-
Strategie. Es ist eine Geschäftsstrategie des IT-Bereichs oder eines IT-
Bereichs 
Information strategy exists on 
the corporate level, the busi-
ness unit level, and the IT 
department level 
Table 42: Strategic IP decisions made on different organizational levels 
4.2.4.2 Discussion 
Parts of the information strategies described by the interviewees followed the conception of a 
functional strategy. The explanation given by practitioners for the fact that information strat-
egy was not fully regarded as a functional strategy was that strategic IP decisions have to be 
made on different organizational levels and do not only concern the IT unit or information 
function. Interviewees on a corporate level (case 5, 8, 9, 11) stated that they allocated mostly 
decisions on application and technology standards (decision areas b, c) and decision rights 
(decision area j) to the corporate level, while decisions on the application portfolio (decision 
area e) were allocated to the business unit level. An explanation for this is that it is simply the 
corporate center’s objective to ensure synergies across and to regulate business units 
(Bowman and Helfat 2001; Collis and Montgomery 1999; Porter 1987). However, decisions 
on standards and decision rights were not exclusive to the corporate level. They were also 
made on the business unit level. For example, the interviewee in case 6 argued for independ-
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ence in making decisions on decision rights (decision area j) on the business unit level to gain 
more independence from the corporate group. 
4.2.4.3 Results and insights 
In practice, information strategy is not solely a functional strategy. Strategic IP decisions take 
place on all organizational levels. This is plausible, because there are a number of IP deci-
sions that are not functional, but cut across all organizational levels and are certainly outside 
the accountability of the IT department (such as setting the budget or deciding on IT-based 
business initiatives).  
We conclude that information strategy does indeed have a functional component, but that stra-
tegic IP decisions are made on all organizational levels and go beyond functional or depart-
mental decision areas. 
4.2.5 Conception 5: Tenor towards IP 
A number of articles viewed information strategy as expressing management’s or industry 
requirements that imply an overall stance to be taken towards IP. The decision on the role of 
and general attitude towards IP then constitutes the content of information strategy. It was 
partly seen as an (ex-post) behavioral pattern and partly as deliberate posture. The reason of-
fered in the respective articles for this decision being considered strategic is that it provides 
coherence and guidance for subsequent IP decisions. 
4.2.5.1 Presence in practice 
In our interviews, the role of IP was not an explicit part of information strategy. As mentioned 
above (see conception 2), some interviewees had a sense of what the attitude towards IP was 
in their companies. But this attitude was a rather implicit notion and not made in the context 
of a deliberate strategy (e.g. in case 13, the overall stance was to not be a pioneer at the cut-
ting edge of technology innovation; in case 9, IT was regarded as a “tool”). 
However, we found principles in a number of decision areas that were meant to guide subse-
quent decisions within these areas. For example, we found that the decision on the role of the 
IT unit (decision area i, e.g., whether it should act as a service provider, as a business partner, 
etc.) was considered part of information strategies. Other examples of principles included the 
overall stance towards sourcing (“we prefer buy over make”) or the principle that IT services 
should be secure but in a cost-efficient manner.   
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4.2.5.2 Discussion 
The interviewee in case 8 provided a good summary explanation for why the decision on the 
tenor towards IP was not considered an explicit part of information strategy: he claimed that it 
was too dependent on the leadership’s personal opinions and on the company’s culture. Hence 
the tenor towards IP was rather a latent norm underlying many other decisions rather than 
seen as a deliberate decision that could explicitly guide other decisions. 
Case  Conception quote Conception summarized 
8 834: also das ist stark führungspersonabhängig und stark auch kul-
turabhängig. In den letzen Jahren kam das [daher] bei uns so nicht vor 
The role of IT is bound to the 
IT executive 
Table 43: Reasons for not deciding on the tenor towards IP 
The first expert confirmed that the role of IT is mostly an implicit rather than an explicit deci-
sion: 
“561: Das ist eine Werthaltung […] [die] schwingt mit, aber ist nicht explizit”67 
4.2.5.3 Results and insights  
Indeed, the role of IP is a normative decision if it only reflects the attitude of managers. In this 
function, it is a factor that may influence information strategy content but is not part of infor-
mation strategy itself. 
However, if the tenor goes beyond personal attitude by reflecting market requirements (see 
Section  2.3.5), it is a governance statement that is intended to ensure that potentials are built 
and decisions are made in compliance with market requirements. 
This also becomes clear in the underlying rationale of a tenor, namely to guide decision-
making by serving as a plank. This reasoning was present in practice, as well. We interpret 
the fact that practitioners included maxims or principles as part of their information strategy 
as evidence for the need for overall guidance of decisions. However, rather than only having a 
rather abstract statement on the role of IP, practitioners seem to require more operational 
break-downs in the forms of principles to guide decisions in different decision areas. As 
stated above, if this guidance aims at ensuring that decisions are made in accordance with 
market requirements or with building and maintaining required potentials, these maxims and 
principles are strategic governance decisions in our view of strategic purposes (cf. Section 
4.1). 
                                                 
67
 Translation by author: “That is a normative attitude […] that is latent, but not explicit” 
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Some authors support the idea of having principles to guide IP decisions in different decision 
areas. “Principles are simple, direct statements of an organization’s basic beliefs about how 
the company wants to use IT over the long term.” (Davenport et al. 1989, p. 131). The idea of 
“guiding principles for IT” (Broadbent and Kitzis 2005, p. 4) is also found in the concept of 
“IT maxims” (Broadbent and Kitzis 2004). A simple statement on the tenor towards IP (e.g. 
“IT is a strategic weapon”) is rather abstract and probably not operational enough. In contrast, 
breaking the tenor down into principles on the level of decision areas might help to “bridge 
the communication gap between top managers and technical experts” and ensures that “busi-
ness strategy [in our view: market requirements] drives technical strategy, as conventional 
wisdom says it should” (Davenport et al. 1989, p. 131) but also that required long-term poten-
tials are built and preserved (see the discussion of conception 1 in Section  4.2.1)  
* * * 
In summary, no conception from research matches the information strategies found in practice 
perfectly. Nevertheless, the conceptions do provide partial contributions for the strategic rele-
vance of IP decisions. Hence, we now look at strategic IP decisions from the point of view of 
practitioners and evaluate whether the reasoning used to argue their strategic relevance is ba-
cked in theoretical discussions. 
4.3 BACKING OF INFORMATION STRATEGY CONTENT AND REASONING FOUND 
IN PRACTICE 
After having scrutinized the proposals from research literature, we also need to discuss the 
content of information strategies in practice. The guiding question is whether there are good 
reasons for the content of practitioners’ information strategies to be regarded as strategic. The 
practitioners gave reasons for viewing the decisions they included in their information strate-
gies as strategic. However, are these reasons meaningful in the sense that they can be relied 
upon to claim a decision as being of strategic relevance? In order to answer this question, we 
have to look for a backing of practitioners’ reasoning. To this end, we look for theoretical 
backing in literature, asking whether we “can we find support for this way of arguing in cur-
rently accepted theories […]?” (Toulmin et al. 1984, p. 68) or theoretical discussions. We 
look for theories and theoretical discussions on strategy and strategic management (see Sec-
tion 4.1 for our view of strategy in the light of strategic management literature). These need 
not necessarily been applied in the literature on information strategy we identified in Chapter 
2. In fact, the discussions need not necessarily been applied to the field of Information Sys-
tems at all so far, even though this would facilitate for matching them to the argumentation 
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used by practitioners. On the basis of practitioners’ reasoning and the potential backing pro-
vided in literature, we then have to discuss and judge whether the respective decisions can be 
considered strategic according to our view of ‘strategic’ (cf. Section 4.1). 
In the following sections, we walk through the different causes or impacts mentioned by prac-
titioners and discuss for each pair of decision and reason whether it can be backed. For each 
decision area, we first briefly summarize the decisions elicited in our interviews which we 
grouped into the area as well as the reasons provided by practitioners for viewing them as 
strategic (see Chapter 3 for details). Then, we summarize the backing we found in literature 
for these decisions to be of strategic relevance. On the one hand, this backing might be given 
by literature we identified in our literature review (cf. Chapter 2). On the other hand, we rely 
on literature that does not primarily focus on information strategy content but may focus on 
the respective decision area (such as investment portfolio) and provides arguments for the 
strategic purpose of the decision. Furthermore, we might find arguments in strategic manage-
ment literature as providing backing. On the basis of the arguments provided in practice and 
literature, we discuss the strategic relevance of the decisions. This is accomplished by refer-
ring back to our view of strategy introduced in Section 4.1. The question here is whether the 
decisions contribute to a company’s market decisions, the potentials fulfill the market re-
quirements or the strategic governance that ensures that the potentials get built, preserved, and 
used in order to make market offerings. Our judgment of whether the decision is strategic 
from this perspective concludes the discussion. 
4.3.1 Application landscaping decisions (a) 
Decisions on the application landscape included decisions on which business processes 
should be supported by IT in terms of functionality. The question was which applications (as 
a combination of work processes and IT) to use and which applications should be replaced, 
extended or renovated. 
The reasons provided by practitioners for these decisions being strategic were the fulfillment 
of business strategy requirements (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 1: Effects related to 
business strategy), the satisfaction of business requirements (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, 
Ad 2: Decisions that help to satisfy business units’ requirements) and the need to stay flexible 
in face of unknown changes (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 4: Decisions that affect the 
company’s flexibility). 
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4.3.1.1 Backing in literature 
In proposals following the third conception (information strategy as a plan for the IP domain), 
we find a number of references to “application plans” including a “high-level specification of 
applications” (Lederer and Salmela 1996), decisions on retiring older systems (Wexelblat and 
Srinivasan 1999), “application areas of IT” (Reponen 1994), “selection of application areas” 
(Lucas and Turner 1982) as well as “[…] system requirements that are most critical to the 
success of the firm […]” (Pyburn 1983). 
Hence, the decision on which applications are needed for which processes (or for which re-
quirements, i.e. to solve which business problems) as well as the decision on keeping these 
applications up to date are included in proposals from literature. However, we do not get in-
sights into why they are included from these sources. 
We also find references to the application landscape in the literature on IS/IT architecture. 
Whole books are written whose titles point towards a strategic role of architecture (e.g. Keller 
2007; Ross et al. 2006)68. Architecture is defined there as the “organizing logic for business 
processes [digitized in the form of applications] and IT infrastructure” (Ross et al. 2006, p. 9). 
The original notion of architecture in the field of IS (Zachman 1987, p. 276) was “a logical 
construct (or architecture) for defining and controlling the interfaces and the integration of all 
the components of a system”. Different types of architecture exist (cf. Keller 2007): e.g. the 
architecture of the IT infrastructure, the architecture of individual applications or the func-
tional architecture. The interviewees talked about the functional architecture which is a “func-
tional general lay-out plan”69 (Keller 2007, p. 26). It defines not only the applications needed 
(which can be thought of as a matrix of processes and technical systems, which together form 
applications) but also the overlaps and interfaces between them (i.e. in the original definition 
by Zachman, the components (here: applications) of the ‘system’ and their interfaces). In that 
sense, the functional architecture comprises the application landscape.  
The application landscape and architecture are said to provide “a foundation for [business] 
execution” in that they are “digitized business processes automating a company’s […] capa-
bilities” (Ross et al. 2006, p. 4). They are prerequisites for success because they define what 
the company can do with IP. Using an analogy, Ross et al. (2006, p. 5, emphasis added) state 
that an “athlete will have muscles, reflexes, and skills that are not easily changed. But these 
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 The titles are “IT-Unternehmensarchitektur: Von der Geschäftsstrategie zur optimalen IT Unterstützung” and 
“Enterprise Architecture as Strategy” respectively 
69
 Translated by author; originally “fachlicher Generalbebauungsplan” 
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capabilities give athletes a tremendous ability to react, improvise, and innovate in their cho-
sen sport. Similarly, digitizing business processes requires making clear decisions about what 
capabilities are needed to succeed.” Interestingly, digitizing business processes in applica-
tions is argued to make the individual processes less flexible, while the whole company ex-
tends its room for action. This coincides with practitioners reasoning of assuring that applica-
tions can still be used even though the environment changes: practitioners tried to design the 
application landscape so that it is adaptable and increases the company’s flexibility. 
4.3.1.2 Discussion and judgment 
The decisions on the application landscape influence how business processes will be run in 
the future. Here, it is not argued that each application has a strategic (e.g. competitive) impact. 
For example, the introduction of an accounting application creates value through the account-
ing processes supported through the application (e.g. cost savings), not necessarily through 
the differentiation of the company from competitors. Hence, simply because the decision 
helps to fulfill business requirements is not a reason for viewing the decision as a strategic 
decision.  
However, the decisions on the application landscape may be viewed as the decision of which 
applications (resources) the company needs in order to make the intended market offerings or 
to fulfill market requirements. The application landscape (as a set of resources) then defines 
the potential of the company to act on the market with the help of IT. Ross et al. (2006, p. 6) 
talk about “IT [based] capabilities” rather than “IT [based] solutions”, implying that it is not 
solving the business problem (or satisfying business units’ requirements (see Section  3.2.3, 
Ad 2: Decisions that help to satisfy business units’ requirements) that the application ad-
dresses that is strategic, but the overall capability of the company that allows to perform cer-
tain market activities in a more routine way.  
The architecture of these applications is a form of organizing resources (in this case applica-
tions). Just as the organization of human resources that represent potentials for the conduct of 
a market strategy would be part of our view of strategy (see Section 4.1), the organization of 
applications for that purpose is also strategic: it serves the same purpose, namely to enable the 
company to make the intended market offerings or to fulfill market requirements.  
In conclusion, the decision on which applications are needed in order to support the intended 
market strategies and how they are arranged (in an architecture) is a strategic decision target-
ing to build potentials as well as their organization. 
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4.3.2 Application system standards (b) 
We subsumed three decisions within this decision area which all center around introducing 
common characteristics for applications. Again, applications include not only IT systems but 
also the work processes supported by them. The decisions were which applications can be 
standardized, i.e. which processes are already or shall be made similar so that they can be sup-
ported by the same IT systems; for which processes can standard software be used and where 
is custom-built software required; which applications need to be made compliant to external 
auditing standards? 
The main reasons for viewing the first two decisions as strategic were that application (and 
hence business process) standardization might interfere with a differentiation strategy on the 
one hand but allows to extract synergies across business units or functions on the other hand 
(see Section  3.2.3, Ad 1: Effects related to business strategy). The main reason for viewing 
the third decision as strategic was that compliance to external standards was a necessary pre-
requisite to fulfill the strategic objective of going public on the stock exchange in the near 
future (see Section  3.2.3, Ad 1: Effects related to business strategy). 
4.3.2.1 Backing in literature 
Application standards were not mentioned explicitly as a decision area in any of the concep-
tions of information strategy found in literature. The decision may be hidden behind terms 
such as “applications architecture” which are included in some of the lists of information 
strategy content listed in Table 9 (conception 3: information strategy as a plan for the whole 
IP domain). We might interpret application architecture decisions to include those on the 
standardization of applications.  
However, we find discussions on application and business process standardization being re-
lated to strategy in at least two streams of the broader literature.  
One stream stems from Business Process Reengineering (BPR). Here, it is stated that “Com-
panies made up of many different business units will face an important strategic question 
[…]: Should all units do things the same way, or should they be allowed to tailor their proc-
esses to their own needs?”, a question termed “The Question of Process Standardization” 
(Hammer and Stanton 1999, p. 114). As processes are reengineered in BPR with the help of 
IT systems (see Section 4.1), process standardization goes hand in hand with application stan-
dardization. The value of standardizing applications lies inter alia in lowered overhead costs 
(fewer process owners, fewer different IT systems, etc.). However, beyond increased opera-
tional efficiency, application standardization is said to serve strategic purposes, as well. On 
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the one hand, it creates the opportunity for the company to extract synergies from the different 
business units, e.g. through “one face to its suppliers and customers” (Hammer and Stanton, 
p. 114). This way, standardized applications enable the company to meet market requirements 
and adapt their market offerings (e.g. by starting to combining products in cross-selling, or by 
following a corporate-wide customer-intimacy strategy (Treacy and Wiersema 1993)). In ad-
dition, standardized applications and processes are also said to increase the flexibility of a 
company, especially with regards to changing market demands: “when all business units are 
performing a process in the same way, a company can easily reassign people from one unit to 
another to respond to shifts in demand. Its organizational structure becomes much more plas-
tic.” (Hammer and Stanton 1999, p. 115). 
On the other hand, process diversity allows different kinds of customers to be served differ-
ently. Here, standardizing applications would interfere with a company’s “ability to meet di-
verse customers’ needs” (p. 115). 
Similar arguments can be found in literature rooted in enterprise architecture which entails 
“reflecting the integration and standardization requirements of the company […] (Ross et al. 
2006, p. 9). Here, it is argued that standardizing applications is the main measure for integrat-
ing and standardizing business processes (and hence also the data processed by the applica-
tions): “The key to process integration from a technology perspective is […] standardization” 
(Weill and Ross 2004, p. 31). Again, the standardization and integration of business processes 
seems to be a main issue for corporations that comprise multiple business units: “A key stra-
tegic decision for multi-business unit enterprises is how to structure business unit relation-
ships” through either business unit synergy or autonomy (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 170). Ross 
et al. (2006) propose that business processes and applications need to be standardized espe-
cially if the corporation follows a “unification” or “replication” approach in extending its 
scope (i.e. when growing). In contrast, “diversified businesses may have much less need for 
standardization across organizational entities” (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 31). For example, if a 
company aims to have a common customer view and approach across business units, it can 
support this by assuring that the same applications are used across different business units. In 
summary, application standardization is especially needed when synergies across business 
units are central to market requirements.  
Using standard software (vs. custom-built software) is a different form of standardizing the 
applications, namely by adopting an external standard. This means that the applications of 
different companies become standardized to some degree. However, the arguments of the 
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practitioner focused more on the aspects of costs (standard software being less expensive) and 
the above mentioned hampering of the potential for differentiation.  
Literature that discusses the strategic relevance of using standard-software agrees that the use 
of standard-software may actually counter gaining a competitive advantage through differen-
tiation because standard software is a common resource available to all competitors (Carr 
2003; Mata et al. 1995). Following the arguments of Carr (2003), the more standard software 
a company uses, the less likely it will be able to accrue an IT-based competitive advantage. 
Another argument found in literature (e.g. Oosterout 2006) that was not mentioned by practi-
tioners is that the use of standard software may increase the flexibility of companies to 
quickly connect to and disconnect from external partners also using compatible standard soft-
ware. The use of custom-built software may make the development of interfaces needed to 
connect to external stakeholders more difficult and may as well tie the two companies to-
gether by increasing switching costs and hence lowering their flexibility in choice of partners 
(Mata et al. 1995).  
We did not find further arguments in literature backing the adherence to external auditing 
standards as a strategic decision. 
4.3.2.2 Discussion and judgment 
The arguments found in literature back the argumentation provided by practitioners, namely 
that the decision to standardize applications determines the degree to which synergies can be 
extracted on the one hand and the potential for differentiation on the other hand. Interestingly, 
application standards have not been argued much to lead to cost reductions (as a form of syn-
ergies). In fact, we find studies citing that the standardization (and ensuing integration) of 
applications and processes in fact requires investments (resulting in a cost increase) in the 
hopes of a later ‘strategic’ pay-off through synergies such as a common view of the customer 
that e.g. allows for better exploitation of cross-selling opportunities70, etc: “companies typi-
cally make big investments […] as part of [… application and business process] standardiza-
tion efforts” (Ross et al. 2006, p. 95). 
Because standardization is unlikely to be the result of fortuitous happenstance, it has to be 
planned for (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 31). Applications (and the processes supported by them) 
cannot be changed quickly and easily across corporations, hence making the decision to (not) 
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 In this examples, standardized applications help to enhance “customer intimacy”, which is one possible strat-
egy according to who extend Porter’s (1985) generic strategies. 
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standardize not easily reversible. This emphasizes that having the right applications standard-
ized adds to a capability to repeatedly extract synergies from different businesses. Companies 
that do not possess this capability (e.g. because applications are not standardized and cannot 
be integrated easily) are likely to need considerable time and effort to extract synergies from 
their different business units (or might not be able at all to e.g. provide a common view and 
treatment of the customer). On the other hand, companies that need differentiation in their 
market offerings, application standardization would hurt the potential for differentiation. 
Similar arguments apply to the choice of standard-software vs. custom built software: custom 
built-software may increase the general potential to differentiate while standard software may 
decrease it. Hence, the respective processes must be carefully selected in order to preserve the 
company’s differentiation potential. The argument that the use of standard software serves the 
purpose of quick-connect and disconnect points towards building and preserving the generic 
capability of flexibility. Hence, the trade-off in this decision is between the support of the 
potential to differentiate through individual functionalities and work processes of custom-built 
applications vs. the maintenance of a generic capability that might be needed for future mar-
ket offerings. The argument of cost-decrease through the use of standard software serves less 
a strategic purpose (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 1: Effects related to business strategy) .  
The decision that applications have to adhere to external standards in order to allow the com-
pany being listed on the stock exchange is a necessary requirement in order to execute the 
initiative of going public. Going public may be seen as a way to meet market requirements. 
Complying to standards is a formal criterion that has to be met in order to execute this initia-
tive. The aim of the company here is to comply to rules set by regulators. Hence, the decision 
to comply to external audit standards is not a strategic IP decision per se. However, it forms 
an important part (complement) of a potential that is formed to fulfill market requirements 
and hence can be seen to serve a strategic purpose. 
In conclusion, the decision of whether to standardize applications is a strategic IP decision. It 
plays a major part in organizing resources (applications) to build and maintain potentials that 
are intended to be used in market offerings. The decision on whether to use standard software 
or custom-built software is as well a decision on resources that have an influence on market 
offerings. The decision that applications have to adhere to auditing standards is part of an 
overall initiative to build a potential for meeting market requirements by going public. 
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4.3.3 Technical architecture standards (c) 
We had subsumed decisions on IT architecture design paradigms (e.g. whether to adopt a ser-
vice-oriented architecture or a monolithic architecture) as well as decisions on IT standards 
within this decision area. The decisions on IT standards included the decision on the extent of 
standardization (should we standardize and how far should standardization go), the choice of 
technologies and the timing of standard adoption. These standards were limited to the level of 
IT infrastructure, i.e. basic hardware and software shared across applications (see Chapter 1). 
This includes computer hardware, operating systems, data base management systems, etc. 
The reasons for viewing the decision on the architecture principles as strategic were focused 
on flexibility and cost reduction (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 3: Effects concerned with 
IP cost containment, Ad 4: Decisions that affect the company’s flexibility). The decisions on 
setting technology standards were mainly reasoned by stating that setting standards reduces 
complexity (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 5: Decisions that help to avoid or mitigate IP 
complexity) and hence helps to preserve the company’s overall ability to act on the basis of 
IP. As this was achieved through regulating business units, standards were seen to provide a 
counter-balance to simply fulfilling market strategy (see the discussion on “deliberate dis-
alignment” in Section 4.2.1). 
4.3.3.1 Backing in literature 
IT architectural decisions were considered in the third conception, “information strategy as a 
plan for the whole IP domain.” For example, we find IT architecture and architectural stan-
dards as part of “IT strategy” in Earl’s (1989) model or as part of “IT scope” in the informa-
tion strategy construct described in the strategic alignment model by Henderson and 
Venkatraman (1993). We find the term “architecture” also in a number of proposed lists (see 
Chapter 2). However, as stated in Chapter 2, we do not find convincing reasons in these pro-
posals as to which decisions exactly are strategic and why.  
In the broader literature, we find some discussion of IT architecture principles and standardi-
zation. Certain IT architectural paradigms (especially service-oriented architecture (e.g. 
Oosterhout 2006)) are also argued in literature as having a strategic effect, especially on the 
generic ability of the company to react flexibly to any kind of environmental or internal 
changes (Duncan 1995; Hagel and Brown 2001; Ross et al. 2006). These paradigms and the 
underlying technologies such as Web-Services promise to increase a company’s agility by 
modularizing components but with loose coupling based on standardized interfaces (Hagel 
  215 
and Brown 2001)71: this shall allow to quickly connect and re-connect parts (“plug-and-play”) 
of the infrastructure. Such agility is helpful if new applications or changes to an application 
are needed, which is likely to be the case in a turbulent environment. It has been argued that 
“traditional [hard-wired] IT architecture [acts] as a barrier to flexibility” in fast-changing 
markets (Hagel and Brown 2003). In stable environments, these investments into agility might 
be an unnecessary burden because they would rarely be needed. Furthermore, the literature 
cites Citibank as an example to show that the adoption of new architectural paradigms may 
form a potential for extending the scope of the company: the bank offers a payment-
processing service as a Web Service to other companies (Hagel and Brown 2001). This was 
made possible only through the adoption of a new service-oriented architecture, which opened 
up a new market for the bank (in this example, it represented part of the ability to start a new 
market offering, namely to introduce a new product). 
The decision on whether to standardize technologies has been argued to determine a com-
pany’s ability to extract synergies from diverse businesses (Weill and Broadbent 1998, see 
also the discussion of application standardization above). For example, for geographic expan-
sion (which is affecting the scope of the company), depending on the degree of integration 
pressures and the need for local responsiveness, the authors distinguish between global, trans-
national, international and multinational business strategies. They argue that a standardized IT 
infrastructure is needed by companies that want to follow a globalization or transnational 
strategy with high needs for integration of processes and that such an integration is enabled 
through technology standardization. The decision on how far to standardize the infrastructure 
is said to determine the company’s “reach and range” (Keen 1991, p. 180). Reach and range 
determine “to whom can we easily connect?” and “what services can we share automatically 
and seamlessly?” (Weill and Broadbent 1998, p. 92). It is claimed that companies often find a 
gap between the actual reach and range and that needed by the company to make new market 
offerings. In that case: “strategies cannot be implemented, new products and services are de-
layed” (Weill and Broadbent 1998, p. 93). Hence, the decision on standardizing the IT infra-
structure architecture is said to build a potential for making certain market offerings or fulfill 
market requirements (such as the need to extract synergies from business units). 
Regarding the argument of cost reduction, literature confirms that IT infrastructure accounts 
for a huge part of the total IP expenses (on average almost 60% of companies’ IP costs) and is 
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 Interestingly, the decision to move to a Web Service-based IT architecture has been labeled “Your next IT 
Strategy” (Hagel and Brown 2003). 
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growing at almost 10% yearly (Weill and Broadbent 1998, p. 82). The standardization of 
technologies can help to reduce these costs. However, in the literature, this is more regarded 
as a “bottom-line”, operational effect rather than a strategic potential.  
Regarding the argument of complexity reduction, we find a surprising discussion in strategic 
management literature: when following the RBV, complexity is mentioned as contributing to 
the imperfect imitability of strategic resources (Barney 1986; Barney 1991) and hence is a 
reason for resources being a source of sustainable competitive advantage. We find similar 
statements regarding IT infrastructure and its architecture (Piccoli and Ives 2005): a complex 
infrastructure may represent a “barrier to imitation” of strategic business initiatives that rely 
heavily on the infrastructure. 
The link between complexity and flexibility has been mentioned elsewhere in the literature on 
agility reporting that “relatively simple [i.e. non-complex] IT architecture had enabled [com-
panies] to deal with […] the need to quickly implement new requirements” (Oosterhout 2006, 
p. 141). Others report that “[i]n most cases, systems built to achieve immediate [also strate-
gic] business needs [meant as ‘without following IT standards’] have become expensive, re-
dundant and difficult to maintain [emphasis added]” (Ross et al. 2006, p. 93). This complex-
ity-induced difficulty gets paired with the long-term commitment companies enter into when 
they choose technology standards and hence imposes a constrain on flexibility: “[…] their 
[technology strategy issues’] importance stems from the fact that an organization’s commit-
ment to a specific technology may involve a time span considerably in excess of [other in-
vestments]” (Hayward 1987, p. 107). All this indicates that the decision to set technology 
standards has strategic implications, but mostly for future (yet unknown) business strategies 
rather than for supporting today’s market strategy. 
Turning to the decision on which technologies to adapt, we find some backing by technology 
strategy literature (e.g. Friar and Horwitch 1985; Hatfield et al. 2001). Here the choice of 
technologies is argued to be a strategic decision if the company intends to base future market 
offerings on the technology. Especially if no dominant technology has emerged so far or if the 
technology is in an early, immature life-cycle stage (also called “leading edge technologies” 
(Hatfield et al. 2001)), the company has to build research and development (R&D) capacities 
in order to exploit the potential of the technology for market offerings or for meeting market 
requirements. 
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4.3.3.2 Discussion and judgment 
The strategic relevance of the choice of technology paradigm to follow (e.g. SOA vs. mono-
lithic architecture) finds some support in the literature. Here the arguments even go beyond 
those of practitioners who argue with an increase in flexibility. Literature even states that new 
paradigms may offer opportunities for new market offerings. Hence, the decision on architec-
ture principles has a dual strategic role: on the one hand it adds to the generic role of flexibil-
ity. The ability to quickly rearrange (connect and disconnect) parts of the architecture contrib-
utes to the company’s flexibility for reacting to changes in the markets. On the other hand, it 
may represent a potential for new market offerings. 
Again, both practitioners and literature stress that a standardized infrastructure may contribute 
to a company’s capability to extract synergies from different parts of the business (e.g. differ-
ent geographies) but may not be appropriate if these parts require local responsiveness. The 
decision whether and to which degree to standardize is part of building and preserving poten-
tials of a company. It should be noted that here, it is not the decision on which technologies to 
use, but rather on the homogeneity of technologies. 
Regarding the argument of complexity, we find some difference between literature and prac-
tice. Some authors emphasize the role of complexity in providing barriers to imitation. How-
ever, practitioners argued in a very different way: a complex IT architecture may represent a 
burden to the company in actually fulfilling market requirements. In this sense, IT architec-
ture complexity may represent a “strategic liability” (see Section 4.1). Setting technology 
standards is then a measure to ensure that IT architecture does not become too complex and 
hence does not become a strategic liability. This strategic liability might be unwittingly 
caused by business units in their “short sightedness” for current market offerings (see discus-
sion on “deliberate dis-alignment” in Section 4.2.1). This furnishes an example of the tension 
between different strategic purposes (in this case between a generic capability and particular 
market offerings). This explains that countering business strategy is actually putting the em-
phasis on preserving longer-term, generic capabilities rather than supporting immediate mar-
ket needs. This is also supported by Ross et al. (2006, p. 9) stating that “architecture provides 
a long-term view of a company’s processes, systems, and technologies so that [one can] build 
capabilities – not just fulfill immediate needs”. In this sense, the decision to set (and enforce) 
technology standards and the extent to which they are set preserves a generic capability. Here, 
the generic capability is the company’s overall ability to act on the basis of IT. If the architec-
ture becomes too complex, this ability is hampered and the company is stymied in making any 
market offering based on IT (“growing complexity in companies’ systems can fossilize [the 
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company]” (Ross et al. 2006, p. 11)). Here, it becomes clear that the value of setting technol-
ogy standards extends beyond the immediate operational impact. Hence, we view setting 
technology standards as a strategic decision aimed at preserving the general potential of the 
company to provide market offerings on the basis of IT (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 5: 
Decisions that help to avoid or mitigate IP complexity). The decision on which technologies 
actually get chosen seems to be of less relevance for reducing complexity or for enhancing the 
capability to extract synergies: as long as a certain standard is established, it does not matter 
which technology is chosen. 
For cost reduction, literature did not relate cost reduction through standardization to strategy. 
Practitioners themselves had their doubts whether this is a strategic purpose and was regarded 
it as “second priority” (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 3: Effects concerned with IP cost 
containment). It is indeed reasonable to expect cost reductions from setting IT architecture 
standards in the long run. These cost reductions are mainly a result of economies of scale. 
Setting architecture standards is not leading directly to cost reductions but is meant to ensure 
containing IP costs continuously in the future. Hence, the decision to strictly set and enforce 
IP standards may contribute to an overall capability to keep IP costs down. Such a capability 
is certainly relevant when following a low cost strategy, especially if, as literature supports, IP 
costs represent a large portion of overall costs.  
As for the decision on which technology to choose, practitioners and literature exhibit some 
differences. Practitioners argued that the choice of technology is an outflow of business strat-
egy and binds the company long term. They went down to the level of products (“our IT strat-
egy is Oracle” (case 8)). Literature on technology strategy stresses more the value of a certain 
type of technology for making market offerings, i.e. in building a capability (e.g. through ex-
tensive research and development) to exploit this technology in future market offerings (such 
as introducing new products, product innovations, etc.). Some of the introductory examples 
from practice in Chapter 1 (such as Wal-Mart investing in RFID) support this argument. Here, 
the choice of a technology does not only represent a significant commitment, but is made with 
the intent to build a capability and exploit it in a number of strategic initiatives (such as redes-
igning the shopping process, changing the integration of suppliers, etc.). However, this intent 
may indeed be bound to “cutting edge” technologies. 
In conclusion, all three decisions, whether to standardize and to what degree, which technolo-
gies to adopt and which architectural paradigm to follow, are strategic decisions. The degree 
of standardization is relevant for a capability to extract synergies from different parts of the 
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business and preserving the ability of different parts of the business to differentiate; it also 
preserves the company’s generic ability to act based on IP by helping to contain complexity; 
the choice of technology has strategic significance for building a potential for making new 
market offerings; the choice of architectural paradigm is strategic for preserving the generic 
ability of flexibility as well as serving as a basis for market offerings.  
4.3.4 Process standards (d) 
Also included in practitioners’ information strategies was the decision to adopt a certain stan-
dard for IT processes such as ITIL for IT operations or PRINCE2 for project management.  
The reasons for regarding this decision as strategic were the hope to increase flexibility (see 
reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 4: Decisions that affect the company’s flexibility) with a new 
software development methodology or to be able to sustain the delivery of IP services in a 
professional way by adopting best practices. This shall allow the company to stay well posi-
tioned to handle future business requirements (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 5: Decisions 
that help to avoid or mitigate IP complexity).   
Another decision, namely to standardize IT operations processes across different IT units 
within a company was regarded as strategic because it helps to reduce IP costs (see reasoning 
in Section  3.2.3, Ad 3: Effects concerned with IP cost containment). 
4.3.4.1 Backing in literature 
There is no explicit reference to IP process standards in any information strategy conception. 
We could interpret hints on “organizational plans” in the third conception (information strat-
egy as a plan for the IP domain) as including decisions on process organization of the infor-
mation function (or the IT unit), which might cover the decision on which standards to adopt 
and whether to standardize IP processes across different IT units. Furthermore, the model of 
information strategy proposed by Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) includes “I/S proc-
esses”, i.e. work processes central to the operation of IP. However, as stated earlier, it is un-
clear in this model whether this (“internal”) part is included in information strategy or not (i.e. 
whether the strategy only includes the “external” domain).  
In the IS literature on competitive advantage, “the ability to provide efficient […] IS opera-
tions on an ongoing basis [… to] develop a cost leadership position” and the “the ability to 
avoid […] cost overruns, unnecessary downtime, and system failure [are] likely to be an im-
portant precursor to superior performance.” (Wade and Hulland 2004, see Chapter 2).  
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In the broader literature, the decision to restructure the IP processes has been found to in-
crease the responsiveness of the IT unit (Earl 2003, p. 59; Lyytinen and Rose 2006; Ooster-
hout et al. 2006). For example, adopting agile software development processes was found to 
help the company to become more responsive to external change in that it can deliver IP 
based solutions faster: “changes in their [company’s] system delivery processes influence or 
are influenced by environmental demands for agility” (Lyytinen and Rose 2006, p. 184) and 
“ISD [IS development agility […] may help achieve better responsiveness during exploita-
tion” (p. 1 97). 
As mentioned in the decision on application standardization, the literature on business process 
reengineering talks about standardization of business processes. However, here, we talk about 
IT support processes and not the use of IT in business processes (i.e. applications). 
4.3.4.2 Discussion and judgment 
The conduct of the processes mentioned (IT project development, IT operations) is not strate-
gic. These are operational processes that are meant e.g. to deliver new applications or main-
tain the existing applications and infrastructure technologies. Hence, at first sight, decisions 
on IP processes might not seem to be strategic.  
Decisions on IP processes touch the information function’s way of delivering resources and 
services needed by other functions. The sought-for value of the IP processes does not lie in 
the processes themselves, but in the end-products of the processes. 
Adopting standards for operational IP processes (such as ITIL for the service desk or configu-
ration management) may improve the ability of the IT unit to deliver IP services in a profes-
sional way. These standards are collections of “best practices” (i.e. prescriptions for conduct-
ing processes in a certain way) that promise to decrease failure rates of processes. If this 
promise is delivered, an impact on firm performance may result (e.g. through increased user 
productivity because of less or shorter outages). If this impact can be retained continuously, 
then the company has increased its ability of producing resources that are prerequisites for 
fulfilling market requirements or making market offerings. Hence, decisions on the profes-
sionalization of IP processes add to the company’s generic capability of building IT-based 
resources and capabilities. In this sense, the strategic relevance to the company is even more 
indirect than e.g. in the decision to standardize technologies. It is a question of how certain 
services (that deliver IP resources that might in turn be used to generate value on the market) 
are conducted within the information function.  
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The decision to standardize IP processes across the whole company (independent of whether 
an external process methodology was adopted) was mainly argued to reduce IP costs. This is 
not a strategic impact if regarded as a one-off effect. The standardization of IP operations may 
help to reduce cost in the future by giving more control and hence may provide value beyond 
reducing cost, namely by adding to the ability to keep cost low in the future, as well. How-
ever, this value seems to be provided more through the decision on centralizing the responsi-
bility (see decision area j below) of operations rather than by standardizing the processes. 
In conclusion, these decisions are not directly related to a specific capability or resource nor 
directly related to specific market offerings. Decisions on the adoption of standards for IP 
processes influence the company’s generic capability to produce IP resources. They also in-
fluence a company’s flexibility, which is a generic capability, as well. In that sense, decisions 
on the organization of IP processes determine how those potentials can be built that are 
needed to make certain market offerings. These fundamental IP process decisions are about 
the organizational set-up needed to deliver IP resources and in this way fits our view of strat-
egy (see Section 4.1).  
4.3.5 Investment portfolio decisions (e) 
The interviewees argued for the decision on which requests for IP investments should receive 
funding. The decision hence includes a prioritization of the allocation of financial resources to 
investment requests from different company-internal stakeholders. The main focus of the in-
vestment requests was on requests for applications (because business units typically would 
not request technology alone without having to solve a concrete business problem). The inter-
viewees themselves referred to this decision as the decision on the (application) portfolio. 
The reasons given for viewing these decisions as strategic were that it takes the current busi-
ness strategy into account and ensures that those investments that are needed to execute this 
strategy receive funding (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 1: Effects related to business 
strategy). Furthermore, the investments were argued to be what business users actually want 
from the IT unit and hence, the application portfolio was seen as the primary decision area 
that helps to satisfy business users’ requirements (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 2: Deci-
sions that help to satisfy business units’ requirements).   
4.3.5.1 Backing in literature 
The application portfolio is one of the core decision areas mentioned in articles following the 
third conception (information strategy as a plan for the IP domain): “It is conventional wis-
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dom and practice” to see the core contents of information systems strategy as “an application 
development portfolio”. The synonyms found for this term range from “systems development 
pan” (Conrath et al. 1992), “application plan” (Lederer and Salmela 1996), “application strat-
egy” (Hayward 1987) to “application portfolio” (Earl 1989). A reason provided for the strate-
gic relevance of this decision area is that it is the “what”, i.e. what the users want from IP – 
one of the reasons provided by practitioners, as well.  
The literature on IP portfolio management refers back to the original purpose of portfolio 
management, which is to balance investments (Ghemawat 2006, pp. 8; Haspeslagh 1982): 
“managing IT as a portfolio [… is] similar to a financial portfolio [… in that it is] striving to 
improve the performance of the portfolio by balancing risk and return” (Jeffery and Leliveld 
2004, p. 41).  
4.3.5.2 Discussion and judgment 
Both, practitioners and academics use the argument that the application portfolio is the pri-
mary decision area that helps satisfying business units’ (or functional units’) requirements. 
However, giving business units ‘what they want’ is not necessarily strategic. Researchers 
themselves describe the application portfolio as a “shopping list” of applications and projects 
(Earl 1989, p. 68). Not all investment requests need to be strategic. Lederer and Sethi (1992, 
p. 25) explain that besides strategic applications the application portfolio “might embrace the 
selection of prosaic [non strategic] applications”. 
However, as we stated above, practitioners went one step beyond, arguing that the decision on 
which investment requests receive funding is one of the primary means to ensure that re-
quirements necessary for market strategy (e.g. making certain market offerings) actually re-
ceive funding and hence get implemented. In other words, the decision on the portfolio takes 
care that those investments receive funding that are needed to deliver the given business strat-
egy. In this sense, decision on which requests receive funding is part of strategy governance. 
It ensures that those potentials that are needed to fulfill market requirements or make market 
offerings are in fact built and used. The portfolio would then be a means to ensure that not 
only what the business units want gets funding but what gets funding contributes to the com-
pany meeting market requirements. Hence, the simple view of risk-return becomes more 
complicated in the realm of strategy. The portfolio would have to ensure that the exploitation 
of current potentials for making intended market offerings is balanced with building and 
maintaining potentials that might serve to support future market offerings. The portfolio un-
derstood in this way would help to counter the “short sightedness” of some stakeholders 
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which was used as an argument by practitioners (e.g. case 4) to argue other decision areas 
(e.g. architecture standards) as strategic. This logic of balancing immediate strategic needs 
and long-term strategic needs of the company (by preserving certain long-term organizational, 
IP-based capabilities) is applicable to the portfolio decision, as well. The IT portfolio decision 
does not support any specific market offering, but ensures the right balance between investing 
in the different potentials and exploiting them.  
Another strategic decision which is underlying the portfolio management decision is ‘which 
investments are needed to help make the market offerings’ rather than the decision on which 
applications should be developed at all. The application portfolio decision may be inseparably 
linked in practice to this decision. This may be because the portfolio decision is more concrete 
and manifests the decision in a resource allocation decision.  
In conclusion, the IT application portfolio comprises a number of strategic decisions At least 
in practice, the decision is linked to the selection of those investments that are needed to make 
the intended market offerings. It is a means to ensure that those investments that are needed to 
make certain IP-based market offerings in fact do get funding. Second, it ensures a balance 
between those investments that are exploiting current potentials and those that are building 
future potentials. Here, the decision is part of a strategic governance framework. 
4.3.6 Budgetary decisions (f) 
Practitioners included the decision on how much to spend on IP (the size of the IP budget) 
and the distribution of the IP budget to units spending it (business areas or functions) or cost 
categories (such as personnel, hardware, etc.) in their information strategies. 
However, they did not provide any reasons from cause (see Section 3.2.3). They argued that 
budgetary decisions serve the guidelining function in that the IP budget is a long-term plan 
and represents a resource allocation and prioritization. 
4.3.6.1 Backing in literature 
Budgetary decisions are only mentioned scarcely in proposals following the third conception 
(information strategy as a plan for the IP domain) (Smits et al. 1997; Smits and van der Poel 
1996). Hints at budgetary decisions are also provided by terms like “financial plans” which 
are proposed to be part of information strategy (Conrath et al. 1992). 
In strategic management literature, budgets are either seen as part of short-term planning or as 
an instrument that ensures strategy implementation. In short-term planning the budget is seen 
as a means to concretize the strategy, by translating the intended measures (what do we need 
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to do) into detailed monetary, quantitative figures. Here, the budget is understood as a way to 
assess the monetary impact of implementing the intended actions, to control them afterwards 
and to coordinate and steer the activities of the various parts of the business system (Welge 
and Al-Laham 1999, pp. 587). As an instrument for ensuring strategy implementation, the 
budget is seen as a way to hand over (financial) responsibility to certain stakeholders with the 
intention to make them accountable for the execution of business strategy. 
4.3.6.2 Discussion and judgment 
The decision of “how much to spend on IP” is not a strategic decision in itself. Budgets also 
include many non-strategic aspects and may allocate resources according to non-strategic pur-
poses.  
Adding to the argument found in literature, the budget is considered typically on a short-term 
(one year) basis and hence does not comply with the time horizons of strategy.  
However, in practice, the yearly budget planning may be the only time when actual strategic 
decisions get made. Hence, budget planning and strategic planning become mingled in prac-
tice.  
However, there are strategic decisions underlying budgetary decisions. One is the question of 
which financial resources are needed in order to build other (non-financial) IP-based re-
sources and capabilities required for making the intended market offerings or fulfilling market 
requirements. Here, the decision on the IP budget falls into the category of strategic IP poten-
tials. 
On the other hand, the decision on budgets (especially in decentralized planning) may act as a 
means to ensure that certain IP-based potentials get built and used. By allocating the IP 
budget to spending units (business areas or functional units such as sales, marketing, manu-
facturing), a decision on prioritizing their IP-based activities is made. Then, the budget deci-
sion is a governance instrument that is intended to encourage the build-up of IP-based poten-
tials in certain areas and to discourage it in other areas. It is in this way that we understand the 
statement of one interviewee (case 5) with regards to IP budget being part of strategy: “Of 
course [it is] part of strategy. Particularly if […] you have the impression that it is not used 
optimally everywhere […] But not under the aspect of ‘is a high or low IT budget good, that 
is not the focus, but really the question ‘is it used in a value-generating way?’” 
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We fully acknowledge the need and the tangibility of budget figures and hence understand the 
reason to include this decision, especially from the point of view of the IT unit, on the infor-
mation strategy agenda.  
However, besides these pragmatic reasons, the question of “how much to spend on IP” only is 
strategic if it is intended to reserve the financial resources necessary for building those IP re-
sources needed for making the intended IP-based market offerings or if it is meant to encour-
age building such IP resources in certain areas and discourage it in others according to a pre-
defined intention set by market strategy. 
4.3.7 Decisions on launching IS/IT projects that support market activities (g) 
The decision to launch IP-based projects for the market strategy of the company (e.g. an 
online shop or a new product) was also mentioned in two cases as part of information strat-
egy. The reasons for viewing this decision as strategic were that these projects are directly 
related to market strategy (e.g. to grow through a new distribution channel or with product 
development) (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 1: Effects related to business strategy). 
4.3.7.1 Backing in literature 
This decision is also found in the first conception of information strategy (the use of IT to 
deliver business strategy). Here, we also find the same reasoning, namely to use IT in initia-
tives that deliver the strategy. 
4.3.7.2 Discussion and judgment 
This is probably the most clear-cut example of strategic decisions: the decision on whether an 
IP-based project should be launched that supports the market strategy is directly related to the 
decision on which market offerings to make.  
In these cases, a new market offering is intended (e.g. to grow with a new product or with a 
new distribution channel). This market offering relies on IP (e.g. a new product requires the 
support of new applications) or is completely based on IP (e.g. the introduction of an Internet-
based distribution channel). Hence, the decision to launch this IP-based initiative is a strategic 
decision that is either part of the market offerings or part of the potentials needed in order to 
make that offering. 
4.3.8 HR and organizational plans (h) 
Decisions on the skills and organization of IT unit’s staff were also mentioned by practitio-
ners as being strategic. These included foremost the decision on the selection of a required 
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skill set. Only in case 4, the determination of a quantifiable skill gap (how many people are 
needed with which skills), whether to fill this skill gap by external recruiting or by internal 
skill development (e.g. trainings, etc.), the decision to introduce skill development plans for 
IP staff’s roles, the decision to introduce limited contracts for employees as well as the selec-
tion of important cultural values for the IT unit were included, as well. Also only in case 4, 
the organization of the IT unit (i.e. what are the organizational sub-units within the IT unit) 
was considered part of information strategy. 
Reasons were rarely provided for viewing these decisions as strategic: they centered around 
HR resources being a scarce and important resource whose availability and allocation needs 
to be planned carefully in advance. Rather than being important for any specific initiative, 
they were argued to be important for all kinds of IP-based initiatives. 
4.3.8.1 Backing in literature 
IP skills and organizational issues are found in many proposals in academic literature: 
Proposals following conception 3 mention “Organizational plan” (Conrath et al. 1992), “Or-
ganizational structure of the MIS unit” (Das et al. 1991), “HR strategy” (Galliers 1991) in-
cluding newly required skills and new roles and responsibilities, “Organizational structure” 
(Lucas and Turner 1982) or “I/S skills” which are choices regarding the acquisition, training 
of the knowledge required to manage and operate the infrastructure (Henderson and 
Venkatraman 1993; however, the authors did not make it clear whether this decision area was 
part of information strategy or not).  
Proposals following conception 4 (functional strategy) view staff and skills (as well as their 
organization) as resources of the function. Decisions on these resources form part of the func-
tional strategy: appropriate human resources have to be accumulated and allocated in order to 
fulfill the requirements from business (market) strategy. 
A reason provided for viewing decisions on IP skills as strategic is found in proposals follow-
ing the RBV in conception 2 (use of IT to gain competitive advantage): “Human IT re-
sources” (Melville et al. 2004), “technical skills”, and “IT management skills” (Melville et al. 
2004; Piccoli and Ives 2005; Wade and Hulland 2004) may be a source of competitive advan-
tage. Although early arguments stated that technical IT skills might not be a source of sus-
tained competitive advantage because they were claimed to be easily transferable between 
companies (Mata et al. 1995), more recent studies state that “some IS skills cannot be easily 
transferred […] and thus, these resources become a source of sustained competitive advan-
  227 
tage” (Wade and Hulland 2004, p. 132). This might not only hold true for managerial IP 
skills, but also for technical skills, e.g. the intimate knowledge of complex IT architectures 
which are idiosyncratic to the company, etc. 
4.3.8.2 Discussion and judgment 
IP skills are not a resource that directly contributes to fulfilling the intended market offerings 
of a company. Rather, they are needed to conduct the IP processes to develop those resources 
that are then in turn used for making market offerings. Hence, the contribution to market of-
ferings is again one further level more indirect than IP processes. The IP processes that are 
needed to develop the IP resources relevant for making market offerings determine the re-
quired IP skills. On the other hand, the existent IP skills determine what the company can in 
fact deliver with the help of IP. They define the area of IP-based activity. The organization of 
IP unit represents the arrangements of those skills in organizational units.  
Hence, determining the most critical skills of IP staff is a strategic decision because it deter-
mines the range of resources the activities the information function can build and maintain 
and hence which IP-based resources the company can use to make the intended market offer-
ings. Similarly we argued the arrangement of resources (their organization) as strategic in our 
view of strategy (Section 4.1). Accordingly, these decisions form strategic IP decisions. 
4.3.9 Decisions on the role of the IT unit (i) 
Practitioners included decisions on the mission of the IT unit, on its role (e.g. to be a service 
provider vs. an advisor), operating principles (e.g. regularly benchmarked, sole service pro-
vider) as well as on the internal customers served and the services and products provided. 
The only reason given was that these decisions provide a common ground across the company 
and that they fundamentally define the scope of the IT unit. 
In one case, the decision on letting the IT unit serve the external market was also regarded as 
strategic because it effectively changed the company’s business strategy. 
4.3.9.1 Backing in literature 
We find decisions on the role of the IT unit in conception 3 (information strategy as a plan for 
the whole IP domain) and conception 4 (functional strategy): e.g. Flynn and Hepburn (1994) 
include the definition of the IT unit’s role and Earl (1989, p. 120) includes defining a “mis-
sion statement for the IT function” in his IM strategy which defines the “relationship between 
the IS/IT function and the rest of the business” (Earl 1989, p. 118). 
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Further support is found in literature on functional strategies. As stated earlier, the notion of 
functional strategy was originally expressed by Vancil and Lorange (1975). Functional strat-
egy is about “determining the bases on which the function will support the desired [business 
unit strategy]” as well as “integrating and coordinating the function with other functions to 
which it interfaces” (Wheelwright 1984, p. 20). Newman et al. (1989, p. 136) state that 
“Business-unit [market] strategy […] is only an expression of intentions until people in the 
operating departments of the company carry it out. The departments are where goods and ser-
vices are produced, customer’s orders are obtained, new products are designed, employees 
trained, etc. So a bridge between business-unit strategy and department operations is crucial”. 
This bridge is built by the functional strategy. However, some authors refute the existence of 
strategic thinking on a functional level, claiming that managers at this level are not in a posi-
tion to look at the “big picture” (Hill and Jones 1989, p. 20). Similarly, Steinmann and 
Schreyögg (2002, pp. 232) also believe that there is no “strategic autonomy” on a functional 
level. 
For the other decision mentioned above (letting the IT unit serve the external market), busi-
ness strategy researchers would agree that decisions affecting the scope of the company are 
‘at the heart’ of business strategy (Hofer and Schendel 1978). In this case, the company made 
the decision to also become an IT service provider. Several authors support the view that the 
decision to build IT-based businesses is a strategic decision. Porter and Millar (1985) talk 
about “spawning new businesses” e.g. by selling overcapacity in IP services; DiRomualdo 
and Gurbaxani (1998) refer to companies becoming an IT outsourcing provider as following a 
“strategic intent of IT outsourcing” 
4.3.9.2 Discussion and judgment 
First of all, there is a difference between the IT unit and the information function. As defined 
in Chapter 1, the information function is the set of all IP activities. The IT unit may perform 
some (or even most) of these. Practitioners did not make this distinction and it is also not 
made clearly within the literature on functional strategy. This might be because the IT unit is 
a coherent and tangible part of the information function.  
We follow the arguments provided by proponents of the notion of a functional strategy: the 
functional strategy is not the operational activities themselves: it is a set of decisions that is 
meant to ensure that the operational activities really contribute to the desired ends defined 
through the company’s intended market offerings. Operational activities do this by actually 
building the resources and capabilities that serve as the potentials for these market offerings. 
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Determining the mission and role of functions and their organizational units guides decision-
making within these units to this end. Hence, setting up principles or maxims that are meant 
to ensure that decision-making is connected to market requirements (see discussion in Section 
4.2.5 on principles and maxims around the tenor of IP) is part of the strategy governance.  
The decision of a company to become an IT service provider by letting the IT unit serve the 
external market is also clearly a strategic decision: it directly changes the market offerings of 
the company. However, we would nevertheless argue that such a decision is not part of in-
formation strategy, but part of business strategy. If we considered it as part of information 
strategy, then all decisions referring to the scope made by IT service companies such as IBM, 
Microsoft and others would be part of information strategy. In these companies, information 
strategy would be inseparable from business strategy, eventually leading the concept of in-
formation strategy ad absurdum. Thus, we exclude this decision from being included in an 
information strategy although we view it as a strategic decision. 
4.3.10 Rights and accountability decisions (j) 
Practitioners argued for the allocation of responsibilities for making IP decisions to stake-
holders within the company to be a strategic decision itself. They also claimed the introduc-
tion of mechanisms for influencing the behavior of these stakeholders to be strategic. 
The reasons given for viewing these decisions as strategic were that how the decision rights 
had to be divided depends on the market strategy (e.g. a more decentral allocation if growth 
was emphasized): the allocation of decision rights (and the associated mechanisms) have to be 
“aligned” with market strategy (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 1: Effects related to busi-
ness strategy). However, at the same time, the allocation of decision rights was also seen as a 
way to manage complexity by establishing clear rules on who can decide what and to force 
the stakeholders to act in a desirable way for the whole company (see reasoning in Section 
 3.2.3, Ad 5: Decisions that help to avoid or mitigate IP complexity).  
4.3.10.1 Backing in literature 
Rights and accountability decisions are found in conception 3, under “Management Strategy” 
(Hayward 1987) or “IM strategy” (Earl 1989) which includes e.g. the decision on the degree 
of decentralization of decisions. An example for IP control mechanisms is mentioned e.g. by 
Lucas and Turner (1982): they state that the decision to introduce “charging” mechanisms for 
IP services helps to stay in control of IP. Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) refer to “I/T 
governance” as part of information strategy.  
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In conception 2 (using IT to gain competitive advantage), authors following the RBV argue 
that the “Management of internal relationships” (Wade and Hulland 2004) and the “Relation-
ship asset” (Piccoli and Ives 2005) may be a source of competitive advantage. Allocating de-
cisions between different stakeholders may help to manifest “rapport […] between the IS 
function and the business” (Piccoli and Ives 2005). 
Decisions on rights and accountabilities are also discussed outside the literature on informa-
tion strategy, typically under the label of IP “governance” (e.g. Ross and Weill 2002; Weill 
and Ross 2004). The allocation of decision rights as well as the introduction of steering 
mechanisms is said to set incentives that influence the behavior of the decision makers: 
“specifying the decision rights and accountability [… helps] to encourage desirable behaviour 
in the use of IT” (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 8).   
In strategic management, these issues are discussed from the point of view of principal agent 
theory (Welge and Al-Laham 1999, pp. 47): how to make diverse decision makers (agents) 
act in line with the strategy set by the principal. Here, distributing the decision rights ensures 
that a chosen strategy gets implemented: “strategy-conforming design of incentive and control 
systems.”72 This need to ensure that business strategy gets properly executed has been argued 
to be especially relevant in corporations consisting of multiple business units and emphasizing 
business unit synergies. In contrast, “enterprises consisting of autonomous business units with 
few requirements for synergies across those business units have little, if any, need for IT gov-
ernance” (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 175). 
Some authors see IP governance separate from information strategy in that it sets a frame for 
information strategy (in the sense of being a meta decision: also strategic IP decisions are the 
object of IP governance decisions). Other authors view strategy and governance being two 
overlapping concepts. For example, Weill and Ross (2004, p. 6) state that desirable behaviors 
“embody the beliefs and culture of the organization as defined and enacted through not only 
strategy but also corporate value statements, mission statements, business principles, rituals, 
and structures”. Hence, they view governance decisions as not merely serving strategic deci-
sions, but also normative decisions. At the same time, they state that different market strate-
gies (e.g. a customer intimacy strategy vs. an innovation strategy) require to make IP govern-
ance decisions differently (p. 159). Market strategy influences how the decision rights get 
                                                 
72
 Translated by author: “Die P-A-Theorie kann Beiträge für ein strategisches Management z.B. dann liefern, 
wenn Fragen der Umsetzung von Strategien (Strategieimplementierung) im Mittelpunkt stehen [… es geht dann 
um die] strategiekonforme Gestaltung des Anreiz- und Kontrollsystems” (pp. 47). 
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distributed. When market strategy changes, the distribution of decision rights may have to 
change.  
Beyond ensuring the support of market strategy, the distribution of decision rights and the 
installment of control mechanisms is a trade-off between the ability to extract synergies and 
the flexibility of business units: “A key strategic decision for multi-business unit enterprises is 
how to structure business unit relationships [i.e. to make the decision between …] autonomy 
and synergy across business units […]” (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 170). Centralized decision 
making can ensure that each IP decision which gets made can be checked for its potential to 
extract synergies. However, it may as well represent a burden for making decisions fast and 
for business units to adapt quickly to changes (as argued e.g. in case 6). 
4.3.10.2 Discussion and judgment 
Many arguments of practitioners are backed by literature. We can view the allocation of rights 
and responsibilities for IP decisions to stakeholders as a meta IP decision: it is a decision on 
IP decisions (including strategic IP decisions). For each decision discussed in this chapter one 
can ask who should be involved in making this decision and which mechanisms can help to 
ensure that it is made in a desirable way. Hence, it is not contributing directly to any specific 
market offering (such as introducing a new product). The allocation of decision rights and the 
installment of incentive mechanisms rather have the purpose of ensuring that the required 
resources and capabilities get built and used as discussed in our view of strategy in Section 
4.1 under the label “governance”. We argued that this purpose is part of strategy and hence 
contributes to long-term form performance. Weill and Ross (2004, pp. vii) even write “that IT 
governance is the most important factor in generating business value from IT” by encouraging 
companies to “generate increasingly strategic benefits from IT” (p. viii). 
An argument not found in literature but provided by practitioners is the reduction of complex-
ity. Of course, clear rules reduce uncertainty of responsibility. However this is not necessarily 
a strategic reason. Some governance mechanisms (such as introducing charging mechanisms 
based on the total cost of ownership) may encourage business units to behave in a way that 
avoids building up architectural complexity. One possibility has already been mentioned in 
the IT architecture discussion above (see decision area c).  
The distribution of decision rights and the decision to install certain control mechanisms rep-
resent incentive schemes, which can ensure that other IP decisions are made to build, preserve 
and use potentials needed for strategic market offerings. In this sense, the decisions form part 
of a frame for strategy execution (strategic governance): the decisions are not part of any par-
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ticular strategic action on the market, and also not part of strategy implementation itself, but 
aim to ensure that any decision that is made gets done in order to implement the strategy. 
4.3.11 Sourcing decisions (k) 
Decisions related to the sourcing of IP activities were part of most information strategies in 
our sample. These decisions included the choice of IP activities to hand over to an external 
service provider, the choice of contract type and the contract design, the number of different 
suppliers to use as well as principles of sourcing decisions (such as: “buy before make”). 
The reasons provided for viewing the first decision as strategic was that business strategy has 
to be taken into account when making the sourcing decision: if certain activities are crucial for 
differentiation, they should not be outsourced. If outsourced, they may hamper the differentia-
tion strategy. Furthermore, outsourcing was regarded as a measure to reduce IP costs. The 
number of suppliers was regarded as crucial for a trade-off between the company’s depend-
ency on too few providers vs. the complexity and cost increase of too many providers. Con-
tract design was regarded as critical to avoid the impediment of flexibility by building in 
clauses that ensure that dependency on the provider is kept to a minimum.  
4.3.11.1 Backing in literature 
Few information strategy content proposals from literature (Chapter 2) include references to 
sourcing decisions. In the second conception, the ability to manage external relationships was 
argued to hold the potential of being a source for competitive advantage (Wade and Hulland 
2004). One of these relations between the IT unit and external stakeholders is the relation to 
outsourcing providers. Here, the argument is different from those found in practice: being 
able to better manage the relationship towards the outsourcing provider in comparison to 
competitors may prove to be an advantage because this might result in continued better or less 
costly service provision. 
We find the proposal that guidance on what should be done internally and what by contract as 
well as rules concerning make or buy decisions in information strategy proposals following 
conception 3 (a plan for the whole IP domain) (Smits et al. 1997; Smits and van der Poel 
1996; Wexelblat and Srinivasan 1999). 
In the literature on strategic management, we find the sourcing decision as part of strategy, 
because it affects the vertical integration (and hence the scope) of the company. Many strat-
egy researchers include vertical integration as an explicit part of business strategy (e.g. Hofer 
and Schendel 1978; Porter 1987). This view is simply based on the fact that the level of verti-
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cal integration determines what the business does by itself and what is done by other stake-
holders in the external environment of the company. The decision on which (IP) activities to 
outsource hence fundamentally impacts many other decisions (such as which skills to build, 
where to allocate resources, etc.). 
It is also not surprising to see the argument of cost reduction in practice: cost reduction 
through leveraging the economies of scale (Apte 1990) is the foremost reason to outsource IP 
activities (McLellan et al. 1998). As we argued in Section  3.2.3 (Ad 3: Effects concerned with 
IP cost containment), cost reduction is not a strategic purpose per se. 
We also find support for the argument of practitioners that strategy has to be taken into ac-
count when making the outsourcing decision. Literature also dwells on the strategic signifi-
cance of an activity being a criterion to be considered when making the outsourcing decision. 
The repeatedly emphasized rule of thumb is to not outsource IP activities that can be a source 
of differentiation (Willcocks et al. 1995). Here, business strategy becomes an input for the 
outsourcing decision: it should be avoided to outsource strategically relevant activities. 
We also find outsourcing being discussed from the point of view of two theories relevant for 
strategic management: the RBV and the Resource Dependency Theory (RDT). 
Organizational success in RDT is achieved by organizations through maximizing their power 
(Pfeffer 1981). This is done through minimizing the dependence on other organizations and 
maximizing the dependence of other organizations in the acquisition of resources (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). RDT also posits that firm survival depends on the acquisition of necessary 
resources from the external environment. A strategy is a way to secure access to critical re-
sources, i.e. a way to survive while maintaining power. IP outsourcing might be seen as a way 
to acquire external resources that are needed for firm survival and are not available inside the 
company. However, the RDT emphasizes that IP outsourcing increases a firm’s dependence 
on external organizations (the outsourcing provider). A firm’s dependence on the provider is 
affected by three factors: the importance of the resource to the organization, the number of 
alternative potential suppliers, and the cost of switching suppliers (Grover et al. 1998; Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). Following the RDT, IP outsourcing might become a threat to the com-
pany’s power. This is also expressed in practitioners’ arguments that outsourcing decisions 
are strategic because they are not easily reversible but represent long-term commitments. Fol-
lowing the logic of the RDT, some authors propose to increase the number of suppliers used 
and to introduce constant battling between these rival outsourcing providers in order to keep 
the company flexible and to increase the company’s power (Lacity et al. 1995). Here, the 
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management of supplier relations is emphasized: it has to be ensured that the suppliers act so 
that the company is supplied with the resources and capabilities needed to make the intended 
market offerings. 
Somewhat contrary, other researchers propose ‘strategic’ partnerships with outsourcing pro-
viders (Willcocks and Kern 1998). This recommendation is based on different theories with 
different assumptions than those of the RDT. According to the resource-based view (see 
Chapter 2), IP outsourcing is a strategic IS decision because it can be used to fill gaps in a 
firm’s strategic resources and capabilities (Grover et al. 1998). In this understanding, out-
sourcing is a form of external acquisition of IP resources (i.e. building a potential rather than 
deploying it (Grant 1991)) that might be needed to complement other resources. Although 
these externally acquired resources might not be strategic in themselves (by definition they 
can be transferred from one provider to the firm), they can still complement other resources 
and in this combination form strategic resources. Outsourcing is then an alternative to build-
ing the resources inside the company and it is a measure to remove barriers for constructing 
strategic resources. McLellan et al. (1998, p. 227) find practical support that “outsourcing 
offers an opportunity to use resources beyond those contained in the [company] to increase 
competitive capabilities […].” Here the outsourcing decision helps to make use of capabilities 
of the outsourcing provider which are not present within the company in order to be able to 
support certain market requirements or make certain offerings (McLellan et all 1998, pp. 
230).  
So, in the context of this theory, IP outsourcing is meant to reduce gaps in the firm’s resource 
base that cannot be closed internally and inhibit building strategic potentials. 
4.3.11.2 Discussion and judgment 
As mentioned before already, cost reduction is not a primarily strategic purpose. Even if fol-
lowing a low cost strategy, the decision to outsource certain IP activities is unlikely to yield a 
long-term cost advantage as outsourcing is a measure that is readily available to most compa-
nies. 
The arguments offered by the RDT and RBV provide two different strategic decisions on IP 
outsourcing. One is centered within strategic governance, the other one in the organization of 
resources and capabilities. 
As we stated, strategic governance ensures that the resources required for market offerings are 
built. Among others, the allocation of decision rights and responsibilities above (decision area 
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j) was argued to fall into this category. IP outsourcing now extends the range of governance 
beyond company boundaries to suppliers. Then, governance has to ensure that also external 
service providers deliver the required resources. However, here, it is not the design of each 
outsourcing contract that is the strategic decision, but more the decision to build and apply an 
ability to manage outsourcing relationships continuously.  
The RBV focuses much more on the question of which potentials are required for making 
(competitive) market offerings but are not found within the company and hence have to be 
procured from external providers. Here, the question becomes one of filling capability and 
resource gaps. 
In summary, there are two strategic decisions related to IP outsourcing: Firstly, when out-
sourcing is a vehicle to fill gaps in a firm’s resource base hindering the building of resources 
required for market strategy. Secondly, the governance of the outsourcing relationship in or-
der to ensure that the required resources and capabilities are in fact built by or in cooperation 
with the outsourcing provider. 
4.3.12 Security and continuity plans and policies (l) 
Interviewees also included decisions concerned with maintaining IT security and continuity in 
their information strategies. The prime decision was on which policies to set in order to avoid 
a critical impact on business operations (see reasoning in Section  3.2.3, Ad 6: Decisions that 
aim at avoiding critical impacts on operational security and continuity). In one case, security 
policies were argued to be essential for the company’s ability to integrate and disintegrate 
companies in mergers and acquisitions as well as disinvestments (see reasoning in Section 
 3.2.3, Ad 1: Effects related to business strategy). 
4.3.12.1 Backing in literature 
Security and continuity policies are not found frequently in information strategies following 
any of the conceptions from literature. The few exceptions again lack reasoning: for example, 
“system reliability” is listed in the component of “systemic competencies” (Henderson and 
Venkatraman 1993); Hayward (1987) mentions “security” as part of IT management strategy, 
Lederer and Salmela (1996) include “security” as part of the data and application plan.  
In support of this, IP security researchers recently confirmed that “[t]o date, the literature with 
regard to the formulation of the information security policy has tended to ignore its important 
relationship with the strategic information systems plan, and vice versa.” (Doherty and Ful-
ford 2006, p. 55)  
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4.3.12.2 Discussion and judgment 
Threats to the security or continuity of IP are threats to smooth business operations. Outages 
of IT systems (whether due to a natural or other disaster or due to malevolent technical or 
human intruders) may cause more or less serious negative impacts on the performance of a 
company. In the worst case, companies may cease to exist. Companies that rely heavily on IP 
(i.e. that exhibit a high degree of information intensity (Porter and Millar 1985), such as the 
pure online bank in case 10) are threatened most. However, threats to business operations are 
exactly that: business operations. Of course, functioning operations are a prerequisite for the 
operational delivery of any business strategy, but that does not make them strategic. This is 
also not the case if the probability of the threats is high (as might be the case with virus or 
hacker attacks) or if the possible (financial) impact is high. Other threats (such as the danger 
of a fire breaking out in the warehouse) would also not be regarded as strategic threats; and 
hence, setting fire avoidance or mitigation policies, contracting fire insurances or planning 
measures such as installing fire hoses company-wide would also not be regarded as strategic 
but purely operational.  
In this line of argumentation, security policies have no other (strategic) purpose beyond their 
protective impact on operations. Accordingly, authors have classified IT security related deci-
sions as “operational” (Ross and Weill 2002). Carr (2003) – assuming that IT has no strategic 
relevance – argued that CIOs should inter alia concentrate on operational issues such as conti-
nuity and security management, implying that IT security is not a strategic issue. 
Another impact beyond operations was argued in case 11, building a routinized business ca-
pability to integrate and disintegrate in mergers and disinvestments. As argued in Section 4.1, 
here the ability to keep the IT infrastructure in a secure state despite the fact that new systems 
get included or excluded frequently is a complement of the capability to merge. If a company 
does not possess that complement, it effectively cannot routinely integrate and disintegrate 
companies (because considerable manual and unreliable work needs to be done to secure the 
integrated companies or to be secured from disintegrated companies). Continuing without this 
part of the capability in fact represents another “strategic liability”. Here, the strategic deci-
sion is to build such a capability to merge and disintegrate (including resources and capabili-
ties complementing each other to form the capability). 
In summary, the decision to set IT security and continuity plans per se is not a strategic deci-
sion, even if it may help to shield the company from highly threatening incidents. 
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However, when intended to be a complement in building an organizational capability, such as 
the one to integrate and disintegrate other companies smoothly, the decision on which security 
policies to set gets strategic significance in building potentials.  
* * * 
Many decisions mentioned by practitioners as part of their information strategies can be ar-
gued to serve a strategic purpose, either in meeting market requirements (or supporting to 
make market offerings), building the potentials the company needs to do so or as part of a 
governance system that ensures that the potentials are built and used. This is regardless of 
whether the reasons for viewing the decisions as strategic were provided by practitioners 
themselves or by discussions in literature. 
The next chapter combines the IP decisions argued as strategic from practice with those from 
literature in a comprehensive proposal. 
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5 INFORMATION STRATEGY: THE BIG PICTURE 
The objective of this thesis is to improve the understanding of information strategy with a 
special focus on its content (the strategic IP decisions). This should be achieved by making a 
reasoned proposal for relevant strategic IP decisions. This proposal shall be based on the cur-
rent academic discussion, but also on practitioners’ arguments. To arrive at such a proposal, 
we examined the proposals made in research literature (Chapter 2) and elicited the content 
and reasoning of information strategies in practice (Chapter 3). We then discussed and as-
sessed the reasoning and practical relevance behind information strategy content in research 
and practice based on our understanding of strategy (Chapter 4). 
The result is not only a reasoned list of strategic IP decisions, but also a number of other in-
sights as regards certain characteristics of a relevant proposal for information strategy content. 
First, both researchers and practitioners looked out for structures of information strategy con-
tent (especially in conception 3). We will propose such a structure in Section  5.1.1. We ar-
gued that the proposed structures in research as found in the third conception (information 
strategy as a plan for the IP domain) were not sufficient: while they do provide a structure of 
IP, they do not provide any hints on why the decisions are strategic. The fact that some of 
these proposals link elements of their IP domain structure to a separate element – usually ti-
tled ‘business strategy’ (see Chapter 2) – already indicates that the authors perceive a need to 
justify the strategic relevance of information strategy content. Hence, a structure of the IP 
domain is not sufficient. Besides, elements from the IP domain need to be related to strategic 
purposes. These purposes are not only limited to a company’s market strategy (which market 
offerings shall be made and which resources are immediately needed for these offerings?) as 
we learned from the discussion of conception 1 (information strategy as the use of IT to de-
liver business (in the sense of market) strategy). Strategic purposes also include more generic 
capabilities, which have to be considered in our proposal. We will discuss strategic purposes 
in Section  5.1.2. The discussion of the other conceptions as well as practitioners’ content and 
reasoning provide us with arguments needed to structure both, the IP domain and the strategic 
purposes. 
5.1 WHAT ARE STRATEGIC IP DECISIONS? 
Strategic IP decisions are statements that link IP elements within the IP domain (the decision 
object) to a strategic purpose (the decision purpose). This relation is expressed in Figure 12 
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(which follows the notation of class diagrams according to the Unified Modeling Language, 
UML).  
Decision 
object
Decision 
purpose
IP domain element Strategic purpose
Strategic IP decision
IP domain
IP sub-domain 
(IP decision area)
1..n
n
m
n
 
Figure 12: General structure of information strategy content proposal 
A strategic IP decision represents the link between a decision object from the IP domain 
(which consists of multiple IP domain elements) and a strategic purpose. It is only through 
that link that an IP decision becomes strategic.  
In the following sections, we describe each of the elements of our proposal (the decision ob-
jects and the decision purposes). We also explain how this proposal reflects requirements we 
derived in our discussion of proposals found in literature and practice and how it differs from 
current proposals in academic literature. After discussing each element separately, we turn to 
the overall proposal again and show how those decisions argued as strategic IP decisions from 
the previous chapter are expressed in the proposal. Finally, we summarize the contributions of 
this proposal (and hence of the overall thesis) and discuss its limitations, which may provide 
impetus for future research on the topic. 
5.1.1 The IP domain  
For a (strategic) IP decision, a fundamental question is on which object the decision is making 
a statement. In literature and practice, we came across very different IP elements (such as the 
IP processes, information technologies, IT architecture, applications, etc.). We defined the IP 
domain as the container of all these IP elements. Researchers who follow the third conception 
of information strategy (information strategy as a plan for the IP domain) mainly focused on 
proposing structures of the IP domain, dividing it into sub-domains (and appending each sub-
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domain within this structure with ‘strategy’). Practitioners also looked for structures of deci-
sion objects into decision areas (see Section 4.2.3).  
Hence, a classification of the decision objects involved in strategic IP decisions seems desir-
able in both, research and practice. Such a structure is useful in that it helps to be clear on 
what is being decided on.  
We need a structure that is capable of mapping the decision objects of the strategic IP deci-
sions we found in research and practice. In that respect, any domain structure that covers the 
decision objects of those decisions we identified as being strategically relevant is sufficient, 
given that it fulfills the requirements for meaningful structures (cf. e.g. Gregor 2006, p. 624) 
by being collectively exhaustive (i.e. a comprehensive structure is preferred over a partial 
structure) and mutually exclusive (i.e. the elements of the structure should not overlap).  
We briefly presented our own domain structure already in Chapter 1 in order to be able to talk 
in a more differentiated way about IP elements such as IS and IT. Now we argue for a struc-
ture that fits our purpose, namely to map relevant strategic IP decisions.  
To this end, it is helpful to take a look again at the decision objects (or decision areas) of 
those IP decisions we argued to be strategic (Table 44). 
Sources  IP decision objects and areas identified 
a. Application land-
scaping  
Application landscape and architecture: decisions on the whole set 
of IS (which functionality is needed; how are the IS organized) 
b. Application stan-
dards 
Application architecture: decisions on the variety within the whole 
set of IS 
c. Architectural stan-
dards 
Individual technologies: decisions on whether to adopt a specific 
technology 
IT architecture: decisions on the whole set of technologies (tech-
nologies and variety) 
d. Process standards Decisions on IP activities (how to conduct them) 
e. Portfolio/investment  Project portfolio: decisions on a set of investment requests (mostly 
for applications) (which new ones to fund) 
f. Budget Financial resources: decisions on how much to spend on IP and how 
to allocate the resources 
g. Projects supporting 
market activities 
Decisions on individual IS or technologies (and how they can help 
in market activities) 
h. HR plan/ organiza-
tion of IT unit 
Skills and the organization of the information function 
i. Role of IT unit Decisions on the IT unit (role of the IT unit, which is an organiza-
tional part of the IF) 
j. Rights & account-
ability 
Decision rights and governance mechanisms (who should make 
decisions on IP objects) 
k. Sourcing  Decisions concerning the source of IP elements (where are IP ele-
ments (mostly IP activities) sourced from) 
Practice 
l. Security/continuity  (Mostly not strategic; decisions concerning the security of IP ele-
ments) 
  241 
Conception 1: IS to 
support business strat-
egy 
Decision on individual IS or types of IS that help to deliver business 
strategy 
Conception 2: SIS or 
other strategic re-
sources that help to 
gain and sustain com-
petitive advantage 
Decisions on individual IS (MBV: Strategic Information Systems) 
Decisions on all kinds of IP resources (RBV: information systems, 
technologies, technical skills, managerial and relationship skills etc.) 
Conception 3: Other 
domain structures, e.g. 
the one by Earl (1989) 
Various domain proposals, e.g. Earl (1989): IS, IT, IM 
Conception 4: Func-
tional strategy 
Decisions related to the information function  
Literature 
Conception 5: Tenor 
towards IP 
Choice of role for IP appropriate in order to meet market require-
ments and to manifest this role in principles 
Table 44: IP decision objects and decision areas identified from literature and practice 
In order to start with a broad classification of the IP domain that can cover the decision ob-
jects of strategic IP decisions found in literature and practice, we argue for two main areas of 
IP decision objects (i.e. decision areas or IP sub-domains): IS/IT and IF. IS/IT comprises in-
formation systems (IS) and information technology (IT). Both, IS and IT represent the pre-
requisites needed to conduct any IP-based business initiative. Hence, IS and IT form the pri-
mary decision areas of IP decisions. As mentioned in Chapter 1 already, information technol-
ogy encompasses all kinds of devices and equipment that can be used for handling informa-
tion. This includes hardware (such as computers or printers) and basic software (such as oper-
ating systems or database management systems) as well as communication equipment (net-
work cabling, routers, etc.). IT is independent from solving a specific business problem; 
rather, it can be used to solve a range of business problems (Teubner 2003). IT has to be ap-
plied (in the form of applications) to solve a specific business problem or support the user in a 
specific task. Hence, besides the technology itself we also include the know-how of how to 
apply the technology in applications as part of information technology.  
An application is based on IT, but goes beyond IT in that it also includes the work processes 
that are supported through the technology. Unlike IT itself, an application is geared towards 
solving a specific business problem (such as supporting a certain accounting process). The 
application together with the users of the application who know how to use the application to 
solve their business problem form a socio-technical system, the so called information system 
(IS) (Teubner 2003).  
Hence, although IT and IS are related (IT forms the basis of any IS) and are both prerequisites 
for conducting IP-based business initiatives, they are distinct in that IT is not problem-specific 
but an IS is. This difference has an implication for making decisions on those two objects, 
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such as e.g. investment decisions. Whereas IS might be evaluated through “business cases”, 
technologies usually cannot (e.g. Ross and Beath 2002) (e.g. because a technology may sup-
port a broad range of uses which might be unknown at the time of investment).  
IS and IT form decision areas in which a number of decisions can be made on actual decision 
objects. The decision objects identified in the discussion of strategic IP decisions in Chapter 4 
that concern IT were individual technologies (e.g. RFID, with decisions on whether to adopt a 
certain technology) and sets of technologies (e.g. the IT architecture, with questions of stan-
dardization and organization of the technologies). The decision objects that concern IS were 
also individual IS (e.g. strategic IS that help to change the market structure or support making 
market offerings) and sets of IS (e.g. the application landscape and architecture, with deci-
sions on the standardization of applications). 
Besides these decision objects, we also found decisions being made on the skills of IP person-
nel, on IP-related activities performed by the personnel (such as the development of other IP 
objects, such as IS) as well as on organizational units, such as the IT unit (e.g. its role). In 
contrast to IS and IT, the activities performed and skills owned by organizational staff mem-
bers (e.g. for developing the application system or maintaining hardware components) are not 
directly supporting IP-based business initiatives. We refer to these activities, skills and human 
resources as the information function (IF). Because the IF only indirectly contributes to busi-
ness initiatives (unlike IS/IT it is not ‘used’ within these initiatives) it is considered a secon-
dary IP decision area. Again, this distinction has implications for making decisions on IF-
related objects. Here, we rather find organizational decisions that cannot always be treated as 
investments (e.g. how to judge the decision on the role of the IT unit as an investment?).  
We can map the objects involved in those IP decisions argued to be strategic to one of the two 
(or three, when distinguishing IS and IT) IP decision areas. Table 45 maps the decision areas 
and decision objects found in literature and practice to the proposed decision areas of the IP 
domain (IS, IT and IF). 
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Decision areas and objects in proposed IP domain Sources used 
IS IT IF 
a. Application land-
scaping  
Application land-
scape and architec-
ture: decisions on 
the whole set of IS 
(which functionality 
is needed; how are 
the IS organized) 
  
b. Application stan-
dards 
Application archi-
tecture: decisions on 
the variety in the 
whole set of IS 
  
c. Architectural stan-
dards 
 Individual technolo-
gies: decisions on 
whether to adopt a 
specific technology 
IT architecture: 
decisions on the 
whole set of tech-
nologies (technolo-
gies and variety) 
 
d. Process standards   IP activities: (how to 
conduct them) 
e. Portfolio/investment  Project portfolio: 
decisions on a set of 
IS (which new ones 
to fund) 
Project portfolio: 
decisions on a set of 
IT (which new ones 
to fund) 
 
f. Budget Financial resources: 
Decisions on how 
much to spend on IS 
Financial resources: 
Decisions on how 
much to spend on IT 
Financial resources: 
Decisions on how 
much to spend on the 
IF 
g. Projects supporting 
market activities 
Decisions on indi-
vidual IS 
Decisions on indi-
vidual technologies 
 
h. HR plan/ organiza-
tion of IT unit 
  Skills and the or-
ganization of the IF 
i. Role of IT unit   Decisions on the role 
of the IT unit, which 
is an organizational 
part of the IF 
j. Rights & account-
ability 
Decision rights and 
governance mecha-
nisms: 
Who should make 
decisions on IS? 
Decision rights and 
governance mecha-
nisms: 
Who should make 
decisions on IT? 
Decision rights and 
governance mecha-
nisms: 
Who should make 
decisions on the IF? 
k. Sourcing  Where are IS 
sourced from? 
Where are IT 
sourced from? 
Where are activities 
sourced from? 
Practice 
l. Security/continuity  N/A N/A N/A 
Conception 1: IS to 
support business strat-
egy 
Decision on indi-
vidual IS or types of 
IS 
  Literature 
Conception 2: SIS or 
other strategic re-
Decisions on indi-
vidual IS (MBV, 
Decisions on strate-
gic technology re-
Decisions on IF 
related strategic 
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sources that help to 
gain and sustain com-
petitive advantage 
RBV: Strategic 
Information Sys-
tems) 
sources (RBV) resources (RBV: 
technical skills, 
managerial and rela-
tionship skills etc.) 
Conception 3: Other 
domain structures, e.g. 
the one by Earl (1989) 
e.g. IS sub-domain e.g. IT sub-domain e.g. IM sub-domain 
Conception 4: Func-
tional strategy 
  Decisions related to 
the IF (mission, 
resources, processes, 
organization) 
Conception 5: Tenor 
towards IP 
Principles ensuring 
that IS decisions 
conform to role of 
IP adequate to meet 
market requirements 
Principles ensuring 
that IT decisions 
conform to role of IP 
adequate to meet 
market requirements 
Principles ensuring 
that IF decisions 
conform to role of IP 
adequate to meet 
market requirements 
Table 45: Mapping of decision areas from literature and practice to the proposed IP domain structure 
We see that a number of decision areas and objects from research and practice cannot be 
mapped directly to the decision areas in our proposed IP domain. We discuss how these fit 
into the picture in the following paragraphs.  
Budget related decisions do not concern one decision area or object (systems, technologies, 
activities and skills) individually. Instead, they relate to all of them in that the decision on a 
decision object (e.g. to introduce a certain technology) has financial implications, as well. All 
of the decision objects hence have a financial dimension in that they incur a certain cost. This 
includes the cost for technology licenses (IT), the cost for introducing a new information sys-
tem (IS), as well as the cost for employing or training IP personnel (IF). The sum of the budg-
eted costs of all decision objects is the IP budget. Financial IP-related decisions can be located 
in our domain structure by introducing a financial dimension for each decision area. 
Similarly, decisions on sourcing do not directly concern the decision objects, but the source 
from which the objects should be obtained. The sourcing of activities (the decision of which 
IP activities to outsource) would be related to the information function. The procurement of 
technologies (research and development vs. external sourcing) and information systems (e.g. 
the outsourcing of the whole conduct of processes) would be related to IT and IS respectively 
(where the latter would be a business decision rather than an IP decision). Hence, although 
practitioners focused on the sourcing of activities, we propose to add a sourcing dimension to 
all decision objects besides the financial dimension. 
As stated in the previous chapter, rights and accountability decisions are meta decisions: they 
are decisions on IP decisions. Hence, it is not surprising that they cannot be found as a deci-
sion object themselves in an IP domain structure. For the decisions on the proposed IP ob-
jects, one has to ask who is involved in making the decision. Hence, just as with financial- 
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and sourcing-related decisions, decision rights require the introduction of a new dimension for 
each of our proposed objects. 
With regards to the conceptions found in academic literature, the decision on the tenor to-
wards IP also intends to guide other IS, IT and IF decisions. In this sense, the tenor towards IP 
is also a meta decision on how the decisions on the elements of the IP domain should be made 
and, with regards to strategic decisions, how they should be linked to the strategic purposes. 
Hence, the tenor is a qualifier of the link between the IP domain and the strategic purpose in 
that it determines the mode of decision making (such as aggressive vs. defensive uses of IP 
elements). We argued that the tenor towards IP is only strategic if it is based on market re-
quirements rather than on personal attitude. Then, the tenor (and its manifestation in the form 
of principles, which may be broken down to the different IP sub-domains) is meant to ensure 
that all IP decisions are made to meet the market requirements. Hence, the decision objects of 
the tenor towards IP are all other decisions on IP objects. 
Overall, besides the dimension of the objects themselves, there are several other dimensions: 
financial, sources, and rights. Different decisions are made with regards to the different di-
mensions. For example, decisions on the object dimension are concerned with the object or 
objects themselves. This includes decisions such as “which objects (e.g. technologies) are 
required, how many different ones are needed, how are they related to each other, when 
should they be acquired, how do they develop over time, etc. Decisions on the financial di-
mension include questions such as “how much to spend on the objects”. Decisions on the 
sourcing dimension focus on the source of the object such as “from where to acquire the ob-
ject?” Finally, decisions on the rights dimension refer to “who makes decisions on these ob-
jects?” Hence, in contrast to the proposals of IP domains of strategic IP decisions prevalent in 
literature, we do not propose to assign one type of decision to a certain decision area (as Earl 
(1989) does in assigning the “what” to IS, the “how” to IT, and the “who” to IM). Such a pro-
posal is somewhat misleading in that it excludes a number of decisions from certain areas. 
Our proposal for the IP domain elements and the dimensions of these elements is illustrated in 
Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Proposed structure of the IP domain 
In summary, we find the following decision objects of strategic IP decisions: IS related deci-
sion objects include individual IS (e.g. in the decision of whether a specific IS be built in or-
der to support a market activity) and sets of IS (the application landscape and architecture e.g. 
in decisions on their variety and relations). IT related decision objects also include individual 
technologies (e.g. RFID in the decision of whether to adopt it or not) as well as sets of tech-
nologies (IT architecture, e.g. in decisions on how far to standardize technologies, i.e. make 
the set of technologies homogeneous). IF related decision objects include IP personnel and 
their skills and the activities conducted by them as well as organizational units (such as the IP 
unit) as groupings of these objects. Looking at the financial dimension of the totality of ob-
jects, we might add the IP budget as a decision object as well as the IP investment portfolio 
(although these are derived or aggregated decision objects in the sense that the decision on the 
IP investment portfolio is in fact a decision on one or a combination of the decision objects 
mentioned above). 
5.1.2 Strategic purposes 
We argued that an IP domain structure is not sufficient for a reasoned proposal of information 
strategy content. The structure of the IP domain does not provide any reason for IP decisions 
being strategic. An IP decision (on an IP object) only becomes strategic through linking the 
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object to a strategic purpose in the decision statement. Hence, we also have to look at strategic 
purposes.   
Again, a number of proposals exist for strategic purposes. From literature, conceptions 1 and 
2 suggested that either those decisions that deliver the business (market) strategy or those de-
cisions that help gaining or sustaining an advantage over competitors are strategic. Practitio-
ners alluded to a number of intentions when arguing decisions as strategic (see Section 3.2.3). 
In Section 4.1 we introduced our own understanding of strategy based on current discussions 
in strategic management literature. Here, whether an IP decision is strategic or not is deter-
mined by its purpose or intent (cf. our definition of ‘strategic’ in Chapter 1 and Section 4.1 as 
a deliberate expression of intentions articulated through decisions which are expected to yield 
a significant impact on long-term firm performance). In this understanding, decisions are stra-
tegic if their purpose is to affect long-term firm performance either through market decisions 
(choosing markets, fulfilling market requirements or making market offerings); through build-
ing, maintaining, and organizing the potentials that are required for such a market strategy; or 
through setting up a governance system, which ensures that the desired potentials are built, 
preserved, and used for the intended market activities. 
We already used this proposal in Chapter 4 in the discussion and evaluation of the decisions 
identified from literature and practice. For example, the decision to build an online shopping 
information system is a strategic (IS) decision because it affects the market offerings of a 
company. The decision of which technologies are needed in order to make this market offer-
ing is a strategic (IT) decision because it determines the required resources to make the mar-
ket offering and hence builds a potential for success. The decision to standardize the IT archi-
tecture is a strategic (IT) decision because it fosters the company’s capability to extract syner-
gies from its different businesses, e.g. through making cross-selling offers to a customer and 
providing a common view of the customer to diverse parts of the company. It also protects the 
company’s generic ability to act on the basis of IP by lowering complexity which might be-
come a strategic liability. The distribution of decision rights (e.g. centralizing IT standards 
decisions or project portfolio decisions) is a strategic IP decision because it is intended to en-
courage the behaviors needed to build and preserve the required resources (e.g. a standardized 
architecture) and capabilities (e.g. the ability to extract synergies) and to use them to intro-
duce the market offering (e.g. set incentives for different business units to provide cross-
selling products within the online-shop despite the risk of cannibalizing their existing busi-
nesses to some extent). 
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Table 46 synthesizes the discussion from the previous chapter by mapping the strategic IP 
decisions in each decision area from practice as well as the decision areas found in literature 
to our proposed strategic purposes. 
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Decision area Markets Potentials: Required resources and capabilities and or-
ganization of potentials 
Governance 
a. Application landscap-
ing  
 Which business processes need to be supported by IP (i.e. 
which applications are needed/need to be renovated) to fulfill 
the requirements of markets/to make chosen market offerings? 
(landscape) 
How should the applications be organized (in terms of archi-
tecture)? 
 
b. Application standards  Which applications need to comply to audit standards in order 
to go public? 
 
How far to standardize the applications (processes 
and software) to preserve generic capabilities (e.g. 
the ability to extract synergies from different busi-
ness units) on the one hand and the ability to differ-
entiate from competitors on the other hand? 
c. Architectural standards Which market offerings are 
made possible through leading 
edge technologies? 
Which technologies are needed to make the market offerings? 
How should the technologies be organized (in terms of an IT 
architecture)? 
How far to standardize the technologies to preserve 
generic capabilities (e.g. flexibility endangered by 
complexity) on the one hand and the ability to 
differentiate on the other hand? 
d. Process standards    
How should the IP processes be organized in order to deliver 
the required resources? 
 
e. Portfolio/investment   Which investments need to be made to support the market 
offerings with IP? 
How to ensure that those projects get funding that 
are needed to build or exploit resources and capa-
bilities in market offerings? 
f. Budget  Which financial resources are needed to support the market 
offerings with IP? 
How can we encourage certain business units to 
invest more/less in market offerings? 
g. Projects supporting 
market activities 
Which IP-based market offerings 
are intended? 
  
h. HR plan/org of IT unit  Which IP skills are needed to conduct the IP processes that 
build those IP resources required for the market offerings? 
How to organize IP so that it can support making the market 
offerings? 
 
i. Role of IT unit   How to steer the IT unit (e.g. what is its role) so 
that it builds the required potentials? 
j. Rights & accountabil-
ity 
  Who should be involved in which IP decision to 
encourage building, using and maintain the re-
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quired potentials?  
k. Sourcing  How far do we want to be verti-
cally integrated with regards to 
IP? 
Which resources cannot be built in-house or could be better 
built externally? 
How to steer the external service providers so that 
they builds the required potentials? 
l. Security/continuity   Which security measures contribute to a capability of ‘quick 
connect and disconnect’ required in mergers and disinvest-
ments? 
 
Conception 1  Which IS are needed to support the given business (market) 
strategy? 
 
Conception 2 How can we use IP potentials to 
introduce new market offer-
ings/change the industry struc-
ture? (RBV, MBV) 
Which IP potentials differentiate us from competitors (RBV, 
dynamic capability view) to provide competitive advantage? 
 
 
Conception 3 N/A N/A Few authors: how to keep IP under control to pre-
serve the generic IP capability? 
Conception 4  How to organize the information function?  
Conception 5   Which tenor towards IP is appropriate to fulfill 
market requirements/make the intended market 
offerings and which principles can ensure that this 
choice gets manifested in all IP decisions? (tenor, 
principles) 
Table 46: Mapping of decision areas from literature and practice to the proposed strategic purposes 
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What becomes evident is that most decisions from practice focus on building and organizing 
IP potentials as well as governing the organization to encourage building, using, and preserv-
ing IP potentials. Only few decisions concern using potentials on the market. An explanation 
may lie in our sample of practitioners. These IT executives may be made responsible rather 
for the supply of potentials than for their actual use on the market. 
Beyond those decisions from practice, we also mapped decisions implied or proposed in the 
conceptions of information strategy found in research literature to the strategic purposes in 
Table 46. The decisions highlighted by the first conceptions focus on the provision of IS (an 
IP resource) to support a given business strategy. If we interpret business strategy in this case 
as the market strategy (see Section 4.2), then these decisions serve the purpose of building IP 
potentials to support market offerings. 
The decisions emphasized in the second conception focus on searching for ways to use IP to 
change the market structure (the MBV) or to supply resources that can be used in a way to 
differentiate the market offerings from competitors’ (RBV). 
Decision areas from the third conception can hardly be mapped to our strategic purposes be-
cause the supplied reasons for viewing them as strategic were scarce. As argued above, the 
focus of proposals following this conception is more on the IP domain than on the strategic 
purpose. The few authors providing reasons looked at keeping IP under control (e.g. Hayward 
1987; Lucas and Turner 1982), hinting at decisions that aim at preserving a generic IP capa-
bility (see the discussion on IP complexity in Chapter 4 and in Section 3.2.3, Ad 4: Decisions 
that affect the company’s flexibility). 
The fourth conception focused on functional and departmental decisions which may be attrib-
uted to the purpose of organizing IP potentials (functional resources such as staff, skills, 
money, etc.) in order to fulfill the requirements imposed by the intended market strategy. This 
argumentation would be in-line with the original logic of functional strategy: making decision 
on the departmental level in order to fulfill the requirements set by business unit (market) 
strategy. 
The fifth conception emphasized the choice of the tenor towards IP and on principles that help 
to embody this tenor in all other IP decisions. We stated that this is a normative decision if it 
is based on personal attitude. It becomes a strategic decision if it is intended to make decision 
comply to market requirements. Then the tenor is part of strategic governance that ensures 
that decisions and activities are made in-line with market requirements.   
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5.1.3 Strategic IP decisions  
Strategic IP decisions link IP elements (as decision objects) and strategic purposes (the deci-
sion’s purposes) in decision statements. From the proposals for IP elements and strategic pur-
poses made separately in the previous two sections, we can combine both to arrive at strategic 
IP decisions. These are presented in Table 47. 
Strategic purposes IP decision areas (deci-
sion objects) Markets Potentials Governance 
IS 
(individual IS, applica-
tion landscape and ar-
chitecture) 
 
Which IP-based market 
offerings do we intend? 
How can we affect the 
market and competition 
with IS (SIS)? 
 
Which applications are 
needed to make the in-
tended market offer-
ings/meet the require-
ments of markets in-
tended to serve (land-
scape)? 
How do the applications 
need to be organized 
(architecture)? 
How far to standardize 
the applications to pre-
serve generic capabili-
ties? 
IT 
(individual technologies 
and IT architecture) 
How can leading edge 
technologies help to pro-
vide new market offer-
ings? 
Which technologies are 
needed to fulfill market 
requirements?  
How do they need to be 
organized (IT architec-
ture)? 
How far to standardize 
the technologies to pre-
serve generic capabili-
ties? 
IF 
(skills, activities and 
personnel) 
How can we differentiate 
ourselves from competi-
tors on the market 
through IP skills, activi-
ties, or relations between 
IP and non-IP personnel? 
Which IP skills, IP proc-
esses and organization of 
these is needed in order to 
build the potentials? 
 
 
Financial dimension 
(budget for and invest-
ment portfolio of objects) 
 Which investments need 
to be made to make the 
market offerings? 
Which financial resources 
are needed in order to 
build the potentials? 
How can we ensure that 
those projects get funding 
that are needed to build or 
exploit resources and 
capabilities in market 
strategies? 
Governance dimension 
(decision rights for ob-
jects) 
  Who should be involved 
in making IP decisions so 
that it is ensured that the 
potentials are built, pre-
served and used?  
Which tenor, principles 
and mechanisms help to 
achieve this? 
Sourcing dimension 
(source of objects) 
How far should we inte-
grate vertically with re-
gards to IP? 
Which IP activities do we 
require externally in order 
to build the required re-
sources? 
How to steer the external 
service providers so that 
they build the required 
potentials? 
Table 47: Strategic IP decisions linking IP decision objects and strategic purposes 
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Going through the matrix, we would like to point out two ways of reading it, which empha-
sizes the interrelatedness of the individual IP decisions. These interrelations may provide sug-
gestions for paths for making coherent strategic IP decisions.  
Row-wise reading (i.e. by IP decision areas) is based on the logic underlying the strategic 
purposes. For example, in the area of IT, a planner might start by asking which market activi-
ties involve the support of technology. A decision here has implications for the IT resources 
(potentials) needed. For example, it might be that a new technology is required and needs to 
be adopted. In turn, governance decisions may have to be adjusted in order to incentivize the 
company-wide introduction of this technology (e.g. if a single business unit had to bear the 
financial burden for building up all R&D capabilities required to introduce the new technol-
ogy, this investment would probably never be made). Besides, negative repercussions on 
other capabilities would have to be taken into account by the planner: incentivizing business 
units to explore new technologies might again lead to a proliferation of new technologies be-
ing employed within the company resulting in a dramatic increase of complexity. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, complexity might act as a strategic liability and stymie the company’s 
generic ability to act with the use of IT and its flexibility in connecting technologies smoothly 
in reaction to changed market requirements.  
Column-wise reading (i.e. by strategic purpose) is based on the logic underlying the IP do-
main structure. For example, starting on the IS row, if new applications are required to make 
an intended market offering mentioned above, the planner would also have to decide whether 
these new applications require new technologies, because applications are based on technolo-
gies. In turn, regarding the IF, skills of IP personnel would have to be built up, or external 
help would have to be sought (sourcing). Eventually, all these decisions would have to be 
considered in the decision on how much to spend on IP. 
These paths may be used by planners to arrive at a comprehensive and coherent information 
strategy. They emphasize that strategic IP decisions are interdependent (in at least two ways) 
and cannot only be regarded in isolation. 
5.2 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
In this thesis, we elaborated a reasoned and relevant proposal for the content of information 
strategy. We did so on the basis of proposals of information strategy content in research litera-
ture and in practice. We found that academic proposals from literature cannot fully explain 
practitioners’ views on information strategy content but still provide partial explanations for 
certain IP decisions being of strategic relevance. On the other hand, not all arguments pro-
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vided by practitioners are backed by theoretical discussions on strategy. Based on an under-
standing of strategy grounded in strategic management thinking, we made a proposal for in-
formation strategy content. Following this proposal, strategic IP decisions link decision ob-
jects within the IP domain to strategic purposes in decision statements. The previous section 
demonstrated that these parts of our proposal are both reasoned and practically relevant. They 
are reasoned in the sense of being grounded in strategic purposes derived from current discus-
sions in strategic management thinking. They are practically relevant in a sense that they are 
based the discussion of information strategies found in practice. We also demonstrated that 
the model is able to integrate the different existing proposals found in research literature 
which either focused on the IP domain (conception 3) or parts of the domain (conception 4), 
or on selected strategic purposes (conceptions 1 and 2). 
In this way, the thesis has made a number of contributions upon which further research can 
build. However, it also exhibits limitations that have to be taken into account. This section 
will discuss these contributions and limitations. 
5.2.1 Contributions of this work and outlook on further research 
Our work contributes to research and practice in several ways. It is the first attempt to provide 
a step towards a comprehensive reasoned and practically relevant proposal for the content of 
information strategy that goes beyond a structure of the IP domain and also beyond a singular 
understanding of strategic purposes (e.g. competitive advantage). The proposal adds to a bet-
ter understanding of information strategy and its content (e.g. by providing a framework for 
the interpretation of extant research literature) which is a prerequisite for further research in 
SIP in general and the process of strategic information planning in particular. As we argued in 
Chapter 1, sound research on the SIP process requires a better understanding of the informa-
tion strategy content. For example, an implication for strategic IP planning is that the planning 
effort has to take different dependencies into account. These dependencies might also repre-
sent tensions among elements. For example, our cases have shown that there might be ten-
sions between building those potentials needed to conduct a certain market offering and pre-
serving higher level generic capabilities, such as flexibility or the general ability of the com-
pany to act with the help of IP. These tensions require trade-offs and prioritizations when 
making strategic IP decisions. An important aspect of SIP would hence be to make these ten-
sions among the capabilities explicit and provide a basis for weighing the arguments e.g. be-
tween hampering flexibility and introducing a new application that is needed for a newly in-
troduced product. In that sense, one of the goals of SIP might lie in uncovering the side-
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impacts caused by strategic IP decisions. Rather than focusing on isolated (and mostly posi-
tive impacts such as competitive advantage), SIP research would contribute by also looking at 
negative side-effects and how to avoid them. Besides being a relatively untreated field of re-
search (cf. Arend 2004), this research would be relevant to IT executives.  
The thesis has also challenged commonly held orthodoxies about strategic IP decisions and 
information strategy. Information strategy, for example, is sometimes classified as a func-
tional strategy; our research makes clear the implications of such a classification. It also 
points out that in practice, strategic IP decisions are made on multiple organizational levels 
and do not only concern functional decision objects. Another common assumption is that all 
IP decisions have to be “aligned with business strategy” or that competitive advantage or 
positive impact were the sole focus of strategic IP decisions. Based on a clearer understanding 
of what we mean by “business strategy” when we talk about aligning information strategy and 
business strategy, we find indications that certain parts of business strategy might have to be 
countered in order to support others. The connection between IP and long-term firm perform-
ance hence might be more complex than assumed. The debunking of some unchallenged as-
sumptions as well as breaking open the black boxes of information strategy and business strat-
egy might constitute an important first step in the rethinking of current research agendas. 
Practitioners might use the results to check their own information strategy content against. 
Our proposal could be used carefully as a ‘checklist’ for practitioners. At least, it can serve as 
a framework that guides information strategy planners. IT executives might find the list 
stimulating for asking themselves whether there are good reasons for not thinking about cer-
tain decisions or for only focusing on certain strategic purposes. It might help them to identify 
dependencies between strategic IP decisions that might go unnoticed otherwise. 
5.2.2 Limitations 
Besides the contributions, our proposal also has limitations that have to be taken into account 
when using it either in practice or for further research.  
With respect to our methodology, we conducted exploratory interviews to elicit strategic IP 
decisions from practitioners from various types of industries. This approach was useful for 
obtaining a broad spectrum of views on information strategy. However, it created a sample 
that restricts generalizability. We cannot ensure that our proposal is exhaustive. While we can 
claim it to be comprehensive in the sense of being based on an extensive literature review and 
discussions with diverse information strategy planners, we cannot assert that it contains every 
conceivable strategic IP decision. Extending the sample size might help to some extend to 
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mitigate this limitation, but would still not guarantee an exhaustive or all-inclusive proposal. 
One reason for this is that currently there is no firm notion of contingencies that might influ-
ence the content of information strategy: not all decisions might be of strategic relevance for 
all companies in all situations. This is at least indicated by the differences among our cases 
with regards to information strategy content. Some of these potential contingencies were 
touched upon in our discussions in Chapter 4: for example the turbulence of the company’s 
environment might have an influence on whether generic capabilities play a bigger role within 
the information strategy. The diversity and autonomy of the businesses covered by a multi-
business unit corporation might influence whether issues such as standardization are regarded 
as important. Finally, normative issues such as the personal attitude towards IP could deter-
mine whether there is a direct contribution of IP to market offerings or not. Practitioners 
would certainly value recommendations on which decisions to focus on in which situation. 
Additional research on contingencies of information strategy content will help to close this 
gap and also provide an explanation for the differences between the cases with regards to the 
content of information strategy. 
One potentially missing component from our proposal is information as a resource itself. Al-
though mentioned only once in the literature on information strategy (in Earl’s last extension 
to his model, adding the ‘Information Resource (IR)’ to his previous IS, IT and IM parts), we 
find some calls in the broader literature to focus more on information itself rather than on the 
systems and technology that process it (e.g. in the call for “Putting the I in IT” (Davenport 
2000)). However, on the one hand, practitioners did not mention information as a resource at 
all. Again, this might be due to characteristics of our sample consisting of IT executives (al-
though we asked them for strategic IP decisions being made by others). This at least opens the 
questions of the practical strategic relevance of decisions concerned with information as a 
resource. On the other hand, we would at least have to discuss whether information is really 
part of the IP domain (which is often naturally assumed; however the business processes that 
make use of information systems are also not part of the IP domain). Here, we would have to 
be very clear in the demarcation of the IP domain vis-à-vis the rest of the business.  
In addition, all of our interviewees were IT executives. We obviously cannot claim that we 
would have obtained the same results had we interviewed business executives who are re-
sponsible for information strategy. This limitation was mitigated to some extent through the 
expert interviews. Two of the experts were board members also responsible for business func-
tions. 
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Another limitation inherent in our sample is its restriction to interviewees from German-
speaking countries. We cannot guarantee that the same results would be generated in other 
countries. To get a quick idea of this, we undertook one interview in the Netherlands and one 
in Ireland. The results from these interviews have not been included in this thesis. However, 
we did not detect any crucial differences among these interviews and the ones presented in 
Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, we did not include any hard measure of whether planning an information strat-
egy in the comprehensive way proposed in the thesis really leads to desirable firm perform-
ance. The interviewees were experienced practitioners who had presented their information 
strategies to peers and gotten the sign-off from their companies to do so. Hence, we can infer 
that they themselves as well as their companies think that the information strategy was suc-
cessful. However, there is a difference between an information strategy that is thought to be 
successful and an information strategy that is in fact successful. We concentrated solely on 
formulated strategies rather than on implemented strategies. We expect a number of obstacles 
to lie between a formulated information strategy and a realized information strategy; impedi-
ments that might even keep a brilliantly formulated information strategy from having a suc-
cessful impact.  
Finally, we conducted the interviews at one point in time rather than in a longitudinal fashion. 
This was mitigated to some extent by asking practitioners about whether their information 
strategies had changed significantly in the past. However, this is no substitute for observing 
the change of information strategy agendas over time and being able to link those changes to 
events. We had to make a trade-off in terms of the time required and the number of diverse 
impressions from different executives though. 
* * * 
While our proposal has limitations, and we cannot claim our proposal to be exhaustive in 
terms of having identified every conceivable strategic IP decision, it could nonetheless serve 
as a framework, which can be used for identifying strategic IP decisions. Our proposal pro-
vides a starting point for thinking creatively about strategic IP decisions. 
We hope that through the contributions as well as the limitations of this research, we have 
renewed researchers’ interest in information strategy content. Although the field has been the 
object of research for some time now, many questions remain unanswered. While we hope 
that this thesis has answered or provided the grounds for answering some of these questions, 
we are sure that has also generated many more for future research in this exciting and highly 
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relevant field. 
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APPENDIX 
A. E-MAIL REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY 
Dear Mr. <name of requested individual>, 
On various conferences’ web pages (e.g. <name of conference>), I learned that you have 
given a number of presentations in the context of IT strategy. 
I am currently working on my PhD thesis on “IT Strategy in Practice” at the University of 
Muenster (Prof. Dr. Stefan Klein), Germany. 
After having completed a literature analysis and initial publications, I have already discussed 
this topic with a number of CIOs and heads of IT strategy departments in different companies. 
Due to your above-mentioned presentations and your position as Head of IT Strategy at <or-
ganization’s name>, it would be great to be able to discuss which IT decisions are strategic in 
your company and why. The discussion should take around 90 minutes and does not require 
any preparation on your side. 
 
I would truly appreciate your response. 
With kind regards, 
Martin Mocker 
--- 
Martin Mocker  
Research Group on Strategic Information Management  
Department of Information Systems  
University of Muenster  
Leonardo-Campus 3  
48149 Muenster  
Germany 
Phone: +49 (0)251 - 8338 114  
Fax: +49 (0)251 - 8338 119  
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B. SHORT DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEWED COMPANIES 
The following sections give a brief overview of the companies in which we conducted the 
interviews. All figures refer to the reporting year 2004 if not stated otherwise. The interviews 
were conducted in 2005/2006. 
Case 1 
The company in case 1 is an insurance group with a total premium income of around 2 billion 
EUR. The group offers all types of insurances (ranging from accident insurance, auto insur-
ance, legal protection insurance, health and life insurance) and selected investment products 
(mainly funds-based products). Products are sold to the roughly 3 million private customers 
via 2,200 agencies in Germany which are supported and directed by the corporate headquarter 
consisting of 2,800 employees. The company consists of four subsidiary but legally separate 
entities for life insurance, health insurance, legal insurance and pension funds.  
As reported by the interviewee, the company was doing well and did not feel any cost pres-
sures. 
The IT department is a sub-unit of the unit “Accounting and IT”, which is located beneath the 
board. The staff-unit “IT strategy” is located within the sub-department “IT infrastructure”. 
The interviewee is the head of the staff unit “IT strategy” consisting of another full-time staff 
member.  
Case 2 
The second company we interviewed was also an insurance company with approximately 
1 billion EUR premium income. The company serves private and corporate customers within 
a region of Germany. Other (sister) companies – all of them organized under a central holding 
company employing about 3,500 employees – serve other regions of Germany. The products 
within that region (accident and indemnity insurance) are sold via 500 own agencies and 
1,500 agencies of an affiliated bank. The company also takes care of all the group-wide bene-
fits processing for life insurances. 
The four IT departments report directly to a board member responsible for IT. One of these 
departments is “IT Development”. We interviewed the head of this department.  
When we conducted the interview, the company was considering to merge the IT unit with 
another IT unit of the affiliated bank. However, we discussed the information strategy before 
these considerations due to confidentiality reasons. 
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Case 3 
The third case company is a health service group consisting of three business units, together 
generating a revenue of around 4 billion EUR. The company is active globally in more than 
100 countries. These units develops and sells medical equipment used by medical doctors and 
hospitals for the treatment of certain diseases and offers accompanying services (such as 
monitoring of patients). Furthermore, it manages hospitals itself. 
The IT unit was run as a profit center and headed by a CEO who was the CIO of the whole 
group reporting directly to the group’s board at the same time. We interviewed this person.  
The company was targeting a tremendous growth (today, it has almost doubled its revenue) 
through acquisitions but also through organic growth.  
Case 4 
The fourth case organization is a public, supra-national public administrative body, which is 
responsible for currency-related services such as statistical analyses and money transactions. 
The institution is headed by politically elected members of the board and consists of several 
directorates, directly reporting to the board. One of these directorates is the IT unit. Overall 
the company employs around 2,000 staff members, 200 of them within the IT unit. 
We interviewed the director of the IT unit. He reported that the institution – which was 
founded only a decade ago – had undergone turbulent times in which it had to build up its 
service offerings. When we conducted the interviews, the company had moved into more sta-
ble operations. 
Case 5 
This company (headquartered in Germany) is a global telecommunication corporation, offer-
ing fixed-line, mobile and data services through three separate business units. A fourth busi-
ness unit is a full-service IT provider that also serves the other business units. The whole 
group generated revenues of approximately 50 billion EUR with around 240,000 employees. 
We interviewed the Vice President of Corporate IT Management, a staff unit of 20 employees 
located in the corporate center. 
The company was reported to be constantly undergoing restructurings. When we conducted 
the interview, the allocation of responsibilities for IP decisions was under reconsideration. 
Case 6 
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In the sixth case, we interviewed at a private Swiss investment bank, which formed part of a 
large banking group. It had roughly 24 billion EUR assets under management and 700 em-
ployees (the group employs 60,000 staff members). 
We interviewed the director of the IT department who was two reporting levels beneath the 
board. The company was reported to expand massively, especially by opening up or acquiring 
new regional offices. 
Case 7 
In case 7, we interviewed at a unit within a global logistics group. The group offers delivery 
of mail, packages as well as financial services. The unit itself is responsible for delivering 
mail world-wide (but not within Germany, although the headquarters are there) and generated 
revenues of 17 billion EUR. It is organized by regions. The regional offices operate within 
their countries, but also report to the corporate center.  
Our interview partner was the head of IT, a unit within the corporate office. The CIO’s in the 
regional offices reported to their regional CEO as well as to our interview partner. 
Case 8 
The eighth case company is a German universal bank offering all sorts of financial services to 
private and corporate customers including payments, credits, asset management and invest-
ment banking. The bank was organized into four divisions, “Private and business customers”, 
“Wealth management”, “Corporate and commercial property customers” as well as “Markets 
and Investmentbanking”. It had a credit volume of 320 billion EUR. IT had around 25,000 
employees and more than 700 offices. 
The bank has a central IT unit that serves the divisions. Our interview partner was the deputy 
head of IT strategy, located within the corporate center of the bank.  
At the point of time of the interview, the bank was in the midst of being acquired by another 
banking group. However, we discussed the information strategy before the acquisition. 
Case 9 
In case 9, we interviewed at a German public ground transportation group. The group em-
ploys more than 200,000 staff members. The group contains three business areas, passenger 
transportation, cargo, and transportation infrastructure. The IT services are provided to these 
business areas by an internal IT service provider with around 2,000 employees. 
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We interviewed the head of “IT strategy”, a staff unit located in the corporate center of the 
group. When we conducted the interview, the group was about to be privatized and aimed at 
going public on the stock exchange. 
Case 10 
The tenth case company was a German retail bank that has a pure-online business model. 
Customers can only interact with the company through the internet, the phone or via mail. 
There are no branch offices. The company’s credit volume was 48 million EUR. The whole 
company employed no more than 20 people. All operational business processes (including 
payment services, printing, etc.) were outsourced to external service providers. The employ-
ees concentrated fully on product design and management tasks (including provider manage-
ment). 
The IT unit consisted of two employees. Also with regards to IP, almost all processes were 
outsourced to external service providers. The two employees were concerned with managing 
the external providers and advising the other employees responsible for banking products in 
terms of IP. We interviewed the head of the IT unit. 
Case 11 
In case 11, we interviewed at an aviation group that generated 23 billion EUR revenues. The 
company employed around 90,000 staff members. Most of them work within one of the five 
main business units: passenger transportation, cargo logistics, catering, maintenance of air-
crafts as well as IT services. IT services are provided by a business unit which also serves as 
the central IT unit to the other business units. Besides, each business unit has its own decen-
tral IT units, as well. 
We interviewed the head of IT strategy located in the corporate center of the group. The group 
was reportedly run in a very decentralized fashion, providing autonomy to the business units. 
However, the interviewee also stated that the entrance of low-cost carriers into the market 
increased the pressure on the company to find synergies. 
Case 12 
The twelfth case company was a bank specialized in providing home loans to customers in 
Germany who want to build a house. The deposits made by these customers accrued to 
1.4 billion EUR. As a separate legal entity, the bank formed part of a large banking group.  
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Our interview partner was the CIO who was at the same time the Chief Process Officer re-
sponsible for business process organization. He reported directly to the CEO of the bank. The 
company had won several IT-related awards on practitioner conferences. 
Case 13 
The last interview was conducted at a ceramics manufacturer with revenues of about 1 billion 
EUR and employing around 10,000 staff members. The company consists of several business 
areas focusing on different application areas of ceramics: tableware, tiles, kitchen and bath-
room. The business areas were not organized as separate legal entities. 
The company had a central IT unit serving the business areas as a main functional department. 
Our interview partner was the head of this IT unit who held the title of CIO. He reported to 
the Chief Financial Officer of the company. Reportedly, when the CIO entered the company, 
the IT unit was in bad shape and about to be fully outsourced. The CIO reported that he had 
recently been able to turn this situation around. 
C. INTERVIEW GUIDE USED IN STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Guiding question: Are those decision areas identified in literature regarded as strategic or not? 
Why or why not? 
Part of interview Questions to ask 
Transition to structured 
interview  
 
 
I think that I now have a better understanding of those IT deci-
sions that are strategic in your company. What I am also interested 
in: in many companies, literature for project management, soft-
ware engineering, etc. is used. Do you use any books, journals or 
magazines for developing your IT strategy? 
In this literature, a number of decision areas are thought of as be-
ing strategic, although there is no final consensus. Nevertheless, I 
would like to understand how you deal with these decision areas 
in your company. 
For each decision area, 
check, whether it is plan-
ned strategically and why 
or why not 
Is this decision are strategically relevant in your company? If not, 
why not? What decisions are made with respect to this topic? 
Who is involved in making the decisions? Is it documented? 
How? 
You did not mention these decisions in our first part of the inter-
view? Is there a reason fort his? 
As I said, these decisions are regarded as strategic. If not caring 
about these decisions, researchers would expect a number of prob-
lems to occur. Do you agree and how does it show up? (Aiming at 
reasoning) 
Check whether there is a 
business strategy and 
Are you familiar with your company’s business strategy? Is it do-
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whether it is known cumented? How is your IT strategy linked to business strategy? 
Role of IT 
Role of IT unit 
Mission of IT unit 
Lack of consideration might 
lead to missing guidance, no 
“alignment” 
Budget for IT spending Overspending, underspending, 
missing prioritization, lack of 
incentive 
IT security policies Inadequate security policies 
(too rigid, too lax), not aligned 
to business strategy 
IT architecture (models, blue-
prints defining how IT compo-
nents are connected; technology 
standards) 
No ‘strategic’ platform, lack of 
flexibility, agility, complex 
technology architecture, high IP 
costs  
Application portfolio  Unclear priorities, priorities not 
in-line with business strategy 
Strategic Information systems 
(to gain competitive advantage) 
Company lags behind competi-
tion 
Strategic IT resourced (to gain 
competitive advantage) 
Company lags behind competi-
tion 
IS architecture (plan for appli-
cations and how applications 
work together) 
Wrong processes supported, 
overlaps, no synergies 
Information model Redundancy, inconsistency 
Service catalog Intransparency 
Organization of IT function (is 
there an IT unit, multiple IT 
units, structure of IT unit, etc.) 
Unclear responsibilities,  
Skills of IT personnel Inadequate skills, required IP 
services cannot be delivered 
Sourcing Problems in delivering IT ser-
vices 
IT governance (allocation of 
decision rights and incentive 
mechanisms) 
Decisions not made in desired 
way 
Decision areas proposed 
in literature and reasons 
for potential problems, 
when not considered 
IT processes Required IP services cannot be 
delivered 
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D. INTERVIEW GUIDE USED IN EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
Guiding question: answering the question why practice deviates from those decision areas and 
reasonings proposed in research literature.  
Introduction to expert: I deal in my thesis with the content of IT strategy (or information strat-
egy as it is also called in research). The question is which IT decisions are strategic and why. I 
am interested in intentional decisions, not in a-posteriori reconstructed patterns.  
I collected those decisions considered as strategic in literature and also in practice and I found 
some differences. I would like to discuss these differences with you today and get your view 
on whether the theoretical reasons provided in literature really do not apply or what else keeps 
practitioners from applying them. I am talking to you because you are an executive in practice 
and you also know the academic perspective very well. Hence, I would like to talk about your 
overall experience as an expert on the topic, not so much in your role within your company. 
The broad topics discussed were structured by the conceptions found in literature: 
Conception 1: Use of IT to deliver business strategy: practitioners do not only support busi-
ness strategy, but also “deliberately dis-align” with business strategy. They consider informa-
tion strategy as a separate strategy rather than part of business strategy. 
Conception 2: Use of IT to gain competitive advantage: practitioners do not consider competi-
tive advantage. Discuss MBV/RBV/DCV theories. 
Conception 3: Plan for the whole IP domain: not discussed (due to lack of reasoning) 
Conception 4: Functional strategy: practitioners do not view it as functional strategy on de-
partmental level only. Discuss functional strategy logic. 
Conception 5: Tenor towards IP: the tenor is considered only as a normative, implicit deci-
sion, not as an intentional decision. Principles are used instead. 
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